shadows888
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soon 2050 America will be minority white. The only way out is to build that Trump wall.
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China-US Geopolitics: News & Discussions
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soon 2050 America will be minority white. The only way out is to build that Trump wall.
Penguin
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Yeah, that's what it is about, giving the US the middle finger. Really, that's why you starve your own people to develop missiles to reach .... Alaska. Real clever.If showing the flag suffice it would have stopped DPRK launching missiles after missiles and now they demonstrated an IRBM to show US a middle finger. Got guts to attack Iraq under false pretense of WMD, well the world already knows our neighbor's nuclear tests are not fake so what does the US do? Keep begging China to help with the issue instead of ATTACK ATTACK ATTACK ATTACK
I don't think China can do a lot either about the disaster they've helped create called North Korea.
Jlaw
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powastick
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cloud4000
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Those Chinese that are rich are coming to US legally, but those who are not rich are coming to US illegally. Why would anyone leave China given that its economy is a dynamo; and the US, according to some, is in the state of decay?
John Reese
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Two US B-1 bombers flew over disputed waters in the East and South China Seas on Thursday, conducting a joint military operation with Japanese fighter jets amid escalating tensions with North Korea and souring relations with China.
The bombers were joined by two Japanese F-15 fighters and carried out a cooperative mission over the East China Sea -- an area both Japan and China claim as their own.
While joint flights between the two allied nations have become increasingly routine, this mission marked the first time US B-1 bombers from the Pacific Command have carried out an operation of this kind with Japanese fighters at night, according to a statement from US Pacific Air Forces.
What are Japan's options against North Korea?
"Flying and training at night with our allies in a safe, effective manner is an important capability shared between the US and Japan," said Maj. Ryan Simpson, Pacific Air Forces chief of bomber operations.
"This is a clear demonstration of our ability to conduct seamless operations with all of our allies," he added.
The Japanese Air Self Defense Force claims that the mission was not intended to send a message to any specific country despite previous face-offs in the East China Sea with Chinese ships and warplanes.
Earlier this year, US Defense Secretary James Mattis reaffirmed US commitment to defending Japan and its disputed islands.
Following the joint operation, the US B-1 bombers then flew over the South China Sea "to exercise the rights of freedom of navigation" before returning to Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.
The US has routinely challenged China's claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea and the issue has put a strain on relations between the two powerful nations for years.
"We have noted relevant reports but I have no information on this specific case, said Geng Shuang, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman on Friday.
"China has always respected and supported other countries' freedom of navigation of overflight in accordance with international law," he added. "But we are firmly opposed to saber-rattling that harms China's sovereignty and security by certain countries on the pretext of freedom of navigation and overflight."
US destroyer sails close to disputed island in the South China Sea
On Sunday, a US Navy destroyer sailed within 12 miles of a disputed island in the South China Sea that is claimed by China, a US military official told CNN.
China called the action "a serious political and military provocation." The US "stirs up trouble" and runs "in the opposite direction from countries in the region who aspire for stability, cooperation and development," the ministry statement said.
End of the honeymoon and North Korea
Thursday's demonstration of military might by the US and one of its key regional allies comes on the heels of a tense week in US-China relations, which analysts said signaled the end of the honeymoon period between the two nations that began with a summit at President Donald Trump's Mar-a-Lago resort in April.
US, China relations begin to cool as Trump's honeymoon with Xi ends
Xi said that ties with the US have been strained by "some negative factors" in a telephone conversation with Trump on Sunday following a flurry of controversial moves from the US.
"Xi Jinping stressed that since his meeting with President Trump, important results have been achieved in China-US relations," reported Chinese state media outlet CCTV.
"Meanwhile, bilateral relations have also been affected by some negative factors, for which the China side has expressed its position to the US side."
Last week, a $1.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a renegade province, was approved after months of delay, the same day as China's Dandong bank was sanctioned by the US for alleged ties to North Korea.
The US also labeled China as one of the world's worst human traffickers and challenged Beijing in the South China Sea, by sailing close to a disputed island chain that China claims.
Many took these moves as evidence of the US pursuing a harder line on the Asian superpower, likely caused by mounting frustration over a perceived lack of action by Beijing to contain North Korea.
North Korea state media celebrates 'gift' to 'American bastards'
According to the White House statement, Trump raised the growing threat of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic arsenals with the Chinese president in their phone call on Sunday.
"Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula," the White House said in a readout of the phone call.
Trump and Xi at G20 in Hamburg: Time to abandon illusions
Trump also spoke to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe by phone on Sunday, with the two pledging deeper cooperation on North Korea in the wake of growing frustrations over the rogue state.
But North Korea's successful launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on Tuesday has raised the stakes ahead of Trump and Xi's scheduled meeting at the G20 Summit on Saturday as relations between China and the United States continue to cool in the months following the February's cordial meeting between the two leaders.
Not giving up hope
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said Friday that the United States has not given up hope on China helping to solve the situation in North Korea, calling US efforts to persuade China to help a "peaceful pressure campaign."
Tillerson's statement contrasted with some of Trump's tweets, where the President has indicated he had largely given up on China's willingness to help in North Korea.
