GERMAN INFANTRY TACTICS - GENERAL METHODS
INTRODUCTION:
The german army followed a
triangular organization structure from platoon upto divisional level.3 squads =1 platoon,3 platoons plus support=1 company,3 companies plus support=1 battalion,3 battalions plus support=1 regiment,3 regiments plus support=division.All support was organic,meaning integrated from the beginning into the structure..thus frequent support attachments from higher levels for missions were unnecessary.This was the result of
the Einheit principle standardized in the german army.It provides that any given arm or service will develop a number of standard unit groups, each with standard organization, leadership, training, and equipment. The
unit group is an organic entity, capable of operating independently and self-sufficient both for tactical and administrative purposes. Within a given branch or service, each basic type of unit group will represent a different combination of the various components (or weapons) of that branch or service.The
Einheit principle of organization has several advantages. Obviously the supply and replacement of equipment can be more readily geared to a few standard types of units. The training and tactical employment of a given type of unit can be standardized, and directed with uniformity. Above all, the existence of these basic type-units, each so composed as to serve a different function,
permits easy organization of any desired type of larger unit.This principle also applies to the infantry naturally.(scroll back pages to see infantry organization from squad to division in detail in this thread)
The triangular model was
flexible as it gave each level of command 2 units to commit to a battle while holding one in reserve as a manuever element to be used at a critical juncture as the battle developed.German doctrine at this era placed an overwhelming emphasis on the offensive as the only means of achieving decisive victory.First we get an overview of general german tactical methods of recon,attack and defense before going into detail from battalion down to squad tactics.
RECONNAISSANCE:
PRINCIPLES - The German doctrine stresses aggressiveness, attempt to obtain superiority in the area to be reconnoitred, and strive for continuous observation of the enemy. They believe in
employing reconnaissance units in force as a rule. They expect and are prepared to fight to obtain the desired information.
Only enough reconnaissance troops are sent on a mission to assure superiority in the area to be reconnoitred.
Reserves are kept on hand to be committed when the reconnaissance must be intensified, when the original force meets strong enemy opposition, or when the direction and area to be reconnoitred are changed. The Germans encourage aggressive action against enemy security forces. When the reconnaissance units meet superior enemy forces, they fight a delaying action while other units attempt to flank the enemy.Reconnaissance is classified by the Germans as
operational, tactical, and
battle reconnaissance.
METHODS -
Operational reconnaissance, penetrating over a
large area in great depth, provides the basis for strategic planning and action. This type of reconnaissance is intended to determine the location and activities of enemy forces, particularly
localities of rail concentrations, forward or rearward displacements of personnel, loading or unloading areas of army elements, the construction of field or permanent fortifications, and hostile air force concentrations. Identification of large enemy motorized elements, especially on an open flank, is important. Operational reconnaissance is
carried out by the Air Force and by motorized units.Operational air reconnaissance units are generally limited to the observation of important roads and railroads .The motorized units employed for operational reconnaissance have only directions and objectives assigned.
Storch,tactical reconssaince aircraft
Tactical reconnaissance,
carried out in the area behind the operational reconnaissance, provides the basis for the commitment of troops. Its mission embraces
identification of the enemy's organization, disposition, strength, and antiaircraft defense; determination of the enemy's reinforcement capabilities; and terrain reconnaissance of advanced sectors.
Air Force reconnaissance units and motorized and mounted reconnaissance battalions are employed for tactical reconnaissance. Their direction and radius of employment are based upon the results of the operational reconnaissance.
Sectors of responsibility are assigned to ground tactical reconnaissance battalions(the support units-motorcycles,armored cars,cavalry etc in divisions and regiments)The width of a sector is determined by the situation, the type and strength of the reconnaissance battalion, the road net, and the terrain. In general, the width of a sector assigned to a motorized reconnaissance battalion does not exceed 30 miles.
Divisional reconnaissance battalions seldom operate more than one day's march (18 miles) in front of the division, covering an area approximately 6 miles wide.
Battle reconnaissance as a rule is
begun when the opposing forces begin to deploy. All troops participating in battle carry out battle reconnaissance through patrols, artillery observation posts, observation battalions, and air reconnaissance units. The information obtained on the organization and strength of the enemy provides the basis for the conduct of the battle.Can be conducted by several means -
If a panzer/motorized division is nearby,armored car will be dispatched.
