CIA declassified documents Air War 1971 - PAF v IAF

[Jackdaws]

Gotta admire how conveniently West Pakistan with 45% population is "mainland" and East Pak with 55% is not.

 

[Myth_buster_1]

He is Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, hailed as probably the greatest strategist of German Army in WW2.

Yeah, i do have a little bit of military background.

I heard Pakistan is one of the few military in the world that still studies WWII strategies.

Gotta admire how conveniently West Pakistan with 45% population is "mainland" and East Pak with 55% is not.

LOL

 

[PanzerKiel]

I heard Pakistan is one of the few military in the world that still studies WWII strategies.

Not few, rather many......i have a book rack full of WW2 case studies of US Staff College, Fort Leavenworth......there is so much to learn from conflicts of the past century.

I heard Pakistan is one of the few military in the world that still studies WWII strategies.


LOL

Actually, aim is not replicate the WW2 strategies in the present times, which would be a mistake.....but they can be always molded to real-time requirements.

 

[Cuirassier]

Gotta admire how conveniently West Pakistan with 45% population is "mainland" and East Pak with 55% is not.

When the 55% wants quit the mainland is obviously the 45%.

 

[PradoTLC]

Gotta admire how conveniently West Pakistan with 45% population is "mainland" and East Pak with 55% is not.

it has to do with size....you have seen them on a map?

Yeah, i do have a little bit of military background.

so do i


... i play hearts of iron 4...

 

[Jackdaws]

it has to do with size....you have seen them on a map?

Yes - somewhere between Sindh province and Punjab province of Pak. Balochistan is the largest province. Doesn't matter - population does. New York City has more people than Wyoming.



so do i


... i play hearts of iron 4...

 

[SABRE]

correct Bhutto was the main prime planners in the 1971 debacle... his refusal to accept Rehman's election victory was the main cause of the mutiny... or more accurately it blew things over to the point no return.

Bhutto was the last straw that broke the camel's back, but that's all the worth of Bhutto in 1971 War, "a straw." East Pakistan always had a strong sense of Bangali nationalism and there was nothing wrong with it. The Pakistani establishment's propensity to interpret ethnic nationalism with separatism is misplaced. Bengali nationalist leaders marketed that Bangalism and the rights of East Pakistan were under threat from West Pakistan since 1947 - when there was no Bhutto. They pointed towards their jute revenues being taken by the Western wing, Bengali language being relegated, their majority being undermined, etc. Unfortunately, the West Pakistani political elites did, in fact, tried hard to undermine East Pakistan. Case in point: One Unit, which was proposed by Feroz Khan Noon, who definitely was not a Bhutto. In a TV interview, Sher Baz Khan Mazari mentioned that he visited East Pakistan to desensitise the rising political disgruntlism and observed that ordinary Bengalis on the street held unfavourable views for a particular majoritarian ethnic group in West Pakistan.

Bhutto was also a poster child of the establishment. They had favoured him, marketed him, owned him, and prefered him over Mujib. On the other hand, the establishment was so much opposed to Mujib that they were even willing to kill him, & who saves Mujib?
Mujib Says That Bhutto Foiled An Execution Order by Yahya
https://www.nytimes.com/1972/01/17/...hutto-foiled-an-execution-order-by-yahya.html

In a TV interview long ago one Pakistani official of the time revealed Yahya was absolutely unwilling to hand over power to Mujib. He anticipated East Pakistan to break away regardless of whatever came of the elections. His fear was the once Mujib would become the PM he would transfer West Pakistani assets like the State Bank of Pakistan to East & then declare independence.

Some on this forum might find the following page useful. It's from a book called Bhutto & The Breakup of Pakistan by Muhammad Younis, a former officer of the foreign office. He has some interesting things to say.

& then recently this is what Kissinger had to say:

East Pakistan would be given independence, Pak president told US in November 1971
https://www.thenews.com.pk/amp/167331-East-Pakistan-would-be-given-independence-Pak-president-told-US-in-November-1971

Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger makes revelation in interview ISLAMABAD: One of the world’s most famous and reputed diplomats Henry Kissinger has revealed in his latest interview...

ISLAMABAD: One of the world’s most famous and reputed diplomats Henry Kissinger has revealed in his latest interview to the magazine ‘The Atlantic’ that the then Pakistan’s president and its army chief had told United States President Richard Nixon in November 1971 that Pakistan would grant independence to East Pakistan.

This is stunning revelation as in November, 1971 India had not invaded East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. India invaded East Pakistan on December 3, 1971.