"No, we have not given up hope. I call it the peaceful pressure campaign," Tillerson said. "This is a campaign to lead us to peaceful resolution because if this fails we don't have very many good options left."
Tillerson said China's contributions have been "a bit uneven."
"China has taken significant action and then I think, for a lot of different reasons, they paused and didn't take additional action. They then have taken some steps and then they paused. ... We have remained very closely engaged with China both through our dialogues that has occurred face-to-face but also on the telephone," he said.
Tillerson added, "There is a clear understanding between the two of us on our intent and I think the sanctions action that were taken here just in the last week or ten days certainly going their attention in terms of their understanding of our resolve to bring more pressure to bear by directly going after entities doing business with North Korea, regardless of where they may be located."
CNN's Steven Jiang and Ben Wescott contributed to this report.
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/07/politics/us-bombers-japan-training-south-china-sea/index.html
The bombers were joined by two Japanese F-15 fighters and carried out a cooperative mission over the East China Sea -- an area both Japan and China claim as their own.
While joint flights between the two allied nations have become increasingly routine, this mission marked the first time US B-1 bombers from the Pacific Command have carried out an operation of this kind with Japanese fighters at night, according to a statement from US Pacific Air Forces.
What are Japan's options against North Korea?
"Flying and training at night with our allies in a safe, effective manner is an important capability shared between the US and Japan," said Maj. Ryan Simpson, Pacific Air Forces chief of bomber operations.
"This is a clear demonstration of our ability to conduct seamless operations with all of our allies," he added.
The Japanese Air Self Defense Force claims that the mission was not intended to send a message to any specific country despite previous face-offs in the East China Sea with Chinese ships and warplanes.
Earlier this year, US Defense Secretary James Mattis reaffirmed US commitment to defending Japan and its disputed islands.
Following the joint operation, the US B-1 bombers then flew over the South China Sea "to exercise the rights of freedom of navigation" before returning to Andersen Air Force Base in Guam.
The US has routinely challenged China's claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea and the issue has put a strain on relations between the two powerful nations for years.
"We have noted relevant reports but I have no information on this specific case, said Geng Shuang, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman on Friday.
"China has always respected and supported other countries' freedom of navigation of overflight in accordance with international law," he added. "But we are firmly opposed to saber-rattling that harms China's sovereignty and security by certain countries on the pretext of freedom of navigation and overflight."
US destroyer sails close to disputed island in the South China Sea
On Sunday, a US Navy destroyer sailed within 12 miles of a disputed island in the South China Sea that is claimed by China, a US military official told CNN.
China called the action "a serious political and military provocation." The US "stirs up trouble" and runs "in the opposite direction from countries in the region who aspire for stability, cooperation and development," the ministry statement said.
End of the honeymoon and North Korea
Thursday's demonstration of military might by the US and one of its key regional allies comes on the heels of a tense week in US-China relations, which analysts said signaled the end of the honeymoon period between the two nations that began with a summit at President Donald Trump's Mar-a-Lago resort in April.
US, China relations begin to cool as Trump's honeymoon with Xi ends
Xi said that ties with the US have been strained by "some negative factors" in a telephone conversation with Trump on Sunday following a flurry of controversial moves from the US.
"Xi Jinping stressed that since his meeting with President Trump, important results have been achieved in China-US relations," reported Chinese state media outlet CCTV.
"Meanwhile, bilateral relations have also been affected by some negative factors, for which the China side has expressed its position to the US side."
Last week, a $1.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a renegade province, was approved after months of delay, the same day as China's Dandong bank was sanctioned by the US for alleged ties to North Korea.
The US also labeled China as one of the world's worst human traffickers and challenged Beijing in the South China Sea, by sailing close to a disputed island chain that China claims.
Many took these moves as evidence of the US pursuing a harder line on the Asian superpower, likely caused by mounting frustration over a perceived lack of action by Beijing to contain North Korea.
North Korea state media celebrates 'gift' to 'American bastards'
According to the White House statement, Trump raised the growing threat of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic arsenals with the Chinese president in their phone call on Sunday.
"Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a denuclearized Korean Peninsula," the White House said in a readout of the phone call.
Trump and Xi at G20 in Hamburg: Time to abandon illusions
Trump also spoke to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe by phone on Sunday, with the two pledging deeper cooperation on North Korea in the wake of growing frustrations over the rogue state.
But North Korea's successful launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile on Tuesday has raised the stakes ahead of Trump and Xi's scheduled meeting at the G20 Summit on Saturday as relations between China and the United States continue to cool in the months following the February's cordial meeting between the two leaders.
Not giving up hope
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said Friday that the United States has not given up hope on China helping to solve the situation in North Korea, calling US efforts to persuade China to help a "peaceful pressure campaign."
Tillerson's statement contrasted with some of Trump's tweets, where the President has indicated he had largely given up on China's willingness to help in North Korea.
"No, we have not given up hope. I call it the peaceful pressure campaign," Tillerson said. "This is a campaign to lead us to peaceful resolution because if this fails we don't have very many good options left."
Tillerson said China's contributions have been "a bit uneven."
"China has taken significant action and then I think, for a lot of different reasons, they paused and didn't take additional action. They then have taken some steps and then they paused. ... We have remained very closely engaged with China both through our dialogues that has occurred face-to-face but also on the telephone," he said.
