Chinese Takeaway: Modi and Jokowi

[Nike]

Chinese Takeaway: Modi and Jokowi


C. Raja MohanOP-ED OCTOBER 22, 2014INDIAN EXPRESS
SUMMARY

Jokowi with Angolan Vice President


There are good reasons why Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi should start paying serious attention to the new Indonesian president, Joko Widodo.

MODI AND JOKOWI
India is probably too preoccupied with itself to notice that a new leader, Joko Widodo, has taken charge of Indonesia this week. It is a pity that there was no Indian political figure present when Widodo was sworn in on Monday.

There are good reasons why Prime Minister Narendra Modi should start paying serious attention to the new Indonesian president. For Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has much in common with Modi. They both are outsiders to the traditional political elite and made their way up on their own steam. If Modi grew up selling tea, Jokowi was raised in one of Jakarta’s slums. Beyond the personal, Modi must put Jakarta at the heart of India’s strategic imagination. After all, there is no major country in the world that shares so much history and culture with India, not to mention the “Indo” in its name.

Indonesia is the world’s biggest Islamic nation, a democracy and anchors Southeast Asia’s regional institutions. Rapid economic growth in recent years has made the Indonesian economy the ninth largest in PPP terms.


After the expansive political cooperation in the 1950s, India and Indonesia drifted apart from the 1960s. Although there has been greater engagement between the two countries in recent years, neither figures prominently on the other’s mental map. Modi and Jokowi can and should change that. When they meet on the margins of the East Asia Summit in Myanmar and the G-20 meeting in Australia next month, Modi and Jokowi will have an opportunity to inject some strategic content into the bilateral relationship.

MARITIME NEXUS
Political elites in India and Indonesia often recollect that Nehru and Sukarno took the initiative to convene the Asia-Africa conference at Bandung in 1955 and helped found the non-aligned movement. It is but rarely, though, that either country thinks of the other as a neighbour.

India views Indonesia through the prism of Southeast Asia. Indonesia, too, sees India as belonging to another region, South Asia. But geography reminds us that India and Indonesia share a maritime boundary. This shared frontier is likely to acquire greater weight as Jokowi promises to make Indonesia a major maritime power. Although Indonesia is an archipelagic nation, comprising nearly 13,500 islands, maritime strategy has not been at the top of Jakarta’s agenda.

In his inaugural speech, Jokowi has promised to change all that. “We have for too long turned our backs on the ocean, the straits and the bay. This is the time for us to restore it so we will prosper like our ancestors,” he said. Quoting the Indonesian navy’s motto, “Jalasveva Jayamahe (in the seas, we shall be victorious)”, Jokowi proclaimed his determination to build strong maritime capabilities, both civilian and military. Jokowi’s speech is entirely in tune with his campaign promise to make Indonesia a “global maritime nexus”.

BEIJING’S PRESSURE
Indonesia’s new maritime consciousness has been shaped by a number of factors. The growing economic integration between East and West Asia and the strategic significance of the sea lines of communication between the two regions have made Jakarta an enthusiastic proponent of the “Indo-Pacific” as a new geopolitical construct.

It is not difficult to see why. All the straits linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans travel along or across Indonesian waters. This geographic awareness has been reinforced by China’s muscular assertion of its territorial claims, which cover almost all the waters of the South China Sea that is bordered on the south by Indonesia. Parts of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea overlap with Beijing’s claims. As China’s capacity to patrol and control the waters of the South China Sea has grown, so has the frequency of incidents between Chinese maritime authorities and Indonesian fishermen.

Determined to affirm Indonesia’s sovereignty, Jokowi plans to raise Indonesia’s defence spending to 1.5 per cent of GDP; if implemented, it will mark a 70 per cent increase over the current levels. As it seeks to quickly modernise its navy, secure its waters and emerge as a regional maritime power, Indonesia is looking for partners. The United States, which had an arms embargo against Jakarta for many years, and Japan are all set to boost Indonesia’s naval capabilities.

But New Delhi is yet to get its defence engagement with Jakarta in shape. Through the decade-long UPA rule, Delhi and Jakarta had been talking about expanding bilateral defence cooperation. But progress had been rather slow thanks to A.K. Antony’s dysfunctional defence policies. Modi and his defence minister, Arun Jaitley, can do a lot better if they emulate Nehru, who sought to build expansive defence cooperation with Indonesia in the 1950s.