Armored Car Patrols normally are composed of three armored reconnaissance cars, one of which is equipped with radio. An artillery observer often accompanies the patrol so that in an emergency fire can be brought down quickly. This type of patrol usually is organized for missions lasting one to two days.Patrol never splits up. If enemy forces are met, action is avoided unless the force is so weak that it can be destroyed without diverting the patrol from its main task. If enemy action is anticipated, the patrol is reinforced with self-propelled guns and occasionally with tanks. Engineers and motorcyclists are often attached to the patrol to deal with road blocks and demolitions.While scouting a woods, a favorite German ruse is to drive the leading car toward its edge, halt briefly to observe, and then drive off rapidly, hoping to draw fire that will disclose the enemy positions.
The Germans send out
reconnaissance patrols, consisting of a
NCO and three or four men, to get such information as the location of enemy positions and minefields. They generally avoid contact and retreat when fired on.
Combat patrols consist of at least one NCO officer and eight men, but are usually much stronger. As a rule the combatpatrol is commanded by a sergeant who has under him 15 to 20 men, organized in two equal sections, each commanded by a section leader. These are
raiding patrols, and their mission often includes bringing back prisoners of war.
Emphasis placed on
terrain reconnaissance, realizing the influence terrain has upon the conduct of operations. Most of the usual reconnaissance missions include terrain reconnaissance tasks. Terrain may be so important at times as to require reconnaissance by special units. Ground and air reconnaissance units give special attention to the road net--its density, condition, road blocks, mines, and demolitions--as well as to the terrain itself, particularly tank country.
THE ATTACK: GENERAL)
The fundamental principle of German offensive doctrine is to encircle and destroy the enemy. The objective of the combined arms in attack is to bring the armored forces and the infantry into decisive action against the enemy with sufficient fire power and shock.Even the most formidable forces are never sufficient for overwhelming superiority on the entire front. They therefore select a point of main effort (
Schwerpunkt) for a breakthrough, allotting narrow sectors of attack to the troops committed at the decisive locality. Here is massed the bulk of the heavy weapons and reserves. The other sectors of the front are engaged by weaker, diversionary forces. In selecting the point of main effort, the der weaknesses in the enemy's defensive position; suitability of the terrain, especially for tanks and for cooperation of all arms; approach routes; and possibilities for supporting fire, especially artillery are considered. Although the Germans would select a point of main effort in all attacks, they would usually also make plans for shifting their main effort if they meet unexpected success elsewhere. To allow such shifts, sufficient reserves and a strong, unified command are organized.An attack on a narrow front, according to German doctrine, must have sufficient forces at its disposal to widen the penetration while maintaining its impetus, and to protect the flanks of the penetration. Once the attack is launched, it must drive straight to its objective, regardless of opposition.
TYPES OF ATTACK :
'The
frontal attack strikes the defender at what is usually his strongest point, and therefore
requires absolute superiority in men and materiel. In theory, frontal attacks should only be made across terrain that allows the attacking force to break through and quickly get into the depths of the enemy position. To tie down the enemy on the flanks of the breakthrough, the frontage of the attack is usually set wider than the actual
Schwerpunkt within it.
Adequate reserves necessary to counter the certain employment of the enemy's reserves.Viewed the most difficult to execute'.
An
Wing attack directed at one or both of the defending "wings" was considered to have a better chance of success than a frontal attack.
Only a portion of the defenders' weapons would be faced, and only one flank of the advancing force was exposed to enemy fire during the approach. Often the forcing back of one wing would provide opportunities to develop a wing attack into a flank or envelopment attack.
The
flank attack,considered the
most effective attack. The flank attack develops either from the approach march--sometimes through a turning movement--or from flank marches. It attempts to
surprise the enemy and permit him no time for counter-measures. Since mobility and the deception of the enemy at other positions are required, the flank attack is most successfully mounted from a distance; the troop movements necessary for the maneuver can be executed in close proximity to the enemy only with unusually favorable terrain or at night. Attacks are launched on both flanks only when the Germans consider their forces clearly superior.