Tillerson added, "There is a clear understanding between the two of us on our intent and I think the sanctions action that were taken here just in the last week or ten days certainly going their attention in terms of their understanding of our resolve to bring more pressure to bear by directly going after entities doing business with North Korea, regardless of where they may be located."
CNN's Steven Jiang and Ben Wescott contributed to this report.
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/07/politics/us-bombers-japan-training-south-china-sea/index.html
Jlaw
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Why so many nationalist Indians from pdf and high caste Brahmin leave India and live in other countries? Given that India is the fastest growing economy with second in the world in GDP based on PPP? ON top of that India is a superpower since 2012! Why you guys are the number one illegals in HK? Why do you Indians make up the most illegal and legal immigrants in Canada?
Why? Why?
terranMarine
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The best democracy in the world too, why give that up and live in Canada which is freezing cold compared to the warm climate India has to offer? Or what about HK which is a city of their ENEMY. Weird so weird
F-22Raptor
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The lead vessel of the U.S. Navy’s newest class of amphibious assault ships, the USS America, designated Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) 6, departed San Diego on July 7 for its first regularly scheduled deployment to the Pacific, Middle East, and the Horn of Africa, the U.S. Navy reports.
The new America Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) consisting of the USS America, the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock USS San Diego, and the Harpers Ferry-class dock landing ship USS Pearl Harbor, along with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), an expeditionary quick reaction force, comprise around 1,800 sailors and 2,600 marines.
The America ARG and its MEU will conduct maritime security operations, crisis response capability, and theater security cooperation with allied navies, as well as contribute to the U.S. Navy’s overall forward naval presence. The ARG’s first destination will be the Western Pacific. “We are looking forward to conducting persistent forward naval engagement and being always prepared to respond as the nation’s force in readiness,” Colonel Joseph Clearfield, the commander of the MEU said.
“The America ARG/15th MEU is set to provide senior U.S. military leadership and coalition partners with a flexible force which can rapidly respond to contingencies and crises within a region,” a U.S. Navy statement read. “With ships, aircraft, troops, and logistical equipment, the ARG/MEU is a self-contained and self-sustained task force capable of conducting everything from combat operations to humanitarian assistance.”
The new warship is armed with 12 defensive weapons systems, including two rolling aircraft missile RIM-116 Mk 49 l launchers; two Raytheon 20mm Phalanx CIWS mounts; and seven twin .50 cal. machine guns. The ship’s most potent weapon system, however, is the supersonic fifth-generation F-35B Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). In November 2016, the U.S. Navy conducted operational testing of the F-35B aboard the ship, followed by a number of weapons load tests involving the fifth-generation fighter jet.
As I noted elsewhere, (See: “US Navy Build Largest-Ever Amphibious Assault Ship for F-35 Fighters”), the USS America, next to the F-35B, can accommodate MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, CH-53 Super Stallions, and UH-1Y Huey helicopters. In detail, an America-class amphibious assault ship can carry up to nine F-35Bs, four AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters, four CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters, 12 MV-22 Ospreys, and two MH-60S Search and Rescue helicopters.
“There are currently two other America-class amphibious assault ships under construction. Both the LHA 7, the USS Tripoli, and LHA 8, USS Bougainville, are currently being assembled at the Huntington Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi,” I reported earlier this year. “LHA 7 is slated for delivery to the U.S. Navy in December 2018, whereas LHA 8 will reportedly be handed over in 2024. The U.S. Navy plans for a fleet of 11 America-class amphibious assault ships in the coming decades.”
http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/us-n...ous-assault-ship-deploys-to-the-asia-pacific/
ashok321
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US apologised for mistakenly calling Xi leader of Taiwan: China:
The US has apologized to China for mistakenly describing President Xi Jinping as the leader of Taiwan in a statement issued by Washington, a top Chinese official said today.
Reacting strongly to the statement issued by the US after Xi and President Donald Trump met in Germany on the sidelines of the G20, China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a media briefing here that the Chinese side has "lodged a solemn representation with the US".
"The US said sorry for the technical error and they made the correction," he said when asked about the faux pas by Washington.
In a statement issued after Xi and US President Donald Trump met in Germany on the side-lines of G20, the White House press office described Xi as the president of the Republic of China, the formal name for Taiwan. China, led by Xi, is officially called the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan is a sensitive issue for China as it considers it as part of the mainland under its One-China policy
The US has apologized to China for mistakenly describing President Xi Jinping as the leader of Taiwan in a statement issued by Washington, a top Chinese official said today.
Reacting strongly to the statement issued by the US after Xi and President Donald Trump met in Germany on the sidelines of the G20, China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a media briefing here that the Chinese side has "lodged a solemn representation with the US".
"The US said sorry for the technical error and they made the correction," he said when asked about the faux pas by Washington.
In a statement issued after Xi and US President Donald Trump met in Germany on the side-lines of G20, the White House press office described Xi as the president of the Republic of China, the formal name for Taiwan. China, led by Xi, is officially called the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan is a sensitive issue for China as it considers it as part of the mainland under its One-China policy
Jlaw
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Plus it's a criminal offense to grope and rape women in Canada. Yeah so I am not sure why they come here.
samsara
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Reviewing Destined for War: An Interview with Graham Allison
Brett Wessley - The Bridge - October 30, 2017
Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap. Graham Allison. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.
