China's Missile Defense System

[Emperor Palpatine]

What is happening here is deceit. Simple as that. The National Missile Defense program is not static. It will continue to test and to have failures and make progress. The deceit is that a 'snapshot' in time of the program is taken and is presented as if the program has reached its technical limits.

To quote MIT's Bill Delaney...

MIT Lincoln Laboratory: News: William Delaney and Eric Evans appointed to the Defense Science Board


...When he was asked about the feasibility of an NMD-like program...



All the items Delaney listed are, in a manner of speaking, against 'known' threats. The characteristics of these threats are constant and predictable as they are defined by nature itself. A ballistic missile is a manmade threat but even so, this threat's characteristics are also defined and governed by nature's laws and therefore it can be countered.

For example...


If a MIRV-ed bus is targeting multiple ground points, then assuming we have a functional area defense system like the Patriot or THAAD or the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, each ground defense station can attempt terminal phase intercept as designed. But if a MIRV-ed bus is used against a single target, then there is a motion control issue. The bus would be in a ballistic trajectory and all releases would be in that trajectory but at different points. Each release must be sufficiently far apart -- timed interval -- that the warheads do not interfere or even destroy each other. It is to the absurd that an attacker would send thousands or hundreds of warheads against a single target. Ten MIRVs is more realistic but even that is highly speculative. That mean that as long as the defense is able to distinguish several MIRVs in a descent, the defense will be able to launch several interceptors.

ROFL....there is no arguing with gambit

 

[Martian2]

What is happening here is deceit. Simple as that. The National Missile Defense program is not static. It will continue to test and to have failures and make progress. The deceit is that a 'snapshot' in time of the program is taken and is presented as if the program has reached its technical limits.

It is "deceitful" to make a false/strawman argument that "the program is taken and is presented as if the program has reached its technical limits" and then say, "that is not so." No one has suggested that U.S. NMD technology has reached its limits.

However, it is apparent to everyone (except some die-hards; you know who you are) that U.S. NMD technology is currently highly-deficient and that major potential adversaries may have the upper hand.

1) U.S. NMD is highly experimental. The failed test in February is proof of the experimental nature of U.S. NMD technology (see Air Force: Test missile misses its Pacific target | World news | guardian.co.uk).

2) The success rate of U.S. NMD under actual battlefield conditions cannot be reliably projected. U.S. NMD is a very risky and unproven system at best.

Anti-ballistic missile - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"However NMD real-world effectiveness against longer range ICBMs is less clear because they are much faster and a single warhead much harder to hit. Furthermore, warheads are likely to be accompanied by sophisticated penetration aids that are difficult to defeat."

3) I think it is amateurish to propose using Patriot and THAAD for the intercept of ICBM warheads that travel at much faster speeds than SRBM or IRBM warheads.

Intercontinental ballistic missile - New World Encyclopedia

"ICBMs are differentiated by having greater range and speed than other ballistic missiles: intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and the newly-named theatre ballistic missiles.
...
reentry phase (starting at an altitude of 100 km) — 2 minutes — impact is at a speed of up to 4 km/s (for early ICBMs less than 1 km/s); see also maneuverable reentry vehicle."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terminal_High_Altitude_Area_Defense

"Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), formerly Theater High Altitude Area Defense, is a United States Army system to shoot down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles using a hit-to-kill approach. The missile carries no warhead but relies on the kinetic energy of the impact. THAAD was designed to hit Scuds and similar weapons, but also has a limited capability against ICBMs."

4) The Federation of American Scientists has highlighted serious problems with attempting to intercept a terminal phase warhead. The countermeasures available include the following:

Terminal Phase Defense

"Several countermeasures are available to combat a terminal-phase defense:

* Speed: Early re-entry vehicle designs used blunt shapes which caused them to decelerate significantly during re-entry. Modern re-entry vehicles are shaped like ice cream cones to minimize aerodynamic drag. While the primary purpose of high-speed re-entry is to improve accuracy, it carries the collateral benefit of reducing the duration of exposure to terminal missile defense.

