Battle of Umberkhind

[Joe Shearer]

All that I want to say at the end of this can be in bullet form:

• @Crixus, please keep posting these accounts; they are very interesting. But please give out some references and citations as well; many of us would like to know more;
• Members who take this as an aberration, a Muslim setback amidst an almost unbroken chair of victories, please don't degrade this to a Hindu-Muslim thing;
• Members who take offence quickly, please calm down, take a drink of water, lose your sensitivity, and come back.

 

[saiyan0321]

Well first of all this isnt muslim vs hindu. This is military tactics and some of the best muslim victories would be found through generals studying the tactics of non-muslims. To a student it never matter whether it was an army of hindu or muslims. The idea here to study is how well intelligence warfare was conducted and implemented in those days and how well guerrilla experience mattered. We must also come to understand the impossibility or atleast the difficulty of outmaneuvering your opponent in his homeland or known area and you fighting on foreign fields. I would take this impossibility to the example of hannibal and how he had won every battle to this extent and to this legend status that it wouldnt surprise me if he would open the battle field with a cry of, 'So you come to meet in battle you mere mortal' yet he had lost the entire war fighting a war on foreign fields away from your home base and in the base of the enemy which could replenish its supply and conduct far more successful intelligence operations.

We must also come to understand that Decca was one hard conquest for Tughlaq, Khilji and the mughals since conquests were fine with large armies, you can run over anybody. The problem was controlling the region and administrating it from the center of the Indian Subcontinent. Always the rule didnt last long and often declined simply because Deccan was just too far. Tughlaq was a smart king and he understood that there is no way an area like Decca could be ruled from Delhi and thus he tried to establish administrative and military control by making the devagiri aka Daulatabad. Scholars say that he did it to establish a capital far away from the western invasions but i think there was another reason and it was the establishment of central control in the south. Delhi would always be the administrative center of northern Indian Subcontinent. No matter what however the south needed its own established capital and thus Tughlaq decided to make daulatabad the capital. If he was running away from fear of western invasions then he would have just built more forts and outposts across the Indus frontier which would have been less expensive but he did this. The reason was Decca needed to be controlled and it could not be done without a central military and administrative capital which could serve as a home base from which fresh offensives and more effective administration could be dealt with. The Mughals faced the same thing in Decca. Fighting far from home and sending reserved and military equipment and gold would take weeks if not months. Offensives would be delayed, opportunities missed and no way could a stretched army take down guerrilla harassers especially not someone as keen as the Shivaji. The mughals repeatedly tried offensives until their army was demoralized and exhausted and it didnt help that Aurangzebs Father had lost Qandahar which left the south western region of the empire exposed and without any proper monetary gain, Kandahar was where the money was and persia just took it. Conquests to Fergana were checked as well.

so the question is what was the best method to control the southern conquests. The answer was given to us by british that you can control any empire as long as it has a coastal region and the south had a huge coastal region and a navy was the secret to control Decca. Naval supplies would not be so easily harrassed and naval reinforcements would come with zero intelligence threat. A large army would be witnessed from far and wide. A thousand ships sailing in the Indian ocean would only be notices when they are leaving or when they are arriving save any pirate or merchant ship spotting them but chances are less. None of those three had a navay and all of them failed to establish controls in areas far from their capitals i.e. Kabul, Bengal or Decca. The British however captured the coasts and then the land and were only stretched when they faced the Kun Lun Mountains.

 

[FCPX]

I’m not particularly interested in psyops, but if you refer any material I can surely look into it. My interest is general military history of certain periods. Lack of material in Indian military history is what I lament. So it would be great if you point out any good material regarding it, provided it gives a balanced view. I’ll look forward to it.

