According to him, it all started with Indian Army’s successful counter-border operation in June 2015 against NSCN-K terrorists hiding in Myanmar by then 3 corps commander, Lt Gen. Bipin Rawat. The killing of about 38 terrorists in a flash operation got the Indian Army wondering what if the government asked it to do similar operations on the Line of Control against Pakistan. So, the two Special Forces regiments under northern command, were instructed to do training in Udhampur in the winter of 2015-2016. Once dastardly killings of soldiers of Uri brigade by terrorists happened on 18 September 2016, it was time to plan what Hooda called a ‘revenge operation’. Within hours, Delhi gave a go ahead for operations to Hooda allowing him to decide the plan, its execution and timing. By now, Rawat, the hero of the Myanmar strike was in Delhi as the vice chief to Gen. Dalbir Singh, who did not mind Rawat talking over his shoulder to the political leadership.
One of the most serious distortions in the cross-section of skills among our senior commanders must be the excessive time and attention given to counter-insurgency. The Indian Army has always resisted this diversion. This molecularisation of the discipline of war was never sought. It has been the consistent failure of the central government in Delhi that has dragged the Army (and, on one infamous occasion, the Air Force) into this quagmire. It has been the dire vision of the future that made the generals of that long-departed day insist on the AFSPA; political correctness has dictated that many of those whose views I share, the liberal element in India (and in Pakistan), and our fellow travellers and occasionally determined allies, the left*, have felt it necessary to pour vials of acid on the act. It is the only thing that insulates the Army, to some extent, from the vulgarity of the squabbles between politicians that drags into the gutter even the most poignant incidents involving the life and limb, and the liberty, and the reputation of our citizens. If not for this, the Army would have had to bear the brunt of tweets by the likes of the wannabe actor with an unbridled libido who seems to have the tacit role of representing the opinions of our rulers.
This distortion is what has given us Rawat. That is balanced, to some extent, by the very professional reaction of the Army in creating the RRs. Fortunately, the Chinese have saved the situation, by forcing attention back to war-fighting from the people-bashing that is all that the Sanghi in the wild understands.
For these and other reasons, it was galling to read OP's contemptuous dismissal:
By now, Rawat, the hero of the Myanmar strike was in Delhi as the vice chief to Gen. Dalbir Singh, who did not mind Rawat talking over his shoulder to the political leadership.
Unfortunately, there is the ring of truth in this. One is left to grind one's teeth and cordially detest him.
The Hooda plan, which required Special Forces to cross the LC at multiple points across the Pir Panjal Range (covering both 15 and 16 corps zone of operations) to strike at launchpads (temporary place where terrorists converge for a limited time after training while waiting for infiltration) three to five kilometres across the military line, had ‘simplicity of purpose.’ Since Pakistan was not Myanmar, the planning, execution, and contingency arrangements had to be considered meticulously and secretively. How to extricate Special Forces teams if the Pakistan Army got wind of the operations? Should more Special Forces be sent across, or should the Indian Air Force be used for extrication of soldiers? To finalise many of these finer details, Hooda made three secret visits to Delhi in seven days where he met-up with the army chief and others (who he did not name).
As Hooda spoke, I was reminded of my longish conversation with Lt Gen. S.S. Chahal (retd) in April 2018. Chahal was the director general military operation during operation Parakram, when India ordered mobilisation of its army against Pakistan for 10 months on 18 December 2001. Between December 13, when the terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament, and issuance of mobilisation orders by the army chief, Gen. S. Padmanabhan, the army commanders were instructed to repeatedly fly into Delhi for meetings with the vice chief, Lt Gen. N.C. Vij. No written instructions were given, the Union war book which had procedural details for war was set aside, and everything was by face-to-face meetings. The idea was that Pakistan should not get wind of what Indian Army was to do.
Hooda seemed to follow the same drill. Once the finer details of the operation were cleared by Delhi, it was left to Hooda to conduct the execution.
An excellent summary. Nothing can be added to this. Or subtracted.
It only remains to understand that military operations cannot be run like the PMO runs the country. No doubt a few thousand more farmers' sons will have to die before this is understood, and we have to wade through the muck of 62 once more.
Not once did Hooda mention Lt Gen. Dua who was the 15 corps commander or his counterpart in the 16 corps, both of whom were no more than facilitators privy to the plan on need-to-know-basis. Finally, Hooda remarked that ‘surgical strikes were overhyped and politicised.’
This is what an officer and a gentleman like Hooda has been reduced to.
A perfectly well-executed military manoeuvre was reduced to this small-town tamasha, replete with candy-floss stands, and unbearable buffoons and mountebanks who specialise in making films out of these, and making our soldiers look and sound like asses, rather than the tightly disciplined professionals that they are.
It was now left to defence journalists to glamorise the stories of valour of Indian soldiers; a team of two did well by writing a series of books on this which eventually translated into a web-series. A Bollywood movie was also made on it.
