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Beijing’s Next Target in the South China Sea: Indonesia?
Victor Robert Lee reports from Natuna Island, Indonesia
What might be called “homeland security” is tight at Natuna Island, and it should be — this may be the next bite China takes out of the South China Sea.
Upon landing at Natuna (also called Natuna Besar), Indonesia’s largest island within the hotly contested South China Sea, foreigners must register and provide copies of their passports even though all arriving flights are domestic. No photos are allowed until well outside the airfield because it doubles as an Indonesian Air Force base. When departing the island, all foreigners must “check out” with security personnel who quiz visitors on where they have been during their stay, and their routing into and out of the area. Even a casually met off-duty naval officer will make pointed inquiries about a visitor’s activities on the island.
Two of three air force hangars at Natuna’s Ranai airfield. Photo by Victor Robert Lee.
Given that Beijing has recently promulgated a map with boundaries that claim a swath of sea that may include the Natuna Islands as part of its territory, the increased security is understandable, but the paucity of military clout on this significant Indonesian border outpost is a stark reminder that Beijing faces little hard resistance to its ongoing annexation of the South China Sea. Over the past two years, China has reinforced its territorial quest through intimidation, naval patrols, localized blockades, oil rig placements, ramming of fishing vessels, and construction of military facilities on numerous small islands and sub-surface shoals.
How to connect Beijing’s speculative dashes? The 2013 map is by SinoMaps Press, an arm of the Chinese government (with thanks to Euan Graham for a digital image). Dashes in pink denote Beijing’s claimed “nine-dashed line” (now comprising ten dashes). Superimposed black dashed lines, by the author, show hypothetical ways of connecting the two southernmost dashes in Beijing’s self-proclaimed southern boundary. All three hypotheticals would overlap with Indonesia’s claimed territory around the Natuna Islands, including the reportedly largest gas field in Southeast Asia, called Natuna D Alpha block, recently renamed Natuna East field, which has been the subject of longstanding dealings between the Indonesian government and Exxon Mobil Corporation. Repeated requests to ExxonMobil to clarify the contractual status of the Natuna East field and the potential impact of China’s claims on the territory were not answered.
Until recently Indonesia seemed immune to these hostilities, and its government offered itself as an honest broker among the disputing neighboring states — China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan — but with Beijing’s recent inclusion of the area around Natuna in its newly sanctioned maps (and on Chinese passports), Indonesia’s incoming President Joko Widodo may find China’s aggression to be a first item in his inbox when he assumes office on October 20th.
He will also find that the air force base at Natuna as well as the “naval base” there are unlikely to provide much front-line defense. The air force base has an abundance of housing quarters — more than thirty small buildings — but only three modest aircraft hangars. The fact that there are no military aircraft visible at the base may demonstrate stealth, or perhaps the absence of aircraft.
Indonesian naval vessels at dock, Natuna Island. Photo by Victor Robert Lee.
On the lawn of an adjacent navy compound, two dozen personnel including several women were admirably practicing martial arts, but the only navy vessels on the island are two small and lightly armed patrol boats and an RIB (rigid inflatable boat), all tied to a deteriorating pier. Even granting that some naval assets may have been transferred recently to a base in the Anambas Islands, 210 miles to the southwest of Natuna, the strict no-photo regulation may be driven by a wish to hide weaknesses rather than to keep military secrets.
The primary radar station on Natuna Island for monitoring the South China Sea. Photo by Victor Robert Lee.
In March of this year Indonesia’s government for the first time acknowledged that China’s unilateral claims on most of the South China Sea include parts of Indonesia’s Riau province, to which Natuna and other islands belong. Indonesia, a nation of 250 million people, may, despite its government’s polite attempts to carve itself out of the South China Sea conflicts, find itself the latest victim of Beijing’s acquisition campaign.
In March 2013, as researcher Scott Bentley has described, a Chinese “maritime law enforcement” ship confronted an Indonesian patrol vessel that had arrested nine Chinese fishermen for operating in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone, 200 kilometers northeast of Natuna Island. The commander of the armed Chinese vessel Yuzheng 310 threatened the Indonesian crew and demanded the release of the Chinese detainees. It is also highly likely that the Yuzheng 310 electronically jammed the communications of the Indonesian boat. Under threat and with no link to headquarters, the Indonesians released the Chinese fishermen. There is evidence that other similar incidents have occurred, but the Indonesian government has refrained from discussing them in public.
