jhungary
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I came to Australia after my service. One day, i get into a bar wanting to get a beer, turns out the establishment is a Return Servicrman Club (RSL), inside was a display, inside was photo and memorabilia from Vietnam War. I gone over to the display and look, it saids
"Long Tan, 1966"
Battle of Long Tan, may not be familiarised with by the people outside Australia. It was a provincial engagement that changed nothing by both US/Australian standard nor to Vietnam. Overhere, however, it was seen as THE iconic battle for Australian, in the same effect as in Galipoli in WW1, Kokoda Campaign in WW2 or Kapyong in Korea. In vietnam war, the Aussie have Long Tan.
I know little about Battle of Long Tan before, i know of the battle existed, and Australian involvement, that's it. So i asked the club staff, what is it about Battle of Long Tan that capture the Australian mind??
And it is also why this battle is the third battle i wrote about Vietnam War
Background of the battle :
Long Tan is a habitan village in Phouc Tuy Province, before the war started it was one of the pro-communist area in south vietnam, its resident lived thru and supported the Vietminh to resist french and when the time change, they supported the Vietcong for the current American occupation.
Oddly enough, this is the exact location the Australian choose to base their operation in, siting a quick assess to sea route for supply and an enclosed/secluded area which is prefect for their pacification program.
Australian involvement in vietnam way come 1962 when the Australian establish the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam in Saigon, when the war escalated in 1965, US also asked the Australian to step up with the involvement. Resulting a direct engagement of Australian via the form of 1RAR (Royal Australian Regiment). As the organisation grew bigger, the need for more personnel for a more permenant setting is required, resulting the establish of 1 ATF (Australia Task Force) and the Task Force was based out in Nui Dat, in vietnam southern province.
1ATF replace 1RAR as the station force in Vietnam, where 1ATF comprise of element from 5RAR and 6RAR. The Australian are to seperate from US Divisonal Command and have themselve taken care of their own section of battlefield.
Australian and US operation is very much different, where as US opt for a large scale search and destroy, using the mobility provided by Airmobile to insert large forces to any corner of the battlefield once their smaller force found and draw out the enemy. However, Aussie operate on a permanent fixture, sending patrol and establish safe zone (Much like the establishment of Green Zone in Iraq) Whedre they will pacifify spot after spot, seperate the insurgent from local.
1ATF ultimate goal is to dominate the whole Phuoc Tuy province, eventually listing all the area in to their TAOR (Tactical Area of Operation Responsibility) thus, "converting" the whole province and allow an en trenched Southern government establishment.
Deposition of Forces :
Australian 1ATF included 2 Battalions, the 5th RAR and the 6th RAR, supplimented with Battalions HQ, 2 Troop from 1st APC squadron, a troop from 3rd SAS Squadron, Combat engineer, 1 Field Regiment of Royal Australian Artillery (+ US A Battery 2/35 Battalion) Composed of the defence of Bases in Nui Dat Total strength is somewhere around 2000.
Oppositing the field is 2 Regiments from VC 5th Division, the 274 and 275 regiments operate in the area, totalling about 3,900 men. Supporting the 5th VC Division is D445 independent Battalion of 500 men and local rear support group that take care of Casualty of 50-100
Tactical Consideration :
The main Tactical Consideration for the Aussie is their base, apparently. Due to the limit number of troop, the base defence took half of their resource of stationed troop, and only leave appoximately one half to go out and about and carry on with their business. The base defence are rotated between 5 RAR and 6 RAR, while one is doing base security, the other are outside the wire and conduct patrol and interdiction mission to scout and disrupt the enemy.
US Asset from II Crop Tactical Zone can be called upon, but simply, it's some way away.
The main tactical consideration for the VC is also the Australian Base, with it as a ground of operation, they have disrupte the VC influence to the local villager, and that translated into hampered recruitment, dwindling ration from population, and harder to conduct insurgency.
Also of consideration is the weather, that part of vietnam would have full monsoon during that time of year (August) and visibility will drop, for the Australian, that mean disruption of airborne resupply and restriction of movement. For the vietcong, that mean troop are harder to gather for any major operation (Most VC troop are not mechanised) For which will play a significant role for what happened next.
