Civil-Military Relations: Heed the Timely Message

[kurup]

The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh addressing the Combined Commanders’-in-Chief Conference, in New Delhi on November 22, 2013.


Concluding his recent address to the annual combined commanders conference during which he listed some serious challenges facing not just the armed forces but the entire national security structure of the country, the prime minister concluded by saying — “There have been concerns that have been raised in recent times about the nature of civil-military relations in our country. Let me assert… that the political leadership of India has the highest faith in its military and its institutional rectitude within the democratic framework. The apolitical nature of our military and its proven professionalism are the envy of the world and have also nurtured the Indian democratic experience….”

What prompted this assertion after 66 years of magnificent service by the Indian armed forces remains a matter of conjecture. The temptation to jump to the obvious conclusion that this was a fallout of the recent episode of an erstwhile army chief’s brief spat with the government over his age would be doing injustice to the deeper ramifications of the prime minister’s message to the military commanders, the ministry of defence and the nation’s democratic institutions.

Addressing the same conference last year, the prime minister had emphasized that various challenges would require confronting issues of jointness and constructive debate to develop composite capabilities. Enjoining on the MoD to develop synergies, he had cautioned that compartmentalized views would delay India’s response and dilute its impact. That he was addressing the entire national security edifice was clear when he referred to the task forces led by Naresh Chandra (security structures and decision-making processes) and Ravindra Gupta (defence modernization and self-reliance), respectively. He specifically observed that these task forces had made a number of valid suggestions and that it was in India’s interest to reach a consensus on their recommendations. Coming as it did from the highest executive, this had generated hope not just amongst the military commanders but across the security community. The government, it seemed, was prepared to initiate defence management reforms.

A year later, when the prime minister rose to address the commanders, once again, he would have been conscious of the fact that his earlier advice on evolving consensus on the recommendations of the two committees had met with little success. He would also have been aware that the reasons for this stagnation do not rest at the doors of the uniformed fraternity only. The Kargil Review Committee opined that the “political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo.”

It is hardly surprising that this year, while emphasizing the need to develop comprehensive national power, the prime minister drew attention of both the MoD and the armed forces to the twin tasks of making tangible progress in establishing the right structures for higher defence management and the appropriate civil-military balance in decision-making that the complex security environment demands. He further touched upon reviewing the different task force reports that the government had initiated to achieve a higher index of indigenous capability in defence production.

That the prime minister was compelled to repeat his earlier plea is indeed a poor reflection on national security governance. The real reason behind the prime minister raising the issue of civil-military relations lies in his concern that those within the system favouring status quo are now winning. By showing faith in the military, he was perhaps attempting to apply a healing touch to the frustration that is evident within the military establishment.

The prime minister and the defence minister expressed serious concern over the spate of incidents of indiscipline in some army units. The army was reminded that the educational and social background of the jawans have changed and that there was a need for sensitizing officers. Whilst these are valid observations, we would be deluding ourselves if we were to believe that the problem is that simple.

There are many issues that lead to considerable stress in the domain of civil- military relations. Suicide in the armed forces has shown a frightening rise. Yet, when one such incident was brought up in Parliament, a discussion was shelved on the pretext that it would be detrimental to morale. Which self-respecting democracy would respond as supinely as we did to the desecration of bodies of soldiers defending the borders? The list is indeed long.

In a paper titled “Absent Dialogue”, Anit Mukherjee, a former army officer and a research scholar, outlines three characteristics of civil-military relations in India. The first is the strong administrative, procedural and bureaucratic control that is exercized by the MoD over the armed forces. The second is the exclusion of the military from crucial decision-making fora, thus denying it a legitimate role in policy-making. Finally, as a consequence of these, armed forces are left to their own devices in areas of threat assessments, operations, force structures, training and, to a limited degree, in promotions and postings. He concludes that this structure of civil-military relations loosely translates into a system where, according to the noted strategic thinker, K. Subrahmanyam, politicians enjoy power without responsibility, bureaucrats wield power without accountability, and the military assumes responsibility without direction.

The reality is that with the changing socio-economic profile of India’s population, the rising aspirations of the people and the arrival of the information age with free and instant flow of information, the entire approach to managing the armed forces must change. Whilst the onus of how this must evolve within the military training and social domains rests squarely within the armed forces, it can never be achieved without a similar change in the way national security is organized and managed in the larger context of civil military relations.

Strained civil-military relations are resulting in turf wars that prevent the military from working towards integrated warfare. This state of affairs is incompatible not only in the context of the modern battlefield but equally in the context of the current economic slow down. Coming as this does in the face of alarming reports of stagnant modernization and depleting force levels, the armed forces are now faced with a double shock: severe internal stresses coupled with poor equipment in the face of dynamic external threats.

The military is the most complex of democratic institutions because in its heart it continues to believe that its commitment to the nation is the only honourable thing to do. It is the sacred duty of every democratic institution to remember that the day this institution begins to have second thoughts on the fairness of the cause of its commitment, India’s survival itself will be in jeopardy.

True civil-military relations are about rebuilding and balancing trust under the overarching umbrella of political control over the military. If indeed this was the underlying message of the prime minister to the wider national security audience, it was more than timely.

Civil-Military Relations: Heed the Timely Message » Indian Defence Review

 

[Indo-guy]

The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh addressing the Combined Commanders’-in-Chief Conference, in New Delhi on November 22, 2013.


