T-Faz
RETIRED MOD
- Joined
- Feb 16, 2010
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The recent visit of two Chinese warships to Abu Dhabi has triggered a new interest in China's reach in the Gulf, and its long-term ambitions in the region. It was the first visit to the UAE by the Chinese navy, and was seen as a symbol of the country's future ability to use its fast-growing blue-water navy to deliver military power to wherever it wants. This ability will become more and more important as China emerges from its self-imposed isolation and takes a more active part in world politics. It is also a potential challenge to the American view that the United States is the ultimate guarantor of security in the Gulf.
The Gulf is an increasingly vital area for China as it imports increasing volumes of oil, and becomes the largest exporter of goods into the Gulf region. But any Chinese policy on the Gulf will be influenced by what is happening in the wider region. China has vital and long-standing political interests in what is happening in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It has also taken a lead in suppressing piracy off the Somali and Yemeni coasts, to protect its sea routes to Europe and beyond.
China's exceptional economic growth will require a lot of hydrocarbons to sustain. Its oil consumption is expected to double from its present eight million barrels a day to 16 mbpd by 2030, and today at least 40 per cent of this comes from the Gulf. That proportion can only grow as the world's fastest growing economy buys energy from the world's largest source of oil.
This long-term requirement means that China needs to get closer to the Arab states in the Gulf, and it cannot afford to focus solely on its friendship with Iran. As China-Gulf commentator Ben Simpfendorfer says in his blog, Silk Road Economy, while Iran might supply 13 per cent of China's present oil consumption, Saudi Arabia supplies an even larger 20 per cent.
This strategic requirement and the basic mathematics of the oil business will have some immediate implications later this year as US President Barack Obama seeks a new round of sanctions against Iran. China will have to decide if it is going to support the sanctions or not. Through the previous three rounds of sanctions against Iran, China has maintained a policy of non-intervention and abstained.
Growing irritation
But Simpfendorfer observes increasing Chinese irritation with the very aggressive stance taken by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government, and by its secret development of new nuclear sites. This Chinese irritation coincides with what the Obama administration is saying, even though Beijing and Washington start from very different global positions. China has told Iran many times that it supports its right to nuclear power, but it will not want to be dragged into unquestioning support for every action of Ahmadinejad's government. It is therefore possible that Obama might succeed in building a consensus with China over Iran's nuclear programme.
The Gulf is not yet an important political target for China, although it is a vital economic partner. Much closer to home for China are Afghanistan and Pakistan, where China has vital political ambitions. These policies will take priority in the development of any new Chinese policy in the Gulf, since China will not allow decades of ****** plans to get knocked off course by its new interests in the Gulf.
This means that Chinese thinking on how to respond to an American challenge to Iran, what to do in Iraq, and its relationships with the oil-rich Arab Gulf states will all be looked at through the prism of how these relationships will play with Chinese plans in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Michael Swaine, writing at the Hoover Institution, makes the important point that China's approach to what is happening in Afghanistan is influenced by its very close political, military and economic ties with Pakistan. China sees its friendship with Pakistan as encouraging an important strategic counterweight to India, and part of the continuing long-term rivalry between India and China.
As Swaine says, "A stable, independent, friendly, and regionally influential Pakistan prevents Indian domination of South Asia, weakens Indian influence in Central Asia, and obstructs any Indian desire to focus primarily on strategic rivalry with China".
In addition, China welcomes Nato intervention in Afghanistan, since if they were not there, China would probably have to commit more of its own resources to helping build a stable and friendly Afghanistan. This in turn provides Pakistan with a degree of strategic depth, and also stops radical Chinese Muslim groups finding safe havens in Afghanistan and infiltration routes back into China.
Finally, there is a Gulf component in this thinking. China's relationship with Iran is designed to support its work in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But looking ahead to new business links with the Gulf, Pakistan offers an important route for Chinese trade and energy supply, running from the Indian Ocean port at Gwadar which is close to the Gulf up through Pakistan and over the Karakorum Pass into China.