* Maneuvers: It is possible to design a re-entry vehicle that will perform simple but unpredictable and intense maneuvers upon re-entry. All that is required is that the re-entry vehicle’s center of gravity and center of drag not line up along its trajectory. This can be done by using a slightly bent nose, a small fin at the rear, or an internal weight that is moved laterally during re-entry. In the 1970s the U.S. developed a maneuvering re-entry vehicle, the Mark 500, for the Trident 1 SLBM. Its tests were successful and included 200G maneuvers that would severely challenge any defense. The Mark 500 was not deployed because the Soviet missile defense system did not warrant it. Maneuvering re-entry vehicles of this type sacrifice some accuracy and payload, but for a rogue state attack these are probably not significant. Whether China or a rogue state could now equal such thirty year old American technology requires further study.

* Ladder down: A nuclear warhead exploding in the upper atmosphere would create a cloud of ionized gas that would be opaque to radar for several minutes. One tactic available to the offense would be to use such a precursor explosion to mask a following re-entry vehicle. The second re-entry vehicle would become visible after passing through the cloud, but the time remaining for the defense would be significantly reduced. Possibly a second, lower, precursor could be used to ensure penetration by the third re-entry vehicle."

5) Decoys problem.

NTI: Issue Brief: A Look at National Missile Defense and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System

"The NIC report stated that a country capable of fielding an ICBM would be capable of developing countermeasures.[20] A Union of Concerned Scientists/ Massachusetts Institute of Technology (UCS/MIT) report that focused on relatively unsophisticated countermeasures concluded that these countermeasures would have a significant impact on the effectiveness of GMD.[21] Rather than focusing on making decoys resemble a warhead, they considered countermeasures that would disguise the warhead to make it look like a decoy, which would be a simpler prospect. Also, the warhead could be covered in a liquid nitrogen-cooled metal shroud, which would make it more difficult for the EKV to find the warhead in time to maneuver into its path. These two types of countermeasures require the EKV to be highly proficient at not only detecting a warhead, which may be disguised or hidden, but also distinguishing it from decoys that are specifically designed to fool it."

In conclusion, U.S. NMD technology can be used to intimidate unsophisticated countries like North Korea and Iran. U.S. NMD technology and its plethora of problems are almost useless against a major military and technological power (e.g. "near-peer") like China.

 

[applesauce]

What is happening here is deceit. Simple as that. The National Missile Defense program is not static. It will continue to test and to have failures and make progress. The deceit is that a 'snapshot' in time of the program is taken and is presented as if the program has reached its technical limits.

To quote MIT's Bill Delaney...

MIT Lincoln Laboratory: News: William Delaney and Eric Evans appointed to the Defense Science Board


...When he was asked about the feasibility of an NMD-like program...



All the items Delaney listed are, in a manner of speaking, against 'known' threats. The characteristics of these threats are constant and predictable as they are defined by nature itself. A ballistic missile is a manmade threat but even so, this threat's characteristics are also defined and governed by nature's laws and therefore it can be countered.

For example...


If a MIRV-ed bus is targeting multiple ground points, then assuming we have a functional area defense system like the Patriot or THAAD or the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, each ground defense station can attempt terminal phase intercept as designed. But if a MIRV-ed bus is used against a single target, then there is a motion control issue. The bus would be in a ballistic trajectory and all releases would be in that trajectory but at different points. Each release must be sufficiently far apart -- timed interval -- that the warheads do not interfere or even destroy each other. It is to the absurd that an attacker would send thousands or hundreds of warheads against a single target. Ten MIRVs is more realistic but even that is highly speculative. That mean that as long as the defense is able to distinguish several MIRVs in a descent, the defense will be able to launch several interceptors.

1. no one made the conclusion that the current NMD is at its limit

2. so basically your saying currently, as in at this time. there is no NMD effective enough where deploying defenses come anywhere near the price of making more missiles.

3. the talk about future developments is for another day


Side note: suppose i send merely 2 live warheads against a target.
your post fails to account for decoys which need not worry about interfering with or destroying live warhead and maintaining decoys is cheap, very cheap. so, now the defense will be facing large numbers of targets and given that the current system,the patriot and thaad all have only a partial capability to engage ICBM's and are not proven against the speed of the reentry vehicles and the fact that an adversary can make maneuverable warheads that does not follow a ballistic trajectory means again no current NMD is effective in defending against a moderately capable opponent, which was the point of first post, no current development nor any in the near foreseeable future can be use to defend against a moderately prepared opponent.

other side note: this is not to say that in the future things cant change but that currently and in the near future the "fanboys" need not worry.