Start of Battle :
A co-ordinated artillery bombardment were organised by VC to strike the base in Nui Dat, in response, the Australian send out company based patrol over to check for firing spot.
Aussie response by sending out B Coy toward the plantation while the A Coy, already on patrol NE of the AO, move SE toward B coy and a detactment of C company are laying ambush South and South West of Nui Dat
B Company with 80 men were to be relieve by D Coy on 18 August, while part of B Coy discharge fro mthe battlefield on 17th, the rest of B Coy patroleast of Nui Dat near the plantation.
1100 August 18, D Coy left their post in Nui Dat, tasked to link up with B company, then proceed to look for the VC artillery if B Coy did not found it, or follow and interdict if they do.
D company linked up what B company at 1300, and setup a defensive perimeter on and near the plantation, B company move back to Nui Dat sometime after 1300 and D company set off at 1500 due East continuing the search.
With 10th Platoon on elft, 11th on the right, and 12th held at research, the first shot came 1545 when the 11 platoon sighted VC movement ahead, forward element engage and wounded or killed 1 VC and the rest disappear SE to the wood and dense vegetation.
This contact proven to be critical, as 11 platoon now break formation and in pursuit of the fleeing VC, there were a gap exist between 1 and 10 platoon, still maintaining roughtly an inverted V formation, the 11 platoon were now 250 meter ahead of all other platoon and the platoon is now ahead at the point of the V.
At 1608 a brust of machine gun fire started the battle, with the main column of 275 regiment clashed on the flank of 11 platoon, pinned down the whole platoon. D company commander harry smith now halted the advance and trying to regroup but their effort to reach our to 11 platoon have been beaten back by a larger encircle force, by now, both 10 and 12 platoon have been engaging with their own battle. Only the back, facing a dense bamboo jungle were clear of Enemy fire, enemy fire on 3 side on D Company.
With casualty mounting, D company were pinned on the spot with minimal cover. Where 11 platoon have been hitted the hardest thanks to the explosing flank, smith repeated tried to rescue the 11 by ordering the 10 to link up, to no avail.
With situation getting increasing desperate, the only thing saving those Australian is from friendly artillery fire from Nui Dat. However, as most of the enemy fire were directed to the 11 platoon and they were outside the Company HQ sight, the FO for D Company have to rely on 11 Platoon's leader relay the co-ordinate. And due to the non-line of sight, artillery fire generally goes over the Australian to prevent friendly fire, which would destroy the VC formation in the back, but do not take pressure off the frontline fighting.
At that moment, platoon leader of 11 platoon were killed and situation got a lot worse, 11 platoon became combat ineffective, of the 28 men, only 7 were still fighting. Other was either dead or seriously wounded.
By now D Company CO Smith order the 12 platoon to try to link up the 11th from the right. 12 Platoon get as close as 150 meter, stopped by intense enemy fire and got themselve pinned down as well.
By now, nearly 2 hours had passed and after several enemy attamped outflanking, 11 platoon decided to leave the killed and wounded and withdraw toward 12 platoon, which throw a grenade before to mark their location. Of the 7, 5 got out.
Now, eventually 11 platoon (What left of it) got out of the 3 knoll, D copany now function as a single unit again, contributed to the wounded, the D company cannot move and have to defend the land they stand. Where 10 and 12 platoon, which wasn't hit as hard were given the task to defend the southern and southwestern route, where the enemy were most likely to attack from, the depleted 11 platoon and the HQ secion hold the line on the North West. First time since the opening of the battle, the artillery fire and all other support were not divided and now Smith can fully ulitise the support he has been given to try to beat back the VC.
Meanwhile at the base camp, facing a dilema of sending more troop to help D company, HQ contemplating sending out reinforcement to support the D company, but doing so will weaken
the base defence. Or, if not, D company will risk being overrun any second and suffer an embrassrassing defeat.
Finally a go-order were given for 1 APC Squadron to send out a troop of APC loaded with A Company, 6 RAR to relieve the D Company, at the same time, B company were ordered to double time back to D Company on foot to support D company.