Henry Kissinger was 56th US Secretary of State and served from September 22, 1973 to January 20, 1977. Kissinger also served as US National Security Adviser from January 20, 1969 to November 3, 1975. Kissinger played a key role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977.

In his latest interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, the Editor-in-Chief of ‘The Atlantic’, Kissinger has discussed many issues ahead of recent US elections.

While narrating events of 1971 in context of US’ opening to China and Pakistan-India Bangladesh issue, Kissinger said, “After the opening to China via Pakistan, America engaged in increasingly urging Pakistan to grant autonomy to Bangladesh. In November, the Pakistani president agreed with Nixon to grant independence the following March.”

The interview starts with the introductory para; “What follows is an extended transcript of several conversations on foreign policy I had with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ahead of the 2016 US presidential election, which formed the basis of a story in the December issue of The Atlantic. That story, along with an interview on Kissinger’s reaction to the surprise electoral victory of Donald Trump, can be found here. The transcript below has been condensed and edited for clarity.”

The relevant question asked by The Atlantic’s Editor-In-Chief and the Kissinger response were as follows:

Goldberg: Was the opening to China worth the sacrifices, the deaths, experienced in the India-Pakistan Bangladesh crisis?

Henry Kissinger: Human rights are an essential goal of American policy. But so is national security. In some situations, no choice between them is required, making the moral issue relatively simple. But there are situations in which a conflict arises, specifically when a country important to American security or international order engages in conduct contrary to our values, requiring the president to make a series of judgments: about the magnitude of the conflict; the resources available to remedy it; the impact of our actions on its foreseeable evolution; and finally, if the president identifies a path forward, the willingness of the American public to maintain that effort. Emphasizing human rights led us into failed nation-building in Iraq; ignoring them permitted genocide in Rwanda. Contemporary policymakers face this challenge all over the world, especially all over the Middle East.

The statesman can usually only reach his goal in stages and, by definition, imperfectly. The art of policy is to move through imperfect stages towards ever-more fulfilling goals.

Your question on Bangladesh demonstrates how this issue has been confused in our public debate. There was never the choice between suffering in Bangladesh and the opening to China. It is impossible to go into detail in one far-ranging interview. However, allow me to outline some principles:

1- The opening to China began in 1969.

2- The Bangladesh crisis began in March 1971.

3- By then, we had conducted a number of highly secret exchanges with China and were on the verge of a breakthrough.

4- These exchanges were conducted through Pakistan, which emerged as the interlocutor most acceptable to Beijing and Washington.

5- The Bangladesh crisis, in its essence, was an attempt of the Bengali part of Pakistan to achieve independence. Pakistan resisted with extreme violence and gross human-rights violations.

6- To condemn these violations publicly would have destroyed the Pakistani channel, which would be needed for months to complete the opening to China, which indeed was launched from Pakistan. The Nixon administration considered the opening to China as essential to a potential diplomatic recasting towards the Soviet Union and the pursuit of peace. The US diplomats witnessing the Bangladesh tragedy were ignorant of the opening to China. Their descriptions were heartfelt and valid, but we could not respond publicly. But we made available vast quantities of food and undertook diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation.

7- After the opening to China via Pakistan, America engaged in increasingly urging Pakistan to grant autonomy to Bangladesh. In November, the Pakistani president agreed with Nixon to grant independence the following March.

8- The following December, India, after having made a treaty including military provisions with the Soviet Union, and in order to relieve the strain of refugees, invaded East Pakistan [which is today Bangladesh].

9- The US had to navigate between Soviet pressures; Indian objectives; Chinese suspicions; and Pakistani nationalism. Adjustments had to be made—and would require a book to cover—but the results require no apology. By March 1972—within less than a year of the commencement of the crisis—Bangladesh was independent; the India-Pakistan War ended; and the opening to China completed at a summit in Beijing in February 1972. A summit in Moscow in May 1972 resulted in a major nuclear arms control agreement [SALT I]. Relations with India were restored by 1974 with the creation of a US-Indian Joint Commission [the Indo-US Joint Commission on Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Cooperation], which remains part of the basis of contemporary US-India relations. Compared with Syria, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the sacrifices made in 1971 have had a far more clear-cut end.

 

[TigerOfMysore]

True ... but that was not the point of this thread...

the point was Indians were caught lying again....

they always claim they inflicted far more losses on us .... and most laymen tended to agree given the fact we “lost” the war...

That is exactly my point. They attribute the moth-balling in East Pakistani in the stats. Without that, the numbers (kill ratio) would be even better for PAF.

