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Battle of Gang Toi - 1965 AD Vietnam War Series

jhungary

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Coming to the 4th Battle of the Vietnam Series, today, i will bring you to the start of the war and look at one of the first battle fought betwen US/Australian and VC Forces. The battle officially make the first casualty of Australian Force other than the training command

Today battle will take you to the Gang Toi Hills, Bien Hoa province, Republic of Vietnam.

Background of the battle

The war for the United States is ust coming out from an advisory action into the one with major engagement role. With the planned Troop insertion and surge to 210,000 later next year. General Westmoreland are looking at bases to capitalise on the troop entrance. For that, they needed base to pacify the local region.

The plan was simple. Each division already in Vietnam will take up an area and make them the base of operation. 1st ID have Di An and the 25th ID have Cu Chi. While the 173 Bgd and the Australian Army 1RAR would have an dedicated area of Bien Hoa.

Bien Hoa is home to Bien Hoa Airfield. Where the USAF based on. The Bien hoa Air Base operate major air traffic operation in the area, a place have equal status between Saigon Tan Son Nut and Da Nang Airfield.

1RAR was under the command of US 173 Airborne Brigade at that time and their task is to pacify the area in and around the Bien Hoa Air Base.

At the same time, the VC uses the area extensively for their communication adn resupply effort, the area intersect with 2 river (Be River and Dong Nai River) and were the exit of the famous Ho Chi Ming Trail. VC have set up numerous bunker and underground complex to protect the effort on the area

Deposition of Forces :
III_CTZ_May_to_September_1965.jpg

In the Bien Hoa province, home to the US 173 Airborne Brigade (173 BGD) and 2nd Brigade, 1 Infantry (2/1). Australian force comprise of 1 Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR)

VC forces in the AO at the start of operation Hump is Q762 (Q762R) Regiment and D800 (D800R) regiment.

In this specific battle, however, the Australian 1 RAR included only A company and the VC force have Company 238 (From Q761 R)to defend the bunker structure, which is where U1 HQ occupied.

Tactical Consideration

For the Australian, the consideration is to clear the given area and prepare for the area for future operation, theerefore the Asutralian Force are to be airmobile (to cover more area and quick reaction) and lightly armed. Fire Support Base (FSB) were set up near the SW quadron of the AO to provide fire support

While the VC have U1 HQ based on the area. This is C238 job to defend the area and being the hub for communcation and resupply. Their motivation is high and have certain combat support within the Australian AO. Although the main force were drawn into fighting other major battle in the immediate area as per operation hump. The resource and morale is high within the Gang Toi HQ TAOR.

The operation were to airlift 1st battalion, 503 parachute infantry regiment (1/503 PIR) and send them NW ward to patrol the side of Song Be River while the 1RAR will partol the jungle near Dong Nai River. The US/AUS force are to be air mobile and each company were deliever and extracted with Helicopter.

The VC on the other hand were in fortified defensive position on thwe plain of Gang Toi. Digging in and defending the whole area.

Start of Battle

600px-Battle_of_Gang_Toi_8_Nov_1965.png


November 5, 1100 zulu, the US and AUS force jumped off in 3 different LZ cleared by prep artillery fire provided by 105mm Bat in FSB Ace. The US landed in LZ King while the B Coy 1RAR landed in LZ princess and A/C Coy 1RAR landed in LZ Queen.

As the map suggested Hill 82 (Gang Toi) were occupied with a single company of VC force and the company were observing the landing in Queen in their overhead OP. Nov 5 Landing completed without any major challenge, according to battle report, only a few mortar round fired toward the LZ and did not create a serious threat to the Landing troop.

However, the Mortar Attack prompted the Australian Force believe there are spotter on the Hill 82. Later after the landing, during that day, A Company started to receive sprodic attack/skimishes as they approach the root of Hill 82. The B coy trverse tto their objective without major incident while the US force walks into a complex bunker system in their objective of Hill 65.

Nov 7 Passes without any serious engagement. The company turn around and prepared to be exfilled by the same LZ they were dropped off 2 days ago. With the Majority portion of the Patrol yielded virtually nothing, the Asutralian Force set out to set up NDP near the root of Hill 82 expect little or no attack from the VC

Nov 8, 0800, A company were ordered to move out and traverse thru the plateau of Hill 82 to reach LZ Queen and await for extraction the following day. Upon setting the heading, there were increasing VC activities and first a Scout was discovered and killed and the group subsequently discover a company sized camp site.

