At last, Pakistan zeroes in on Baitullah Mehsud

[SSGPA1]

I have to thank Baitullah Mehsud for re-orienting the Lahore Police Academy discussion. Without his clarion acknowledgement of responsibility this whole board would still be off in la-la land.

Now it's the responsibility of those here to lift the burden from Mehsud's shoulders and blame "hidden hands" for perverting and twisting this man's mind with the allure of women, wine, trinkets and baubles, and song. Ain't that how it goes?

First, this is how all nations react. We are not the ones to blame 9/11 within 15 minutes on Al-Qaeda.

Second, last year Musharraf's govt. provided CIA the info about exact locations on two occasions. The idea was to hit Mehsood from a drone but the CIA failed t respond. He was out of range for PA but CIA with drone couls have easily got him, but CIA was busy providing women, wine, trinkets and baubles, and song for their most favourite operator.

 

[S-2]

Mehsud was attacked at least twice last year of which you seem unaware-June and October.

Of the rest, the pros aren't sharing targeting stories with you so, no, you're not a credible source on PREDATOR operations nor targeting critieria.

Your story has been tossed about by others here to mythic proportions in a circular loop of self-reinforcement but that doesn't make it correct by a long shot.

A long, long shot.

 

[fatman17]

Got an AK in the closet? If not you'll need one soon.

yep! at my farm and in my apartment!

Islamic Caliphate of Pashtunistan

its no where near that!

Def.pk. Dept. of Redundancy

now thats below the belt dude!

 

[S-2]

Actually, I think their spokesman referred to themselves here as the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan but I think that they're building a certain...flexibility into the name.

Funny in this down economy but Taliban, Inc. sees growth on their horizon.

 

[fatman17]

Actually, I think their spokesman referred to themselves here as the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan but I think that they're building a certain...flexibility into the name.

Funny in this down economy but Taliban, Inc. sees growth on their horizon.

thats right! because they keep changing addresses! bajaur, mohmand, dir, waziristan - wonder why?

 

[S-2]

Those are franchises. Some are doing better than others. All are operating where there were once none eight years ago. The last year, K, was stunning.

I don't think you're done in Bajaur by a long shot and America is busier than hell in Konar all the way down below Khost. That, btw, is funky FATAville all the way.

 

[fatman17]

US increases focus on interdiction in Afghan-Pakistan border region

Joanna Wright JDW Correspondent - Kunar

Key Points
An increased focus on the region bordering Pakistan by US forces in Afghanistan's Kunar province has led to more contact with the enemy

Fighting now occurs mainly in remote mountainous areas away from local population centres


Changes in US and Afghan tactics in Kunar, one of Afghanistan's most 'kinetic' provinces, have resulted in more contact with the enemy following the introduction of a battalion-sized element from the US 10th Mountain Division in January.

Task Force Duke Commander Colonel John M Spiszer of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, told Jane's in late March that the focus in Kunar had shifted to border interdiction. "We pushed a lot more forces onto the border ... to prevent the enemy from being able to do operations further in so we can continue with the development and government [projects]," he said. "We went from about six platoons in the Kunar River Valley to 16."

Additional platoons have also been concentrated at existing combat outposts and forward operating bases to increase force presence outside the wire, added Col Spiszer.

Kinetic incidents in Kunar were up 62 per cent during the first three months of 2009, with 375 events compared to 231 in the same period last year.

Kunar, in the mountainous northeast, gained a level of notoriety after a number of severe roadside ambushes, several incidents of helicopters being downed by small-arms fire and the battle at Wanat combat outpost in July 2008, which claimed the lives of nine US soldiers. However, Lieutenant Colonel Rumi Nielson-Green, US spokesperson for Combined Joint Task Force-101, told Jane's that the majority of attacks had been "ineffective direct fire and indirect fire".

Most fighters are reported to be local Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, although highly skilled operatives from other groups, including Lashkar-e Taiba, also take part in some attacks.

Col Nielson-Green told Jane's that 60-70 per cent of Kunar's kinetic events had occurred in the remote Korengal Valley, which is distant from population centres in the Kunar River Valley. Col Spiszer said a government clampdown on the illicit timber trade was among the initial causes of hostilities in the Korengal and that US forces are now working with the provincial government to try to facilitate a legal forestry industry.