 

[Indus Pakistan]

When the 55% wants quit the mainland is obviously the 45%.

I have always said "we broke off from Bangla" and not the other way around. You can't call the bigger piece "breaking off" when it had 55% of the population. Minorty broke from majority.

 

[PradoTLC]

That is exactly my point. They attribute the moth-balling in East Pakistani in the stats. Without that, the numbers (kill ratio) would be even better for PAF.

100% agree

Bhutto was the last straw that broke the camel's back, but that's all the worth of Bhutto in 1971 War, "a straw." East Pakistan always had a strong sense of Bangali nationalism and there was nothing wrong with it. The Pakistani establishment's propensity to interpret ethnic nationalism with separatism is misplaced. Bengali nationalist leaders marketed that Bangalism and the rights of East Pakistan were under threat from West Pakistan since 1947 - when there was no Bhutto. They pointed towards their jute revenues being taken by the Western wing, Bengali language being relegated, their majority being undermined, etc. Unfortunately, the West Pakistani political elites did, in fact, tried hard to undermine East Pakistan. Case in point: One Unit, which was proposed by Feroz Khan Noon, who definitely was not a Bhutto. In a TV interview, Sher Baz Khan Mazari mentioned that he visited East Pakistan to desensitise the rising political disgruntlism and observed that ordinary Bengalis on the street held unfavourable views for a particular majoritarian ethnic group in West Pakistan.

Bhutto was also a poster child of the establishment. They had favoured him, marketed him, owned him, and prefered him over Mujib. On the other hand, the establishment was so much opposed to Mujib that they were even willing to kill him, & who saves Mujib?
Mujib Says That Bhutto Foiled An Execution Order by Yahya
https://www.nytimes.com/1972/01/17/...hutto-foiled-an-execution-order-by-yahya.html

In a TV interview long ago one Pakistani official of the time revealed Yahya was absolutely unwilling to hand over power to Mujib. He anticipated East Pakistan to break away regardless of whatever came of the elections. His fear was the once Mujib would become the PM he would transfer West Pakistani assets like the State Bank of Pakistan to East & then declare independence.

Some on this forum might find the following page useful. It's from a book called Bhutto & The Breakup of Pakistan by Muhammad Younis, a former officer of the foreign office. He has some interesting things to say.

View attachment 640790

& then recently this is what Kissinger had to say:

East Pakistan would be given independence, Pak president told US in November 1971
https://www.thenews.com.pk/amp/167331-East-Pakistan-would-be-given-independence-Pak-president-told-US-in-November-1971

Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger makes revelation in interview ISLAMABAD: One of the world’s most famous and reputed diplomats Henry Kissinger has revealed in his latest interview...

ISLAMABAD: One of the world’s most famous and reputed diplomats Henry Kissinger has revealed in his latest interview to the magazine ‘The Atlantic’ that the then Pakistan’s president and its army chief had told United States President Richard Nixon in November 1971 that Pakistan would grant independence to East Pakistan.

This is stunning revelation as in November, 1971 India had not invaded East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. India invaded East Pakistan on December 3, 1971.

Henry Kissinger was 56th US Secretary of State and served from September 22, 1973 to January 20, 1977. Kissinger also served as US National Security Adviser from January 20, 1969 to November 3, 1975. Kissinger played a key role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977.

In his latest interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, the Editor-in-Chief of ‘The Atlantic’, Kissinger has discussed many issues ahead of recent US elections.

While narrating events of 1971 in context of US’ opening to China and Pakistan-India Bangladesh issue, Kissinger said, “After the opening to China via Pakistan, America engaged in increasingly urging Pakistan to grant autonomy to Bangladesh. In November, the Pakistani president agreed with Nixon to grant independence the following March.”

The interview starts with the introductory para; “What follows is an extended transcript of several conversations on foreign policy I had with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ahead of the 2016 US presidential election, which formed the basis of a story in the December issue of The Atlantic. That story, along with an interview on Kissinger’s reaction to the surprise electoral victory of Donald Trump, can be found here. The transcript below has been condensed and edited for clarity.”

The relevant question asked by The Atlantic’s Editor-In-Chief and the Kissinger response were as follows:

Goldberg: Was the opening to China worth the sacrifices, the deaths, experienced in the India-Pakistan Bangladesh crisis?