Where B company reverse back from west and approach D compan y from East, A company with 3 Troop are limited on paved road because of the terrain, hence it will approach D company from the south. Meanwhile the 275 regiment moving north of D Company from East and established a ready position, meanwhile a company of D445 across the south and south east and converge into the Australian Position.
2 wave of human wave co-ordinated attack were repulse by a combine of artillery and clever use of terrain (Which Australian troop had occupied a reverse slope to the south) Thus the vietcong can only mount an attack by extremly close to the australian position, by the the bulk of force would already buckled by artillery fire and machine gun attack, and those who survive the artillery screening were quickly dispatched by small arms.
After holding the first 2 waves, the Australian are seriously tired and out of ammunition, just as the enemy organised a third wave to overran the Australian Position using the same template before. The A company via 3 troop and B company simutaniously arrive from South and West behind the VC assault force and unflanked the VC troop from behind. Thus scattered the assult wave from South and South West, the assault wave at North East looked at the situation, decided the assault have no more purpose to continue, decided to call off the attack and disappear from the battlefield.
As the relief is arriving, the attack on the East started to subside, the Australia are now triple in number (about 400 men) with 7 M113 APC support. The remaining VC force disengage and the battle on August are officially over, by then it was 2050, nightfall. With casualty evac'ed by 0031
Over August 19-21, there were scattered firefight and mopping up action, but the principal of the engagement is a clearing the battlefield and look for the rest of the 11 platoon that were left behind in the original position. all 13 were found with 11 bodies and 2 wounded. It was at clearing the battlefield did the Australian knows, rather than facing an reinforced company the command originally thought (Actually they thought it was platoon strength first ) By the Enemy death they collect (245 VC bodies), weapon variety (Range from ex US WW2 Weapon to soviet AKs as well as heavy weaponry), map that recovered and prisoner account, they then know the 108 men from D company were fighting a Reinforced Regimental force strength at 1500-2000 men, despite 15 to 20 to 1 outnumbered. The Australian hold the day.
Importance of the battle
The main reason why this battle is important because it was a tactical and strategic victory with the Australian force. This is the high water mark of the VC activities until the Aussie vacate those bases in 1972 when they left. The VC did not do any sort of damage or that scale after the Battle of Long Tan. VC have laid out an order to avoid fighting the ATF in massive scale again and relegated to harrassment action.
And perhaps the most important message in this battle is, the VC already adopted the way the American and South Vietnamese fight, however, the way the Aussie fight is an irregularity to even the VC. Where the VC have to study and find a way to break the Australian, that draw away brain power as well as man power. And in the end there are no other regimental action against the Australian later in the war, suggested that the VC never really find a solution to resist how Australian fought. Which in itself were an important achievement by the Australian.
Ambush or No Ambush??
This is a question even people, soldier and command were asking today. This question is also important to ask too, many of you who had not serve did not realise that it's a tactical failure to allow your troop to walk into ambush, without knowing there were one.
Obivoiusly you won't have 1,500 people walking around doing nothing, the original force of 275 were up to something before the 11 platoon and D company walk in and started an encounter engagement (unprepared engagement or chance engagement)
However, there are tell tale sign that the Battle of Long Tan were indeed an VC ambush and D company walked in unknowningly. First, it was a standard draw out tactics for Communist force to fire mortar and artillery in a fix structure and draw out investigator. Where lack of counter battery fire (Destroy or trying to destroy the Australian Artillery piece) suggest the VC artillery fire is hit and run and that will automatically spawn an reaction, in this case a company strenght patrol to locate the firing position.
While the Aussie looking for months before the battle found nothing, no battalion or regimental level evidence, the barrage strongly suggested an harrashment action. There are no indication than anything bigger than a battalion strength level enemy is out there, and hence the D company (also A and B company) expect no more than a company of enemy.