Concluding his recent address to the annual combined commanders conference during which he listed some serious challenges facing not just the armed forces but the entire national security structure of the country, the prime minister concluded by saying — “There have been concerns that have been raised in recent times about the nature of civil-military relations in our country. Let me assert… that the political leadership of India has the highest faith in its military and its institutional rectitude within the democratic framework. The apolitical nature of our military and its proven professionalism are the envy of the world and have also nurtured the Indian democratic experience….”

What prompted this assertion after 66 years of magnificent service by the Indian armed forces remains a matter of conjecture. The temptation to jump to the obvious conclusion that this was a fallout of the recent episode of an erstwhile army chief’s brief spat with the government over his age would be doing injustice to the deeper ramifications of the prime minister’s message to the military commanders, the ministry of defence and the nation’s democratic institutions.

Addressing the same conference last year, the prime minister had emphasized that various challenges would require confronting issues of jointness and constructive debate to develop composite capabilities. Enjoining on the MoD to develop synergies, he had cautioned that compartmentalized views would delay India’s response and dilute its impact. That he was addressing the entire national security edifice was clear when he referred to the task forces led by Naresh Chandra (security structures and decision-making processes) and Ravindra Gupta (defence modernization and self-reliance), respectively. He specifically observed that these task forces had made a number of valid suggestions and that it was in India’s interest to reach a consensus on their recommendations. Coming as it did from the highest executive, this had generated hope not just amongst the military commanders but across the security community. The government, it seemed, was prepared to initiate defence management reforms.

A year later, when the prime minister rose to address the commanders, once again, he would have been conscious of the fact that his earlier advice on evolving consensus on the recommendations of the two committees had met with little success. He would also have been aware that the reasons for this stagnation do not rest at the doors of the uniformed fraternity only. The Kargil Review Committee opined that the “political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo.”

It is hardly surprising that this year, while emphasizing the need to develop comprehensive national power, the prime minister drew attention of both the MoD and the armed forces to the twin tasks of making tangible progress in establishing the right structures for higher defence management and the appropriate civil-military balance in decision-making that the complex security environment demands. He further touched upon reviewing the different task force reports that the government had initiated to achieve a higher index of indigenous capability in defence production.

That the prime minister was compelled to repeat his earlier plea is indeed a poor reflection on national security governance. The real reason behind the prime minister raising the issue of civil-military relations lies in his concern that those within the system favouring status quo are now winning. By showing faith in the military, he was perhaps attempting to apply a healing touch to the frustration that is evident within the military establishment.

The prime minister and the defence minister expressed serious concern over the spate of incidents of indiscipline in some army units. The army was reminded that the educational and social background of the jawans have changed and that there was a need for sensitizing officers. Whilst these are valid observations, we would be deluding ourselves if we were to believe that the problem is that simple.

There are many issues that lead to considerable stress in the domain of civil- military relations. Suicide in the armed forces has shown a frightening rise. Yet, when one such incident was brought up in Parliament, a discussion was shelved on the pretext that it would be detrimental to morale. Which self-respecting democracy would respond as supinely as we did to the desecration of bodies of soldiers defending the borders? The list is indeed long.

In a paper titled “Absent Dialogue”, Anit Mukherjee, a former army officer and a research scholar, outlines three characteristics of civil-military relations in India. The first is the strong administrative, procedural and bureaucratic control that is exercized by the MoD over the armed forces. The second is the exclusion of the military from crucial decision-making fora, thus denying it a legitimate role in policy-making. Finally, as a consequence of these, armed forces are left to their own devices in areas of threat assessments, operations, force structures, training and, to a limited degree, in promotions and postings. He concludes that this structure of civil-military relations loosely translates into a system where, according to the noted strategic thinker, K. Subrahmanyam, politicians enjoy power without responsibility, bureaucrats wield power without accountability, and the military assumes responsibility without direction.

The reality is that with the changing socio-economic profile of India’s population, the rising aspirations of the people and the arrival of the information age with free and instant flow of information, the entire approach to managing the armed forces must change. Whilst the onus of how this must evolve within the military training and social domains rests squarely within the armed forces, it can never be achieved without a similar change in the way national security is organized and managed in the larger context of civil military relations.

Strained civil-military relations are resulting in turf wars that prevent the military from working towards integrated warfare. This state of affairs is incompatible not only in the context of the modern battlefield but equally in the context of the current economic slow down. Coming as this does in the face of alarming reports of stagnant modernization and depleting force levels, the armed forces are now faced with a double shock: severe internal stresses coupled with poor equipment in the face of dynamic external threats.

The military is the most complex of democratic institutions because in its heart it continues to believe that its commitment to the nation is the only honourable thing to do. It is the sacred duty of every democratic institution to remember that the day this institution begins to have second thoughts on the fairness of the cause of its commitment, India’s survival itself will be in jeopardy.

True civil-military relations are about rebuilding and balancing trust under the overarching umbrella of political control over the military. If indeed this was the underlying message of the prime minister to the wider national security audience, it was more than timely.

Civil-Military Relations: Heed the Timely Message » Indian Defence Review

Comment posted in response to this article is worth paying attention....so I am just copy pasting it here !
( I have edited some portion which ideemed contentious and biased from this comment...)


