Articles on Father of nation , Quaid-E-Azam

[ghazi52]

A Pakistani View





On the occasion of the All India Muslim League session, 1936

Jinnah was not invited to the later sessions of the Round Table Conference, but he was now residing in England, and had opportunities of meeting the delegates from India. An important contact, which he effectively renewed during this period was with Sir Muhammad Iqbal, who had come as a delegate to the Round Table Conference. Jinnah was the principal speaker at a reception given in honour of the poet by Iqbal Literary Association and thereafter invited him to lunch at his house. Thus began a series of meetings which were to leave a mark on the course of India’s history. Jinnah was not now a delegate to the Round Table Conference, but during the first session, which he attended, he had criticised to conception of the central federation, which other delegates had supported enthusiastically.

His objections were partly from the nationalist anglet (sic) – the inclusion of the autocratic princes at the centre would “water down democracy” – and partly from the Muslim point of view – a strong centre would nullify the provincial autonomy which the Muslims valued so much. Iqbal, on the other hand, had a few years before, held out his plan for a Muslim bloc in the North-West. This did not receive much consideration at the Round Table Conference, but the separation of Sind, and grant of full reforms to the North-West Frontier Province were bound to pave the way for its fulfillment. This plan, the poet discussed at length with Jinnah, and gradually convinced him that in this lay the only hope for a contented, peaceful India in general and for the bulk of Indian Muslims in particular.

​

Iqbal had got Jinnah seriously interested in what came to be known as the “Pakistan Scheme” but even then he did not return to India to take it up. He was biding his time, and all the time, most unhappy. During the course of a brief visit to Oxford in 1932, he said to the present writer, with great anguish of soul, “but what is to be done? The Hindus are short-sighted and I think, incorrigible. The Muslim camp is full of those spineless people who, whatever they may say to me, will consult the Deputy Commissioner about what they should do! Where is, between these two groups, any place for a man like me?”

Meanwhile he was getting reports from India that Indian Muslims were a flock of sheep without a shepherd. The Aga Khan’s leadership was ineffective, as he wanted the palm without the dust, and could not give up the health resorts of France and Switzerland. Maulana Muhammad Ali was dead. So was Sir Muhammad Shafi, and even if he had been alive, he was too closely associated with a pro-British policy to inspire general enthusiasm. The League and the Muslim Conference had become the plaything of petty leaders who would not resign office, even after a vote of no-confidence! And, of course, they had no organization in the provinces, and no influence with the masses.

It was in these circumstances that certain well-wishers of the Muslims turned towards Jinnah. They requested him to return to India, and once again lead to army, which was first becoming a rabble. Iqbal joined in these appeals. Jinnah relented, but even now he would only visit India for a few months and return to England again. In 1934, however, he was elected the permanent president of the All-India Muslim League, and finally returned to India in October, 1935.

Back in India, Jinnah began to reorganize the All-India Muslim League. Its annual session was held at Bombay in April 1936, under the presidentship of Sir Wazir Hasan, and its constitution was revised to make it more democratic and living organization. Steps were also taken, for the first time, to set up a machinery for contesting elections on behalf of the Muslim League. A central election board with provincial elections under the Government of India Act of 1935. Jinnah toured the country to convass (sic) support for the League candidates, but his efforts were only partially successful. In the Punjab, he had the constant support of Iqbal, but could not come to an agreement with Sir Fazl-i-Hussain, the Unionist leader and League fared very badly in that ‘key’ province. Experience in Bengal was similar. In the elections, the League was actively assisted by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama, and had generally the goodwill of the Congress, which had been receiving support for Jinnah’s Independent Party in the Central legislative Assembly, but it failed to make much headway against firmly entrenched provincial parities.

The Rallying-Post

The provincial elections of 1937 produced many surprises. The League had not come out with flying colours. The Congress, on the other hand, achieved a success, which neither its supporters nor its opponents had anticipated. Most provincial Governors and British officials expected at the provincial election a repetition of the previous elections to the Central Legislature, when Congress had won about 50 per cent of the Hindu seats. They looked to the provincial parites, which they had encouraged in various areas – the Unionists in Punjab, the Justice Party in Madras, the Zamindars in the Nationalist Party in U.P., the Marathas in Bombay – and were sure that although the Congress may be the largest single party, it would have to depend on others to form ministries. Here they were to be completely disillusioned. The organizing ability of Sardar Vallabhbhi Patel, who had succeeded Dr. Ansari as the Chairman of the Parliamentary Board, the army of the workers, which the Congress had built up during the previous twenty years, the magic name of Mahatma, and the whirlwind tours of the president, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, completely upset the official calculations. The Congress triumphed in all the Hindu provinces and even in the North-West Frontier!

