This is a well-written and informative piece!
Winning hearts and minds
Sunday, August 31, 2008
Khalid Aziz
This asymmetric war is being waged at different levels in FATA and THE NWFP. Unlike a conventional war, where success and failure is measured in term of enemy area captured, the success or failure here is measured in terms of the number of people supporting the militants or the government. This war is thus not about control over land area but winning the support of a larger number of people than the opposing side. In other word, this is a conflict for the hearts and minds. Failure or success in this area is crucial--the central point for focusing if Pakistan wants to emerge out of this conflict successfully will be governance.
The militants in Waziristan, Kohat, Mohmand, Swat and Bajaur have tried to retain control over their strongholds by launching a reign of terror based on assassinations and defeating the morale of the security forces, as well as to provide a system of justice and security.
The approach adopted by them has been to whittle away at the security services by capturing or killing them and by adroit propaganda amongst the population that the militants were the soldiers of Islam while government forces were fighting in support of a non-Muslim power. This propaganda has been effective in obtaining the goodwill of Pakistanis for the militants overall objectives. However, a majority also decry the militants' recourse to violence. For the last few years the militants adopted the clever strategy of exploiting the weakness within the Pakistani system. If you examine the circumstances preceding the many "agreements" between the militants and the government forces, four things become apparent.
One, such agreements normally occur when the military, after initial difficulties, begins to regain supremacy but has not yet attained it. The "agreement" thus interrupts a trend which is heading towards success. Two, in return for releasing government captives, the militants obtain the release of many of their own rank and file who were arrested in the area of operation or on charges of sabotage in other parts of Pakistan.
The militants also force the security forces to withdraw from dominant positions which had been won after much bloodshed and sacrifice. Three, many of the agreements are reached after a good deal of money is transferred to militants as facilitating fees or as compensation for loss of lives and property. Four, for "convincing" the government to attain peace and then to weigh decisions in favour of militants,
great reliance is placed on the tribal MNAs and senators, who act as a pressure group within the assemblies and later as members of peace jirga negotiating between the government and the militants.
This political group can thus be classified as those with leanings towards the militants. It cannot be otherwise, since they live in areas under the militants' domination.
In support of this contention is the figure of more than 600 tribal Maliks executed by the militants since 2002. However, not a single MNA or Senator has been so victimised. Another attribute of such "agreements" is the preeminent role which the JUI-F plays on the floor of the Assembly or during subsequent negotiations.
A few weeks ago the security forces in Bajaur Agency came under a severe attack from a well organised group of Arabs and Central Asian fighters. When matters reached a critical level with the possible imminent capture of Khar, the agency headquarters, the military and the air force retaliated strongly. It resulted in heavy casualties to the militants and lead to their dispersal. An unintended consequence of the fighting was the departure of more than 250,000 residents of Bajaur, who are now refugees.
Tribesmen are holding jirgas in Salarzai and other places against the militants. They have forced the militants to evacuate their areas since they are accused of bringing pain to the residents of Bajaur. Furthermore, the military action has resulted in the death of more than 8,000 militants. Regrettably there have also been a number of innocent deaths. Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, the leader of the militants in Bajaur, is either dead or injured, because he is not traceable.
In Swat the community protected the veteran political stalwart Afzal Khan against the militants. In Koza Banda in Swat when Sikander Khan and Qayyum, two locals, were injured by the militants, the community retaliated and killed those responsible for the attack. Similarly, in Buner, Dir, Peshawar, Mardan and other places, the communities have organised themselves to defend against the militants. Thus a situation has arisen where the ascendency of the radicals has seen challenges for the first time by the communities with only marginal government assistance.
However, when the government is near success the old game of using Parliament as a prop to defeat the will of the state is brought into play. Any revision of policy at this stage will be a great blow to the government. At the same time, Pakistan is in the midst of a severe political crisis. This has occurred due to a breakdown of the coalition at the time of a presidential election. The tribal areas have 20 electoral votes in this contest.
The tribal MNAs and Senators have said that they would like the military activity stopped in Bajaur as a precondition for casting their votes for the PPP candidate. In short, the presidential contest has become a negotiable item in the path of security operations. The JUI-F, which has more than 30 Electoral College votes, has categorically asked for a halt to all military operations.
What will be the consequences if the military action is stopped? It will not only let down the military but also all those who have accepted the challenge to fight the militants at the community level. We have seen that while the government adheres to ceasefires the militants do not. The militants use ceasefires to retaliate against those who risked attacking the militants. The government's ascendancy that now prevails will be lost.
One is not for war and would wish an end to the killings, but if there has to be a ceasefire the militants must surrender their core leaders and weapons and promise to end all violence. Secondly, this narrative clearly suggests that implementation of Pakistan's security policy after the guidelines have been fixed should not become a part of the political calculus.
At the start I had mentioned that the final determinant of an insurgency is winning the hearts and minds of the people. If you examine the militants' narrative it relates to the story of a rich person, bin Laden, who gave up his wealth, family and privileges to come and defend the poor, in a world where they believe their religion is under challenge. The "valiant" bin Laden is seen pitched in a battle against those who have greater personal and private interest in retaining power for themselves rather than for the public good.
Clearly under these circumstances the battle for the hearts and minds will be in favour of bin Laden than the leadership in Pakistan, which is portrayed as self-centred. This is indeed a huge challenge, but one which is overlooked by the ruling elite. In this battle for the hearts and minds the side which is moral, fair and bases its policies on principles, rather than on expediency, will win the battle for hearts and minds.
If Pakistan is to have a fighting chance of coming on top of the insurgency it must improve governance and help the poor. Secondly, it must protect its security policies from the vagaries of selfish political actors. A contrary course will spell disaster.
The writer is a former chief secretary of NWFP and heads the Regional Institute of Policy Research in Peshawar. Email: azizkhalid **********