ASHOK CARROL on February 20, 2014 at 7:31 pm said:
To go down in history as a man and pm of integrity , vision and supreme national interests, the pm respected Manmohan singh must not hesitate and fully implement the report of naresh chandra committee headed by a devoted ex cabinet secretary , ambassoder to usa , and head of many committees supported by visionary , chiefs of intelligence , police , service chiefs and defence strategists. by biting the bullet
he must shove the decisions down the throats of mod babus , self serving service
hqs and transform the defunct national higher defence organisation of the country
to modern 21st century work and response . THE present moribund 18th century
status quo mod and service hqs have laid waste billions of tax payers money
with no accountabilty and left the forces ill equipped and not capable of meeting
the sensor to shoot response in a nuclear armed hostile envoirment . The procurement policy taking 10 to 15 yrs for major aquistions is A LAUGHING STOCK OF THE WORLD and the cost of terrorism imposed by pakistan is not fully calculated and understood . WHILST THE VIPS HAVE SPG AND NSG THE COMMON MAN IS FRUSTRATED WITH THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSE OF THE NATION HEADED BY INDECISIVE , MEEK TIMID LEADERSHIP.SCANDEL AFTER SCANDEL IN DEFENCE PURCHASE S HAS LEFT THE SOLDER WITH POOR
CLOTHING , OLD WEAPONS , LITTLE SPARES AND NO WAR WASTAGE RESERVES. A COMPLETE OVERHAUL IS THE CRYING NEED OF THE HOUR AND NO CONTROL WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILTY BY POLITCANS AND BABUS CAN BE ANY FURTHER SUPPORTED BY THE NATION AND THE VOTERS.A IMPARTIAL LEARNED , SWIFT , PROFESSIONAL BEAURCRACY TO CONTROL THE INTEGRATED MOD TO OVERSEE THE PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS OF THE SERVICE HQS IS REQUIRED SO THAT THE SERVICES ARE NOT RUN AS FIEFDOMS AND THE NATION HAS A WELLEQUIPPED PROFESSIONAL TRAINED AND SATISFIED SERVICES CAPABLE OF MOUNTING SWIFT ACTION

 

[kurup]

Leave the Indian army alone

The Cross of Fire, a 1992 Colin Forbes thriller, had its plot set in France against the backdrop of a neo-Nazi movement. A right-wing army general disgusted with the problem of immigrants and indifference of democratic leadership decides to take matters into his hands. He conferences in his army commanders and issues them an ultimatum. Either they support him on a well-planned coup or they don’t leave the room alive. The army commanders are forced to concede and the general then proceeds to take a majority of middle-rung officers into confidence, replacing many key appointments with officers personally loyal to him.

Next the general unleashes several Special Forces units incognito to create a series of “terrorist” actions all over France, plunging the country into chaos. One such action bombs a TGV train carrying the entire democratic leadership; liquidating them in one go. Other units are positioned near important communication centres, radio and TV stations, administrative buildings and major highways. The plan is to push the country into anarchy with riots, explosions, killings and general pandemonium until the desperate French populace starts begging the army to take over. The general then plans to reluctantly oblige, promising a return to democracy as soon as the situation stabilizes.

And that is how a coup happens even in fictitious imagination. Not by a couple of units fanning out of their garrison in a routine mobilization exercise. The fact that routine movement of two army units sparked a front-page story two years ago probably surprised the army more than anyone else, primarily because it is not in their DNA to even contemplate such a possibility. As pointed out by the defence minister and other senior officials—at best the incident was a misunderstanding which should have been put to rest then and there. So it is bizarre that this non-issue is being dredged up again.

India is currently going through unprecedented socio-political, economic, external and internal security challenges. The looming political uncertainty, allegations ranging from corruption to nepotism, accusations and counter-accusations, hypocrisy and opportunism are combining to create a perfect storm. Every opportunity to undermine adversaries is being exploited with scant regard to propriety, its relevance or implications of such actions.

In these circumstances, it would behoove saner minds to leave the Indian Armed Forces—an institution that has been apolitical, non-parochial and perhaps one of the only remaining instances of national integration working for the national cause—out of this mudslinging. The Armed Forces (though recently tarnished by aberrations of individual and tragically, senior officers) are possibly the last bastion of what our founding fathers conceived this nation’s strength in diversity to be.

This million-plus army is drawn from each and every part of our country, purely on merit, kept largely insulated from its degenerating environment, trained to value mission above self and honed to a point where it sacrifices lives for us. Whether it is military operations safeguarding our country, aid to civil authorities or action during disasters, this organization has delivered each and every time—selflessly with no expectation of reward or recognition beyond their professionalism and honour.

It is perhaps one of the last remaining unsullied role models for our youth, who have been disillusioned by several other establishments.

Raking up a bogey, which anyone remotely familiar with our army will dismiss as pure nonsense, is possibly the worst insult that can be inflicted on it, especially if it is being done for self-serving goals and not for any organizational improvement. Tragically, our nation attempts to learn very little about its own defence forces. We don’t appreciate their travails or hardships. Most of us are ignorant about their organizational structures, command and control mechanisms, safeguards, deployments, previous operations, modus operandi and an unblemished tradition of political detachment.

And, therefore perhaps, we don’t appreciate that the army marshals its strength from the morale of the nation behind it. Our troops don’t fight with just weapons; they fight with resolve drawn from 1.2 billion people.
They don’t scale the impossible heights of Siachen glacier with just mountaineering equipment, they claw up, buoyed by a sense of responsibility towards our safety. Our pilots don’t fly rescue missions through storms just using instrumentation; they are also guided by the desire to save fellow citizens from death. Our soldiers stand between us and our enemies, so we can sleep peacefully in the knowledge that nothing will happen to us—not during their watch. It is their sacrifice which allows us to enjoy our freedom and the democracy whose current manifestation has reached a nadir that no country could be proud of.