The
enveloping attack was actually a combination of the frontal and flank techniques, and was especially favored by the Germans. The enveloping forces would be directed against either or both the defenders' flanks, and was accompanied by a
simultaneous frontal attack aimed at fixing in place their main forces. The success of an envelopment depended on the extent to which the enemy was able to redeploy his units in the threatened direction(s). Of course, the deeper that enveloping forces drove into the enemy's flanks,greater became the danger they would themselves be counter-enveloped. The Germans therefore emphasized the necessity of strong, experienced reserves, coupled with the organization of the enveloping forces in depth.
In an
encirclement the enemy was not attacked at all along his front (or perhaps only by light diversionary forces), while the
main attacking force passed entirely around him with the objective of completely maneuvering him out of position. This was a particularly decisive form of attack, but at the same time one usually more difficult to execute than a flanking or enveloping attack, and
one requiring extreme mobility and deception.
PENETRATION AND BREAKTHROUGH:
Penetrations and
breakthroughs were not actually separate forms of attack by themselves, but rather were terms used to describe the exploitation of a successful frontal, wing or flank effort.
A penetration was said to have occurred when the
continuity of the enemy front was first broken. The broader that initial penetration, the deeper the wedge that could be driven. It was considered important to have strong reserves available to block enemy attempts to counterattack (usually on the flanks) the penetration.
German units were trained to exploit penetrations to the maximum, leading to a full breakthrough before effective enemy countermeasures could be taken. The deeper and more swiftly the attacking force penetrated, the more effectively frustrated would be the defenders' attempts to close their front again by withdrawal toward the rear. The
Germans didn't consider a penetration successfully and entirely evolved into a breakthrough until the attack had overrun the defenders' artillery positions. Once that was done, reserve units would be committed to turn and roll up the remainder of the enemy's line from the newly created flanks of the penetration/breakthrough. This maneuver was referred to as ''wedge and cauldron."
Pursuit was considered to have begun when the defender was no longer able to maintain his position and abandoned the combat area with the bulk of his force. The objective of the pursuit was nothing less than the complete annihilation of the retreating and routed enemy. Accordingly, it was conducted across as broad a front as possible .Effective pursuit efforts required great initiative from the commanders at all levels of the operation. To be successful pursuits usually had to be started the instant the enemy retreat was seen to be under way, even though the attacking troops might already be exhausted from their initial effort. The idea was to deny the enemy any quiet time to pause and reconstitute his defense. Naturally, then, the fastest moving, most mobile, forces were the ones selected for pursuits, usually tank and armored infantry units well supported by aircraft.
MEETING ENGAGEMENTS:
In meeting engagements the
advantage lay with the side that first succeeded in completing effective preparations for an attack, thereby depriving the enemy of his freedom of action. The advance guard of any advancing German force was always tasked with quickly using fire and maneuver in such a way as to secure that freedom of action for their side. When
both sides attacked immediately from march columns, the decisive factors were then the initiative of the junior officers and the overall efficiency of the troops they led.
Overall,german offensive tactics always aimed at outflanking or encircling the main area of the enemy defense with motorized and mechanized formations. The
straight-leg infantry was intended for use in rolling up the enemy defenses in the rear, or participating in the penetration/breakthrough with the tanks to develop the wedge and cauldron.
ORGANIZING AN ATTACK:
The attack order (
Angriffsbefehl) generally contains the
objective of the attack, the disposition of the infantry, unit sectors and boundaries, disposition and support missions of the artillery, location of reserves, and the time of attack. The order is not drawn up in accordance with any stereotyped form, but as a rule follows this pattern:
- Estimate of the situation (disposition of hostile and friendly troops).
- Mission.
- Assembly areas for the forward companies; objective; sector boundaries; orders for the continuation of combat reconnaissance.
- Instructions for the preparation of the heavy-weapons fire support, especially for massed fire.
- Orders to the artillery for fire preparation and coordination.
- Assembly areas for the reserves.
- Time of attack.
- Instructions for rear services (medical service and supplies).
- Location of command posts.