In many ways the Peloponnesian War was a maritime struggle—the Athenians built their empire through their navy, the culminating point of the war was the failed Syracuse expedition where Athens lost 200 ships, and the war finally ended when Athens surrendered a decade later after the remainder of its fleet was destroyed by Sparta at Aegospotami. In The History of the Peloponnesian War, Athenian exile Thucydides details how his native city-state’s empire and power expanded throughout the Hellenic world, often at the relative expense of status quo power Sparta.
“It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this instilled in Sparta, that made war inevitable.”[1] This quote pithily summarizes Graham Allison’s phrase “The Thucydides’s Trap” and the hostile dynamic created by rising and displaced powers. In Allison’s latest book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, he delves into the changing dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship, and the implications this has for the security situation in the Indo-Pacific and worldwide.
Naval power is a prominent metric of the relative strength of the U.S. and China. Territorial conflicts between China and its neighbors, many of whom are U.S. allies, take place across the vast waters of the Pacific. Islands serve as benchmarks for Chinese territorial expansion, whether in the South China Sea throughout the Spratly Islands, the East China Sea and the Senkaku Islands, or surrounding the isolated democracy Taiwan. Over the last decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has expanded both its capacity and capability for maritime operations, and years of Chinese economic growth have funded programs aimed to deter U.S. intervention against its interests.
The role foreign navies played in China’s Century of Humiliation cannot be understated—historically a land power, the Qing Dynasty was unable to contend with gunboat diplomacy. Beginning with European and U.S. navies, foreign powers carved out trade and territorial concessions from China in the 19th Century. Most maddening was how the Japanese—viewed as wokou or “dwarf pirates” by the Chinese—leveraged modernized naval warships and doctrine to defeat China in several conflicts from the late 19th century through World War II.
Today China has fielded a navy second only to the United States, both in quantity and quality, and at a pace the regional navies in the Indo-Pacific cannot match. The Chinese Navy continues to roll out new platforms and capabilities, many designed to counter U.S. power projection, in the form of missiles, counter-space weapons, and cyberspace capabilities. Simultaneously, the Chinese are developing power projection capabilities of their own, refining carrier strike group training, tactics, and procedures, while deploying flotillas into the Indian Ocean and beyond. The impact China’s rise has had on the balance of power in the Pacific cannot be understated. As Allison writes, “There is no ‘solution’ for the dramatic resurgence of a 5,000-year old civilization with 1.4 billion people. It is a condition, a chronic condition that must be managed over a generation.”[2] It’s from this perspective that I began my conversation with Graham Allison, and discussed Destined for War.
Brett Wessley: Since your article “Thucydides’s Trap” was published in The Atlantic in 2015, have any new developments changed your views on the topics addressed in Destined for War?
Graham Allison: Basically, the idea in the 2015 piece is pretty much the same idea. Thucydides’s Trap is the dangerous dynamic that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power. In 2015, I had only found 15 cases; in the book I have 16 cases. And actually, if you look at the website, we say this is an open story and so we are looking for more cases. These are all the cases we have found and certified of a rising power threatening to displace a major ruling power. Of course, there will be other cases where it is not a major power, so regional conflict would also be interesting. The purpose of the article and book in producing the Thucydides’s case file is not to produce a statistical data set for statisticians, but instead to have a series of comparative cases, each of which has certain differences and nuances that are very important, but which all have a similar storyline: that of a rising power threatening to displace a ruling power.
Can you speak to the role of sea power, and how the U.S. Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy have played in China’s rise?
Thucydides has helped us understand what is happening with China’s rise—better than the conventional wisdom from many China scholars who argue that because China had not been a sea power historically, and had not been interested in being a sea power, we should not expect much on the naval front.
I think that this was clearly a mistake, and has been since 1996 and the humiliation the Chinese felt over their having to back down when they tried to intimidate Taiwan, and we [the United States] sent aircraft carriers to the region to emphasize our superiority. Thucydides would say, and I think Realism would say, as China has become bigger and stronger, the presence and predominance of a potentially hostile power on its border or in its adjacent waters has become less and less acceptable...and they have sought to counter it. This was taken to be a threat to Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, which they regard as much a part of China as we regard California to be a part of the U.S., a sovereignty they saw challenged by the U.S. in 1996 when they tried to bring Taiwan to heel and the U.S. came to Taiwan’s rescue.
What China has done is very methodically build up an A2/AD [anti-access/area denial] and anti-ship missile capabilities that have successfully pushed the U.S. Navy back behind the First Island Chain when planning for war. They are intending to push us further back because they think in terms of the Three Island Chains. I was in Beijing recently and someone told me about the Fourth Island Chain. I asked, “What’s the Fourth Island Chain?” They think of that as San Diego.
You talk about AirSea Battle in your book—or now termed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JCAMGC). When paired with the Third Offset, and capabilities such as autonomous drones and human/machine teaming, is this enough to counter China’s military?