Of all ranks in the Forces, none have a tougher job than its junior officers—the lieutenants, captains and majors. It is these young men and women who have to lead soldiers into combat. It is they who shoulder the enormous responsibility of motivating troops and explain to them the incredulous insinuations of trust deficit between the military and political leadership.

They have enough painful battles on their hands without having to add this one. And such mongering for whatever objective is a great disservice to troops of an army that prides itself on apolitical professionalism and draws its strength from it.

Leave the Indian army alone | idrw.org

 

[kurup]

Remembered Only at Election Time



It is no secret that the armed forces of the Union have, to an extent, been viewed by our ruling elite as a necessary burden. Reportedly at one time our first prime minister even wondered if they were needed. With this mindset it is little surprise that the armed forces have generally been kept out of national security policy making and showered with periodic superficial praise just to keep them in good humour. But beneath this veneer, not just their conditions of service but also their very status in the warrant of precedence have progressively and by design been degraded. It is, of course, a different matter when the country faces aggression and suddenly the armed forces become darlings of our ruling classes. It then becomes a race to be seen in the company of the uniformed fraternity, if only to get a few photo opportunity points. Television coverage of our netas lining up to receive our Kargil dead at the Palam military airport or gracing military funerals come vividly to mind.

On the other hand, the people at large trust and respect the armed forces in far greater measure as frequent polls show. Clearly there is far greater affinity between the people of this country and their armed forces than there is between the government and its armed forces. Just as the aam admi is treated with great respect in the run-up to the elections and he becomes irrelevant soon thereafter, the soldier suffers a similar fate in the events of war and peace. In our system of national governance it could be said that the soldier is the ‘aam admi’ within the government.

As election season dawns, it is no surprise that the flavour of the season is the genuine aam admi of the country being wooed by political aspirants of every shade. What appears new, however, are signs that for the first time in electoral politics the aam admi of the government, namely the soldier, is also finding political suitors.

When presenting the interim budget in the Lok Sabha the other day, the finance minister stated, “Hon’ble Members are aware of the long standing demand of the defence services for one rank one pension. It is an emotive issue, it has legal implications, and it has to be handled with great sensitivity.” He was, however, cautious in not providing the nation amplification of this very pregnant statement because at its heart lies everything that is wrong with how successive governments have handled vital issues of pay commissions for the armed forces, pensions, parity with their civilian counterparts and a host of allied problems.

One rank one pension or OROP has not only been a genuine demand of the services for nearly three decades, but has at various times been accepted in principle by political leaderships of various shades. Yet no government has delivered on this promise, resulting finally in veterans launching agitations and returning their hard-earned medals in their thousands to their supreme commander. For veterans to be forced to fall back on this extreme step for which they have no emotional appetite is a severe blow to their consciences and pride. But beyond this it also has deep national security underpinnings, as today’s soldiers are tomorrow’s veterans. Governments of the day have, however, remained unmoved. So the finance minister was justified in referring to this as an emotive issue.

When the finance minister touched on legal implications, he failed to enlighten Parliament that there was at present a contempt petition admitted and being heard in the Supreme Court from the Retired Defence Officers Association against the erstwhile defence secretary that named officials of the ministry of defence for failing to implement apex court orders in the rank pay case. A case that the defence ministry had lost to the RDOA in every court including the highest. That the veterans had been compelled to fight their own ministry of defence in various courts and that even when the ministry had lost, it failed to implement the court’s directives makes us look worse than a banana republic.

Finally, the sensitive leadership of a nation faced with huge external security challenges, such as India is, would no doubt have appreciated that a combination of these two factors could very easily result in a sensitive situation. So one must agree with the finance minister on this but, being fully conscious of the above background, he could at least have acknowledged that it goes to the undying credit of the professionalism and patriotism of our veteran soldiers that they have lived with this adverse, humiliating and sensitive situation without ever letting it become sensational or ugly.

The finance minister concluded with the statement, “I am happy to announce that government has accepted the principle of ‘One Rank One Pension’ for the defence forces.” He estimated the budgetary requirement for the next financial year to be Rs 500 crore and as an “earnest of the UPA government’s commitment” proposed to transfer this sum this year itself. Such display of commitment merely endorses guilt for past unkept promises.

Whilst many of those adorning the benches who mechanically thumped their tables on this announcement may not have really understood the import of the finance minister’s words, the defence minister would surely have been alive not only to every word spoken but, more importantly, to what was unsaid. That he has been unable or unwilling to rein in his bureaucracy and let the situation come to this sorry pass is a story for another day.

It is no surprise that with this background, the finance minister’s announcement of OROP is being taken with the proverbial pinch of salt, as is his earnest commitment to transfer money this year, because not only is there a huge gap between “acceptance in principle” and actual implementation, but also because the amount so magnanimously earmarked is nowhere near annual figures for the OROP estimated by the ministry itself.

If one were to look objectively at the various unresolved issues flowing from the fourth, fifth and sixth pay commissions and the dogged battles that the defence ministry has fought in courts to deny the affected veterans their legitimate dues, the only conclusion that one can draw is that the announcement of the finance minister was divorced from any genuine concern for the welfare of the soldier and aimed solely at the forthcoming battle at the hustings. The current gaping trust deficit between the State and the veteran soldier must cause all political and national security pundits serious concern.

But the story does not end here. In a windfall announcement a few days later, the chief minister of Haryana announced a steep hike in the grant of monetary benefits to the recipients of gallantry and other medals and enhanced financial assistance for World War II veterans, their widows, and ex-servicemen and their widows. Not to be left behind, soon thereafter the chief minister of Himachal Pradesh announced the setting up of a war museum where busts of soldiers who had won prestigious medals right from the British era till recent times would be installed. He further said that the names of martyred soldiers belonging to the state would also be displayed in the museum so that the younger generation comes to know about their valour.