The terrain provides perfect guerrilla warfare territory, with insurgents using inaccessible valleys as staging areas, he added. "It is just very rugged terrain and the enemy is pretty well entrenched to the south of the Korengal outpost and very hard to get at," he said. "[There are] not many helicopter landing zones [and] the ones that are there have been used before [so] the enemy knows where they are," he continued. "There are only so many places that you can even move in the mountains, trails for the most part. On the other hand, there are not a lot of people, there are not a lot of villages", which should reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties when combat occurs.

The military focus on the border area includes increased co-operation with Pakistan, although "it is hard to communicate at the tactical level through those mountains," according to Col Spiszer.

A senior US military source also warned that there is the potential for insurgent lines of communication to shift further to the northeast along the Kunar border, sparking additional contacts in areas that are currently calm. He added that effects felt in Kunar from operations or peace agreements on the Pakistani side of the border have been minimal. "If you start to see a lot of activity the answer is probably because of what we are doing down south. It is certainly not what the Pakistanis are doing," he said.

 

[batmannow]

Your regular army infantry are adequate to the task if they are, indeed, well-schooled. It starts there.

Will mistakes be made? Yes. Direct assaults shall occur when it might have been best in retrospect not to do so. Other times, you will bombard when you should have attacked directly.

These are lessons of war and your forces will uncover solutions as they discover dilemmas. You can go to school on COIN forever but at some point you must fight and the battlefield, in the end, is the best classroom. Meanwhile this war isn't waiting.

"Perfect" is the enemy of "good enough".

"The East threat is way over rated"

It is about time, saadahmed, for your brothers here and you to come to grips with this issue. It is my firm belief that your military is intentionally avoiding a fight in the west by posturing the threat in the east as paramount and immediate.

Your army is not emotionally prepared to take on the special challenge presented by your citizens who shall use the clarion of Islamic brotherhood against your men. Your commanders, I believe, fear this.

Your commanders fear the type of battle that will be confronted. It will have many faces. Open warfare in this village, civil pacification in that town, patrols in near-constant contact in the hills and seemingly going into infinity.

Welcome to the "long war".

Your commanders fear the human dimension of the unfolding tragedy. They can't be assured after Loe Sam that your government will backfill with the civil resources to lift the army's burden and mollify the anger of locals at necessary kinetic activity.

Justify the violence by transforming the locale. It's not easy. We struggle daily with the same in Afghanistan. Struggle you must, though, until proficient or simply not engage at all. I don't think that's an option any longer but that's just me.

In for a penny, in for a pound on this one.

There is professional hesitation at the posed dilemmas of COIN in Waziristan.

i guss, the US must support the idea of more mens in PA , also it should in courge the new command for FATA. it would be good, if US back this up!

 

[fatman17]

Your regular army infantry are adequate to the task if they are, indeed, well-schooled. It starts there.

Will mistakes be made? Yes. Direct assaults shall occur when it might have been best in retrospect not to do so. Other times, you will bombard when you should have attacked directly.

These are lessons of war and your forces will uncover solutions as they discover dilemmas. You can go to school on COIN forever but at some point you must fight and the battlefield, in the end, is the best classroom. Meanwhile this war isn't waiting.

"Perfect" is the enemy of "good enough".

"The East threat is way over rated"

It is about time, saadahmed, for your brothers here and you to come to grips with this issue. It is my firm belief that your military is intentionally avoiding a fight in the west by posturing the threat in the east as paramount and immediate.

Your army is not emotionally prepared to take on the special challenge presented by your citizens who shall use the clarion of Islamic brotherhood against your men. Your commanders, I believe, fear this.

Your commanders fear the type of battle that will be confronted. It will have many faces. Open warfare in this village, civil pacification in that town, patrols in near-constant contact in the hills and seemingly going into infinity.

Welcome to the "long war".

Your commanders fear the human dimension of the unfolding tragedy. They can't be assured after Loe Sam that your government will backfill with the civil resources to lift the army's burden and mollify the anger of locals at necessary kinetic activity.