Chinese takeaway: Modi and Jokowi | The Indian Express | Page 99

 

[Nike]

China Turns to Southeast Asia

Source: Getty
Zhao KejinARTICLE MARCH 28, 2014
SUMMARY
A primary focus of China’s next era of foreign policy will be emerging powers in Southeast Asia. Indonesia in particular will take center stage in China’s new approach to the region.
RELATED TOPICS

• China and South Asia
• China and the Developing World
• China’s New Diplomacy

When Chinese President Xi Jinping coined the phrase “a new type of relationship between major countries” during a summit with U.S. President Barack Obama in June 2013, everyone assumed he was talking about relations with the United States. But the Chinese leadership may have had other countries in mind, and these nations may prove even more vital for China.

Xi’s foreign visits since the summit—as well as those of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang—have demonstrated that a primary focus of China’s next era of foreign policy will be emerging and neighboring powers, especially in Southeast Asia. Indonesia in particular will take center stage in China’s new approach to the region.

Statements by Chinese leaders confirm Beijing’s interest in turning to its Southeast Asian neighbors. At the World Peace Forum, a high-level international security meeting that took place shortly after the U.S.-China summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi affirmed that Chinese diplomacy will “take its surrounding region as a priority” with the goal of fostering “a more peaceful, stable and prosperous neighboring environment.”


This statement kick-started a new foreign policy in which Beijing is using economic investments to strengthen bilateral relations with countries in Southeast Asia. The Chinese leadership has emphasized on many occasions that China will promote a new initiative of building a “community of common destiny” with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This initiative may come to define the regional arrangement, like the European Union or the North American Free Trade Agreement.

This focus on improving bilateral ties and forging strategic partnerships with key neighbors may be one of the most
substantial changes in Chinese diplomacy during Xi’s term. Ever since its admission into the World Trade Organization in 2001, Beijing has been increasing China’s presence at the multilateral level. And because multilateralism provides a platform for cooperation with other powers, China will likely continue to strengthen its voice in the multilateral organizations it is member of, such as ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). However, multilateralism tends to privilege the status quo. All members of a multilateral institution are required to abide by the organization’s rules and norms. As a rising and emerging power, China needs a more flexible arrangement to accommodate its expanded interests, so Xi is putting greater emphasis on bilateral concerns.

China’s new approach to its Southeast Asian neighbors is determined in part by the individual countries’ relationships with Beijing and with the other major world power, the United States. When it comes to close U.S. allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, China has adopted a rather hardline policy with little flexibility on principle issues. Because Beijing sees minimal potential to improve relations with states that are so firmly in the U.S. camp, it is unlikely to alter this approach.

China’s policies toward those countries that already cooperate closely with Beijing on economic matters, such as India and Vietnam, are also unlikely to change. Overlapping economic interests firmly link Beijing to New Delhi and Hanoi. As a result, China does not spend considerable time focusing on its relations with India and Vietnam beyond ensuring that they do not worsen.

Beijing pays more attention to China’s relationships with South Korea, Thailand, and Australia because bolstering these ties has the potential to advance China’s economic interests. These countries have found a way to successfully maintain relationships with Beijing and Washington by balancing strong security alliances with the United States and robust trade ties with China.

China seeks to strengthen its economic relations with these nations without challenging their alliances with the United States. During a visit to Thailand, Premier Li grabbed headlines as the first foreign official to address the Thai parliament in at least ten years. In his speech, he pledged that China would import 1 million tons of Thai rice over the next five years (it imported 143,000 metric tons last year) and increase imports of Thai rubber. He also highlighted China’s desire to invest in a high-speed railway in Thailand.

But while increasing economic cooperation with these nations is one goal of China’s new foreign policy, Beijing’s primary focus is elsewhere in Southeast Asia. China is concentrating most of its efforts on improving bilateral relations with Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. These countries are particularly attractive to Beijing because they have no formal alliance with the United States, and they already share significant economic interests with China. Beijing sees the potential for even more Chinese investment in all four states.

The Chinese leadership has made efforts to develop friendlier relations with these nations at the multilateral and bilateral levels. During a meeting with General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the president of Indonesia, in October 2013, Xi announced China’s intent to establish an Asian infrastructure investment bank to drive China’s new diplomatic goal of proactively providing public goods to the region at large. The bank is intended to promote Chinese investments in creating infrastructure throughout the region, but its primary focus will be on building transportation infrastructure in these key nations.

Many of Beijing’s bilateral efforts have focused on strengthening ties with Indonesia, a cornerstone of China’s turn to Southeast Asia. Xi concluded a tour of the region in fall 2013 with a high-profile visit to Indonesia, where he was the first foreign leader to address the Indonesian parliament. He emphasized the need for a stronger bilateral relationship as well as the need to improve China-ASEAN relations overall.

It is no surprise that Xi is paying so much attention to Indonesia. In part, this is due to China’s long-standing philosophy that developing countries need to help other developing countries. But it is also because increasing economic cooperation with Jakarta could greatly benefit Beijing. As the largest economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is a growing market with fewer trade restrictions than the West, and it represents tremendous potential for Chinese exporters.