Also evidencing an ambush is the way the enemy positioned. It is a textbook blockade route by the D445. Where the D445 spaced apart in the begining in the rear were only used to converge on the Australian to cut their route to the south, where the attack commence on firing from 3 sides, this is also an evidence an ambush was set
But then again there are some suggestion that i wasn't. For example, the position of D445 were infact put in the rear of 275th Reg, but the timing is soimply sucked. If D445 were in a calculated sychonised attack, the D445 will appear on the back of D company and close the lid before the 11 platoon recover and everyone would still be facing the wrong direction. Yet it was almost 3 hours later the D445 converge on the Australian
Then there come the "Favouritable Ground" when the D company reunited, it was located in a so called favoritable position where the natural feature prevent an mass assult (Reverse slope, gentle curve and thick trees.) If an organised ambush were set up, the VC would have denied the Australian in such geographical feature, unless you want an extra challenge to the ambush you set up. The place is not a perfect place to set up an ambush, either a bit to the east and a bit to the south where open ground and flat ground will provide more advantage for the assaulting force.
And finally the "ambush" is located within Nui Dat artillery strike zone, so any ambush done would have done in a quick and swift manner, but not blogged down in a 3 to 4 hours fire fight. In the term of such ambush, you are require to quickly finish the enemy before they cna bring their big gun on you, infact if not for these big guns, the D Company would have long gone. Question is, can a 4 hours firefight be called "Quick and Swift"??
What generally accepted is, according to consences of Australian Military Historian, veteran and the commander of the VC force. That the 275 + D445 were to attack the weaken Nui Dat after drawing and decimating a compny out. However, either Australian Pace is quicker, a lot quicker or the VC expecting a different route than they original throught, the ambush was not prepared in the area, where the ambush transform to a general attack of the Australian Force where dragged on for 4 hours.
What Went Wrong??
Regardless if the engagement is or is not an ambush. The original idea of attack even a weakened Nui Dat were flawed. Only company, not battalion were send out for patrol, so even if you decimated a company, the defence strength will only lose a company (1/20 strength) For an assault on fix position, you need average 5 to 1 strength to 9 to 1 strength to finish the job, the VC force in that AO have no where near that number.
The pace of the VC movement is also the let down for them, while half of the balmes goes to the monsoon, still the movement is slower than expected as it gave time the Australia to drop artillery over them. While still seriously outnumber the Aussie, the artillery prevent any meaningful attack the VC can mount.
Another factor the Vietnamese done wrong is to allow the reinforcement to come without any harrassment, notice that in some sense, this battle is just like Operation market garden back in WW2. The airborne were spearheaded and waiting for the XXX Corp to come in to support them. Nazi harrasse the XXX corp so that they failed their ultimate objective. However, this time, the VC did not anticipated to intercept any ground rescue send by the Australian, they would need to ambush it on the road side to impede their rescue effort. In reality, 3 Troop were never really challenged and lost 1 killed and some wounded in 2 seperate engagement on route.
One final thing the VC did wrong is they fail to see the situation as a whole. Instead fixated on the D company by tunnel vision. If, indeed attacking the base in Nui Dat were their objective all along, the time it take to crush one company using full regimental strength is not acceptable, they already know they badly mauled that company, leave a brigade or even battalion can tie down said company and allow the mainforce to go after their objective. They may lose at their objective or they may not, but without doing it, the VC literally admit their own defeat by saying, "oh, i can't finish off that company, i would not go after the base" Unless their main objective is literally destroy that company, then it would still also be a failure, as the company survive the attack, so in the end they either switch their primary objective to the secondary and they fail, or they simply failed their primary objective. Which the double failure resulting a stragetic defeat for the Vietnamese force.
For the Australian, once again they were let down by the Military Intelligence, not knowing a bigger force (A lot bigger force) the VC have out there is a major mistake. Although all sign points to a regimental or greater force still the Australian go ahead sending one of its company to its doom. well, they survived in the end mostly because of luck and the inept attack by the enemy. But this does not masked the command failure on the Australian side
For D company, acting on insufficient intelligent, they got into their situation is a natural happening, under the same situation i would have lead my company in like that too, but the sheer courage and will to fight says more to the men of D company. Facing an truely overhelming odds, they still hold out for as long as the rescue come. This battle could have ended eitherway, if the 11 platoon were wipe out, there is a good chance that D company would be followed in a defeat in detail. Had the ground is not favoring the Australian, they may have been overran by the enemy. Had the rescue come min after the 3rd wave attack, there maybe nothing left to retrieve. All in all, in the end of the day, D company survived and the Vietcong were defeated, that i9s what mattered. And in fact, that was the result.