Justify the violence by transforming the locale. It's not easy. We struggle daily with the same in Afghanistan. Struggle you must, though, until proficient or simply not engage at all. I don't think that's an option any longer but that's just me.

In for a penny, in for a pound on this one.

There is professional hesitation at the posed dilemmas of COIN in Waziristan.

S-2, you may feel that your argument is very "cut and dry" but it is not that simple. now dont get me wrong I dont disagree with what needs to be done but let me repeat - it is not so cut and dry. there is a baggage of history (right or wrong) which this nation has to bear and has not been able to live down.

1. The Bangladesh crisis - the army crackdown of March 25, 1971 whereby the govt (military) decided to expell all foreign journalists from Dacca was the biggest mistake because the ensuing western -ve reporting fuelled by indian propoganda still bears deep scars on the psyche of the govt. and the military.....fast forward to 2007-09.

2. the local media and politicians are portraying the political and security conditions in Pakistan today, akin to that of East Pakistan in 69-71. The image of the army has been battered beyond recognition by the same punjabi population from which it recruits!!! think about this! people are saying the army is fighting "america's war" (they are dead wrong!) and i have said in many posts and op-eds that we need a coherent strategy which has the backing of the people.

3. Threat from the East: There is years of animosity which cannot be erased in one go. there are agreements between Pakistan and India on Siachin and Sir Creek issues ready to sign but no one in both countries has the political or military will to sign on the dotted line.....and then came Mumbai (as if the past wasnt enough!)

4. Indian actions in Afghanistan: We are getting paid-back for what we did to India in Kashmir. there is documented evidence presented to the US on indian activities to fuel insurgency in FATA and Baluchistan but the US is not listening. its falling on deaf ears! why?

5. Adm Mullen and Gen.Petraeus both have testified in senate hearings that US sanctions of the past decade (1993-2001) were detrimental to US policy and influence with regards to Pakistan (esp. the military) and there is deep skepticism within the army that the US will leave when the party is over.....and yet we read that the US aid (economic and military) will have more strings and conditionalities tied to it without "mutual consultation" with an "ally" who is considered "vital" in the fight against terror and extremism.

There is professional hesitation at the posed dilemmas of COIN in Waziristan.[/B] - now you know why? the army is ready to take these militants on (it has shown in Bajaur), it is not getting the political as well as the public support for its kinetic actions.

this is the unfortunate ground reality. there is a need for a major paradigm shift by all the players involved in this theatre, otherwise look for more of the same!

 

[fatman17]

insight: Terrorism and its discontents —Ejaz Haider

If employing proxies was realpolitik at one point, pulling the curtain on them without any compunction is realpolitik now. Once this has been clearly determined, it becomes easier to develop cooperative mechanisms to fight a threat that seeks to hurt all states equally and is global, transnational and protean in character

A recent conference in Bangkok on confidence-building between India and Pakistan threw up a paradox: even as much has changed since January 2004 when both sides started a normalisation process on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in Islamabad, they are also in many ways back to where they had begun.

Some structures are there; until Mumbai happened last year, movement had already been made along the eight tracks in the dialogue framework. As Lt-Gen Asad Durrani (retd) correctly observed during one session, the design logic of the framework was simple. While it was to be a composite dialogue, movement along some tracks would be easier and faster than others. The very agreement on the framework necessitated an implied acceptance of that.

Given that, there may be no reason to entirely reject the past five years of dialogue — i.e., the various rounds that have taken place at multiple levels involving issues in the eight baskets. Yet, what we see now is a slide in the level of trust which threatens even that which has been achieved.

Here we face another paradox. The Indian government has hit the pause button on the process because of Mumbai but the only way to resolve Mumbai and its fallout, as well as to try and prevent such occurrences from derailing the process again, is to keep the process alive. The composite dialogue offers the only framework in and through which cooperation can be sought and given.

Addressing, tackling, and eradicating terrorism was and remains part of the framework. When the dialogue started, India insisted on discussing it because it hurt Delhi. Since then, statistically speaking, terrorism has hurt Pakistan more than it has India and now poses the former an existential threat. In many ways then, the problem of terrorism has taken centre-stage. In fact, if India’s reaction to Mumbai is the benchmark, terrorism has the capacity to determine the outcome of the entire normalisation process and, by extension, bilateral relations between Pakistan and India.