 

[applesauce]

ROFL....there is no arguing with gambit

oh and gambit, speaking of fanboys, congratulations you seem to have one right there

 

[Martian2]

There are serious technical problems (e.g. failure to shoot down a ballistic missile under almost ideal test conditions) and countermeasures facing an existing BMD system. The following article is focused primarily on China's ASBM (i.e. anti-ship ballistic missile or "carrier killer").

However, we are interested in subsections (2) and (3) on China's MARV (i.e. "a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV)"). By the way, you have to click on the newslink and go to the website to access the hotlinks. The most important point is that China's "Dong Feng MARV warhead is designed to evade Patriot and standard defense missiles."

DONG FENG MARV WARHEAD IS DESIGNED TO EVADE PATRIOT AND STANDARD DEFENSE MISSILES

http://www.informationdissemination.net/20...evelopment.html

"Saturday, March 28, 2009
PLAN ASBM development

I was contacted by Galrahn to read over a Chinese blog entry on PLAN's ASBM development (found here) and post my thoughts on it. I think that before you look further, there are some other good reads on this topic. Sean O'Connor has posted one of the better summaries on this regarding to OTH radar and ASBM threat. I have also written an entry in the past regarding ASBM threat, but it's really not that well researched. That one was based on an article that stated China has solved the difficulties surrounding hitting a moving target with a ballistic missile.

I think that the blog entry I read was definitely the best researched work on PLAN's ASBM plans. It listed many research papers that were written in Chinese and published years ago. As a result of that, I cannot possibly confirm that some of the things I've read are actually accurate. The sources that I can confirm on the Internet do seem to conform to what he was stating. I think in order to continue, it would be beneficial to read some of the resources that he mentioned. The include:
Sinodefence's Space Page
Sinodefence's Missile Page
Xianglong UAV Page
Yilong UAV page
The first one is important, because you can look through the current and future development in China's space industry. It's important to look through the communication, IMINT and EO satellites that China will use in this system.
In the second link, the important missiles to look for are DF-21 and possibly DF-15. In the third link, it lists China's probably most recent venture into HALE UAV. It's about 2/3 the size of Global Hawk or maybe even smaller. We don't have any figure on its endurance, but one would guess it's much less than that of Global Hawk due to the smaller size and less efficient engine. Although at this point, I would think that PLAN would be fine with an Asian Hawk. And the final link is an entry with information on China's version of Predator MALE UAV. The stats listed on that page were actually from its ddescription in the Zhuhai airshow, so I can verify that they are accurate. The two UAVs are both developed by Chengdu AC (the developer of J-10), so my guess is that Xianglong's endurance is comparable to Yilong (around 20 hours).

Reading through those links + Sean's blog entry are important in appreciating the rest of the ASBM system. I will try to make this out in Q&A format:

1. What caused China to start develop this system?
There are two main causes that drove this project. The first one is USA's Pershing II project. I guess this showed PLA the accuracy that can be achieved through MaRV warhead and active radar guidance. The second one is the Taiwan incident in 1996 when PLA's powerlessness against USN carrier group was on full display.

2. When did the project start and where is it now?
China probably started researching on MaRV right after Pershing II was deployed in 1984. By 1991, China had finished research on MaRV. According to the blog, there was a famous research paper in 1994 about attacking fixed target using MaRV technology. In 1999's national pride parade, they showed a missile with all the basic technology needed for the missile part of the ASBM system. If we look at the current status of the satellite constellations and reconnaissance platforms, we could probably say that the system has achieved some operational capability. The entire system needed for ASBM probably will not get set up until all the space assets and UAVs are online next decade.

3. Which missile are they using and what kind of improvements are they putting in?
It looks like DF-21 is the missile that ASBM is based on. It uses a solid propellant, is road-mobile, widely deployed and also have recently been improved to DF-21C. It's range of around 2000 km would perfectly cover the areas where future conflict is likely to be fought. Its range also would cover most of the areas that China's OTH-B radar would cover. It is also large enough to carry a large warhead needed to inflict damage on carrier while also holding a more complex guidance/seeker. They have put a MaRV warhead on DF-21 for maneuverability. In order to improve the penetration capability, they have added a third stage to it to provide unpredictable movement (I think the blog described it as some kind of oscillation). They have apparently made modifications to the warhead in order to lower its radar signature. They have also added a new multi-mode seeker that apparently has an active, passive radar and infrared seeker (I'm not sure how that works). It didn't mention how the missile would counter ESM of the fleet except for improving the seeker and getting more updated info from the sources that provided it initial targeting data.