This conclude my third combat report on Vietnam War.
Question and discussion welcome
"Long Tan, 1966"
Battle of Long Tan, may not be familiarised with by the people outside Australia. It was a provincial engagement that changed nothing by both US/Australian standard nor to Vietnam. Overhere, however, it was seen as THE iconic battle for Australian, in the same effect as in Galipoli in WW1, Kokoda Campaign in WW2 or Kapyong in Korea. In vietnam war, the Aussie have Long Tan.
I know little about Battle of Long Tan before, i know of the battle existed, and Australian involvement, that's it. So i asked the club staff, what is it about Battle of Long Tan that capture the Australian mind??
And it is also why this battle is the third battle i wrote about Vietnam War
Background of the battle :
Long Tan is a habitan village in Phouc Tuy Province, before the war started it was one of the pro-communist area in south vietnam, its resident lived thru and supported the Vietminh to resist french and when the time change, they supported the Vietcong for the current American occupation.
Oddly enough, this is the exact location the Australian choose to base their operation in, siting a quick assess to sea route for supply and an enclosed/secluded area which is prefect for their pacification program.
Australian involvement in vietnam way come 1962 when the Australian establish the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam in Saigon, when the war escalated in 1965, US also asked the Australian to step up with the involvement. Resulting a direct engagement of Australian via the form of 1RAR (Royal Australian Regiment). As the organisation grew bigger, the need for more personnel for a more permenant setting is required, resulting the establish of 1 ATF (Australia Task Force) and the Task Force was based out in Nui Dat, in vietnam southern province.
1ATF replace 1RAR as the station force in Vietnam, where 1ATF comprise of element from 5RAR and 6RAR. The Australian are to seperate from US Divisonal Command and have themselve taken care of their own section of battlefield.
Australian and US operation is very much different, where as US opt for a large scale search and destroy, using the mobility provided by Airmobile to insert large forces to any corner of the battlefield once their smaller force found and draw out the enemy. However, Aussie operate on a permanent fixture, sending patrol and establish safe zone (Much like the establishment of Green Zone in Iraq) Whedre they will pacifify spot after spot, seperate the insurgent from local.
1ATF ultimate goal is to dominate the whole Phuoc Tuy province, eventually listing all the area in to their TAOR (Tactical Area of Operation Responsibility) thus, "converting" the whole province and allow an en trenched Southern government establishment.
Deposition of Forces :
Australian 1ATF included 2 Battalions, the 5th RAR and the 6th RAR, supplimented with Battalions HQ, 2 Troop from 1st APC squadron, a troop from 3rd SAS Squadron, Combat engineer, 1 Field Regiment of Royal Australian Artillery (+ US A Battery 2/35 Battalion) Composed of the defence of Bases in Nui Dat Total strength is somewhere around 2000.
Oppositing the field is 2 Regiments from VC 5th Division, the 274 and 275 regiments operate in the area, totalling about 3,900 men. Supporting the 5th VC Division is D445 independent Battalion of 500 men and local rear support group that take care of Casualty of 50-100
Tactical Consideration :
The main Tactical Consideration for the Aussie is their base, apparently. Due to the limit number of troop, the base defence took half of their resource of stationed troop, and only leave appoximately one half to go out and about and carry on with their business. The base defence are rotated between 5 RAR and 6 RAR, while one is doing base security, the other are outside the wire and conduct patrol and interdiction mission to scout and disrupt the enemy.
US Asset from II Crop Tactical Zone can be called upon, but simply, it's some way away.
The main tactical consideration for the VC is also the Australian Base, with it as a ground of operation, they have disrupte the VC influence to the local villager, and that translated into hampered recruitment, dwindling ration from population, and harder to conduct insurgency.
Also of consideration is the weather, that part of vietnam would have full monsoon during that time of year (August) and visibility will drop, for the Australian, that mean disruption of airborne resupply and restriction of movement. For the vietcong, that mean troop are harder to gather for any major operation (Most VC troop are not mechanised) For which will play a significant role for what happened next.
Start of Battle :
A co-ordinated artillery bombardment were organised by VC to strike the base in Nui Dat, in response, the Australian send out company based patrol over to check for firing spot.