There was no real difference of opinion between the two sides at the conference on the threat terrorism holds out. What is however troublesome, as I stressed, is determining whether blame for a particular terrorist act can be laid at the door of the state of Pakistan. How and who is to trace the spoor; who would determine the intent behind the exercise and what role is domestic politics likely to play in such an exercise, as it did during and after Mumbai?

The Indians had no clear answers to these questions. But the point must be pressed because incidents of terrorism will happen. Without addressing these questions there is no point in resuming the dialogue because another attack will have the potential to sabotage relations yet again.

The Indian argument, flimsy at best, is that the level of sophistication of these attacks and the equipment used by the terrorists show they could not have commandeered these resources on their own. The fact is that the expertise of terrorist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda now easily matches that of special forces. Their cadres have fought long enough, are battle hardened and inoculated, and draw lessons from their encounters. These groups have also shown remarkable ability to innovate and change tactics. This is known to US and NATO-ISAF troops in Afghanistan and has been repeatedly acknowledged.

One basic element of all warfare is to gain asymmetric advantage over the adversary. The terrorist, for several reasons, begins with that asymmetric advantage. States and armies have to first neutralise this asymmetric advantage before they can turn the tables on the terrorist groups.

As for equipment — assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, TNT and RDX, satellite phones, global positioning systems etc — it is easily available. If terrorist groups can sustain the cost of their operations and continue to acquire funding from multiple sources, it is naïve to think that the only way they can get sat-phones and GPS devices is through state sponsorship.

Even as I was trying to get a response from the Indian side on how to determine that an attack involves Pakistan, news came in about the attack on the police training school in Manawan. Perfect timing it was. I asked the Indians if they thought Islamabad or, more to the point the ISI, had arranged for this group to target the training facility.

It is important, as we noted at the conference, to determine how the two sides, but especially India, will respond to a spectacular terror attack. One, Mumbai is likely to be repeated even though the tactic next time may be different; two, if bilateral standard operating procedures are not adopted to address the post-attack situation, the two sides will not be able to resume any meaningful dialogue.

And what does it mean to seek and give cooperation sans a process?

In some ways, other issues, even though contentious, are known. Responses and counter-responses in most cases are practised, even path-dependent. The unknown in this case, with an increasing ability to affect the entire spectrum of cooperation, is terrorism. Would India always react as it did post-Mumbai?

If the answer is yes, then the terrorists have already acquired a massive asymmetric advantage over not one but two states. If no, then India will have to nuance its approach to terrorism and engage Pakistan meaningfully rather than pointing fingers at Islamabad.

Simultaneously, outstanding issues cannot be consigned ad infinitum to an interminable process, important though processes are. There must be some visible movement towards a resolution. This is where both states, India more than Pakistan, have shown the tendency to resist innovative thinking.

Terrorism, without doubt, is the biggest threat right now. Equally, however, it unfolds within a context even as the terrorist tries to change the context. Addressing the context therefore is as important as fire-fighting. For India to think that terrorism can be addressed and defeated without reference to what has caused it is simplistic at best and dangerous at worst.

For its part, Pakistan needs to understand, and very clearly, that the option of using proxies is over. Period. If employing proxies was realpolitik at one point, pulling the curtain on them without any compunction is realpolitik now. Once this has been clearly determined, it becomes easier to develop cooperative mechanisms to fight a threat that seeks to hurt all states equally and is global, transnational and protean in character.

Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

 

[fatman17]

Petraeus calls for ‘sustained’ commitment to Pakistan

WASHINGTON: General David Petraeus – commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) – on Thursday sought Congressional support over developing a sustained relationship with Pakistan as Pentagon leaders testified before lawmakers on the new Obama administration’s strategy for the second day running. The members of the House Armed Services Committee broadly backed the new strategy. Replying to lawmakers’ questions, Petraeus said, “What we’re after, of course, is to build a relationship with them [the Pakistanis] that can, in a sense, reassure them … that’s something that, you know, will take a sustained substantial commitment on our part, in return for which, obviously, we can expect a sustained substantial commitment on their part.”

app

 

[BaburCM]