I recently bought 2 books:

- "1962: The war that wasn't" by Shiv Kunal Verma. Since I knew nothing about this I thought this would be a good intro. I am halfway reading and its certainly an eye opener. Seems pretty well researched or so I think.
- "The Anarchy: The relentless rise of the East India Company" by William Dalrymple. Though not strictly military history but nevertheless it unmasks the role of the East India company in its conquest and rule of India. Haven't started reading as yet but I watched a few talks by the author on Youtube and his research seems to be very comprehensive, perhaps more than anyone else on this subject.

The problem with buying/reading historical books is to try and figure our which ones are well researched and unbiased & based on historical evidence rather than faux patriotism.

 

[meghdut]

I recently bought 2 books:

- "1962: The war that wasn't" by Shiv Kunal Verma. Since I knew nothing about this I thought this would be a good intro. I am halfway reading and its certainly an eye opener. Seems pretty well researched or so I think.
- "The Anarchy: The relentless rise of the East India Company" by William Dalrymple. Though not strictly military history but nevertheless it unmasks the role of the East India company in its conquest and rule of India. Haven't started reading as yet but I watched a few talks by the author on Youtube and his research seems to be very comprehensive, perhaps more than anyone else on this subject.

The problem with buying/reading historical books is to try and figure our which ones are well researched and unbiased & based on historical evidence rather than faux patriotism.

Ahh you speak my mind dude. For 1962 I have the book you mentioned but not read yet. If you can please get Nevile Maxwell's "India's China War", that's the most comprehensive book you will get on this subject. Of Dalrymple I read " The Return of A King". That is about the 1st Afgan War and is immensely readable and interesting, and it draws parallel to the present situation in Afganistan. About present I can recommend Bryan Cloughley's "A History of the Pakistan Army" , I believe you will find it a very interesting and dispassionate read.

 

[meghdut]

We must also come to understand that Decca was one hard conquest for Tughlaq, Khilji and the mughals since conquests were fine with large armies, you can run over anybody. The problem was controlling the region and administrating it from the center of the Indian Subcontinent. Always the rule didnt last long and often declined simply because Deccan was just too far. Tughlaq was a smart king and he understood that there is no way an area like Decca could be ruled from Delhi and thus he tried to establish administrative and military control by making the devagiri aka Daulatabad. Scholars say that he did it to establish a capital far away from the western invasions but i think there was another reason and it was the establishment of central control in the south. Delhi would always be the administrative center of northern Indian Subcontinent. No matter what however the south needed its own established capital and thus Tughlaq decided to make daulatabad the capital. If he was running away from fear of western invasions then he would have just built more forts and outposts across the Indus frontier which would have been less expensive but he did this. The reason was Decca needed to be controlled and it could not be done without a central military and administrative capital which could serve as a home base from which fresh offensives and more effective administration could be dealt with. The Mughals faced the same thing in Decca. Fighting far from home and sending reserved and military equipment and gold would take weeks if not months. Offensives would be delayed, opportunities missed and no way could a stretched army take down guerrilla harassers especially not someone as keen as the Shivaji. The mughals repeatedly tried offensives until their army was demoralized and exhausted and it didnt help that Aurangzebs Father had lost Qandahar which left the south western region of the empire exposed and without any proper monetary gain, Kandahar was where the money was and persia just took it. Conquests to Fergana were checked as well.

This has always been the classic military problem. The further the provinces were the more difficult were they to control. If you recall Julius Caesar's campaigns in Gaul you will find that there were frequent rebellions whenever central authority was weak. Moreover in the case of Mughal expansion, when they invaded Assam in 1662 and managed to capture the Ahom capital, Mughals were unable to hold the conquest for long due to the same reason you mentioned and were eventually defeated and driven away.

Your assessment regarding British naval supremacy and it's impact of maintaining the empire is spot on. But please do recall that they established their empire exploiting the existing differences and weakness of the reigning kingdoms of that period. They skillfully played one kingdom against another and thus established their dominance gradually.