Aussie response by sending out B Coy toward the plantation while the A Coy, already on patrol NE of the AO, move SE toward B coy and a detactment of C company are laying ambush South and South West of Nui Dat
B Company with 80 men were to be relieve by D Coy on 18 August, while part of B Coy discharge fro mthe battlefield on 17th, the rest of B Coy patroleast of Nui Dat near the plantation.
1100 August 18, D Coy left their post in Nui Dat, tasked to link up with B company, then proceed to look for the VC artillery if B Coy did not found it, or follow and interdict if they do.
D company linked up what B company at 1300, and setup a defensive perimeter on and near the plantation, B company move back to Nui Dat sometime after 1300 and D company set off at 1500 due East continuing the search.
With 10th Platoon on elft, 11th on the right, and 12th held at research, the first shot came 1545 when the 11 platoon sighted VC movement ahead, forward element engage and wounded or killed 1 VC and the rest disappear SE to the wood and dense vegetation.
This contact proven to be critical, as 11 platoon now break formation and in pursuit of the fleeing VC, there were a gap exist between 1 and 10 platoon, still maintaining roughtly an inverted V formation, the 11 platoon were now 250 meter ahead of all other platoon and the platoon is now ahead at the point of the V.
At 1608 a brust of machine gun fire started the battle, with the main column of 275 regiment clashed on the flank of 11 platoon, pinned down the whole platoon. D company commander harry smith now halted the advance and trying to regroup but their effort to reach our to 11 platoon have been beaten back by a larger encircle force, by now, both 10 and 12 platoon have been engaging with their own battle. Only the back, facing a dense bamboo jungle were clear of Enemy fire, enemy fire on 3 side on D Company.
With casualty mounting, D company were pinned on the spot with minimal cover. Where 11 platoon have been hitted the hardest thanks to the explosing flank, smith repeated tried to rescue the 11 by ordering the 10 to link up, to no avail.
With situation getting increasing desperate, the only thing saving those Australian is from friendly artillery fire from Nui Dat. However, as most of the enemy fire were directed to the 11 platoon and they were outside the Company HQ sight, the FO for D Company have to rely on 11 Platoon's leader relay the co-ordinate. And due to the non-line of sight, artillery fire generally goes over the Australian to prevent friendly fire, which would destroy the VC formation in the back, but do not take pressure off the frontline fighting.
At that moment, platoon leader of 11 platoon were killed and situation got a lot worse, 11 platoon became combat ineffective, of the 28 men, only 7 were still fighting. Other was either dead or seriously wounded.
By now D Company CO Smith order the 12 platoon to try to link up the 11th from the right. 12 Platoon get as close as 150 meter, stopped by intense enemy fire and got themselve pinned down as well.
By now, nearly 2 hours had passed and after several enemy attamped outflanking, 11 platoon decided to leave the killed and wounded and withdraw toward 12 platoon, which throw a grenade before to mark their location. Of the 7, 5 got out.
Now, eventually 11 platoon (What left of it) got out of the 3 knoll, D copany now function as a single unit again, contributed to the wounded, the D company cannot move and have to defend the land they stand. Where 10 and 12 platoon, which wasn't hit as hard were given the task to defend the southern and southwestern route, where the enemy were most likely to attack from, the depleted 11 platoon and the HQ secion hold the line on the North West. First time since the opening of the battle, the artillery fire and all other support were not divided and now Smith can fully ulitise the support he has been given to try to beat back the VC.
Meanwhile at the base camp, facing a dilema of sending more troop to help D company, HQ contemplating sending out reinforcement to support the D company, but doing so will weaken
the base defence. Or, if not, D company will risk being overrun any second and suffer an embrassrassing defeat.
Finally a go-order were given for 1 APC Squadron to send out a troop of APC loaded with A Company, 6 RAR to relieve the D Company, at the same time, B company were ordered to double time back to D Company on foot to support D company.
Where B company reverse back from west and approach D compan y from East, A company with 3 Troop are limited on paved road because of the terrain, hence it will approach D company from the south. Meanwhile the 275 regiment moving north of D Company from East and established a ready position, meanwhile a company of D445 across the south and south east and converge into the Australian Position.