Sectors of Attack - The width of a sector assigned to an infantry unit in the attack
depends on the unit's mission and battle strength, on terrain conditions, on the available fire support of all arms, and on the probable strength of enemy resistance. Normally the sector assigned to a platoon is between 165 and 220 yards. A company attack sector is about 330 to 550 yards. A battalion sector is 440 to 1,100 yards, while a division sector may be 4,400 to 5,500 yards. These sectors also provide the boundaries for the other arms, especially for the artillery in support of the infantry, although the artillery may utilize favorable observation positions in neighboring sectors. This also applies to the heavy infantry weapons.For large units the sectors are determined from the map; for smaller units, from the terrain.
Fire Plan - Fire superiority is achieved through coordination of the infantry and artillery weapons. The basis for the fire plan is the regulation of the commitment of all weapons.
The fire plan includes the following:
- Assignment of combat missions.
- Distribution of observation sectors and fields of fire for the infantry and the artillery.
- An estimate of capabilities of the artillery for effective execution of the combat mission.
- Orders for the commencement of fire and fire schedules.
- Orders for the preparation for massed fire.
- Instructions for ammunition supply. The Germans stress the coordination of flat and high trajectory weapons so that all dead spaces are covered by fire. Lack of signal equipment, however, often hinders the application of this principle.
THE DEFENSIVE (GENERAL)
In German doctrine the object of the defense is to halt the hostile attack, or to gain time pending development of a more favorable situation for resumption of the offensive.They
favored an elastic defense wherein great importance was placed on the idea of immediate and violent counterattacks as the best way of defeating an attacking enemy.The Germans divided their defensive battlefields into four positions: the
advanced position, the outpost position, the main line of resistance, and the reserve position.They
apply the principle of selecting a point of main effort (Schwerpunkt) to the defense as well as to the attack. This principle necessarily is applied in reverse order in the defensive, the main effort being made opposite the point where the enemy is making his main attack.
The width and depth of a German defense area depend upon the terrain and the proportional strength of friendly and hostile forces. In general, however, the width of a defensive sector assigned to a unit is approximately twice the width of the sector when the same unit attacks. Normal sectors are: platoon, 220 to 550 yards; company, 440 to 1,100 yards; battalion, 880 to 2,200 yards; regiment, 2,200 to 3,300 yards; division, 6,600 to 11,000 yards.
ZONES OF RESISTANCE:
The Advanced position was
closest to the enemy line and was usually set up five kilometers in front of the German main line of resistance, thus staying within range of their own medium artillery. Advanced positions were selected on the basis of good defensive terrain that provided observation points for friendly artillery and, if possible, also
worked to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main line farther back. The troops manning the advanced position
operated so as to make an attacking enemy deploy his troops from march prematurely and in the wrong directions
German troops in the advanced position were not expected to hold at all costs. In the face of superior enemy numbers or firepower
they were to retreat along predetermined routes under the cover of friendly artillery. The forces selected for the advanced position were therefore usually mobile reconnaissance detachments, made up mostly of armored cars, mobile infantry, assault guns .Units that had both the firepower and mobility to make them suitable for such deployment.
The Outpost position was usually
established two kilometers in front of the main line of resistance. Its location would therefore
always be in range of both medium and light friendly artillery As long as the troops manning the advanced position remained in front of it, the outpost position would be only lightly occupied. Ordinarily, individual strongpoints within the overall outpost position would be manned by no more than an infantry platoon supported primarily by the fire of close-support weapons such as mortars and infantry guns. Anti-tank guns were often also assigned to the outpost position to repel hostile armored reconnaissance units. The
main defensive weapon of this area, however, was the heavy machinegun, which could fire out to a range of about one kilometer.
Good fields of fire were considered mandatory for all positions within the outpost area. Firing positions were usually selected at the forward edges of woods, villages, hedgerows and hills. Numerous decoy positions would also be constructed. Guards were posted, particularly at dusk and dawn, to provide warnings of enemy advances. Small, prepared counterattacks with limited objectives were often launched from outpost positions, with the aim of disrupting enemy preparations and gaining information.
Firing positions within the outpost area were also selected on the basis of facilitating unobserved withdrawal of those defenders to the main line of resistance once enemy pressure grew too strong. Several alternate positions would be prepared for each weapon, and shifts were made day and night to make it more difficult for the opposition to detect and dislodge the defenders. When an outpost position was abandoned, the
withdrawal was likely to be covered by carefully registered fire from heavy weapons intended to discourage the enemy from immediately advancing.
