Cambodia's foreign relations
Losing the limelight
CAMBODIA rarely gets the chance to shine on the international stage. A decade ago it scored kudos for its first-time effort as chair to the ten-nation Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), a significant milestone for a country that was still struggling after 30 years of war.
Phnom Penh’s diplomats revelled in the summits that came with the job and in the company of their guests, including America’s then-secretary of state, Colin Powell, and Japan’s prime minister at the time, Junichiro Koizumi. The dignitaries lent an unprecedented air of political celebrity to the capital.
Since then, however, Cambodia’s external relations have changed. With billions of dollars of aid at stake, Cambodia has snuggled up to China and become its de-facto proxy within ASEAN. The attendance of Hillary Clinton, as America’s current secretary of state, could not make the same impression as Mr Powell’s. And China arrived with every reason to try taking advantage of its new leverage as Cambodia played host to the block for its second summit in Phnom Penh.
At the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)—where foreign ministers from South-East Asia and farther afield thrash out their differences—China picked a backroom tussle for influence in the South China Sea. Their Cambodian hosts might have been alone in failing to anticipate the manoeuvre.
The remote Spratly islands are claimed in whole by China and in whole or in part by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. The Paracels are claimed entirely by both China and Vietnam.
China wants to negotiate disputes over the potentially resource-rich Spratly and Paracel islands with its neighbours on a series of bilateral talks. ASEAN would prefer to present a united front. America tends to see these matters in the ASEAN way.
Two years ago China was angered by America’s declaration that it sees the South China Sea—which about half of the world’s ship-borne trade passes through—as a proper part of its own national interests. America ratcheted up the diplomatic stakes by signalling a realignment of its priorities back towards Asia.
Central to this is the Code of Conduct (COC), a document that has been tossed around and discussed between ASEAN countries and China ever since Cambodia first time as the summit’s host. The COC’s purpose is to prevent or limit any military confrontation before it gets out of hand.
Many argue the COC is needed now more than ever, with the frequency of clashes involving civilian and military vessels increasing over recent months.
Cambodia attempted to nudge the COC along by writing up a list of “key elements” for which it hoped would win acceptance from ASEAN. Instead its proposal was criticised for lacking teeth and demurring to China—and for infuriating the Philippines and Vietnam, who have led the block on this issue.
The negotiations quickly became heated. As reports circulated to the effect that Cambodia’s foreign minister, Hor Namhong, was simultaneously seeking China’s advice while negotiating with fellow members of ASEAN, the atmosphere grew dismal.
The Philippines’ contingent then upset their hosts by insisting on a communiqué that mentioned their navy’s standoff with Chinese vessels at Scarborough shoal, a ring of mostly submerged rocks to the east of the Paracels. The Cambodians balked and in the end delegates failed to strike any deal on the COC. For the first time it its 45-year history ASEAN’s delegates also failed to issue a closing statement.
Caught between defending the national interest and wanting to keep the Chinese sweet, Cambodia’s delegates went into a huddle. Mrs Clinton took a moment to remind ASEAN that America had invested much more in South-East Asia over the years than China ever has. She also warned that confrontations over the Spratly and Paracel islands would probably escalate.
“None of us can fail to be concerned by the increase in tensions, the uptick in confrontational rhetoric and disagreements over resource exploitation,” Mrs Clinton said. “We believe nations of the region should work collaboratively and diplomatically to resolve disputes without coercion, without intimidation, without threats and certainly without the use of force.”
China does not want the issue settled by the international courts nor by the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (to which it is signatory, though America is not). Its representatives said it would resume talks on a legally binding document, such as could regulate rade and shipping in the South China Sea, only when “the time is ripe”.
Mrs Clinton left Phnom Penh for a side trip to Siem Reap, home of the 12th-century temple ruins of Angkor Wat, and then she was on to Myanmar. Left behind was Hor Namhong, who tried to explain the summit’s failure.
“I have told my colleagues that the meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers is not a court, a place to give a verdict about the dispute,” he mustered for reporters.
The feuding over the South China Sea will be no less vitriolic for Cambodia’s efforts to mediate between China and its ASEAN neighbours. All that has changed is that Cambodia’s place within the alliance—and its relationship with China—are being questioned as never before.
Cambodia's foreign relations: Losing the limelight | The Economist