4. What are the sources that provide targeting data for this ASBM system?
The blog basically listed 5 sources and they are:

* Reconnaissance Satellites - I think you can look at the Ziyuan and Yaogan series of satellites that have EO, CCD and SAR sensors as possibilities here. They could also be talking about the FY series, which is actually expected to be a constellation of Earth Observation satellites. I think it's important that in the 18th Committee on Earth Observation Satellites plenary and workshop in 2004, they announced they would launch over 100 Earth Observation satellites. I don't know enough about this to comment on which specific satellites I think will be used for scanning ships, but the blog did mention that China has used FY-2 series of satellites to track movement of targets. Another possibility is launching many short duration, micro-Earth Observation satellites in times of conflict. It mentioned that China can launch a 100 kg satellite on 12 hours notice. In peace mission 05. They launched an experimental satellite on August 2nd for detection/science experiment work. This operated for 27 days and returned to earth on August 29th after the conclusion of the exercise.
* Elint satellites - It mentioned something like USN's White Cloud Spaceborne ELINT System. The problem I have with this is that I can't find any mention of China having similar system anywhere.
* OTH Radar - Has a range of 800 to 3000 km. The accuracy in targetting is around 20 to 30 km. This can be improved to 2 to 3 km with improved algorithm. OTH radar can work with the recon satellites to provide more accurate targeting info.
* UAV - As mentioned above, China does have a robust UAV program going right now including the aforementioned XiangLong program. As we've seen in the Zhuhai airshow, they have numerous HALE and MALE UAV projects going. The major problem currently with Chinese UAV programs is that they simply don't have many small turbojet/turbofan engine series. As a result of having to work with what they have, the major design institute in AVIC-1 can't come up with the most optimal UAVs. I think that this will change in the next 10 years, so this part of the targeting system is behind recon satellites and OTH radar.
* Radio post - This is problem the most confusing one for me. The blog talked about working with elint satellites (which I don't think they have) to get the location of the carrier group through communications between ships and satellites/aerial assets.


5. How does the launching/attacking process work?
I think that in times of war, they would launch many micro-EO satellites that have short duration to increase reconnaissance in the area approaching Taiwan. Similar to US, they would have HALE UAVs to do advanced scouting in front of the war zone. The OTH radar will give the base initial idea of incoming fleet. This information would be combined with data of the recon satellites to provide a more precise and more accurate targeting data. The missile would be launched to the estimated position based on initial position + velocity, but this would obviously be off. Although, I think the movement of the carrier group will not be overwhelming. If the target is 2000 km away and the missile is traveling at mach 10 (343 * 3.6 * 10 = 10,000+ km/h) , it would get there in less than 12 minutes. During that time, if the fleet moves at 30 knots, it would move at most 6 knots or around 11 km from the original location. Still, if we add this to the initial precision problems of OTH radar + EO satellite, this could still cause the fleet to be outside the scanning area of the ASBM. In the cruising process, the missile would have to continuously communicate with the base through those new Data relay satellites (like TianLian-1 that they launched recently) to get more improve the precision. The ASBM will also likely veer off the path at this time, so it would need communication with Beidou-2 constellation in order to keep it on track. When it gets close to the target, the blog talked about 3 phases in its attack: high altitude guidance, high altitude gliding and low altitude guidance. I'm really not sure how accurate is the blog's description of the process. Its general theme is slowing down the speed of the missile as it gets closer to the target to maybe give the seeker more time to lock on to target and make unpredictable movements to penetrate defense.

6. What is the operational status of this system?
From all the past sources I've read, it seems like PLAN already considers this system to have achieved IOC. Normally, I don't read about a certain capability developed in a Chinese military magazine until after it is attained. From reading through different sources, it looks like IOC was probably in 2007 or 2008. As mentioned before, more elements in the system like UAV and satellites are getting added as time goes on, so I look at this as a continuously evolutionary process.

