Bay of Bengal geopolitics under transformation

[Banglar Bir]

IS BANGLADESH READY FOR THE CHALLENGE?
Bay of Bengal geopolitics under transformation
Shahid Islam
When the tide of time changes the contours of reality, nations must reset their priorities to meet the emerging challenges and new realities. The geopolitics of the Bay of Bengal and its littoral nations are under transformation amidst competing interests of regional and global powers.

Bangladesh, as a nation central to this new development, must prepare to take the plunges that lurk in the blue waters beyond the nation’s territorial waters, as well as on the shiny shores dotting the vast coastline shared by Myanmar and Bangladesh in particular.

Rohingya dispossession
This new reality has been ushered in by the systematic uprooting of the Rohingya Muslim minorities in Myanmar who are historic inhabitants of a strategic landmass called Arakan (Rakhine state of Myanmar) that spreads over 36,778 km² and, mountains as high as 3,063 metres separate the region from central Myanmar to mesh it neatly with the hilly suburbs of neighbouring Bangladesh.

Besides, the military backed regime in Myanmar considers the Rohingya as Bengali settlers who, the regime believe, should be driven back to their ancestral homes in Bangladesh’s Chittagong area that, until 1666, was part of the Arakan landmass while the rest of the land was annexed by Burma in 1784.

The Rohingya crisis is taking a turn for the worst at a time when the regional and global powers believe that the brewing China-US rivalry — and the Indian decision to strategically align with the USA—is shaping up the parameters of a major global conflict centering Myanmar’s Rakhine state; from where Rohingyas in their hundreds of thousands are being driven back to Bangladesh, sparking a major humanitarian crisis that needs immediate global humanitarian and military interventions.

Stake for Bangladesh
Bangladesh may have been napping—and not alerted by the increased visitations recently to the country of people and dignitaries from the East and the West—while the USA, UK, and their NATO allies might have planned for one of the three particular outcomes to unfold in this festering crisis.

First: Myanmar should take back the dispossessed Rohingyas and offer them citizenship.

Second: The UN should make provision for a Bosnia-type humanitarian intervention backed by military force; a prospect much feared by China, Russia and India.

Third: Arakan should be an independent state for all the inhabitants of the area, including the local Buddhists.

Being an inheritor state of the British empire, Bangladesh does have a historic claim on Arakan due to the Arakan landmass being under the British rule since a bloody war in 1824 between the Burmese and the Brits resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Yandabo (1826), ending prolonged hostilities following Burma’s ceding of Arakan, alongside Tanintharyi (Tenasserim), to the British Indian government.

Legal footnotes
The rationales of the Myanmar regime in driving out the Rohingya minorities from their ancestral home are untenable, and the pattern of racial and ethnic discriminations are staggeringly overwhelming.

Following independence in 1945, the Burmese government passed the Union Citizenship Act, which ascribed the ethnicities “indigenous” to Myanmar, and, excluded the Rohingyas, the Muslim inhabitants of Arakan, for not being indigenous, and hence, not being one of the country’s 135 designated official ethnic groups.

Yet, Bangladesh failed to mount a major diplomatic offensive in 1974 when all citizens in Burma were made to get national registration cards, excluding the Bengali speaking Rohingyas, who were only allowed to obtain foreign registration cards. And again, in 1982, when a new citizenship law prevented the Rohingyas from obtaining Burmese citizenship and rendered them virtually stateless, Bangladesh displayed a curious silence.

Now that the Myanmar regime is evidently found in conducting an orgy of ethnic cleansing and, by now had forcefully evicted almost one million Rohingys from their ancestral homes, Dhaka’s burden to shouldering them can only be ameliorated by moving aggressively toward adopting a Chapter 7 enforceable Resolution under the UN Security Council, which the USA and its NATO allies seem poised to take onboard as the most viable option, according to the diplomatic mutterings swirling around.

China, Russia, India factors
The move is not obstacle-free, however. Myanmar is China’s clientele state and ideologically aligned as the inseparable communist siblings of the same indoctrination. Yet, in the midst of a brewing China-US rivalry for global supremacy, and the Indian decision to strategically align with the USA, Washington does have an upper hand in steering the Rohingya crisis toward a direction suiting its global agenda.