2 wave of human wave co-ordinated attack were repulse by a combine of artillery and clever use of terrain (Which Australian troop had occupied a reverse slope to the south) Thus the vietcong can only mount an attack by extremly close to the australian position, by the the bulk of force would already buckled by artillery fire and machine gun attack, and those who survive the artillery screening were quickly dispatched by small arms.
After holding the first 2 waves, the Australian are seriously tired and out of ammunition, just as the enemy organised a third wave to overran the Australian Position using the same template before. The A company via 3 troop and B company simutaniously arrive from South and West behind the VC assault force and unflanked the VC troop from behind. Thus scattered the assult wave from South and South West, the assault wave at North East looked at the situation, decided the assault have no more purpose to continue, decided to call off the attack and disappear from the battlefield.
As the relief is arriving, the attack on the East started to subside, the Australia are now triple in number (about 400 men) with 7 M113 APC support. The remaining VC force disengage and the battle on August are officially over, by then it was 2050, nightfall. With casualty evac'ed by 0031
Over August 19-21, there were scattered firefight and mopping up action, but the principal of the engagement is a clearing the battlefield and look for the rest of the 11 platoon that were left behind in the original position. all 13 were found with 11 bodies and 2 wounded. It was at clearing the battlefield did the Australian knows, rather than facing an reinforced company the command originally thought (Actually they thought it was platoon strength first ) By the Enemy death they collect (245 VC bodies), weapon variety (Range from ex US WW2 Weapon to soviet AKs as well as heavy weaponry), map that recovered and prisoner account, they then know the 108 men from D company were fighting a Reinforced Regimental force strength at 1500-2000 men, despite 15 to 20 to 1 outnumbered. The Australian hold the day.
Importance of the battle
The main reason why this battle is important because it was a tactical and strategic victory with the Australian force. This is the high water mark of the VC activities until the Aussie vacate those bases in 1972 when they left. The VC did not do any sort of damage or that scale after the Battle of Long Tan. VC have laid out an order to avoid fighting the ATF in massive scale again and relegated to harrassment action.
And perhaps the most important message in this battle is, the VC already adopted the way the American and South Vietnamese fight, however, the way the Aussie fight is an irregularity to even the VC. Where the VC have to study and find a way to break the Australian, that draw away brain power as well as man power. And in the end there are no other regimental action against the Australian later in the war, suggested that the VC never really find a solution to resist how Australian fought. Which in itself were an important achievement by the Australian.
Ambush or No Ambush??
This is a question even people, soldier and command were asking today. This question is also important to ask too, many of you who had not serve did not realise that it's a tactical failure to allow your troop to walk into ambush, without knowing there were one.
Obivoiusly you won't have 1,500 people walking around doing nothing, the original force of 275 were up to something before the 11 platoon and D company walk in and started an encounter engagement (unprepared engagement or chance engagement)
However, there are tell tale sign that the Battle of Long Tan were indeed an VC ambush and D company walked in unknowningly. First, it was a standard draw out tactics for Communist force to fire mortar and artillery in a fix structure and draw out investigator. Where lack of counter battery fire (Destroy or trying to destroy the Australian Artillery piece) suggest the VC artillery fire is hit and run and that will automatically spawn an reaction, in this case a company strenght patrol to locate the firing position.
While the Aussie looking for months before the battle found nothing, no battalion or regimental level evidence, the barrage strongly suggested an harrashment action. There are no indication than anything bigger than a battalion strength level enemy is out there, and hence the D company (also A and B company) expect no more than a company of enemy.
Also evidencing an ambush is the way the enemy positioned. It is a textbook blockade route by the D445. Where the D445 spaced apart in the begining in the rear were only used to converge on the Australian to cut their route to the south, where the attack commence on firing from 3 sides, this is also an evidence an ambush was set
But then again there are some suggestion that i wasn't. For example, the position of D445 were infact put in the rear of 275th Reg, but the timing is soimply sucked. If D445 were in a calculated sychonised attack, the D445 will appear on the back of D company and close the lid before the 11 platoon recover and everyone would still be facing the wrong direction. Yet it was almost 3 hours later the D445 converge on the Australian
Then there come the "Favouritable Ground" when the D company reunited, it was located in a so called favoritable position where the natural feature prevent an mass assult (Reverse slope, gentle curve and thick trees.) If an organised ambush were set up, the VC would have denied the Australian in such geographical feature, unless you want an extra challenge to the ambush you set up. The place is not a perfect place to set up an ambush, either a bit to the east and a bit to the south where open ground and flat ground will provide more advantage for the assaulting force.