7. How beneficial is this system?
That I really would have no idea. I wouldn't even know how much damage would 1 missile cause on a carrier. I would think that if this system can even temporarily put one carrier out of commission and/or keep carrier groups further out from the mainland, it would've achieved its purpose.

8. Are there other launch platforms to this system?
I always thought that an-air launched version of ASBM from JH-7A is possible. There are certainly a large variety of short range ballistic missiles that JH-7A would be able to carry and provide updates for. I have not thought about launching ASBM from a SSBN, since that could easily be mistaken for a nuclear missile.

That's about it. I think a lot of resources on this are available to form an opinion.

Posted by Feng at 7:02 PM"

 

[gambit]

1. no one made the conclusion that the current NMD is at its limit

The jump to conclusion is evident enough.

2. so basically your saying currently, as in at this time. there is no NMD effective enough where deploying defenses come anywhere near the price of making more missiles.

Yes...But currently, our overwhelming superiority over China regarding operational nuclear warheads is sufficient deterrence while we develop a cost effective BMD system. How much does each of China's nuclear or even conventional warhead cost? Remember, a missile is essentially a throwaway weapon. You are discarding the launch vehicle and the ammunition with each shot, like discarding the pistol after every round. Each THAAD cost about $2 mil.

Trident

Flyaway Unit Cost $: 10.300 million. in: 1982 unit dollars.

That is for the Trident for an example. Am willing to bet that we could construct a whole THAAD or SM-3 much faster than China could assemble a Trident equivalent warhead, not counting the missile to carry it.

3. the talk about future developments is for another day

Scared...I see.

Side note: suppose i send merely 2 live warheads against a target.
your post fails to account for decoys which need not worry about interfering with or destroying live warhead and maintaining decoys is cheap, very cheap. so, now the defense will be facing large numbers of targets and given that the current system,the patriot and thaad all have only a partial capability to engage ICBM's and are not proven against the speed of the reentry vehicles and the fact that an adversary can make maneuverable warheads that does not follow a ballistic trajectory means again no current NMD is effective in defending against a moderately capable opponent, which was the point of first post, no current development nor any in the near foreseeable future can be use to defend against a moderately prepared opponent.

other side note: this is not to say that in the future things cant change but that currently and in the near future the "fanboys" need not worry.

There is no need for me to rebut you about 'decoys'. As I pointed out with Delaney's comment, this is about engineering problems and solutions. Everything listed in this thread so far has been about failures and nothing about successes. But it is funny that after the failures have been listed and ridiculed, you Chinese fanboys boasted about how China is following in the same footsteps as the Americans. Why do you follow failures? Or is it more likely that you guys are afraid of our successes?

You focus on current level of NMD technology but you talk as if China is capable of sending thousands of nuclear warheads to overwhelm the current NMD defense level. That make no sense. Examine carefully on the failures' details. They are just as significant as the successes because failures ALWAYS point to deficiencies in the program and how to correct them to have proof of concept. The joke is on the Chinese fanboys here because no matter how many flaws they point out, China cannot exploit those flaws, and the more you focus on them the more it will look like petty jealousy on your part.

 

[gambit]

It is "deceitful" to make a false/strawman argument that "the program is taken and is presented as if the program has reached its technical limits" and then say, "that is not so." No one has suggested that U.S. NMD technology has reached its limits.

You seem to have a reading comprehension problem. I never said that the NMD program has reached its technical limits. I said YOU implied so with this list of program flaws and test failures.

However, it is apparent to everyone (except some die-hards; you know who you are) that U.S. NMD technology is currently highly-deficient and that major potential adversaries may have the upper hand.

No...It is apparent to everyone, or at least anyone who has experience in developmental testing regimes, that all programs have their successes and failures. Highly-deficient? Show us all a single weapons system, a single new car design, a single new widget that is immune to the ridiculous charge of being 'highly-deficient'. An adversary 'may' have the upper hand? There goes that word 'may' and its inevitable inflation again.

1) U.S. NMD is highly experimental. The failed test in February is proof of the experimental nature of U.S. NMD technology (see Air Force: Test missile misses its Pacific target | World news | guardian.co.uk).

Har...No one deny that. But potential adversaries would love to focus on that as distraction from their own incapability to do the same.