In Bosnia too, in the early 1990s, Russia vehemently opposed any military intervention under the UN mandate while the Bosnian Muslims faced Serv-conducted ethnic cleansing. But the USA proved relentless in its pursuance of creating an independent nation-state for the Bosnian Muslims. The same scenario may get replayed in Arakan unless the Myanmar regime takes back the driven-out Rohingya people sooner.

For its part, India can either tow the US-Western line, or dither on the grey shred of ambivalence, as it did by abstaining from voting lately in the UN Human Rights Commission-mooted motion on the crisis.

The caveat is: Delhi’s failure to make a clear stand on the issue will cost it by
(1) stalling Western support to becoming a permanent member of the UNSC;
(2) losing face with the USA and the West at a time when Delhi’s betrayal with Moscow after decades of strategic cohabitation remains unforgivable, and;
(3) blundering on the false assumption that the historic animosity with Beijing is deferrable, or erasable.

The national interest of Bangladesh, under these givens, will be best served by staying glued with the human-rights-conscious Western regimes to tilt the precarious diplomatic imbalance it now confronts.

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[bluesky]

Being an inheritor state of the British empire, Bangladesh does have a historic claim on Arakan due to the Arakan landmass being under the British rule since a bloody war in 1824 between the Burmese and the Brits resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Yandabo (1826), ending prolonged hostilities following Burma’s ceding of Arakan, alongside Tanintharyi (Tenasserim), to the British Indian government.

By the 1826 treaty, Arakan belongs to now Bangladesh. But, our uneducated politicians do not know history, and also do not understand the implication of this treaty. BD is a meek country infested with parasite politicians who are not willing to put their personal interest away for the sake of the nation.

 

[Banglar Bir]

Rohingyas and the politics of crisis
Afsan Chowdhury, November 30, 2017

Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district, Photo: UNHCR
While Bangladesh is not really able to assert itself on the Rohingya crisis given its lack of clout and support, Myanmar has done better given the solid backing it has received from China. The result has been an MOU of sorts which has not generated any confidence in any quarters and ensured that the heat on Myanmar cooled a bit.
The Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Yi while visiting Bangladesh had said that as a mutual friend of both China and Bangladesh it welcomes the agreement or the MOU.

Myanmar should feel pleased with the MOU which puts no pressure on it to take back the refugees as has been pointed out. It has already started to go down any way compared to the initial days. World press has already started to shift attention and except for stray incidents about Suu Kyi losing one degree or another, Myanmar appears safe.

The West in general is more worried about North Korean bombs and Bangladesh –Myanmar issues are heading towards a low priority zone. Having withstood the initial global condemnation quite effectively, Myanmar is now stabilizing. It translates into dictating terms on the Rohingya matter.

Rohingya politics and Bangladesh
Making sure the Pope doesn’t even utter the word “Rohingya’ during his Myanmar trip was a good example of how strong Myanmar has become in the last three decades since they have been sending Rohingyas to Bangladesh. China has also backed the efforts made by Myanmar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said everyone should recognize that much progress has happened since the crisis began, which is not Bangladesh’s stand.

While the MOU is about if and how and when – many think never- Rohingyas return to Myanmar, the Bangladesh Government’s position on what will happen if they don’t return is not clear which is a distinct possibility. However, there are domestic political issues involved as well.

The domestic audience wants to hear that Rohingya refugees will return as per the MOU and for the political side of the government which is also facing an election, it can’t afford not to have a “agreement” of some sort which will make it look good.

Real China and reality China
Chinese Minister Wang Yi while in Dhaka said that Bangladesh was the biggest recipient of Chinese concessional financial facilities, 5 billion US dollars in 2017 alone. He also discarded the claims that China loans were too expensive. “All this loans have been provided in light of actual needs,” adding that Bangladesh should dispel such speculations.
Also Read: Myanmar’s Suu Kyi to visit China amid Western criticism over Rohingya exodus

Wang Yi also stated that both One Belt and One Road (OBOR) initiative and strengthening the BCIM (Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation) were both China’s priorities.

On the Rohingya issue, Wang Yi did admit that internal problems of Myanmar were affecting Bangladesh. He also praised Bangladesh’s humanitarian role on the Rohingya issue. China’s position, he stated, was a solution that was mutually acceptable and within the bi-lateral framework.

While Wnag Yi mentioned the UN’s role in the crisis the message was clear. China is a “good friend of both” and will do the best to play a constructive role. Meaning, China is the only player that matters for the moment.