And finally the "ambush" is located within Nui Dat artillery strike zone, so any ambush done would have done in a quick and swift manner, but not blogged down in a 3 to 4 hours fire fight. In the term of such ambush, you are require to quickly finish the enemy before they cna bring their big gun on you, infact if not for these big guns, the D Company would have long gone. Question is, can a 4 hours firefight be called "Quick and Swift"??
What generally accepted is, according to consences of Australian Military Historian, veteran and the commander of the VC force. That the 275 + D445 were to attack the weaken Nui Dat after drawing and decimating a compny out. However, either Australian Pace is quicker, a lot quicker or the VC expecting a different route than they original throught, the ambush was not prepared in the area, where the ambush transform to a general attack of the Australian Force where dragged on for 4 hours.
What Went Wrong??
Regardless if the engagement is or is not an ambush. The original idea of attack even a weakened Nui Dat were flawed. Only company, not battalion were send out for patrol, so even if you decimated a company, the defence strength will only lose a company (1/20 strength) For an assault on fix position, you need average 5 to 1 strength to 9 to 1 strength to finish the job, the VC force in that AO have no where near that number.
The pace of the VC movement is also the let down for them, while half of the balmes goes to the monsoon, still the movement is slower than expected as it gave time the Australia to drop artillery over them. While still seriously outnumber the Aussie, the artillery prevent any meaningful attack the VC can mount.
Another factor the Vietnamese done wrong is to allow the reinforcement to come without any harrassment, notice that in some sense, this battle is just like Operation market garden back in WW2. The airborne were spearheaded and waiting for the XXX Corp to come in to support them. Nazi harrasse the XXX corp so that they failed their ultimate objective. However, this time, the VC did not anticipated to intercept any ground rescue send by the Australian, they would need to ambush it on the road side to impede their rescue effort. In reality, 3 Troop were never really challenged and lost 1 killed and some wounded in 2 seperate engagement on route.
One final thing the VC did wrong is they fail to see the situation as a whole. Instead fixated on the D company by tunnel vision. If, indeed attacking the base in Nui Dat were their objective all along, the time it take to crush one company using full regimental strength is not acceptable, they already know they badly mauled that company, leave a brigade or even battalion can tie down said company and allow the mainforce to go after their objective. They may lose at their objective or they may not, but without doing it, the VC literally admit their own defeat by saying, "oh, i can't finish off that company, i would not go after the base" Unless their main objective is literally destroy that company, then it would still also be a failure, as the company survive the attack, so in the end they either switch their primary objective to the secondary and they fail, or they simply failed their primary objective. Which the double failure resulting a stragetic defeat for the Vietnamese force.
For the Australian, once again they were let down by the Military Intelligence, not knowing a bigger force (A lot bigger force) the VC have out there is a major mistake. Although all sign points to a regimental or greater force still the Australian go ahead sending one of its company to its doom. well, they survived in the end mostly because of luck and the inept attack by the enemy. But this does not masked the command failure on the Australian side
For D company, acting on insufficient intelligent, they got into their situation is a natural happening, under the same situation i would have lead my company in like that too, but the sheer courage and will to fight says more to the men of D company. Facing an truely overhelming odds, they still hold out for as long as the rescue come. This battle could have ended eitherway, if the 11 platoon were wipe out, there is a good chance that D company would be followed in a defeat in detail. Had the ground is not favoring the Australian, they may have been overran by the enemy. Had the rescue come min after the 3rd wave attack, there maybe nothing left to retrieve. All in all, in the end of the day, D company survived and the Vietcong were defeated, that i9s what mattered. And in fact, that was the result.
This conclude my third combat report on Vietnam War.
Question and discussion welcome