So even if the Chinese naval visit to Abu Dhabi did not add up to much on its own, it was a valuable reminder to the Gulf that the emerging superpower in the East has important interests in the region, and the relationship needs to be nurtured from both sides.
http://gulfnews.com/opinions/editorials/china-is-courting-the-gulf-1.609257
The Gulf is an increasingly vital area for China as it imports increasing volumes of oil, and becomes the largest exporter of goods into the Gulf region. But any Chinese policy on the Gulf will be influenced by what is happening in the wider region. China has vital and long-standing political interests in what is happening in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It has also taken a lead in suppressing piracy off the Somali and Yemeni coasts, to protect its sea routes to Europe and beyond.
China's exceptional economic growth will require a lot of hydrocarbons to sustain. Its oil consumption is expected to double from its present eight million barrels a day to 16 mbpd by 2030, and today at least 40 per cent of this comes from the Gulf. That proportion can only grow as the world's fastest growing economy buys energy from the world's largest source of oil.
This long-term requirement means that China needs to get closer to the Arab states in the Gulf, and it cannot afford to focus solely on its friendship with Iran. As China-Gulf commentator Ben Simpfendorfer says in his blog, Silk Road Economy, while Iran might supply 13 per cent of China's present oil consumption, Saudi Arabia supplies an even larger 20 per cent.
This strategic requirement and the basic mathematics of the oil business will have some immediate implications later this year as US President Barack Obama seeks a new round of sanctions against Iran. China will have to decide if it is going to support the sanctions or not. Through the previous three rounds of sanctions against Iran, China has maintained a policy of non-intervention and abstained.
Growing irritation
But Simpfendorfer observes increasing Chinese irritation with the very aggressive stance taken by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government, and by its secret development of new nuclear sites. This Chinese irritation coincides with what the Obama administration is saying, even though Beijing and Washington start from very different global positions. China has told Iran many times that it supports its right to nuclear power, but it will not want to be dragged into unquestioning support for every action of Ahmadinejad's government. It is therefore possible that Obama might succeed in building a consensus with China over Iran's nuclear programme.
The Gulf is not yet an important political target for China, although it is a vital economic partner. Much closer to home for China are Afghanistan and Pakistan, where China has vital political ambitions. These policies will take priority in the development of any new Chinese policy in the Gulf, since China will not allow decades of ****** plans to get knocked off course by its new interests in the Gulf.
This means that Chinese thinking on how to respond to an American challenge to Iran, what to do in Iraq, and its relationships with the oil-rich Arab Gulf states will all be looked at through the prism of how these relationships will play with Chinese plans in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Michael Swaine, writing at the Hoover Institution, makes the important point that China's approach to what is happening in Afghanistan is influenced by its very close political, military and economic ties with Pakistan. China sees its friendship with Pakistan as encouraging an important strategic counterweight to India, and part of the continuing long-term rivalry between India and China.
As Swaine says, "A stable, independent, friendly, and regionally influential Pakistan prevents Indian domination of South Asia, weakens Indian influence in Central Asia, and obstructs any Indian desire to focus primarily on strategic rivalry with China".
In addition, China welcomes Nato intervention in Afghanistan, since if they were not there, China would probably have to commit more of its own resources to helping build a stable and friendly Afghanistan. This in turn provides Pakistan with a degree of strategic depth, and also stops radical Chinese Muslim groups finding safe havens in Afghanistan and infiltration routes back into China.
Finally, there is a Gulf component in this thinking. China's relationship with Iran is designed to support its work in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But looking ahead to new business links with the Gulf, Pakistan offers an important route for Chinese trade and energy supply, running from the Indian Ocean port at Gwadar which is close to the Gulf up through Pakistan and over the Karakorum Pass into China.
So even if the Chinese naval visit to Abu Dhabi did not add up to much on its own, it was a valuable reminder to the Gulf that the emerging superpower in the East has important interests in the region, and the relationship needs to be nurtured from both sides.
http://gulfnews.com/opinions/editorials/china-is-courting-the-gulf-1.609257