What about India?
India has been left out of sorts from the crisis management and given China’s economic and military clout- it’s the largest arms supplier to both Myanmar and Bangladesh- India can do little. Some sections of Indian media have expressed a bit of unhappiness about China’s big role but as some analysts say, “India is not as big as China.”

While India has a long relationship with both Bangladesh and Myanmar, the ties are at different levels. Moreover, China’s relationship is also deeper with Myanmar than India’s and though it’s close to Bangladesh, China is rapidly coming closer.

So if India is feeling left out, it really can’t do much at the moment. China is playing top dog and the Indian bark is perhaps louder than its bite.

The stakes for all the countries actually have risen due to the crisis but so has uncertainty. For the moment China and Myanmar with the MOU signed may feel they have an edge over others but the MOU has to work to make Bangladesh in general and Sk. Hasina politically look better in 2018.
Also Read: Indian BSF pushes back Rohingyas to Bangladesh

If the MOU is a dud, her political priorities may push her to look for options which an unexplored West led by the US seems available.
But that may not still include India.

South Asia’s smaller member are also going to be more cautious about China seeing that its wide ranging interest in the region means it can’t take a particular side. The rise of expensive loans will not go away either. So how far China can travel as economies grow is a new era and 2017 seems to be crunch year in that calendar.

Bangladesh has already started to invest 270 million dollars to build a camp for a lakh of refugees which means both long term and immediate prospects are being considered. The Government will also have to reduce emerging anti- Rohingya hostility in the camp zones that may spread and cause political issues for 2018.

India will also worry if a regime change may mean a government less sympathetic to India’s transit facilities, something China may not dislike. And the Jihadist anxiety grows no matter what is said.

In other words, the Rohingya problem has left the refugee camps and entered the main space in Bangladesh and may do so in the region.
Also Read: Pope skips Rohingya crisis in Myanmar speech
https://southasianmonitor.com/2017/11/30/rohingyas-politics-crisis/

 

[UKBengali]

By the 1826 treaty, Arakan belongs to now Bangladesh. But, our uneducated politicians do not know history, and also do not understand the implication of this treaty. BD is a meek country infested with parasite politicians who are not willing to put their personal interest away for the sake of the nation.

Until both Awami League and BNP are destroyed as parties of power, not much will change.
BD needs new politics and Arakan should have been an easy prize to take from tiny and genocidal Barmans.
West would not have said much if BD annexed Arakan. China will not shed a single soldier to defend anyone but themselves.

 

[Bilal9]

Until both Awami League and BNP are destroyed as parties of power, not much will change.
BD needs new politics and Arakan should have been an easy prize to take from tiny and genocidal Barmans.
West would not have said much if BD annexed Arakan. China will not shed a single soldier to defend anyone but themselves.

From a strategic military standpoint the valley of Arakan is not all that defensible which is surrounded by mountains. Horrible in terms of infantry logistics and in terms of invasion by sea. Unless the Tatmadaw wants to put all their eggs in that basket militarily that is. Which they won't be able to do even if they want to.

 

[UKBengali]

From a strategic military standpoint the valley of Arakan is not all that defensible which is surrounded by mountains. Horrible in terms of infantry logistics and in terms of invasion by sea. Unless the Tatmadaw wants to put all their eggs in that basket militarily that is. Which they won't be able to do even if they want to.

Exactly, the Arakan mountains are the natural border between BD and Myanmar.
This was the PERFECT opportunity to annex BD's rightful territory and the Rohingya would
have finally been safe in their own lands.
BD has two extremely useless major parties. If they were even remotely mindful of how
defence is the major component of national well-being, this would have been a wonderful
time for BD. Arakan would provide huge farming land, abundant hydroelectric power and
other natural resources like gas that would have propelled BD economy to new heights.

 

[Banglar Bir]

Rohingyas and the politics of crisis
Afsan Chowdhury, November 30, 2017

Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar district, Photo: UNHCR
While Bangladesh is not really able to assert itself on the Rohingya crisis given its lack of clout and support, Myanmar has done better given the solid backing it has received from China. The result has been an MOU of sorts which has not generated any confidence in any quarters and ensured that the heat on Myanmar cooled a bit.
The Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Yi while visiting Bangladesh had said that as a mutual friend of both China and Bangladesh it welcomes the agreement or the MOU.

Myanmar should feel pleased with the MOU which puts no pressure on it to take back the refugees as has been pointed out. It has already started to go down any way compared to the initial days. World press has already started to shift attention and except for stray incidents about Suu Kyi losing one degree or another, Myanmar appears safe.