(An improvised field machine gun bunker)
Main Line of Resistance - The Germans organized their
main battle line in depth, with individual strongpoints connected to form uninterrupted belts. These strongpoints, constructed to
allow for all around defense, and surrounded by barbed wire obstacles and minefields, contained one or more heavy weapons, including machineguns, mortars, infantry guns, and riflemen. The smallest strongpoints constructed were intended to be occupied by reinforced squads. Such squad positions were normally incorporated into platoon strongpoints, company strongpoints, and so on up the organizational scale.
The Germans always attempted to make
maximum use of reverse slopes in their defensive positions. Forward-slope positions were avoided whenever possible, since they could be detected early on by an approaching enemy, and were likely to be attacked by mass fire.Wherever they defended the Germans adhered to the principle of "effect over protection." For example, though cutting and removing underbrush might increase the enemy's ability to spot defending troops, the enhancing effect such removal had on those same defenders' firing lanes was considered worth the increased risk.
A
detailed fire plan was prepared in advance by the infantry officers,and then coordinated with the artillery. The mass of the available artillery would be used to lay concentrated fire both close to and well in front of the main battle line, and was sited to cover the spaces between the effective fire zones of the frontline units.
German defense of their main battle line was based on
stubborn resistance at individual strongpoints, local counterattacks against areas of immediate enemy penetration, and larger-scale counter attacks carried out by mobile reserves. Defenders in strongpoints were taught to continue their resistance even after they were surrounded, since their perseverance impeded the attackers' advance and facilitated counterattacks. German doctrine therefore prescribed that intact portions of a breached main battle line continue to fight, regardless of the immediate situation, until the appropriate higher command ordered a readjustment of the line.
Immediate local counter thrusts by the infantry at hand and whatever support elements happened to be near the enemy penetration endeavored to hurl back the enemy before he had a chance to establish himself. These small counterattacks were directed at the flanks of the enemy penetration whenever possible.
(A typical battalion strongpoint,3 companies in defensive strongpoints with heavy weapons company in rear and available artillery,usually heavy mortars or infantry guns -in detail later)
was constructed
far enough to the rear of the main battle line to compel the enemy artillery to move forward to bring it under fire. Mobile reserve units were also normally kept there. Troops in the main battle line would retire to the reserve position only under the heaviest pressure.
Anti Tank Defenses - At first the Germans tended to construct anti-tank ditches well forward of their main battle line. But experience showed that such construction merely served to offer good jump-off positions for the enemy's infantry while also revealing the location of the main battle line, increasingly, then, during the last two years of the war they more often dug anti-tank ditches in the area between the main battle line and their artillery positions. They were built in an uninterrupted line to avoid leaving any complete passage
German anti-tank guns were always dispersed in depth, with some In placing them they preferred positions in enfilade, or even on reverse slopes. Normally two to four anti-tank guns were deployed in each position,
with light machineguns located around them to protect against enemy infantry assault. Considerable effort was often made to conceal anti-tank guns to prevent the enemy from discovering the location and strength of the anti-tank defense prior to his attack. Though single anti-tank guns sometimes engaged enemy armor at ranges up to one kilometer, they usually opened fire at about 250 meters.
German artillery - attempts to disrupt a hostile attack before it reaches the defensive positions. German manuals state it is invaluable to
install observation posts simultaneously in the main line of resistance, in the advanced position, and in the immediate vicinity of the gun position. Thus to keep a hostile force constantly under observation and fire even when it achieves a penetration. The divisional level artillery regiment commander controls the fire as long as possible, although requests for artillery barrages may be made by unit commanders as low as platoon leaders. Capabilities of German heavy mortars, which like all other support weapons usually are sited on reverse slopes, are exploited.
When the enemy succeeds in making a large penetration or breakthrough, the German higher echelon commander decides whether a general counterattack should be launched to restore the position or whether the main battle position
should be reestablished farther to the rear. The counterattack is directed against the hostile flank, where possible, and is prepared thoroughly. Assembly area, time, objective, zone, artillery support, and employment of tanks, self-propelled artillery, assault guns, and air units are controlled by one commander.
(The above strongpoints and zones will be detailed with pics in coming posts at battalion,company and platoon levels).
NEXT: BATTALION LEVEL TACTICS -OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