2) The success rate of U.S. NMD under actual battlefield conditions cannot be reliably projected. U.S. NMD is a very risky and unproven system at best.

Meaningless statement. Same can be said for China's laser program. Or even the PS-XX 'stealth' fighter program. Am sure you can guess what the 'PS' stands for. This is funny. The DF-21 is touted by clueless Chinese fanboys as all but certain to be a success but the US NMD is 'unproven' and 'unreliable'.

"However NMD real-world effectiveness against longer range ICBMs is less clear because they are much faster and a single warhead much harder to hit. Furthermore, warheads are likely to be accompanied by sophisticated penetration aids that are difficult to defeat."

Depends on the pen-aids.

3) I think it is amateurish to propose using Patriot and THAAD for the intercept of ICBM warheads that travel at much faster speeds than SRBM or IRBM warheads.

And I think it is amateurish and grossly premature to proclaim that the program is a failure without knowing even the basic facts.

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), formerly Theater High Altitude Area Defense, is a United States Army system to shoot down short- and medium-range ballistic missiles using a hit-to-kill approach. The missile carries no warhead but relies on the kinetic energy of the impact. THAAD was designed to hit Scuds and similar weapons, but also has a limited capability against ICBMs."

The keywords are 'terminal' and 'high altitude'. Ballistic warheads have a 'terminal' phase, which is the descent phase. Patriot and THAAD are designed to hit the warhead, assume singular for simplicity's sake, at this phase.

4) The Federation of American Scientists has highlighted serious problems with attempting to intercept a terminal phase warhead.

Problems? Are they insurmountable as Chinese fanboys would like the readers to believe?

The countermeasures available include the following:

Terminal Phase Defense

"Several countermeasures are available to combat a terminal-phase defense:

* Speed: Early re-entry vehicle designs used blunt shapes which caused them to decelerate significantly during re-entry. Modern re-entry vehicles are shaped like ice cream cones to minimize aerodynamic drag. While the primary purpose of high-speed re-entry is to improve accuracy, it carries the collateral benefit of reducing the duration of exposure to terminal missile defense.

The phrasing: 'reducing the duration of exposure to terminal missile defense.' means compress or even eliminate the response time for the defense. The problem for ANY defense, be it for a soldier or missile defense, is threat identification and discrimination. Both items require time. So it would behoove the defense to as quickly as possible ID and discriminate the descending warhead. We will leave this subject as is -- for now.

Intercontinental ballistic missile - New World Encyclopedia

"ICBMs are differentiated by having greater range and speed than other ballistic missiles: intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and the newly-named theatre ballistic missiles.
...
reentry phase (starting at an altitude of 100 km) — 2 minutes — impact is at a speed of up to 4 km/s (for early ICBMs less than 1 km/s); see also maneuverable reentry vehicle."

The major issue here is closing velocity between interceptor and threat. We already have closing velocity solution with air-air missiles.

* Maneuvers: It is possible to design a re-entry vehicle that will perform simple but unpredictable and intense maneuvers upon re-entry. All that is required is that the re-entry vehicle’s center of gravity and center of drag not line up along its trajectory. This can be done by using a slightly bent nose, a small fin at the rear, or an internal weight that is moved laterally during re-entry. In the 1970s the U.S. developed a maneuvering re-entry vehicle, the Mark 500, for the Trident 1 SLBM. Its tests were successful and included 200G maneuvers that would severely challenge any defense. The Mark 500 was not deployed because the Soviet missile defense system did not warrant it. Maneuvering re-entry vehicles of this type sacrifice some accuracy and payload, but for a rogue state attack these are probably not significant. Whether China or a rogue state could now equal such thirty year old American technology requires further study.

There is a great difference between a programmed maneuver and a maneuver that is in response to a threat. For the descending warhead, the threat is the interceptor, assuming a ground based missile defense. To make an unpowered warhead responsive to threat, it would need active sensor-guidance-control system that would demand a compromise of either payload or MIRV count. But even if the warhead is able to maneuver, either by programming or responsive, there is a point where the warhead cannot maneuver in order to get a fix on the ground target and the distance or altitude between this point and the ground is where an interceptor can get a fix on the warhead. Of course, the shorter this distance, or the lower this altitude, the more difficult it will be for the interceptor to have a hit. Difficult but not impossible.

