Analysis by Ijaz Hussain
If Obama tries to force things on India, it would negatively impact Indo-US relations which, given the importance that India currently enjoys in American strategic thinking, the US simply cannot afford
When then-Senator Barack Obama linked peace in Afghanistan with the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, the Pakistani and Kashmiri leadership welcomed it. The Indian government, on the other hand, was quite upset, though it put up a brave face by dismissing the statement as a pre-election rhetoric that deserved to be ignored.
However, following Obamas election as president, and the media speculation that he was thinking of appointing former President Bill Clinton as special envoy on Kashmir, India got worried and directed the Indian delegation, which was leaving for the UN General Assembly, to apprise Obamas aides about the state of the ongoing peace process between the two countries and the futility of the American initiative.
Since Obamas statement, others have expressed similar views. For example, the French government too has linked the prospects of peace in Afghanistan with resolution of the Kashmir conflict as have the Afghanistan specialists Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid.
What is the significance of Obamas statement and will he be the Kashmiris messiah?
To fully appreciate the significance of Obamas statement, one needs to examine the American attitude towards the Kashmir dispute over the last sixty years. Even before the UN was seized of the dispute, the US State Department on December 2, 1947 instructed the American representative to the UN to opt for a bilateral settlement between Pakistan and India. The US practice at the UN was however utterly contrary to the instructions as the American representative took sides in the matter by voting in favour of a number of resolutions that the SC adopted, and on one occasion he, along with other permanent SC members, even sponsored a resolution (of April 21, 1948). The explanation for this departure from instructions partly lies in the fact that being unfamiliar with the issue, the US relied on the United Kingdom for guidance, and partly in the fact that Pakistan became a US ally during the Cold War.
The next event that marked strong American association with the Kashmir dispute related to the Pakistan-India talks which the US, along with Britain, sponsored after the Sino-Indian border war. It mediated because of the commitment that it had made to Pakistan to help settle the Kashmir dispute as a reward for desisting from mounting an assault on Kashmir during the Sino-Indian war, which, according to Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan was under pressure to undertake.
Following the end of hostilities, Pakistan and India held six rounds of talks under the US-British auspices, which were inconclusive because the US sided with India. India was not ready to part with Srinagar as it wanted to build an all-weather military artery from there to Leh for defence against China.
1972 marked a watershed in Pakistan-India relations because of the Simla Accord, under which the two neighbours made the Kashmir dispute a bilateral affair. This must have been a welcome development as it provided the US with an excuse to politely refuse Pakistans nagging entreaties to play a mediatory role on Kashmir.
One event where it nonetheless made a commitment of sorts related to the Kargil crisis. Following this misadventure, Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington seeking US help in getting out of that cul-de-sac. Then-President Clinton helped Sharif by forcing the Washington Agreement on him by virtue of which Pakistan was made to underwrite the sanctity of the Line of Control. Clinton at the same time made a commitment to take a personal interest in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Nothing came out of the commitment because it was more of a face saving device for Sharif to withdraw troops from Kargil than anything else.
The last major event that reveals the American attitude towards the Kashmir dispute is the ongoing peace process. Its genesis goes back to the Armitage mission that took place at the height of the military standoff between Pakistan and India in 2002, and resumption of talks was linked with a permanent end to cross-border terrorism by Pakistan.
Two years later, the two countries signed the Islamabad Declaration, which stipulated the Indian commitment to resume talks in exchange for Pakistans pledge to end cross-border terrorism. It is an open secret that behind the scenes, the US was instrumental in getting the peace process started. However, it must also be recognised that by deciding to abandon the UN resolutions on Kashmir even before talks got underway, Musharraf too played an important role in bringing India to the negotiating table.
This review shows that the US has mostly played the role of a facilitator or a mediator on Kashmir rather than, in the words of Feroze Khan Noon, an initiator of courageous or decisive action. In this backdrop, how do we explain Obamas statement, which appears to invest the US with an intrusive and proactive role?
The explanation seems to lie in Obamas realisation that the US cannot win the war in Afghanistan without the full and unstinted cooperation of Pakistan, which it is reluctant to extend. This is due to the Pakistani perception that India is using its consulates in Afghanistan to do mischief in the tribal areas and Balochistan. Besides, it has built a strategic road linking the Afghan road network with the Iranian port of Chahbahar. Consequently, Pakistan regards India as a greater threat to its security than terrorism. In this perspective, the argument goes that if Kashmir, which is the mother of all discord between the two countries, is resolved Pakistan would extend full cooperation in winning the war in Afghanistan.
Here the question arises whether Obama would play the role that his statement requires. In our estimation, it is a non-starter because India is utterly opposed to third-party intervention in its disputes with Pakistan, and the Indian foreign minister reiterated this stance when he commented on Obamas statement.
If Obama tries to force things on India it would negatively impact Indo-US relations which, given the importance that India currently enjoys in American strategic thinking, the US simply cannot afford. Let us not forget that in a letter addressed to Manmohan Singh last September, Obama stated that deepening and broadening the friendship between our two countries will be a first-order priority for me in the coming years.
Whatever the explanation for Obamas statement, we do not think that the Man of Change would depart from traditional American policy on Kashmir, which incidentally also comes out from his interview in Outlook last July, in which he stated that the US should encourage the ongoing peace process. In the light of the foregoing, we do not think that Obama will be a messiah for Kashmir.
The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at
hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com