Indonesia is also in a very strategic position at the geopolitical level. For Washington’s rebalancing strategy toward Asia to succeed, the United States will need to draw Indonesia closer to its side. The U.S. government shutdown forced Obama to miss two important regional gatherings in late 2013, the East Asia Summit and the APEC meeting. His absence was noted with criticism by many Southeast Asian countries.

At the same time, Xi is hoping to draw Indonesia closer to China. Beijing wants to be able to count on Jakarta’s support whenever disputes arise with the United States on issues such as the South China Sea territorial disputes or disagreements over military exercises.

And for China, courting Indonesia is about more than just keeping the United States in check. Forming more robust ties with Indonesia is critical to Beijing’s overall success in developing stronger relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors. Many ASEAN member countries remain ambivalent about and unenthused by China’s friendly overtures, but they may be more open to improving relations with Beijing if Jakarta were to do so first. Further development of the interconnected regional economic networks between Beijing and Jakarta would provide these nations with improved infrastructure, preferential economic rights, and other benefits that would smooth the path to a closer relationship with China.

In addition to the potential economic opportunities and geopolitical benefits of closer ties with Jakarta, Beijing recognizes that Indonesia is looking for a security guarantee from a bigger power, like China or the United States—and that the same is true of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Malaysia. Even the strongest of these nations, Indonesia, does not have the military force to defend itself. China would benefit from convincing these countries to pursue security alliances with Beijing instead of with Washington.

The United States already has an advantage in this matter because of its more advanced military technology, but it does not have enough economic power to sustain a stronger strategic relationship with these nations. Here, China has the advantage.

And now, after the Chinese leadership’s successful goodwill trips to Southeast Asia, it is up to Beijing to maintain that advantage. To keep these countries from simultaneously pursuing a security commitment from the United States and an economic relationship with China, it is imperative for Xi to draft a new regional strategy to consolidate China’s advantage in Southeast Asia.

This article was published as part of the Window into China series

China Turns to Southeast Asia-Carnegie-Tsinghua Center

 

[Kyusuibu Honbu]

Indian relations with Indonesia in UPA Govt was limited, though Yudhoyono was looking for deeper ties.

Hope that becomes possible with Modi and Jokowi

 

[Nike]

it's a pity since a large potential benefit in which can be reap by both countries by doing intensive bilateral cooperation, Indonesia-China has prove that, and now annually Indonesia-China bilateral trades can reach more than 65 billion dollar and it will surpassing 120 billion dollar US at the end of this decade

 

[Kolaps]

US and India want East Asia to became a war zone like Middle East.



There's no doubt that India will became a world superpower to replace USA and the future China soon enough.

I heard India will replace US troops in Afghanistan.


For Indonesia, their choice is quite limited, between USA and India.

As China is just a temporary superpower before the rise of India.

 

[scholseys]

C Raja Mohan is a cunning troll, i take his words with a inch of salt.

 

[TaiShang]

Chinese companies cater to Indonesia's need of infrastructure
2014-10-27

Agribusinesses like Mazhongdu International and Hainan Baisha control enormous tracts of land. China Railway Construction wants to build a fast link between the capital, Jakarta, and the airport.

In July, Sinohydro announced that it is working with an Indonesian consortium to build the second-largest dam in the country. The Export-Import Bank of China is bankrolling the project.

When President Xi Jinping visited Indonesia in October 2013, he left behind signed deals for financing and investment from Chinese companies worth almost $33 billion, an Indonesian government official said at the time. In a sign of the growing links between the two countries, Xi was the first foreign leader to speak to Indonesian lawmakers in parliament.

Xi said he wants trade between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to hit $1 trillion by 2020, three times as much as in 2012. ASEAN's 10 members have a population of around 600 million, and a little less than half of those people are in Indonesia.

Xi said bilateral trade between China and Indonesia should hit $80 billion next year. It was more than $66 billion in 2013.

As the number of Chinese companies keeps growing, the investment has become more diversified and much larger.

"Many of the companies have built their facilities in Indonesia and some manufacturing companies have transferred Indonesia into a part of the industrial chain instead of just a foreign market," says Liu from the China Chamber of Commerce.

 

[Gandhara]

India and Indoneshia should promote more trade between our countries. Also form a naval alliance to patrol malacaa strait to facilitate
trade and to check rough chinese state.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

C Raja Mohan is a cunning troll, i take his words with a inch of salt.

Actually you need to take a sack-full of Epsom Salt for your affliction.......that 'inch of salt' will simply not work.

 

[Steakhouse]

Indonesia won't ally with either India or China to hurt Indonesia long term national interest, Indonesia will work with both India and China to increase their economy growth and mostly stay neutral in the conflict between India and China.