* Ladder down: A nuclear warhead exploding in the upper atmosphere would create a cloud of ionized gas that would be opaque to radar for several minutes. One tactic available to the offense would be to use such a precursor explosion to mask a following re-entry vehicle. The second re-entry vehicle would become visible after passing through the cloud, but the time remaining for the defense would be significantly reduced. Possibly a second, lower, precursor could be used to ensure penetration by the third re-entry vehicle."

So the cost here is up to three nuclear warheads against one target? After the first nuclear detonation goes, the resultant radar blanket would affect the second warhead's radar guidance as well, correct? And when the second warhead passes through the nuclear cloud, how is it protected from that nuclear environment? And if that second warhead survive, when it emerges it would be visible to ground radar. Who the hell dreamed up this absurd scheme?

5) Decoys problem.

NTI: Issue Brief: A Look at National Missile Defense and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System

"The NIC report stated that a country capable of fielding an ICBM would be capable of developing countermeasures.[20] A Union of Concerned Scientists/ Massachusetts Institute of Technology (UCS/MIT) report that focused on relatively unsophisticated countermeasures concluded that these countermeasures would have a significant impact on the effectiveness of GMD.[21] Rather than focusing on making decoys resemble a warhead, they considered countermeasures that would disguise the warhead to make it look like a decoy, which would be a simpler prospect. Also, the warhead could be covered in a liquid nitrogen-cooled metal shroud, which would make it more difficult for the EKV to find the warhead in time to maneuver into its path. These two types of countermeasures require the EKV to be highly proficient at not only detecting a warhead, which may be disguised or hidden, but also distinguishing it from decoys that are specifically designed to fool it."

This is absurd. The way to distinguish a decoy from the real warhead is not how they 'look' differently but how they BEHAVE differently. Decoys are generally lighter in mass and against less sophisticated radars, the decoys and the warhead will have very similar initial behaviors once they are discharged from the bus. But once they become endoatmospheric, each decoy's lighter mass and divergent descent path would be distinguishable by modern and more capable radars. Decoys versus warhead discernment is a problem, but not an insurmountable one and we are much further ahead than China in sensor technology.

In conclusion, U.S. NMD technology can be used to intimidate unsophisticated countries like North Korea and Iran. U.S. NMD technology and its plethora of problems are almost useless against a major military and technological power (e.g. "near-peer") like China.

Seriously flawed 'conclusion'. When the Soviet Union existed, so did MAD and when Raygun announced the US was proceeding with SDI, the Kremlin went into a near panic. There were also no shortage of skeptics about SDI, in and outside of the Soviet Union and within the Soviet scientific community the division was split, with the ones who have been to the US on various Party sanctioned scientific exchanges believed the US could make 'Star Wars' operational within their lifetime. How many ballistic missiles does China have to exploit those flaws and therefore to qualify as 'near peer'?

CDI Nuclear Issues Area - Nuclear Weapons Database: China's Nuclear Delivery Systems

The Dong Feng-5 is China's only true ICBM. U.S. intelligence estimates claim that China may have as many as 100 by 2015.

One hundred ICBMs by 2015? Even if we be generous and TRIPLE that China would still be unable to exploit the flaws of the current state of NMD development. The correct conclusion is that with each success NMD's progress actually intimidate China.

 

[Martian2]

This is pretty simple. I think someone is a hypocrite.

He insists that the technology is unproven and extremely theoretical when discussing China's ASBM, which is a ballistic missile aiming to hit a giant 4-acre U.S. aircraft carrier on a 2-dimensional ocean surface and moving at 34.5 miles per hour.

On the other hand, he insists that U.S. NMD technology will soon hit a tiny warhead moving in 3-dimensional space and traveling at 4 km per second.

A wall of rhetorical text cannot obfuscate the facts and common sense.

I don't think he has any credibility.

 

[gambit]

This is pretty simple. I think someone is a hypocrite.

He insists that the technology is unproven and extremely theoretical when discussing China's ASBM, which is a ballistic missile aiming to hit a giant 4-acre U.S. aircraft carrier on a 2-dimensional ocean surface and moving at 34.5 miles per hour.

On the other hand, he insists that U.S. NMD technology will soon hit a tiny warhead moving in 3-dimensional space and traveling at 4 km per second.

A wall of rhetorical text cannot obfuscate common sense.