Graham Allison
Well, I would say we need a better acronym for what’s replaced AirSea Battle. The Third Offset is an understandable idea, I think, but if you are thinking of asymmetric technologies and asymmetric technological advances for the competition, the question is, “Would you choose the incumbent or the disruptor?” I think you would say the incumbent is much more likely to be wedded to current platforms and much less adept at adjusting and adapting to disruptive new technologies than the rising power.
So, if you were able to play the American-Chinese naval competition in the Western Pacific with both parties starting from scratch, that might be one thing. But we are wedded to big, expensive carriers and highly expensive aircraft, whereas China will be more likely to be more agile at unmanned technologies. When you look at the drone business in the commercial domain, I can buy a much better, cheaper Chinese commercial drone than I can an American drone. DJI [Dà-Jiāng Innovations Science and Technology] makes very good and cheap drones. So while at least some part of their navy seems to be captivated by carriers, I think they could more likely take advantage of technological advances, for example in unmanned sea and subsea robotics. When I look at the ways in which technologies could impact the naval balance there, I don’t see why the Third Offset opportunities are not as great for them as for us, maybe even greater.
On the topic of the fleet we’re wedded to, there’s been a lot of talk lately about the 355 ship navy and possibly reaching that number through construction of Littoral Combat Ships and de-mothballing frigates. What’s your view on the Navy’s ship count and the implications for the future?
I’ve always thought trying to count units makes no sense. I understand why it is politically attractive and why some in the Navy and some politicians like the idea. But while a kayak and a carrier might each count for one, they are not equal. So I don’t think collecting a bunch of old hulls and calling them combatants does much. I would much rather focus on capabilities, for which I would certainly prefer to have one or two good units than a hundred of these old hulls. I think the more interesting part of it is where the technologies will challenge the platforms we are wedded to. And those are big capital expenditures. Whether carriers, or advanced manned aircraft, or ships vs. mines. I think smart mines are something we should be much more actively exploring and deploying. I would rather have unmanned subsurface units that operate against ships or subs, than I would a whole bunch of Littoral Combat Ships or de-mothballed hulls.
I think the ship count sometimes feeds into the Navy’s posture vs. presence debate. If we’re not constantly patrolling the South China Sea eventually it becomes a de-facto Chinese lake, simply because we aren’t contesting their claims.
I was going to ask you about the case of the South China Sea, because you have to watch it every day. I was in Beijing two weeks ago with a lot of people talking about Thucydides’s Trap, and some people—Chinese—believe the contest in the South China Sea is basically over...and that they won. Now, has anyone said that at U.S. Pacific Command? Would they be considered nuts, or is that at least a plausible idea?
I think that would be news to us, but I’m interested in hearing why the Chinese think it’s over.
There was an Australian there, a former Australian foreign minister, and he said he thought it was over too. He basically said the Chinese have achieved their objective: all the governments in the region now ask first what will China do, and look first to China rather than the U.S. over the contest in the area. I said, “Geez, I didn’t think that was the prevailing American view,” and he said Americans are often slow to wake up. So, I just started looking at it again. If you think of the economic balance of power between China and the U.S. as a seesaw, and that's why I have that graphic in my book, that basically shows the seesaw is tilting and our feet are now lifting off the ground. That is the reality. That reality is even more extreme in the case of relations between China and every one of its Asian neighbors. So China is important to every Asian neighbor as the market and the source of investments, as the party that can squeeze them if it decides to squeeze them. Whether it's the Philippines—or now even Singapore—feeling this, it is a fact of life for them every day.
I say in the book that the economic balance of power, at least in the Asian region, has become even more relevant in everyday life than the military balance of power. The economic balance of power continues to shift in China’s favor, and the American abandonment of the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership]—which we had put so much of our energy and prestige into, telling everybody this was the pillar of our pivot, and getting other parties to invest in their own politics in getting TPP ratified and then pulling the rug out from under them—has left deep, deep wounds in all the parties. And you can see this in [Japanese Prime Minister] Abe, who is stressed in seeking and reaching an agreement with the E.U., exactly the kind of response you would see from people looking to go the wrong way in the economics component in this. I would say this looks ominous for the U.S. and its Southeast Asian allies, and for the likelihood of the South China Sea becoming a Chinese lake.
It is very ominous. Is it time that there needs to be a rebalance in the sense that we need allies—Japan, Australia, India—to have closer defense ties?
Maybe. We have explored that in the past and discovered, in the way the balance is shifting, Australia is a fascinating case to watch. We tried to get them to perform joint operations in the South China Sea for the past three years, and they said, “Forget about it!” The Australians are even looking at the situation again very carefully. There was a set of polls that came out in Australia last month where basically the Australian public feared the United States’ actions more than they feared China’s. Which makes you think—WHAT? Australia has fought with us in every war since the First World War. So, I would watch Australia as a bellwether in terms of what’s happening. I think that for Japan, the Japanese and Chinese roots of that conflict are so deep that Japan is a potential bigger ally. On India, Bob Blackwill, who was my expert out there, used to say the quickest way to get an Indian foreign policy expert to jump out the window is to talk about China. India talks out the one side of its mouth and talks out the other side, and actually both the Indians and the Chinese are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. I would say we have to watch them closely, but they are likely to stick to neutrality. So, it’s not really clear where our allies are going to come from in the region.
