That I know but what are the technical parameters in terms of advantage and gains....which wiki can't tell us....nice chopper stealthy, agile, lot of money invested and then rejected...
While they need that...remember Abbottabad attack...why they become so secretive about stealth Helos....
at the other hand they showcasing raptors and f-35 etc stuff
Plenty info out there, if you care to research.
The Comanche featured an all-composite fuselage, fully integrated digital flight controls, and advanced navigation and weapons systems... The two protoypes are now in the collection of the U.S. Army Aviation Museum at Fort Rucker, Ala.
Boeing: Historical Snapshot: RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter
RAH-66 COMANCHE CAPABILITIES
Sensors and avionics. In the reconnaissance role, the Comanche will be equipped with a new generation of passive sensors and a fully integrated suite of displays and communications. Advance infrared (IR) sensors will have twice the range of OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and AH-64 Apache sensors. The Comanche will be equipped with the Apache Longbow fire control radar and the Helmet Integrated Display and Sight System (HIDSS). The fully integrated avionics system will allow tactical data to be overlaid onto a digital map, allowing the crew to devote more time for target detection and classification. A triple-redundant fly-by-wire system can automatically hold the helicopter in hover or in almost any other maneuver, reducing workload, allowing the pilot to concentrate on navigation and threat avoidance. A hand-on grip permits one-handed operation.
Stealth characteristics. The Comanche incorporates more low-observable stealth features than any aircraft in Army history. The Comanche radar cross-section (RCS) is less than that of a Hellfire missile. To reduce radar cross-section, weapons can be carried internally, the gun can be rotated aft and stowed within a fairing behind the turret when not in use, and the landing gear are fully-retractable. The all-composite fuselage sides are flat and canted and rounded surfaces are avoided by use of faceted turret and engine covers. The Comanche's head-on RCS is 360 times smaller than the AH-64 Apache, 250 times less than the smaller OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, and 32 times smaller than the OH-58D's mast-mounted sight. This means the Comanche will be able to approach five times closer to an enemy radar than an Apache, or four times closer than an OH-58D, without being detected.
Noise suppression. The Comanche only radiates one-half the rotor noise of current helicopters. Noise is reduced by use of a five-bladed rotor, pioneered by the successful Boeing (McDonnell Douglas) MD-500 Defender series of light utility helicopters. The fantail eliminates interaction between main rotor and tail rotor wakes. The advanced rotor design permits operation at low speed, allowing the Comanche to sneak 40% closer to a target than an Apache, without being detected by an acoustical system.
Infrared (IR) suppression. The Comanche only radiates 25% of the engine heat of current helicopters, a critical survivability design concern in a low-flying tactical scout helicopter. The Comanche is the first helicopter in which the infrared (IR) suppression system is integrated into the airframe. This innovative Sikorsky design feature provides IR suppressors that are built into the tail-boom, providing ample length for complete and efficient mixing of engine exhaust and cooling air flowing through inlets above the tail. The mixed exhaust is discharged through slots built into an inverted shelf on the sides of the tail-boom. The gases are cooled so thoroughly that a heat-seeking missile cannot find and lock-on to the Comanche.
Crew Protection. The Comanche features a crew compartment sealed for protection against chemical or biological threats, an airframe resilient against ballistic damage, enhanced crash-worthiness, and reduced susceptibility to electromagnetic interference.
Maintainability Comanche will be easily sustained, will require fewer personnel and support equipment, and will provide a decisive battlefield capability in day, night and adverse weather operations. Comanche has been designed to be exceptionally maintainable and easily transportable. Through its keel-beam construction, numerous access panels, easily accessible line-replaceable units/modules and advanced diagnostics, the RAH-66 possesses "designed-in" maintainability. Comanche aircraft will be able to be rapidly loaded into or unloaded from any Air Force transport aircraft.
http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/rah-66.htm
The radar cross section has been minimised, primarily by the precisely shaped fuselage and internal weapons configuration. The airframe was crashworthy and ballistically tolerant to 23mm gunfire. The helicopter had a composite five-bladed bearingless main rotor and an enclosed composite fantail tailrotor for increased anti-torque capability. The rear rotor was able to withstand impact by 12.7mm rounds and provided a 180° turn in 4.7 seconds in hover mode and an 80kt snap-turn-to-target in 4.5 seconds. The fly-by-wire flight control system was triple redundant.