I don't think he has any credibility.

I gave a far better speculation of how the DF-21 could hit a moving target than anything you and your pals have brought on so far. The difference here is that the ship's movement create a larger surface displacement, aka angular difference, than a descending warhead, which is pretty much vertical and will remain that way. For the interceptor, the angular difference between it and the target actually decreases as it rises in altitude.

 

[Martian2]

Would you rather believe the Federation of American Scientists or him?

 

[Martian2]

I gave a far better speculation of how the DF-21 could hit a moving target than anything you and your pals have brought on so far. The difference here is that the ship's movement create a larger surface displacement, aka angular difference, than a descending warhead, which is pretty much vertical and will remain that way. For the interceptor, the angular difference between it and the target actually decreases as it rises in altitude.

All of you have to understand. I do not have an endless supply of time to address the rhetorical and silly arguments of anti-China cranks. I'm getting tired of this, but I will prove that he is wrong again.

Look at this picture with your eyes and don't listen to the nut. Do all of these "descending warheads" look "vertical" to you?

Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Testing of the Peacekeeper re-entry vehicles, all eight (ten capable) fired from only one missile. Each line represents the path of a warhead which, if it were live, would detonate with the explosive power of twenty-five Hiroshima-style weapons.

 

[gambit]

Look at this picture with your eyes and don't listen to the nut, do all of these "descending warheads" look "vertical" to you?

Unfreakinbelievable...!!!

The camera's position of course would show the descending warheads' trajectory as angular. But from the interceptor's perspective at it rises, the target's approach would be quite near vertical. It is about perspective. Yeah...You should be quite tired of being proved wrong by now.

 

[Martian2]

Unfreakinbelievable...!!!

The camera's position of course would show the descending warheads' trajectory as angular. But from the interceptor's perspective at it rises, the target's approach would be quite near vertical. It is about perspective. Yeah...You should be quite tired of being proved wrong by now.

What a pathetic excuse. Do you see any camera position problem in this picture of the rocket trails for a nuclear test? The rocket trails in this picture are clearly vertical. On the other hand, the trails for the Peacekeeper re-entry vehicles are clearly not vertical. Look, the guy is full of it.

Try this at home. Take eight ballpoint pens and arrange them vertically on your desk with some separation between the pens. Look at the pens from different views at desk-level (e.g. similar to the ground-level perspective of the picture). Can you duplicate the extreme angles in the Peacekeeper picture? I can't. It is not the camera.

On my desk, the pens all look vertical; just like the rocket trails in the picture of the nuclear blast.

Testing of the Peacekeeper re-entry vehicles, all eight (ten capable) fired from only one missile. Each line represents the path of a warhead which, if it were live, would detonate with the explosive power of twenty-five Hiroshima-style weapons.

 

[Martian2]

Since he won't stop making up stuff and admit that he's wrong, I'll give you more proof. Look at the picture of the terminal phase. I see an angle. How about you?

Steeljaw Scribe: Missile Defense 101 – ICBM Fundamentals

"09 May 2007
Missile Defense 101 – ICBM Fundamentals

 

[Martian2]

I will also explain the physics. Just like throwing a baseball to your friend, a missile warhead has a vertical and horizontal component to its velocity. At the top of its trajectory, a missile has no vertical velocity and only horizontal velocity. A missile has tremendous speed. You know at the top of its trajectory that it has tremendous horizontal velocity, because it is speeding towards its target on another continent.

A missile and a warhead are both very aerodynamic. Since the terminal phase only lasts 1 to 2 minutes, the aerodynamic warhead should not lose very much horizontal velocity due to air resistance. Therefore, when the warhead strikes its target, it has substantial horizontal velocity; in addition to vertical velocity.

An object, whether it's a baseball or a missile warhead, will strike the ground at an angle; unless the warhead is intentionally aimed for a near-vertical strike. (By the way, a baseball isn't very aerodynamic in comparison to an ice-cream cone-shaped warhead; the baseball will actually lose horizontal speed fairly quickly; an imperfect analogy but you get the picture.)

If you don't believe me, I suggest that you go outside and throw a baseball away from you. Does the baseball hit the ground at an angle and bounce away? Or does the baseball drop "vertically" and come to rest at the same spot where it first hit the ground? You already know the answer.