Petraeus calls for ‘sustained’ commitment to Pakistan

WASHINGTON: General David Petraeus – commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM) – on Thursday sought Congressional support over developing a sustained relationship with Pakistan as Pentagon leaders testified before lawmakers on the new Obama administration’s strategy for the second day running. The members of the House Armed Services Committee broadly backed the new strategy. Replying to lawmakers’ questions, Petraeus said, “What we’re after, of course, is to build a relationship with them [the Pakistanis] that can, in a sense, reassure them … that’s something that, you know, will take a sustained substantial commitment on our part, in return for which, obviously, we can expect a sustained substantial commitment on their part.”

app

What kind of sustained substantial commitment, I wonder? The one that we also received after the Cold War? The one which is aimed at defaming Pakistan as much as possible? The one in which a certain loud mouthed superpower only does the talking, but comes short in deeds such as providing the necessary equipment? The one which involves slaughtering innocent people in the tribal areas? Sick and tired of these loud mouthed Americans. They are only full of hot air.

 

[rubyjackass]

4. Indian actions in Afghanistan: We are getting paid-back for what we did to India in Kashmir. there is documented evidence presented to the US on indian activities to fuel insurgency in FATA and Baluchistan but the US is not listening. its falling on deaf ears! why?

Please give links to sources.

 

[fatman17]

Baitullah Mehsud now public enemy No 1 for US?

* The Observer says Taliban chief has brought together Pashtun warlords, jihadi fighters from Punjab and Al Qaeda fugitives

LAHORE: The US had announced a $5 million reward on Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan chief Baitullah Mehsud 10 days ago, “elevating him... to the rank of a senior Al Qaeda leader”, according to a profile published in The Observer on Sunday.

“Since February, CIA drones have concentrated their missiles on Mehsud's mountainous demesne,” the newspaper said. “On Monday, he responded in the way he knows best,” it said while referring to the attack on a police academy in Lahore.

Mehsud claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it was a response to the US drones attacks in the Tribal Areas targeting his men, and added that the next attack will be “at the heart of American power”, The Observer said.

"Not in Afghanistan, but in Washington, which will amaze the entire world," the newspaper quoted him as saying.

Although US General David Petraeus said he was ‘galvanised’ by the claim, The Observer said in the article, few analysts take the threat seriously.

However, Mehsud poses “a very real danger in Pakistan”, the newspaper said, where he has ‘revitalised’ what it called “Pakistan’s jihadist network”.

“He has brought together disparate groups of Pashtun warlords, jihadi fighters from Punjab and Al Qaeda fugitives from across the Muslim world,” it said.

daily times monitor

 

[muse]

Originally Posted by muse
The two ideas of islamist terror - -and it is islamist terror becasue islam is used as both motivation and justification for terror,

muse, Sir. I have been called to task on this forum several times for calling the "irhabis": "islamists" or "jihadis". So, I have changed to using "irhabi" so as not to offend. But, here, you have used "islamist terror". What do you think of this argument over the terms, the words, islamist and jihadi. Are the people who rail against non-Muslim Westerners, like myself, for using the term "jihadi" or "islamist" just trying to misdirect the conversation, in a way to give "protection" to the irhabis, or, are their complaints that the terms are pejorative, true? Is it offensive to most Muslims for me, a non-muslim, to call Baitullah Mehsud a "jihadi" or an "Islamic terrorist"?

Truth Seeker (TS - terribly sexy?)

Those who object to the term "Islamist terror", in my opinion, are hoping to deny realitym - they want to deny the motivation and justification of those who carry out such acts.

Why?

I think they are deeply disappointed by those who carry out such attacks and hope that most of the rest of us will not notice that by and large they agree with the ideology of those who carry out such attacks.

They argue that some they describe as "peaceful and moderate" find the moniker "islamist terrorists" offensive - as if it were OK to buy into the ideology of the islamist, so long as you can describe yourself as "peaceful and moderate" - to these the question must be posed:

What is so wrong with "MUSLIM" that you now suggest a subset, ISLaMist be legitimized???

You will note that in any answer to this question, the question of ideology will not be far, and will be be difficult to obscure. They fight a losing battle and not one without consequences for all, especially the committed.