Viewed from the perspective of a veteran, this bountiful generosity is not being showered because of any great love for the profession of arms or in recognition of the sacrifice soldiers continue to make. These are mere political moves in the shadow of the elections and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in another dubious first in the history of Indian electoral politics the uniformed fraternity is being co-opted into the unique vote-bank system that has become the hallmark of Indian democracy.

In his book, The Soldier and the State, that has become the standard in professional and academic discourse, the political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington, suggests two types of civil-military relations in theory. In the subjective control model, the military is closely integrated with and participates in the political and social system, but its professionalism is minimal. Alternatively, in the objective control model, the respective political and military leaders focus on their areas of expertise with the military remaining separate from the political system. There is a clear division of labour resulting in maximized military professionalism. Whilst Huntington showed preference for the latter model, he was aware that in the United States of America the military and civilian government operate somewhere in between. There are other scholars who differ with this theory and argue that the best relationship between the civilian and military is one in which both cooperate and collaborate, but the military remains subordinate to civilians. That such a debate continues in the US as newer security challenges emerge signifies the strength of a vibrant democracy where national security institutions respect and have abiding trust and faith in one another and are willing to discuss and debate the changing dynamics of their relationship.

Unlike the US, our system remains fixated on a compartmentalized model. Faced as we are with unresolved border issues and complex external security challenges, an engagement within our security institutions for a preferred model is long overdue, but this needs mutual institutional faith and trust. Instead, we are on the verge of introducing a destructive and self-defeating variable of vote -bank politics into this challenging issue of civil-military relationship. It is still not too late for our political leaders to take a deep breath and step back.

Remembered Only at Election Time » Indian Defence Review

 

[kurup]

After the naval disasters, it’s time to revisit relationship between government and armed forces

The armed forces and the defence ministry always had an uneasy relationship. But never before have the frustrations of a military chief compelled him to quit
The crisis in the Indian Navy has showcased two contrasting perspectives. On one hand we have the binding ethos of our armed forces, and on the other is the disconnect between the ministry of defence and the security forces, which are its constitutional responsibility.

For navy chief Admiral D K Joshi, it was an imperative of honour that prompted his resignation. Accepting moral responsibility for the operational mishaps that occurred during his tenure was laudable, but whether he needed to put in his papers is debatable.

By accepting the navy chief ‘s resignation with surprising readiness, it would appear thatdefence minister A K Antony has not only distanced himself from the problems that plagued the navy but has passed the buck down the line.

Look Ma, Clean Hands

To clear the yardarm is an old navy expression that is synonymous with washing one’s hands of a responsibility. It came into vogue in the days of sail when Britannia ruled the waves and Lordships of the Admiralty, perched ashore, found it expedient to pass the buck. So why would Antony “clear his yardarm” when the Indian Navy is the responsibility of the defence minister?

It has a lot to do with the need to integrate the armed forces into the ministry of defence. Little has happened. And since the old order has not changed, it is still the old “us-versusthem” mindset that prevails.

Calling itself the integrated headquarters of the ministry of defence may sound impressive, but inducing systemic changes requires much more than a cosmetic change of nomenclature. What is needed is a change of attitude and an understanding of military ethos.

The Last Straw

The political leadership should take a leaf out of the Kargil report. It carries a doctrinal message on how the armed forces should be motivated and galvanised into action when the chips are down.

The uneasy relationship that exists between our armed forces and the defence ministry is nothing new. Over the years, it has taken ugly twists and turns. But never before have the frustrations of a military chief or his disillusionment with the system compelled him to quit.

What happened with Admiral Joshi is symptomatic of a deeper problem at the core of a military chief ‘s command responsibility. It has much to do with what the nation expects of its service chiefs.

The armed forces have been charged with the highest responsibility that can be vested in the citizens of a country: the protection of India.

For the Indian Navy, the primary concern is its sharply depleted submarine force levels. It is ironic that it took the tragic loss of INS Sindhurakshak to draw attention to this.

The force-multiplying effect of a submarine makes it the most potent component in the war-fighting arsenal of any navy. It gives the nuclear triad the greatest survivability.

Being one of the most complex war machines ever developed, the induction of submarines into service is a long process that extends over years. The Indian Navy diligently conceived a long-term submarine acquisition programme in 1997.

Despite government approval, this has languished with bureaucratic delays. With no submarine replacements in sight, the Indian Navy is in an untenable situation. It is stranded with a few ageing Kilo-class Russian subs, kept alive through refits and overhauls. They ought to have been scrapped long ago.

Loosen the Purse Strings

Given the paradigm that determines priorities between the three armed forces, a shrinking defence budget has aggravated the situation for the Indian Navy. Admiral Joshi may have paid the price for governmental apathy but he has drawn attention to the plight of his service.

The Indian Navy has had a spate of operational incidents. That it happened within a short span of time did cause concern. But the navy is a professional force. With robust measures being instituted, our navy would have come to grips with these operational glitches. Accidents and incidents need to be seen as an occupational hazard for an active blue water navy. They have happened before and professional navies take it in their stride.

It is not easy to understand the operational environment of the navy and the risks that go with it. It was our late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who put this in perspective. Recording his experience underwater, while embarked on our nuclear submarine INS Chakra, he said, “Thank God I was a pilot, not a submariner.”