Victor Robert Lee reports from Natuna Island, Indonesia
What might be called “homeland security” is tight at Natuna Island, and it should be — this may be the next bite China takes out of the South China Sea.
Upon landing at Natuna (also called Natuna Besar), Indonesia’s largest island within the hotly contested South China Sea, foreigners must register and provide copies of their passports even though all arriving flights are domestic. No photos are allowed until well outside the airfield because it doubles as an Indonesian Air Force base. When departing the island, all foreigners must “check out” with security personnel who quiz visitors on where they have been during their stay, and their routing into and out of the area. Even a casually met off-duty naval officer will make pointed inquiries about a visitor’s activities on the island.
Two of three air force hangars at Natuna’s Ranai airfield. Photo by Victor Robert Lee.
Given that Beijing has recently promulgated a map with boundaries that claim a swath of sea that may include the Natuna Islands as part of its territory, the increased security is understandable, but the paucity of military clout on this significant Indonesian border outpost is a stark reminder that Beijing faces little hard resistance to its ongoing annexation of the South China Sea. Over the past two years, China has reinforced its territorial quest through intimidation, naval patrols, localized blockades, oil rig placements, ramming of fishing vessels, and construction of military facilities on numerous small islands and sub-surface shoals.
How to connect Beijing’s speculative dashes? The 2013 map is by SinoMaps Press, an arm of the Chinese government (with thanks to Euan Graham for a digital image). Dashes in pink denote Beijing’s claimed “nine-dashed line” (now comprising ten dashes). Superimposed black dashed lines, by the author, show hypothetical ways of connecting the two southernmost dashes in Beijing’s self-proclaimed southern boundary. All three hypotheticals would overlap with Indonesia’s claimed territory around the Natuna Islands, including the reportedly largest gas field in Southeast Asia, called Natuna D Alpha block, recently renamed Natuna East field, which has been the subject of longstanding dealings between the Indonesian government and Exxon Mobil Corporation. Repeated requests to ExxonMobil to clarify the contractual status of the Natuna East field and the potential impact of China’s claims on the territory were not answered.
Until recently Indonesia seemed immune to these hostilities, and its government offered itself as an honest broker among the disputing neighboring states — China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan — but with Beijing’s recent inclusion of the area around Natuna in its newly sanctioned maps (and on Chinese passports), Indonesia’s incoming President Joko Widodo may find China’s aggression to be a first item in his inbox when he assumes office on October 20th.
He will also find that the air force base at Natuna as well as the “naval base” there are unlikely to provide much front-line defense. The air force base has an abundance of housing quarters — more than thirty small buildings — but only three modest aircraft hangars. The fact that there are no military aircraft visible at the base may demonstrate stealth, or perhaps the absence of aircraft.
Indonesian naval vessels at dock, Natuna Island. Photo by Victor Robert Lee.
On the lawn of an adjacent navy compound, two dozen personnel including several women were admirably practicing martial arts, but the only navy vessels on the island are two small and lightly armed patrol boats and an RIB (rigid inflatable boat), all tied to a deteriorating pier. Even granting that some naval assets may have been transferred recently to a base in the Anambas Islands, 210 miles to the southwest of Natuna, the strict no-photo regulation may be driven by a wish to hide weaknesses rather than to keep military secrets.
The primary radar station on Natuna Island for monitoring the South China Sea. Photo by Victor Robert Lee.
In March of this year Indonesia’s government for the first time acknowledged that China’s unilateral claims on most of the South China Sea include parts of Indonesia’s Riau province, to which Natuna and other islands belong. Indonesia, a nation of 250 million people, may, despite its government’s polite attempts to carve itself out of the South China Sea conflicts, find itself the latest victim of Beijing’s acquisition campaign.
In March 2013, as researcher Scott Bentley has described, a Chinese “maritime law enforcement” ship confronted an Indonesian patrol vessel that had arrested nine Chinese fishermen for operating in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone, 200 kilometers northeast of Natuna Island. The commander of the armed Chinese vessel Yuzheng 310 threatened the Indonesian crew and demanded the release of the Chinese detainees. It is also highly likely that the Yuzheng 310 electronically jammed the communications of the Indonesian boat. Under threat and with no link to headquarters, the Indonesians released the Chinese fishermen. There is evidence that other similar incidents have occurred, but the Indonesian government has refrained from discussing them in public.
OP is notoriously vicious in maligning China 24/7