The West in general is more worried about North Korean bombs and Bangladesh –Myanmar issues are heading towards a low priority zone. Having withstood the initial global condemnation quite effectively, Myanmar is now stabilizing. It translates into dictating terms on the Rohingya matter.

Rohingya politics and Bangladesh
Making sure the Pope doesn’t even utter the word “Rohingya’ during his Myanmar trip was a good example of how strong Myanmar has become in the last three decades since they have been sending Rohingyas to Bangladesh. China has also backed the efforts made by Myanmar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said everyone should recognize that much progress has happened since the crisis began, which is not Bangladesh’s stand.

While the MOU is about if and how and when – many think never- Rohingyas return to Myanmar, the Bangladesh Government’s position on what will happen if they don’t return is not clear which is a distinct possibility. However, there are domestic political issues involved as well.

The domestic audience wants to hear that Rohingya refugees will return as per the MOU and for the political side of the government which is also facing an election, it can’t afford not to have a “agreement” of some sort which will make it look good.

Real China and reality China
Chinese Minister Wang Yi while in Dhaka said that Bangladesh was the biggest recipient of Chinese concessional financial facilities, 5 billion US dollars in 2017 alone. He also discarded the claims that China loans were too expensive. “All this loans have been provided in light of actual needs,” adding that Bangladesh should dispel such speculations.
Also Read: Myanmar’s Suu Kyi to visit China amid Western criticism over Rohingya exodus

Wang Yi also stated that both One Belt and One Road (OBOR) initiative and strengthening the BCIM (Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation) were both China’s priorities.

On the Rohingya issue, Wang Yi did admit that internal problems of Myanmar were affecting Bangladesh. He also praised Bangladesh’s humanitarian role on the Rohingya issue. China’s position, he stated, was a solution that was mutually acceptable and within the bi-lateral framework.

While Wnag Yi mentioned the UN’s role in the crisis the message was clear. China is a “good friend of both” and will do the best to play a constructive role. Meaning, China is the only player that matters for the moment.

What about India?
India has been left out of sorts from the crisis management and given China’s economic and military clout- it’s the largest arms supplier to both Myanmar and Bangladesh- India can do little. Some sections of Indian media have expressed a bit of unhappiness about China’s big role but as some analysts say, “India is not as big as China.”

While India has a long relationship with both Bangladesh and Myanmar, the ties are at different levels. Moreover, China’s relationship is also deeper with Myanmar than India’s and though it’s close to Bangladesh, China is rapidly coming closer.

So if India is feeling left out, it really can’t do much at the moment. China is playing top dog and the Indian bark is perhaps louder than its bite.

The stakes for all the countries actually have risen due to the crisis but so has uncertainty. For the moment China and Myanmar with the MOU signed may feel they have an edge over others but the MOU has to work to make Bangladesh in general and Sk. Hasina politically look better in 2018.
Also Read: Indian BSF pushes back Rohingyas to Bangladesh

If the MOU is a dud, her political priorities may push her to look for options which an unexplored West led by the US seems available.
But that may not still include India.

South Asia’s smaller member are also going to be more cautious about China seeing that its wide ranging interest in the region means it can’t take a particular side. The rise of expensive loans will not go away either. So how far China can travel as economies grow is a new era and 2017 seems to be crunch year in that calendar.

Bangladesh has already started to invest 270 million dollars to build a camp for a lakh of refugees which means both long term and immediate prospects are being considered. The Government will also have to reduce emerging anti- Rohingya hostility in the camp zones that may spread and cause political issues for 2018.

India will also worry if a regime change may mean a government less sympathetic to India’s transit facilities, something China may not dislike. And the Jihadist anxiety grows no matter what is said.

In other words, the Rohingya problem has left the refugee camps and entered the main space in Bangladesh and may do so in the region.
Also Read: Pope skips Rohingya crisis in Myanmar speech
https://southasianmonitor.com/2017/11/30/rohingyas-politics-crisis/

Rohingya issue: Bangladesh caught in its short-sightedness
Published: 00:05, Nov 29,2017 | Updated: 01:15, Nov 29,2017

WHY no one seems to be too enthusiastic about the recently signed MoU between Bangladesh and Myanmar on Rohingya repatriation is best explained when our foreign minister says that it has been drafted as Myanmar desired. He added that Bangladesh is happy that Myanmar has agreed to take some of them back.
But Myanmar may be comfortable that the heat will be low now after the MoU and, of course, it can send more refugees any time and Bangladesh can do little about it. Rohingya situation/status has not changed since 1977 and Bangladesh remains at the mercy of Myanmar’s political will.