Given the praise that Antony has showered on Admiral Joshi, it is difficult to believe that an admiral would throw in the towel rather than face up to the challenge. There may be more to it than meets the eye.

A military chief shoulders the expectations of the nation. The navy chief ‘s action may have come at a moment of despair, but in the larger context, it calls for serious introspection: what really ails the armed forces of our nation?

After the naval disasters, it’s time to revisit relationship between government and armed forces | idrw.org

 

[kurup]

‘Bureaucracy is main hurdle for armed forces’

The bureaucracy is the main bottleneck between the armed forces and the political leadership, said SV Seshagiri Rao, the chairman of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) working group on national security. “The bureaucracy in the defence ministry has to explain how it is functioning,” he said.
The spate of incidents dogging the Indian Navy is a “very serious issue”, said Rao at a media conference on Sunday. The meet was held a day after a worker was killed and three seriously injured at the Ship Building Centre of the Eastern Naval Command on Saturday in the third accident in two weeks involving the Indian Navy.

On March 7, a commander died and two dockyard employees fell ill after carbon dioxide leaked from a unit when INS Kolkata was undergoing trials in Mazgaon Dockyard. Earlier, on February 26, two sailors died in a mishap aboard the submarine INS Sindhuratna.

Rao said, “Our defence equipment whether it is in the navy, air force or army, is all obsolete.”

“If the army or navy or air force put forward a proposal for acquiring equipment, it will take eight years for the equipment to come to the country and then go the recipient. This is the present state of affairs. There is also a fast-track route, but this so-called fast-track route takes three years. Nearly 70% of our defence equipment comes from outside. All three wings are in a very bad shape,” he said. Rao pointed out that only panels are being formed and no action is being taken on ground and said that the Indian Navy is no match for the Chinese. “Indian Navy is one-third of the Chinese. The Chinese have also entered the Indian Ocean, which is our region in geopolitical terms. Chinese ships are there in Seychelles, which is on the western coast of India. This is the state of affairs,” he said.

The BJP leader said that the party is preparing a plan for the armed forces and also a vision document to improve the situation with regard to defence.

Meanwhile, referring to the skirmishes between Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and BJP, he said, “What happened in Gujarat was something that was cooked up by AAP. No other political party has done a demonstration in front our office since our inception. Even though Congress, BJP and CPM have different views on subjects, we never behaved like this. Their leaders climbed walls like schoolchildren.”

‘Bureaucracy is main hurdle for armed forces’ | idrw.org

 

[kurup]

Bureaucratic Mischief with the Military!



When India became free, one of the first tasks was to evolve a new structure for management of the Defense set-up. Therefore, it would be relevant to enumerate the broad principles on which the defense structure of a democratic country needs to be built:

• In a democracy, there has to be ‘civil’ control over military; But the word ‘civil’ means political (and only political) and not bureaucratic.

• War is the most complex and specialized activity that a man engages in. What makes a soldier give his life (for the country) is an issue far more complex than even understanding the nature of God. Over the ages, millions have claimed to understand the concept of God. But those who understood the motivation behind the soldier’s willingness to die would be in thousands, may be only hundreds. It is not claimed that all generals understand these issues, but some of them do. We have to identify them and bring them up. In short, issues of war have to be left to the generals. They must be listened to with respect directly by the politicians, not through the via media of bureaucrats. In any set up, lot of space must to left to the generals to plan and maneuver.

• Each cog in the defense structure which has some degree of power must have an equivalent amount of responsibility and accountability; and that must be defined in very precise terms leaving no room for ambiguity, and manipulability to escape responsibility.

All the above principles were violated with impunity in evolving the defense structure of independent India. In view of the luke warm interest (and lack of capability) of the politicians, bureaucrats took on the job. Of course, the politician reminded the bureaucrat of the principle of a ‘tight leash’. The Indian bureaucracy (the ICS and IAS) has some of the finest brains of the country. They set about designing a structure in which generals were pushed on to the periphery, from which they could:

• Neither participate in any meaningful way in the decision making process.
• Nor protest over being excluded.

In other words, the generals could be seen (occasionally), but were not to be heard.

Service Headquarters were given the status of attached subordinate offices. An umbrella-type all encompassing Ministry of Defense (MoD) was created and put above these subordinate offices. All powers — organizational, financial and promotional — were concentrated in the hands of the bureaucrats at the MoD. The post of Defense Secretary was created, who soon enough assumed powers of an ersatz Chief of Defense Staff. The Defense Secretary and as indeed, the Joint Secretaries can walk in and out of the office of the Defense Minister several times a day. The Service Chiefs generally get to meet the Defense Minister only on weekly meetings.

With their close proximity to the politicians, bureaucrats in the MoD have the ear of the Defense Minister. Whenever they find him in a relaxed mood, they can always whisper a thing or two in his ear. The note for the selection of a new Service Chief is initiated by a Joint Secretary, in which he could cleverly build in the necessary biases. Defense Secretary would pen the final note in which he would, of course, keep the ‘pliability’ factor in view. The deputies to the Service Chiefs, called the Principal Staff Officers at Service Headquarters have no chance of interacting with the Defense Minister. Views of the generals cannot be conveyed to the Defense Minister, unless and until these have been edited, chipped and chopped by the Deputy and Joint Secretaries. An iron wall in the form of bureaucracy came to be built between the military and the politicians, between the Defense Minister and the generals.