At the end of your book, you recommend a move away from the “Engage but Hedge” strategy, where essentially we give China everything, but do nothing to contain them. What’s the role that the Navy plays in this strategy, and something we’re doing in the status quo that we will need to reassess in the future?
The first thing to recognize that “Engage but Hedge” is basically an excuse to go with the flow. It’s very appealing; it lets everybody do whatever they want, and whatever happens you can say we are either engaging or hedging. So I think it’s been a delusion, and I think recognizing this is very important. As we go forward, I believe to the extent that we can maintain a military advantage and not be provocative, that's in every case better. So the thing the Navy could do most would be to try to ask what new technologies and new modes of operation we could develop, especially those that would allow us with a smaller budget to buy more teeth and effectiveness. China’s naval budget will soon exceed our own, especially with regards to regional competition, and it’s unlikely we can buy our way out of this problem. I would think that’s in the areas of unmanned everything—aircraft, seacraft, underwater-craft—and would be in the area of smart mines, which I know that the Navy doesn’t like because they mess up normal operations. In the area of cyber I know we are active, but I would say we need to be even more active—in the area of defensive cyber operations and closing vulnerabilities. So every hole we leave vulnerable, shame on us, whether it’s cyber or satellites. I think that would be the direction I would go in.
Destined for War is an excellent read for those interested in the consequences of a shifting power balance in the Indo-Pacific. While most of the audience is likely aware of China’s military and economic growth, Allison’s detailed metrics describing how the U.S. is being displaced will surprise readers. While the strategic picture painted by Allison is discouraging, at least for those supporting a strong role for the U.S. in Asia, the author is clear that we have options for staying engaged in the region. Looking back to previous instances of Thucydides’s Trap, status quo powers have demonstrated resolve and successfully managed rising powers—including most recently the U.S. during the Cold War with the U.S.S.R.
Allison is skeptical of the role allies will play in upholding a U.S.-led international system, especially within the Indo-Pacific, and undoubtedly his research has shown a reluctance of regional powers to push back against China. One still cannot ignore the role alliances have played in sustaining U.S. power worldwide, though, and a belligerent rise of China will create openings with both traditional and new allies in Asia. How the U.S. will handle the situation diplomatically is up for debate, but previous actions like withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership have squandered opportunities at the expense of economic nationalism.
Ultimately the U.S. will play the largest role in its own fate internationally. Whether the U.S. is destined for war, retreat, or peaceful engagement may be the largest question looming over the 21st Century.
Brett Wessley is an officer in the U.S. Navy, currently assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. The contents of this paper reflect his own personal views and are not endorsed by U.S. Pacific Command, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
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Brett Wessley - The Bridge - October 30, 2017
Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap. Graham Allison. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017.
In many ways the Peloponnesian War was a maritime struggle—the Athenians built their empire through their navy, the culminating point of the war was the failed Syracuse expedition where Athens lost 200 ships, and the war finally ended when Athens surrendered a decade later after the remainder of its fleet was destroyed by Sparta at Aegospotami. In The History of the Peloponnesian War, Athenian exile Thucydides details how his native city-state’s empire and power expanded throughout the Hellenic world, often at the relative expense of status quo power Sparta.
“It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this instilled in Sparta, that made war inevitable.”[1] This quote pithily summarizes Graham Allison’s phrase “The Thucydides’s Trap” and the hostile dynamic created by rising and displaced powers. In Allison’s latest book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, he delves into the changing dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship, and the implications this has for the security situation in the Indo-Pacific and worldwide.
Naval power is a prominent metric of the relative strength of the U.S. and China. Territorial conflicts between China and its neighbors, many of whom are U.S. allies, take place across the vast waters of the Pacific. Islands serve as benchmarks for Chinese territorial expansion, whether in the South China Sea throughout the Spratly Islands, the East China Sea and the Senkaku Islands, or surrounding the isolated democracy Taiwan. Over the last decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has expanded both its capacity and capability for maritime operations, and years of Chinese economic growth have funded programs aimed to deter U.S. intervention against its interests.
The role foreign navies played in China’s Century of Humiliation cannot be understated—historically a land power, the Qing Dynasty was unable to contend with gunboat diplomacy. Beginning with European and U.S. navies, foreign powers carved out trade and territorial concessions from China in the 19th Century. Most maddening was how the Japanese—viewed as wokou or “dwarf pirates” by the Chinese—leveraged modernized naval warships and doctrine to defeat China in several conflicts from the late 19th century through World War II.
Today China has fielded a navy second only to the United States, both in quantity and quality, and at a pace the regional navies in the Indo-Pacific cannot match. The Chinese Navy continues to roll out new platforms and capabilities, many designed to counter U.S. power projection, in the form of missiles, counter-space weapons, and cyberspace capabilities. Simultaneously, the Chinese are developing power projection capabilities of their own, refining carrier strike group training, tactics, and procedures, while deploying flotillas into the Indian Ocean and beyond. The impact China’s rise has had on the balance of power in the Pacific cannot be understated. As Allison writes, “There is no ‘solution’ for the dramatic resurgence of a 5,000-year old civilization with 1.4 billion people. It is a condition, a chronic condition that must be managed over a generation.”[2] It’s from this perspective that I began my conversation with Graham Allison, and discussed Destined for War.