Henry Kissinger: Human rights are an essential goal of American policy. But so is national security. In some situations, no choice between them is required, making the moral issue relatively simple. But there are situations in which a conflict arises, specifically when a country important to American security or international order engages in conduct contrary to our values, requiring the president to make a series of judgments: about the magnitude of the conflict; the resources available to remedy it; the impact of our actions on its foreseeable evolution; and finally, if the president identifies a path forward, the willingness of the American public to maintain that effort. Emphasizing human rights led us into failed nation-building in Iraq; ignoring them permitted genocide in Rwanda. Contemporary policymakers face this challenge all over the world, especially all over the Middle East.

The statesman can usually only reach his goal in stages and, by definition, imperfectly. The art of policy is to move through imperfect stages towards ever-more fulfilling goals.

Your question on Bangladesh demonstrates how this issue has been confused in our public debate. There was never the choice between suffering in Bangladesh and the opening to China. It is impossible to go into detail in one far-ranging interview. However, allow me to outline some principles:

1- The opening to China began in 1969.

2- The Bangladesh crisis began in March 1971.

3- By then, we had conducted a number of highly secret exchanges with China and were on the verge of a breakthrough.

4- These exchanges were conducted through Pakistan, which emerged as the interlocutor most acceptable to Beijing and Washington.

5- The Bangladesh crisis, in its essence, was an attempt of the Bengali part of Pakistan to achieve independence. Pakistan resisted with extreme violence and gross human-rights violations.

6- To condemn these violations publicly would have destroyed the Pakistani channel, which would be needed for months to complete the opening to China, which indeed was launched from Pakistan. The Nixon administration considered the opening to China as essential to a potential diplomatic recasting towards the Soviet Union and the pursuit of peace. The US diplomats witnessing the Bangladesh tragedy were ignorant of the opening to China. Their descriptions were heartfelt and valid, but we could not respond publicly. But we made available vast quantities of food and undertook diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation.

7- After the opening to China via Pakistan, America engaged in increasingly urging Pakistan to grant autonomy to Bangladesh. In November, the Pakistani president agreed with Nixon to grant independence the following March.

8- The following December, India, after having made a treaty including military provisions with the Soviet Union, and in order to relieve the strain of refugees, invaded East Pakistan [which is today Bangladesh].

9- The US had to navigate between Soviet pressures; Indian objectives; Chinese suspicions; and Pakistani nationalism. Adjustments had to be made—and would require a book to cover—but the results require no apology. By March 1972—within less than a year of the commencement of the crisis—Bangladesh was independent; the India-Pakistan War ended; and the opening to China completed at a summit in Beijing in February 1972. A summit in Moscow in May 1972 resulted in a major nuclear arms control agreement [SALT I]. Relations with India were restored by 1974 with the creation of a US-Indian Joint Commission [the Indo-US Joint Commission on Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Cooperation], which remains part of the basis of contemporary US-India relations. Compared with Syria, Libya, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the sacrifices made in 1971 have had a far more clear-cut end.

Good find!

 

[Yankee-stani]

I have always said "we broke off from Bangla" and not the other way around. You can't call the bigger piece "breaking off" when it had 55% of the population. Minorty broke from majority.

Time Machine

goes to 1947

asks Jinnah and ML just let Bangladesh free from Pakistan grip saving us from the "debacle" in 1971

 

[PradoTLC]

Getting off topic...

not many Indians contesting here.. I guess they realized now what their airforce is truely worth now that white boys have spoken...

 

[Aamir Hussain]

Not few, rather many......i have a book rack full of WW2 case studies of US Staff College, Fort Leavenworth......there is so much to learn from conflicts of the past century.



Actually, aim is not replicate the WW2 strategies in the present times, which would be a mistake.....but they can be always molded to real-time requirements.

Agreed fully. I've even seen training videos of basic individual movement quoting WWII and Vietnam experience. Hull down tank tactics that were expensively used by the Iraqis in both Gulf conflicts were first used by the Russians and then the Germans in WWII.

 

[PradoTLC]

Agreed fully. I've even seen training videos of basic individual movement quoting WWII and Vietnam experience. Hull down tank tactics that were expensively used by the Iraqis in both Gulf conflicts were first used by the Russians and then the Germans in WWII.

what the Iraqis didn’t realize such tactics have become obsolete in face of technically and technologically superior force.. Iraqis should have changed strategy..

 

[Aamir Hussain]

what the Iraqis didn’t realize such tactics have become obsolete in face of technically and technologically superior force.. Iraqis should have changed strategy..

They did not look at Wehrmacht game plan of World War 2. The US Air, Land & Sea warfare doctrine, used in Gulf War is a direct evolution of German Blitzkrieg strategy of WWII, but done with modern precision weapons.

So minutely studying past battles has its own lessons to learn.