The Comanche had two identical cockpits for the pilot and the co-pilot, which were sealed and had a positive pressure air system for protection against chemical and biological warfare. Each integrated cockpit had Harris Corp flat screen liquid crystal displays, a colour display for a digital moving map system, tactical situation and night operation display. The cockpit was fitted with a pilot's night-vision system from Lockheed Martin and the pilots had a wide field of view (35° × 52°) Kaiser Electronics helmet-integrated display sighting system (HIDSS). HIDSS employed active matrix liquid crystal display (AMLCD) technology. The targets were designated and the weapons fired from collective and sidestick control push buttons.
Northrop Grumman provided the Comanche's integrated communications, navigation and identification (CNI) suite. The CNI suite will feature secure multiwave, multiband multimode wireless communications, link 16, satellite communications and enhanced position locating reporting system (EPLRS) via the tactical internet.
etc
RAH-66 Comanche - Army Technology
After spending 22 years and $6.9 billion, the Army cancelled the Comanche program, having received precisely zero helos. Reasons for the cancellation abounded. For starters, it was not clear the engines (had they been built) would be powerful enough to get a fully loaded, 10,000+ lb Comanche off the ground (had it been built). Like its ability to fly, many other aspects of Comanche’s technology were deemed too risky (i.e. immature i.e. hadn’t actually been developed i.e. didn’t exist). According to testing performed in 2003, the design still had serious technical challenges in the areas of “software integration and testing of mission equipment, weight reduction, radar signatures, antenna performance, gun system performance, and aided target detection algorithm performance.” Aside from the electronics, the software, the weapon system, the engines and the overall weight, apparently everything else was fine.
The program was also projected to consume upwards of 40% of the Army’s annual aviation budget. By 2004, the Army decided to spend most of that money on UAV’s instead.
“the battlefield for which Comanche was designed had grown less probable.”
On the one hand, if our objective is to procure something and we do not procure it, one might call that a failure, perhaps depending on the reasons for the non-procurement. In Comanche’s case, LTG Cody made it clear Comanche was cancelled because the system was unaffordable, unnecessary and — despite more than two decades of effort — incomplete.
But perhaps there is another layer to this puzzle. Maybe Comanche had a different objective, which it did achieve and which would justify Hawley’s positive assessment. Further research reveals an explanation by Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker, who pointed out, “Much of what we’ve gained out of Comanche we can
push forward into the tech base for future joint rotor-craft kinds of capabilities.” Perhaps the goal wasn’t to build helicopters after all, but to develop new technologies that could be incorporated into other, hypothetical programs. If that was the purpose of the Comanche program, it may not have been such a failure after all.
Indeed, some analysts suggest the helicopter used to ferry troops in the raid that killed Osama bin Laden
incorporated some technologies developed under the Comanche program. Of course, Comanche was going to be a recon / attack helo, not a troop transport, so the unnamed mystery aircraft performed a significantly different mission. But if this helo did indeed use Comanche components, clearly Comanche was not a complete, abject, total, 100% failure. The Army got something useful out of it, even if they didn’t get an actual helicopter
The unavoidable fact is this: Comanche doesn’t exist, and it never did. But Ms. Shyu is correct that two things come out of a program like Comanche: technologies and lessons. As already stated, tech transfer apparently happened and the resulting helo contributed to a very important mission.
Perhaps the lesson is that military tech programs should exercise design restraint, establish strict budget and schedule constraints, and rely on proven technologies to deliver necessary capabilities on operationally relevant timelines. This formula is much lauded among defense acquisition experts and leaders, but was clearly not implemented by the Comanche team. They spent 22 years doing the opposite.
Yes, Comanche was going to be awesome, but it clearly did not achieve the full level of awesomeness envisioned in 1982. Some interesting and important technologies came out of the program, but no actual helicopters did. The partially designed system turned out to be unnecessary, unaffordable and unworkable. The lessons we chose to draw from this experience will depend entirely on whether we think this constitutes a good outcome, or a bad one.
Real Lessons From an Unreal Helicopter | TIME.com