Brett Wessley: Since your article “Thucydides’s Trap” was published in The Atlantic in 2015, have any new developments changed your views on the topics addressed in Destined for War?
Graham Allison: Basically, the idea in the 2015 piece is pretty much the same idea. Thucydides’s Trap is the dangerous dynamic that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power. In 2015, I had only found 15 cases; in the book I have 16 cases. And actually, if you look at the website, we say this is an open story and so we are looking for more cases. These are all the cases we have found and certified of a rising power threatening to displace a major ruling power. Of course, there will be other cases where it is not a major power, so regional conflict would also be interesting. The purpose of the article and book in producing the Thucydides’s case file is not to produce a statistical data set for statisticians, but instead to have a series of comparative cases, each of which has certain differences and nuances that are very important, but which all have a similar storyline: that of a rising power threatening to displace a ruling power.
Can you speak to the role of sea power, and how the U.S. Navy and the People’s Liberation Army Navy have played in China’s rise?
Thucydides has helped us understand what is happening with China’s rise—better than the conventional wisdom from many China scholars who argue that because China had not been a sea power historically, and had not been interested in being a sea power, we should not expect much on the naval front.
I think that this was clearly a mistake, and has been since 1996 and the humiliation the Chinese felt over their having to back down when they tried to intimidate Taiwan, and we [the United States] sent aircraft carriers to the region to emphasize our superiority. Thucydides would say, and I think Realism would say, as China has become bigger and stronger, the presence and predominance of a potentially hostile power on its border or in its adjacent waters has become less and less acceptable...and they have sought to counter it. This was taken to be a threat to Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, which they regard as much a part of China as we regard California to be a part of the U.S., a sovereignty they saw challenged by the U.S. in 1996 when they tried to bring Taiwan to heel and the U.S. came to Taiwan’s rescue.
What China has done is very methodically build up an A2/AD [anti-access/area denial] and anti-ship missile capabilities that have successfully pushed the U.S. Navy back behind the First Island Chain when planning for war. They are intending to push us further back because they think in terms of the Three Island Chains. I was in Beijing recently and someone told me about the Fourth Island Chain. I asked, “What’s the Fourth Island Chain?” They think of that as San Diego.
You talk about AirSea Battle in your book—or now termed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JCAMGC). When paired with the Third Offset, and capabilities such as autonomous drones and human/machine teaming, is this enough to counter China’s military?
Graham Allison
Well, I would say we need a better acronym for what’s replaced AirSea Battle. The Third Offset is an understandable idea, I think, but if you are thinking of asymmetric technologies and asymmetric technological advances for the competition, the question is, “Would you choose the incumbent or the disruptor?” I think you would say the incumbent is much more likely to be wedded to current platforms and much less adept at adjusting and adapting to disruptive new technologies than the rising power.
So, if you were able to play the American-Chinese naval competition in the Western Pacific with both parties starting from scratch, that might be one thing. But we are wedded to big, expensive carriers and highly expensive aircraft, whereas China will be more likely to be more agile at unmanned technologies. When you look at the drone business in the commercial domain, I can buy a much better, cheaper Chinese commercial drone than I can an American drone. DJI [Dà-Jiāng Innovations Science and Technology] makes very good and cheap drones. So while at least some part of their navy seems to be captivated by carriers, I think they could more likely take advantage of technological advances, for example in unmanned sea and subsea robotics. When I look at the ways in which technologies could impact the naval balance there, I don’t see why the Third Offset opportunities are not as great for them as for us, maybe even greater.
On the topic of the fleet we’re wedded to, there’s been a lot of talk lately about the 355 ship navy and possibly reaching that number through construction of Littoral Combat Ships and de-mothballing frigates. What’s your view on the Navy’s ship count and the implications for the future?
I’ve always thought trying to count units makes no sense. I understand why it is politically attractive and why some in the Navy and some politicians like the idea. But while a kayak and a carrier might each count for one, they are not equal. So I don’t think collecting a bunch of old hulls and calling them combatants does much. I would much rather focus on capabilities, for which I would certainly prefer to have one or two good units than a hundred of these old hulls. I think the more interesting part of it is where the technologies will challenge the platforms we are wedded to. And those are big capital expenditures. Whether carriers, or advanced manned aircraft, or ships vs. mines. I think smart mines are something we should be much more actively exploring and deploying. I would rather have unmanned subsurface units that operate against ships or subs, than I would a whole bunch of Littoral Combat Ships or de-mothballed hulls.
I think the ship count sometimes feeds into the Navy’s posture vs. presence debate. If we’re not constantly patrolling the South China Sea eventually it becomes a de-facto Chinese lake, simply because we aren’t contesting their claims.
I was going to ask you about the case of the South China Sea, because you have to watch it every day. I was in Beijing two weeks ago with a lot of people talking about Thucydides’s Trap, and some people—Chinese—believe the contest in the South China Sea is basically over...and that they won. Now, has anyone said that at U.S. Pacific Command? Would they be considered nuts, or is that at least a plausible idea?
I think that would be news to us, but I’m interested in hearing why the Chinese think it’s over.