The facilitator appears to be China who was beginning to feel the heat internationally and knew that at some point of time, the United States might offer something to Bangladesh or do something that could make China uncomfortable.

China’s stake in Myanmar is high and it can still call the shots there and that is what mattered in the end. It came to Bangladesh and reduced the multi-lateral directions that Bangladesh was being forced to take and made it firmly bilateral under Chinese supervision. It was what both China and Myanmar had wanted knowing from the past that Bangladesh’s capacity to diplomatically handle the Rohingya on its own is limited.
Does the MoU mean much?
THE MoU basically takes the heat off Myanmar and gives China more space to pursue OBOR and other economic priorities. But it leaves Bangladesh as vulnerable as before. Given that the MoU follows the 1992 framework closely, the flaws of that one remains. It appears hurriedly cobbled together but as pro-Bangladesh government analysts are saying, It is a beginning at least.

A critical part of the MoU say, only those who came after the alleged ARSA attack will qualify to be considered for repatriation. By doing so, Bangladesh has endorsed the Myanmar, China and Russian position that all of this was due to Rohingya insurgency and not Myanmar army activities.

This also means that the Rohingya refugees before the alleged attack have lost the right to return as the MoU specifically denies/ignores the existence of any such people making the return of all Rohingyas impossible. Thus, about 4,00,00 are now here to stay as Myanmar wanted. It also relieves itself of any accusation that an ethnic cleansing took place.

Ethnic cleansing was actually used by the United Nations which has said that the situation in Myanmar is not fit for the refugees to return. Our media also report that most Rohingyas now in the camps are also not willing to return either. Where does the situation go from here now?
Will refugees return if they at all go back?
IT IS certainly not in favour of the refugees because they are not even a party to the discussion. It is an MoU between Myanmar, which does not recognise the Rohingyas as its citizens, and Bangladesh, which does not accept them as refugees. In this strange quandary, the Rohingyas have no role to play. They are not just victims but invisible too.

But several issues have been mentioned regarding their return to Myanmar which may mean that this is just a time-buyer and another deluge is possible in future. This is apart from the fact that many may not be able to prove their status as residents of Myanmar as mentioned in the MoU.

The 1993 term was vague on their status and the citizenship or associate citizenship is not about to be returned to them; so, even if they do return, they will be housed in temporary shelters and camps which many fear will be used to coerce them again. In that case, what guarantee is there that they will not escape back to Bangladesh? Commenting on the MoU, the Australian web site ‘Conversation’ which has covered the issue since the crisis says:

‘The idea of voluntary return stems from a 1993 agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar, under which those Rohingyas who can prove their identity must fill in forms with the names of family members, their previous address in Myanmar, their date of birth, and a disclaimer that they are returning voluntarily. But those who do choose to return will face extortion, arbitrary taxation, and restrictions on freedom of movement. Many will be required to undertake forced labour, and some will face state-sponsored violence and extrajudicial killings.’
Given this scenario, how far will the MoU guarantee a safe repatriation?
It is admitted by all that China has played a critical part in getting the MoU signed as all the negative publicity was hurting China’s image as the prime vendor in the region. China needs aggressive marketing stances which have stumbled a bit recently in the region. However, it remains strong enough to push Myanmar and Bangladesh to a MoU and in this equation the Rohingyas are not a factor.

The problem is that an MoU that was signed and admitted by the foreign minister was largely done as sought by Myanmar. The world has cited evidence of ethnic cleansing and the people responsible are still in power. No dates and guidelines, no guarantee of safety, no involvement of the United Nations — barring consultation with the UNHCR — if and when Myanmar decides, and, of course, no mention of any long-term plan that leaves Bangladesh as vulnerable as before to a fresh exodus.

Will Bangladesh force the Rohingyas to return if they refuse as it looks like? Will they erect fences to prevent another exodus? At this point, it seems more like a victory for China followed by Myanmar and a helpless Bangladesh caught in the trap of its own short-sightedness.

Afsan Chowdhury is a journalist and researcher.
http://www.newagebd.net/article/29354/rohingya-issue-bangladesh-caught-in-its-short-sightedness