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BLA attack - tactics

Somebody posted a thread sharing links to videos that show the BLA attack. The thread has been deleted, but I still want to discuss tactics.

The post and its defences have not been made to withstand a well planned attack. The guys were pinned by long range fire while enemy troops moved in. I watched the beginning and it looks like the enemy didn't have any snipers. The guys should have ascertained the accuracy of long range fire, and then they should have broken cover to take on incoming men. There is a guy in the corner who tries to remain behind the cover while enemy men amass right outside the wall. Had he tried to jump outside the compound and then take them from the flank they would be easy targets. There seems to be no one in charge who is thinking about all the approaches to the camp and how to defend them. Yes, the lack of hand grenades is appalling. Moreover, the camp is at the base of a mountain. The enemy could have opened another front from the top of that mountain. Conversely, if there had been another camp at the top, that would be an advantageous position for machine gun and sniper fire. I wonder if our regular army is trained to think along these lines?

@PanzerKiel
The regular army is, FC for some unknown reason does not make encampments on elevated terrain from where a wide view of the terrain and command of the land beneath is made possible. If you see the same video, I think some terrorists opened up on the encampment from elevated positions on the hills around giving cover to their advancing comrades on foot beneath. Many things are chronically wrong with FC and people over here do not like hearing it, but PA is also responsible for this. It can't shrug off its responsibility towards the paramilitary by calling it an institution under the MoI. The leadership cadre for FC is drafted from the regular military. If military leaders can take stands (and maybe dictate policy matters in some domains), why can't they demand FC's total divorce from MoI, and its capacity-building under the direct supervision of regular military? They could get additional budget for it. At least we won't lose these men in such a humiliating manner.
 
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If drones aren’t ready or fighter jet too expensive even super mushak with guided bombs. Forget that even an overflight to scare these terrorists. It’s really not asking for much.
 
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Watched some of it.

Guy in lookout tower at the north west from the camera's perspective was dealing with accurate fire.

Whole thing seems pretty well planned, as evidenced by their briefing clip and model at the start, they'd obviously been recceing it for a while, possible monitoring comms too.

RPG fire seemed super accurate, probably a specialist.

The insurgents were also noticed bunching around in groups many times, not the best trained tactical fighters.

A gunship would have laid waste to them, too bad none came, neither did any other form of backup, which is odd, given the mere 30 km distance from an army airbase... what kind of assets does that base host anyway ?

PAF and PA aviation need to be flying some show of force sorties in the area, possibly dropping some heavy munitions in empty areas too, to let their enemy know.
An Indian poster actually contributing in this forum,

Der aye durust aye...
good analysis!
 
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If drones aren’t ready or fighter jet too expensive even super mushak with guided bombs. Forget that even an overflight to scare these terrorists. It’s really not asking for much.
I believe this is what you are talking about Super Tucana
A-29s_Over_Afghanistan_(3).jpg

After drones (which we already have but are not operational as of now) these planes are perfect

Many countries fighting insurgencies use this plane as its really cheap and gets the job down

instead of using proper jets we should have been using these planes in the first place

" “There are plenty of countries that have an extremist threat -- the Middle East and South and Central Africa. SOCOM (Special Operations Command) is asking for this for Nigeria, Somalia and Libya. It is a perfect platform for where we are fighting,”

Can we give these planes to army aviation in order for them to support FC?
 
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This battle was Pakistan’s Wanat. A similar inquiry needs to be done, and even if no one in command takes any blame, at least the lessons learned should be applied to all military installations so that they never happens again and the en who were shaheed did not do so in vain.
 
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It stops with the COAS. He should spend less time talking to businessmen and foreign dignatories and spend more time focusing on the needs of his troops.

It's what I have said countless times; our COAS past and present act more like Foreign Officials and Chamber of Commerce Businessman then military officers, they dip their toes where it doesn't belong.
 
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Is there any information about the captured soldier shown at the end of the video? Has he been recovered or still in BLA hands?
 
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Is there any information about the captured soldier shown at the end of the video? Has he been recovered or still in BLA hands?
Still in BLA's hands they say that they have sentenced him to death.
 
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The FC supposedly went through a revamp under Gen Tariq but the basic incompetence of MoI and the compartmentalizations of Pakistani government at all levels will ensure that such losses occur regularly.
 
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@PanzerKiel

I have recently begun to study BLA/BRA tactics in detail and I must say I am very disappointed at the attention that is being given to this by high-command. Let's put to rest the issue of whether FC is seconded to Interior (FC is commanded by PK Army). The fact of the matter is regular and para mil are getting milled down. I see tons spent on what I would consider secondary expenditure (I am giving it a nice name secondary expenditure), but critical expenditure is wanting.
Now I wont go into the multiple aspects of how to take on the BRA/BLA insurgency. There is sweep ops, there is electronic/signal intel, there is Cantt security, city security, financial monitoring, village security, coastal security, logistic interdiction, road and highway monitoring and finally the part I would like to discuss is FOB/Check-post security. Each of the above is essential however as long as we enable loose law enforcement we'll always enable the financing of insurgency in Balouchistan. For example drugs and fuel smuggling plays into insurgency funding, which is why when CG and FC (take their little side cuts), they are infact killing themselves. That level of awareness needs to permeate into the corps.

Coming back to FOB/Checkpost security. I'll take the recent BRA/BLA attack on the check post. It is shocking to see the disaster unfolding. The boys had no chance of making it out. Yet only a few things different and the outcomes could have been very different. First where was the barbed wire? That entire Checkpost should have been layered in barbed wiring. That would have slowed down close quarters. Because once the enemy is within grenade lobbing distance the goose is cooked. Having them fumble or alert well before close range would give the FC soldiers ability to rain lead on the BLA men.

Second each of these check-post especially remote checkposts should have an accompanying checkpost. Two checkposts within fire cover next to each other make for very difficult targets. That should be a par for the course.

Three there should be monitoring and observation rotations 24x7. These BLA men should never have made it close, and should have been engaged 600-1000 yards from the CP. This speaks to poor SOPs at the CP.

Four, you can clearly see BRA/BLA tactics involve covering fire from snipers at distance. I would say BLA/BRA set sniper nests at about 500-1000 yards. This means two things. One when setting up CPs, potential sniper posts need to be pre-identified and zeroed in. Also inexpensive low cost vibration sensors should be peppered in and around the CP as well as in and around the identified sniper posts. This will give FC some time and potential location to provide some suppressive fire on the snipers, so that the rest of the FC men can engage the advancing ground units. (leverage MW connectors to get local mesh going).

Five, number of men in these units needs to increase. If BRA/BLA can move teams of 10-20 with ease, it is critical that these FC CPs have teams of atleast 10+ men. I feel sometimes these posts are too few men to provide enough fire to push back.

Six, given the sniper threat that is always there, the design of the CPs should be such that normal movement is below visual. Similar to how the CPs and trenches are setup on the LOC.

Seven, sites should have counter-sniper nest built into the CP. This means a pull back setup soa counter sniper is not visible and can engage without exposure through multiple points.

Eight is IR goggles are critical. In this environment IR optics will cause havoc to a positioning enemy.

These FOB/CPs should also have some basic solar setup to provide enough juice to power longer distance comms, and where highly critical an integrated optics sensor system (granted too expensive for each site). Very small tactics hand deployed UAVs to give CP some situational positioning. Also type of firepower is essential as well, RPGs (multi grenade launchers), hand grenades, and high quality ballistic protection.

Combine the above and watch how things change. Till we take some of these into consideration, we will continue to loose men and give the enemy strong propaganda and ability to swell its ranks.
 
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