There was an Australian there, a former Australian foreign minister, and he said he thought it was over too. He basically said the Chinese have achieved their objective: all the governments in the region now ask first what will China do, and look first to China rather than the U.S. over the contest in the area. I said, “Geez, I didn’t think that was the prevailing American view,” and he said Americans are often slow to wake up. So, I just started looking at it again. If you think of the economic balance of power between China and the U.S. as a seesaw, and that's why I have that graphic in my book, that basically shows the seesaw is tilting and our feet are now lifting off the ground. That is the reality. That reality is even more extreme in the case of relations between China and every one of its Asian neighbors. So China is important to every Asian neighbor as the market and the source of investments, as the party that can squeeze them if it decides to squeeze them. Whether it's the Philippines—or now even Singapore—feeling this, it is a fact of life for them every day.
I say in the book that the economic balance of power, at least in the Asian region, has become even more relevant in everyday life than the military balance of power. The economic balance of power continues to shift in China’s favor, and the American abandonment of the TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership]—which we had put so much of our energy and prestige into, telling everybody this was the pillar of our pivot, and getting other parties to invest in their own politics in getting TPP ratified and then pulling the rug out from under them—has left deep, deep wounds in all the parties. And you can see this in [Japanese Prime Minister] Abe, who is stressed in seeking and reaching an agreement with the E.U., exactly the kind of response you would see from people looking to go the wrong way in the economics component in this. I would say this looks ominous for the U.S. and its Southeast Asian allies, and for the likelihood of the South China Sea becoming a Chinese lake.
It is very ominous. Is it time that there needs to be a rebalance in the sense that we need allies—Japan, Australia, India—to have closer defense ties?
Maybe. We have explored that in the past and discovered, in the way the balance is shifting, Australia is a fascinating case to watch. We tried to get them to perform joint operations in the South China Sea for the past three years, and they said, “Forget about it!” The Australians are even looking at the situation again very carefully. There was a set of polls that came out in Australia last month where basically the Australian public feared the United States’ actions more than they feared China’s. Which makes you think—WHAT? Australia has fought with us in every war since the First World War. So, I would watch Australia as a bellwether in terms of what’s happening. I think that for Japan, the Japanese and Chinese roots of that conflict are so deep that Japan is a potential bigger ally. On India, Bob Blackwill, who was my expert out there, used to say the quickest way to get an Indian foreign policy expert to jump out the window is to talk about China. India talks out the one side of its mouth and talks out the other side, and actually both the Indians and the Chinese are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. I would say we have to watch them closely, but they are likely to stick to neutrality. So, it’s not really clear where our allies are going to come from in the region.
At the end of your book, you recommend a move away from the “Engage but Hedge” strategy, where essentially we give China everything, but do nothing to contain them. What’s the role that the Navy plays in this strategy, and something we’re doing in the status quo that we will need to reassess in the future?
The first thing to recognize that “Engage but Hedge” is basically an excuse to go with the flow. It’s very appealing; it lets everybody do whatever they want, and whatever happens you can say we are either engaging or hedging. So I think it’s been a delusion, and I think recognizing this is very important. As we go forward, I believe to the extent that we can maintain a military advantage and not be provocative, that's in every case better. So the thing the Navy could do most would be to try to ask what new technologies and new modes of operation we could develop, especially those that would allow us with a smaller budget to buy more teeth and effectiveness. China’s naval budget will soon exceed our own, especially with regards to regional competition, and it’s unlikely we can buy our way out of this problem. I would think that’s in the areas of unmanned everything—aircraft, seacraft, underwater-craft—and would be in the area of smart mines, which I know that the Navy doesn’t like because they mess up normal operations. In the area of cyber I know we are active, but I would say we need to be even more active—in the area of defensive cyber operations and closing vulnerabilities. So every hole we leave vulnerable, shame on us, whether it’s cyber or satellites. I think that would be the direction I would go in.
Destined for War is an excellent read for those interested in the consequences of a shifting power balance in the Indo-Pacific. While most of the audience is likely aware of China’s military and economic growth, Allison’s detailed metrics describing how the U.S. is being displaced will surprise readers. While the strategic picture painted by Allison is discouraging, at least for those supporting a strong role for the U.S. in Asia, the author is clear that we have options for staying engaged in the region. Looking back to previous instances of Thucydides’s Trap, status quo powers have demonstrated resolve and successfully managed rising powers—including most recently the U.S. during the Cold War with the U.S.S.R.
Allison is skeptical of the role allies will play in upholding a U.S.-led international system, especially within the Indo-Pacific, and undoubtedly his research has shown a reluctance of regional powers to push back against China. One still cannot ignore the role alliances have played in sustaining U.S. power worldwide, though, and a belligerent rise of China will create openings with both traditional and new allies in Asia. How the U.S. will handle the situation diplomatically is up for debate, but previous actions like withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership have squandered opportunities at the expense of economic nationalism.
Ultimately the U.S. will play the largest role in its own fate internationally. Whether the U.S. is destined for war, retreat, or peaceful engagement may be the largest question looming over the 21st Century.
Brett Wessley is an officer in the U.S. Navy, currently assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. The contents of this paper reflect his own personal views and are not endorsed by U.S. Pacific Command, the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
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