1540, the company was travelling in a single line file toward the hill with 1st platoon lead and 2 and 3 platoon followed, at this moment. 1630 The group arrived within 250 meter to the top of the hill, all hell broke lose.

1630, Nov 8, the lead section of 1 platoon were hit by 3 VC machine gun in 3 size creating an enfliade position to the Australian Force, the 3 MG nest were very well placed within each other with interlocking fire and kill zone pre-set in between. 5 men fell from the initial burst of MG fire and the Australian Troop then return fire while being pin down, with all but 1 casualty was recovered where he felt on top of the bunker. Repeated hit and presume dead.

After the initial burst of fire, A Company HQ requested 3 platoon to move up to block the path and relieve the pinned down 1 platoon. Being in a trail would limit the australian engagement by only allowing half to less to half of their troop facing the enemy, and the rest are forced to stuck behind their comarade.

Off the bet, within advancing 50 meter of the trail, 3 Platoon also come under heavy fire from VC bunker, ignoring the incoming fire and continue to advance. The A company suffer the second dead when a Machine Gunner got caught inside a wedge of tall tree, VC tried to retrieve the downed Gunner M-60 to add to their fire power, but was killed in point blank range by the dying Australian Machine Gunner before he collaspe on his own gun.

Now, the 1 platoon pinned down by incoming fire. 3 platoon were pinned down by their flank. The only solace with the Australian Company is the 3 platoon involvement preventing their flank to be overran. And although 105mm battery is available the drop is over the crest and into otherside of the hill (The gun position place the enemy beyond the Australian) and the spotter cannot spot the round for accurate fire support. A company decided to withdraw from the area. And therefore ending the battle early.

With everyman proceed with their own way to getting back to Company HQ, the 2 Australian dead were left behind and only recovered almost 40 years after the battle. At the end of the 2 hours battle, Australian suffer 2 KIA and 6 WIA, Company 238 suffered 6 confirmed KIA and 1 WIA. 5 VC felt prisoner.

Importance of This battle

Being a soldier myself, i know for a fact that leaving your dead behind is not a very good business, this is not good for the morale and it is not good to individual troop the prospect of not getting the body back to proper burial and the prospect of dying alone in a foreign land is chilling, even when we are just talking about it.

This battle to more extend sees as a general American Strategy Failure within their control. The Australian Unit is small, when compare to the American Counterpart. They were not used to or to be use as a large scale sweep like this. This is also the biggest different between American Soldier and Aussie Digger. While the USGI are used to out in force and look for enemy, in the so called "Search and Destroy" mission. The Australian are more probe to small unit action and used to migrate from village to village

The failure of this battle to take hill 82 spell the demise of Joint US-Australian Operation in Bien Hoa area and it also signal the Australian to form their own Task Force and experience it's own little troop surge.

What gone wrong with the Australian??

The problem with the Australian is, they made 3 major error before the battle begin. Couple to the fact that the fighting in Hill 82 are not as exciting as the American Paratrooper in Hill 65. The operation in Hill 82 is treated as a side-show in the grand scheme of things.

Mistake 1. - The Australia were up that hill in a single file. Expect little to no enemy resistence. They march thru the hill as if they have own it. A single file march is extremely exposed to a well place machine gun fire, as the gun do not need to travese much to hit the bulk of the Australian Troop, while you have the smallest surface area contacted the enemy. In the Military, we called it being in Enfliade position

Enfilade_Fire_crop.png


While it is good for quick march, but extremely expose to well placed ambush.

Second Mistake the Aussie made is the lack of recconnissance in the area. Although it is true that no war you fought can be 100% clear, the prospect of graduately discovering enemy position should have alerted the Australian to at least look for ambushes in the area. In this battle, no side guard were ever deployed. No forward recce party were ever send. No rear guard, no wing were send out on both flank, all of the above would have prevented or at least limited the damage done to the Australian. But none have done, hence the result as it is.

Third and last mistake committed by the Aussie is they approach the hill in the wrong direction. To enjoy better gunnery support, it's best that you enter a "Over your head" position, where you put your unit between your target and your gun, that way, the shell would flew over your head and hit the enemy. That's good because of two things. 1.) Round flew over your ehad guarantee that it will not accidentally drop on you, as it travel AWAY from you. (except, of course, short round) 2.) When you put your observer between your target and your gun, you can spot the round that go over you. Especially you are going up hill. If you are on one side, your gun and the enemy is on another side. In between there is an elevation (the hill) who is going to spot the impact of the round?? Or how?? You literally needed to be on the crest of the hill to spot the round going on the other direction. And that piece of land is currenly occupied by your enemy. If you can expel them, you don't need the gun anymore.......