In the foregoing, we have laid major part of the blame for the present state of affairs in the Indian defense set up on the shoulders of politicians and bureaucrats. We have, largely, spared the generals. That is not fair. Generals must also carry a good share of blame for their many acts of commission and omission. On the advent of independence, as stated earlier by us, the politicians gave somewhat of a cold shoulder to the generals. Far from being alarmed from that, the generals might have felt even a bit relieved. The might have argued, ‘Let us talk to the politician through the bureaucrat; he speaks our type of English’. The generals showed a singular lack of vision in not appreciating that the politician controls every lever of power. The overall blame could possibly be distributed as follows: — One third each to politician, bureaucrats and generals — In India, politician is the ‘mai-baap’ (all-in-all); he should be given 50% of the blame; the remainder 50% being shared equally between the bureaucrats and the generals.

At this stage, it must be stated to the credit of the bureaucrat that he only moved in the space which the generals were reluctant to occupy. By the time the generals woke up, it was too late; the bureaucrat was well entrenched and had the ear of the politician. If a general was to express even a mild dissent with the state of affairs, he could be branded anti-national. Something on these lines appears to have happened to a Naval Chief, who was sacked most unceremoniously.

Throughout the history of independent India, generals have generally failed to put up their point of view with the required degree of clarity and emphasis. Is it possible that we have failed to produce generals of the right caliber? Irrespective of the actual position, the prevalent belief is that we did produce ‘good’ generals. Whatever, the generals did not assert when it was imperative to do so, sometimes even in national interest. There could be many reasons for that — the rat race for promotions being one of the important one. It is not easy to disregard the ‘goodies’ that come with the post. Another reason could be the intense Inter-Service rivalry. That exists in all countries, including the USA which even has a ‘Joint Chief of Staff’. However in India, the rivalry exceeds all limits, and is the most distinguishing feature of all Inter-Service interactions. That rivalry is not going to go away even if we appoint a ‘Chief of Defense Staff’, which in any case, would not solve any of the problems presently staring ‘India’s Defense’ in its face. It would just add another cog to the wheel, and make the issues even more complex (However, it is a bigger question, and needs a separate discussion.)

One way to put the Armed forces ‘in their place’, is through means of Pay Commissions. As such, a decision was taken at a very early stage not to allow a General anywhere near the outskirts of the Pay Commissions. The sixth Pay Commission submitted its report in early 2008. By an ingenious thought process, it upset the long established equivalence between the various ranks of the armed forces, vis-a-vis the para-military. Among other things, it pushed the police DGP of a state to a higher level than a Lieutenant General (non GOC-in-C). That meant that the DGP of even the smallest state (with a police force of say 7,000), and DGP (Housing) of UP, rank higher than a Corps Commander, with 60,000 troops, guarding the most sensitive part of the Western border.

When a hue and cry was raised, the government kept on deliberating over it for more than a year at various levels, i.e. Committee of IAS Secretaries (no generals permitted), Group of Ministers. Whilst some Relief Packages were announced, the question of status of the Lt Gen was further complicated. Displaying exceptional ingenuity, combined with rare depravity, the Lt Gens were further split vertically. It was decreed that only ?rd of the Lt Gens will be given a higher grade; the rest ? must rot at the ‘Low’ grade. That decree has created three tiers of Lt Gens (perhaps unprecedented in the world):

Lt Gen — GOC-in-C

Lt Gen — High grade (1/3rd)

Lt Gen — Low grade (2/3rd)

In the IAS, some 80–90% become Additional Secretaries, and about 60–70% full Secretaries. In the Armed Forces, only about 10% reach the level of Lt Gen. After that agonizing and hazardous journey, the Lt Gen is informed, “Please cool your heels in the low grade, till we get time to look at you.” That can shatter the most committed and the most loyal.

There is only one level each of (full) Secretary, and Additional Secretary. Why shred the rank of Lt Gen, all for a paltry few lakhs (hundred thousands) rupees a year; or is there a deeper scheme? It is these ‘low grade’ Lt Gens, who as Corps Commanders are at the cutting edge of the battle. In the final analysis, it is their plans and push and daring that determines the difference between ‘Victory’ and ‘Defeat’. No sane nation will put its generals with ‘a grievance on their mind’, to face the enemy in the actual battlefield. That is how the psychology and nature of war works, which as a nation we do not understand. A mindset which can think of this type of mischievous scheme (split Lt Gens into 3 grades) can do anything to destroy the cohesiveness of the Armed Forces.



However, under a lot of pressure, the issue was partially resolved in January 2010 i.e. after about 2 years; the generals gained as Additional Secretaries had to be accommodated.

In the present defense structure, whilst all power rests with the Ministry of Defense, they have no accountability worth the name. The present defense structure has evolved not on the sacred principle of ‘national interest’, but on the demeaning principle of ‘power grab’ and keeping the Armed Forces ‘on the leash’. The disastrous results are there to see as we shall enumerate in the following chapter.

We may spend a few minutes to understand China’s view of its military. Chinese communists established their rule in China at about the same time as India got its freedom. Contrary to the Indian scene, leaders of the new China were product of the ‘Long March’; all of them had seen actual field action, and watched their comrades fall on the battlefront. We may recall that the British politicians have had similar experience. Once you have seen death at close quarters, your view of military, if not of life itself, changes.