 

[saiyan0321]

This has always been the classic military problem. The further the provinces were the more difficult were they to control. If you recall Julius Caesar's campaigns in Gaul you will find that there were frequent rebellions whenever central authority was weak. Moreover in the case of Mughal expansion, when they invaded Assam in 1662 and managed to capture the Ahom capital, Mughals were unable to hold the conquest for long due to the same reason you mentioned and were eventually defeated and driven away.

Indeed. There was a reason the first emperor Augustus was against anymore conquests atleast western or northern conquests and wanted his successors to focus on establishing proper administration in the areas of Rome proper. The same problem the mughals faced with the campaigns in ferghana under shah Jehan and conquests north of modern day afghanistan. The loss of Qandahar could also be attributed to an empire that was overstretched and how persia captured it and how, two specific assaults and sieges to recover Kandahar failed.

Your assessment regarding British naval supremacy and it's impact of maintaining the empire is spot on. But please do recall that they established their empire exploiting the existing differences and weakness of the reigning kingdoms of that period. They skillfully played one kingdom against another and thus established their dominance gradually.

Thanks and yes. Any state that has been part of that empire knows very well how exploitative they were of existing differences and how well they exploited the weakness of the kingdoms which is also a good lesson to learn. Very skillfully until neither state was strong enough to stand against them. Their role in the Sikh Afghan wars as well as in the internal divisions of the talpur dynasty, make for a very grim but a very studious lesson to learn. The British were kings in this game and they expended minimal effort to gain maximum power. They did it in northern america as well turning tribes against each other and arming some one tribe against the next until nobody could offer a united stand against them. Frankly their intelligence network was equally if not one of the most superior networks in our region and it was in this form that they knew what the nations and empires wanted and what it lacked and who were their enemies and who were their friends. They knew exactly what to do and who to exploit and you cant do that without extensive intelligence gathering. The Khairpur chiefs being against the Talpurs, Talpurs being against Syed Ahmed shah and his state. They were masters of exploiting and their implementation of their knowledge actually is a great subject for study.

 

[meghdut]

Thanks and yes. Any state that has been part of that empire knows very well how exploitative they were of existing differences and how well they exploited the weakness of the kingdoms which is also a good lesson to learn. Very skillfully until neither state was strong enough to stand against them. Their role in the Sikh Afghan wars as well as in the internal divisions of the talpur dynasty, make for a very grim but a very studious lesson to learn. The British were kings in this game and they expended minimal effort to gain maximum power. They did it in northern america as well turning tribes against each other and arming some one tribe against the next until nobody could offer a united stand against them. Frankly their intelligence network was equally if not one of the most superior networks in our region and it was in this form that they knew what the nations and empires wanted and what it lacked and who were their enemies and who were their friends. They knew exactly what to do and who to exploit and you cant do that without extensive intelligence gathering. The Khairpur chiefs being against the Talpurs, Talpurs being against Syed Ahmed shah and his state. They were masters of exploiting and their implementation of their knowledge actually is a great subject for study.

Intelligence of course, and moreover they were very very politically astute. So much so that they foxed every major power of the Indian Subcontinent; and also the French. Just imagine how naive those people were .

 

[xeuss]

This has always been the classic military problem. The further the provinces were the more difficult were they to control. If you recall Julius Caesar's campaigns in Gaul you will find that there were frequent rebellions whenever central authority was weak. Moreover in the case of Mughal expansion, when they invaded Assam in 1662 and managed to capture the Ahom capital, Mughals were unable to hold the conquest for long due to the same reason you mentioned and were eventually defeated and driven away.

Your assessment regarding British naval supremacy and it's impact of maintaining the empire is spot on. But please do recall that they established their empire exploiting the existing differences and weakness of the reigning kingdoms of that period. They skillfully played one kingdom against another and thus established their dominance gradually.

In ancient and medieval times, there were no standing armies. Extent of kingdoms were demarcated by the simple recognition of higher authority by the ruling aristocrat of the region.

Even when standing armies became the norm, suzerainty over far off provinces were dependent upon the whims of the appointed governors of the region.