NEVER PLACE YOUR ENEMY AND YOUR GUN ON ONE SIDE AND YOU ON THE OTHER. This is the most deadly mistake i reckon committed in this battle. If those artillery support can be accurate. A lot can be changed.

Legion of the Battle

Pte Richard Parker (KIA Nov 8 1965)
Pte Peter Gillson (KIA Nov 8 1965)

That's it, this is the 4th battle i have covered on Vietnam War, next battle will conclude this Vietnam Series and also serve as the opening of another series. Stay tuned.
 
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I agree completely,Recon failure was main reason behind this setback.Though in 1965 aussie forces may have been relatively new to the jungle environment and thus wary of delving too deep to get advance recon.
Great work,i am gaining more info on the vietnam war from every new one.:enjoy:
 
I agree completely,Recon failure was main reason behind this setback.Though in 1965 aussie forces may have been relatively new to the jungle environment and thus wary of delving too deep to get advance recon.
Great work,i am gaining more info on the vietnam war from every new one.:enjoy:

a lot of the enemy position are showing via the tell tale sign that VC is occupying the hill. From the mortar attack early on the landing to graduately increase of hostile action and they even discover an enemy camp site. All that were discounted and no forward party nor scout were sent during the whole 3 days ops.

If the aussie are not scouting that area, then they should exit where the came. I don't really understand why they would go thru the hill to get to the extraction point. This i simply don't understand
 
1. We don't have the details, but I suspect there was lack of confidence among the US and Aus higher commanders. Obviously the Aus were sloppy/non-serious about their work.

2.When A Coy was pinned down, VC position became known. The higher commander should have dropped another Coy east of Hill 82 to take control of the battle instead of giving up.

3. At this instance an airborne Forward Observation Officer (arty) was required to obtain effective arty support.
 
Hard to know where to start with so many misconceptions.
I was the platoon commander of 3 platoon on 8 November 1965. The Australian Army was very experienced in jungle fighting, having spent the years since 1948 in the Malayan jungle fighting against communist insurgents there. Before that we had fought during the Second World War in the jungles of New Guinea.
In heavy jungle it is normal to move quietly and slowly in single file for command and control reasons. We never use existing tracks. There is no chance of being ambushed if you do not move along tracks.
We did not have reconnaissance units available to us at that time. That's normally the role of the SAS.
The comment about artillery fire is not correct. You never want to have artillery coming over your head because of the elliptical beaten zone of the artillery . The safest option is to have the artillery at right angles to your line of advance. In jungle, tree bursts are an added hazard.
We used hundreds of rounds of 105mm artillery against the top of Hill 82. Some of it landed only 25 metres from my soldiers. There was an airborne Fire Control Officer above but he could not see where the fighting was taking place below the tree canopy. Fire direction was by our Forward Artillery Observer on the ground.
It would not have been possible to deploy a blocking force because it was thick jungle and nowhere to land helicopters. Nor did we have the troop numbers.
My 3 platoon flanking attack was in extended line not single file as we advanced up a steep slope in an area where visibility was no more than five metres. My 20 soldiers covered a 100 metre front. (A platoon was 33 but you would be lucky to have more than 20 in the field due to sickness, base camp duties, r&r etc.) We were fired on along our whole front as we neared the top of the slope of Hill 82. By the time we broke contact we had used all our grenades, M-72s, M-79 rounds and most of our ammunition.
The company commander's priority that night was to get the wounded evacuated and then return the next day for the two bodies. (Our casualties had to be winched out through primary jungle.) That recovery operation did not happen because the US commanding general called off the operation after the US 1/503 battalion had suffered 49 KIA and 82 WIA.
It is certainly not our policy to leave bodies behind. I was part of the recovery mission in 2007 that recovered the bodies of Parker and Gillson. I also met with Mr Bao who had commanded VC company C-238 that had been on top of the hill. (A unit reportedly with 245 soldiers. Our A Company strength was probably about 70.) Mr Bao proved to be a very decent man who treated the two Australian bodies respectfully and buried them together near the hilltop.
Were there things we could have done better? Probably. But we had limited intelligence on the enemy. Had we been US Marines we would probably have taken the hill and lost most of A Company in the process. Losing soldiers over ground you don't intend to hold is to my mind an irresponsible act by any commander.
I hope that clarifies the situation and helps you better understand what happened at Hill 82.
 

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