Mao Tse Dung was a military genius, who actually enunciated new doctrines of war; he took control of the Chinese State. Mao did not need any briefings from generals; rather he briefed them on the conduct of war. For the first 30 years or so, the effective power in China rested with the military. That period was enough to weave and integrate military thinking in the national psyche. Later, when civilian elements were brought in, the armed forces continued to be a player in the decision making process, if not up-front, at least in the background. That is the difference between China and India. For the Chinese, militarism is a sort of religion; for India, it is just one of the routine issues (like say minority affairs), which the IAS must deal with in their day to day routine manner. That is why the Chinese could wrap ropes around us in 1962. But Indians would not like to recognize that fundamental truth. They would like to continue to believe that we lost in 1962 because we did not have proper boots, or some such other similar silly excuse. The Chinese PLA had fought battles of the Long March either in bathroom slippers or bare-footed, in the biting and intolerable cold of China — some 50% having perished during the march itself.

The moral of the story is:

• Forces must aim, plan and endeavor to fight with adequate numbers and adequate equipment.
• However, if necessary under any circumstance, forces must be (mentally) prepared to fight (successfully), with inadequate numbers and inadequate equipment. That is what nationhood and (good) generalship is all about.

Whatever we have stated in the preceding two paragraphs does not mean that the Chinese have any great military advantage over India; they don’t. In the level of performance, no soldier in the world can measure up to the Indian soldier. All that India has to do is to incorporate changes in its mindset, and get its act together at the higher levels of military and civil leadership. If that can be done, the Indian Armed Forces can take on the ‘best’ in the world; let there be no doubt on that account.

In 2009, Admiral Sureesh Mehta was the Chief of Naval Staff and Chairman of the ‘Chiefs of Staff Committee’. On 10 August 2009, he dropped a bombshell on the unsuspecting Indian public. In a televised address, the Admiral emphatically declared that India was no match for China, and that there was no way the yawning gap between the two could be bridged. What a public statement to come from the Chairman of the ‘Chiefs of Staff Committee’. Even if there was an element of truth in this, the top Defense functionary of the land should be the last person to say that in public.

If such a situation actually exists, it has to be the result of gross all-round neglect (political, bureaucratic and military) over a 20–30 year period; it could not have emerged in a year or two. The Admiral (actually the General) should have briefed the Cabinet Committee on Security in the close confines of the War Room; not a word to come out. And that should have been done within a few months of the Admiral taking-over, and not a few days (yes days) before his retirement.

The public statement has achieved merely the following:

• It tries to project China as a huge bug-bear, whom we must fear; this is an admirable self-goal. China’s projected military advantage is largely a product of our ‘Defeatist’ mindset. Even the tiny Vietnam is not as afraid of China, as our public postures (including TV debates) make India to be. India is a huge country with humongous resources; it is no push-over. We do not have to keep harping on China; let us set our sights at a different level. What is needed is a change in mindset in the higher echelons of governance, as well as in society.
• It has dealt a mortal blow to the morale of the Indian soldier. Earlier, we had blamed the politicians and bureaucrats for not understanding the concept of ‘military morale’. We have to now admit with great regret (and some shame) that admirals (generals) may be doing no better.

The ‘earth-shaking’ (only our perception) statement of the Admiral evoked no response from the government, or the ever watchful, ever alert media. Even the main opposition party, the BJP, who claims a monopoly on nationalism, just looked on half in agreement, half in bewilderment; there was not even a whimper of reaction from them. Perhaps, they, like the government, did not understand what the Admiral was trying to say.

If the Admiral was even partially correct, the government should have been in a ‘tizzy’, and latched on to this one single issue. If the Admiral was wrong, the government should have clarified the situation at the level of the Prime Minister. The PM spoke twice in Parliament on a non-issue like Balochistan (just mention of this name in an irrelevant piece of paper, called joint statement). Why the deathly silence on this ‘life and death’ issue for the nation? This is indicative of the ‘sickening’ low level that the defense issues occupy in this woeful land. But, who are we to complain? There are very wise and prescient men in charge of the nation’s destiny. We should mind our own business, and just shut-up (which we dutifully do, except for making one last comment below).

Perhaps for the first time in the history of modern democratic nations, the top Defense functionary has informed the nation in advance of (almost) certain defeat (to us, the word ‘no match’ does not permit of any other interpretation; we use the word ‘defeat’ with utmost reluctance, and with a sense of horror). Lack of any political response, not even a ‘twitter’ or ‘tweet’, would appear to suggest the following:

• There is nothing new about it; the political class always knew about it.
• If 37 years after learning our lesson in 1962, we are still ‘no match’, why keep on pumping more and more money in Defense?

The political class appears to be of the view that we may not unnecessarily worry our head about this ‘no match’ issue. If things go wrong in any conflict, they can always explain things away. India has a ready-made set of excuses for defeat; those can be presented to the nation. Indian people are simple and trusting. They are neither prone to, nor known to object to what the government tells them. Remember, they lapped up every word that the government told them about the 1962 debacle, i.e. that the (shameful) defeat was really not our fault; some one else must have been responsible. Most Indians are still heard muttering in their sleep, ‘Oh! We were defeated in 1962 due to lack of boots/socks, deficiency in equipment, may be also some shortage of food.’ Others are convinced that we were defeated because the Chinese were just too strong. That has been our hallowed tradition from the days of Ghazni and Ghauri. The people never held the rulers accountable in the past; why would they do it now? Indians are a decent set of people; they do not believe in making unnecessary trouble; they are the accommodating type.

The politicians would add that the Indian public knows and appreciates that they (the politicians) are fully busy (both waking and sleeping hours) in attending to the issues of terrorism. Where is the time for them to attend to the Defense issues? As soon as they find some leisure, they would devote time to Defense; Insha-Allah (God willing) that should happen soon. Why make all this fuss and noise? We must have patience — another great Hindu virtue!

Bureaucratic Mischief with the Military! » Indian Defence Review