Therefore, while the Mughals did conquer the Deccan and North East, their extension of authority was minimal and largely dependent on the (appointed) rulers of those areas to reciprocate the recognition.

 

[meghdut]

In ancient and medieval times, there were no standing armies. Extent of kingdoms were demarcated by the simple recognition of higher authority by the ruling aristocrat of the region.

Even when standing armies became the norm, suzerainty over far off provinces were dependent upon the whims of the appointed governors of the region.

Therefore, while the Mughals did conquer the Deccan and North East, their extension of authority was minimal and largely dependent on the (appointed) rulers of those areas to reciprocate the recognition.

Of course there were no standing armys in present sense , it was and is very expensive to maintain permanent armies. So there was mostly some royal bodyguards and mercenaries who were the permanent military force during those periods. Which is why you’ll find the appalling logistical difficulties they faced, because there were no stable logistical chain to supply them during wartime, especially for the invading forces.
And Mughals never conquered NE they only managed to defeat Ahoms during Mir Jumla’s campaign and were eventually driven out due to the same problems which always beset such armies, lack of a solid service corps.
@Joe Shearer What do you think?

 

[FCPX]

Ahh you speak my mind dude. For 1962 I have the book you mentioned but not read yet. If you can please get Nevile Maxwell's "India's China War", that's the most comprehensive book you will get on this subject. Of Dalrymple I read " The Return of A King". That is about the 1st Afgan War and is immensely readable and interesting, and it draws parallel to the present situation in Afganistan. About present I can recommend Bryan Cloughley's "A History of the Pakistan Army" , I believe you will find it a very interesting and dispassionate read.

Amazing how some things work. Here we are separated by 1,000's of Km's discussing a topic where we have similar interests in books. Thank you for your recommendations!

"India's China War" I will definitely get, now that I've a small "taste" of the events.

"The return of a king" has been on my list. I felt I need lots of time to digest the East India book first as it covers the entire history of India during the period of the East India Company's rule then I can move to Afg. He has another book on the Kohinoor Diamond which is also on my list, not really for a historical perspective but more of a fascinating read about this remarkable piece of glass.... sorry diamond.

"A history of the Pakistan army" I read ages back but I believe there is an updated print might be worth the investment and read.

Not to derail your topic but 2 other books that you might enjoy even tho they are not related to our region:

- "Wings over Sinai: The Egyptian AF during the Sinai war, 1956" by David Nicolle & 2 others. I've read a lot of books and articles about all the wars there but never a book from the Egyptian perspective. Definitely worth a read if you want to know the stories from the other side.
- "Red wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the air war in Korea" by Xiaming Zhang. As above, I only ever read the US/Allied versions and its refreshing to read from the other side's perspective.

 

[meghdut]

Amazing how some things work. Here we are separated by 1,000's of Km's discussing a topic where we have similar interests in books. Thank you for your recommendations!

"India's China War" I will definitely get, now that I've a small "taste" of the events.

"The return of a king" has been on my list. I felt I need lots of time to digest the East India book first as it covers the entire history of India during the period of the East India Company's rule then I can move to Afg. He has another book on the Kohinoor Diamond which is also on my list, not really for a historical perspective but more of a fascinating read about this remarkable piece of glass.... sorry diamond.

"A history of the Pakistan army" I read ages back but I believe there is an updated print might be worth the investment and read.

Not to derail your topic but 2 other books that you might enjoy even tho they are not related to our region:

- "Wings over Sinai: The Egyptian AF during the Sinai war, 1956" by David Nicolle & 2 others. I've read a lot of books and articles about all the wars there but never a book from the Egyptian perspective. Definitely worth a read if you want to know the stories from the other side.
- "Red wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the air war in Korea" by Xiaming Zhang. As above, I only ever read the US/Allied versions and its refreshing to read from the other side's perspective.

Thanks my man, I’ll surely take a look. And never mind derailing the topic it’s okay.