There is no doubt that this unexpected success went to the head of the Congress leaders. Before and even during the elections, they were friendly to the Muslim League. Now they were cold and distant. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru declared at Calcutta that there were only two parties in the country – the British and the Congress. The League had fared so badly at the elections that it was not necessary to acknowledge its existence. To this attitude of high disdain, two other factors contributed. The Congress president was surrounded by certain left wing – almost de-Muslimised – Muslims, who later left even the Congress fold for the Communists’ ranks. They urged on Nehru, that it was “medieval” to recognize political parties based on religions, and the Congress had only to organize a vigorous Muslim Mass Contact Movement to achieve the same success amongst the Muslims, which it had gained among the Hindus. Nehru was carried away by these visions, and an open breach occurred between the Congress and the League. While in the original elections, the Congress had supported the League in U.P. now it set up a candidate to oppose the Muslim League in Bhraich constituency of U.P. which had returned a Leaguer, who died shortly after the elections.

The personality of the chairman of the Congress parliamentary board was another factor, which drove the Congress away from the League. Sardar Patel was a great organizer but for a man of his ability and importance, he was amazingly ill-informed about the background of Muslim politics, and even otherwise perhaps freedom from communalism was not one of his many gifts. He was at this time at the summit of the Congress parliamentary board, bossed over all government in the Congress provinces. He had to decide the question of Muslim representation in provincial government, and he dealt with the problem in his usual firm and unimaginative way. If he had faced the question in a spirit of statesmanship, he could have seen that Sir Sikandar Hayat and other Muslim premiers had already tackled the corresponding Hindu problem in the Muslim provinces, in a manner which could be a very safe guide to the Congress. Sir Sikandar Hayat’s party was in absolute majority in the Punjab Assembly, but he offered the Hindu seat in the Government to the Hindu Mahasabha, and although Raja Narendara Nath, the president of the Hindu Party, was unable to accept it owing to old age, his nominee, Sir Manohar Lal was appointed a minister. There was really no other way to give honest, real, representation to the minorities. If a minister had to be taken not on account of affiliation to the party, or any other personal claim, but to represent the minorities, it was obvious that he should be their genuine representative and not a stooge of the party in power. This the iron-willed Sardar would not – or could not – grasp. Under the constitution, representation had to be given to the minorities. So he was prepared to have Muslim ministers even from the Muslim League – but then, they must resign from the League, sign the Congress pledge, and abide by its discipline. In other words, the minority representatives were not to represent the minorities but the Congress! In imposing his iron discipline, the Sardar had some initial difficulties. The Muslim League had not done well in predominantly Muslim areas, but it had won the vast majority of seats in the Congress provinces. In some of these – like Bombay – not a single Muslim had been returned on the Congress ticket. So what was to be done about the representation of the Muslims in the Governments of these provinces? The problem was somewhat complicated but the efficient, resourceful Sardar was not going to be baffled by these difficulties. He offered the ministry to any Tom, Dick or Harry amongst the Muslim members who was prepared to sign the Congress pledge and so the farce of Muslim representation was complete.

The procedure adopted was, of course, a negation of the constitutional safeguards for the Muslims, but it was also less than fair to the Muslim League. Before the elections the Congress and Jinnah’s Independent Party had closely collaborated with each other in the Central Legislative Assembly and many Congress resolutions against the Government succeeded only on account of Jinnah’s support. Their relations during the elections were also friendly. Later, when after the elections in 1937, the Congress at first refused to accept office, and the Governors called the League leaders, as representing the next largest party, to form what we called interim Ministries Jinnah would not allow this. It is known that in some cases, the leaders of the League parties in the provincial legislatures e.g. Sir Ali Mohammad Khan Dehlavi in Bombay were quite willing – even keen – to become premiers but Jinnah overruled them. He would not profit by the Congress refusal to come in, or do anything, which might jeopardise the prospects of an effective League-Congress collaboration on which his heart was set.

The Congress party leaders, however, when it was their turn to be invited by the Governors, completely ignored the Muslim League. This must have hurt Jinnah; what followed was calculated to rouse his ire still further. The Congress Government had taken one false step in taking, as Muslim Ministers, persons who did not command the confidence of the Muslims in the legislature. This false step was succeeded by many more of the same type. In the absence of a true Muslim representative in the Cabinet, the congress Government had nobody to advise them about the views of the Muslims, when they took decision affecting the general population. The so-called “Muslim Minister” knew very well that he was governed by the Congress pledge, and the iron discipline of that party. He usually represented himself alone, and lacked that moral courage which comes from having “big battalions at one’s back.” In many cases, he was just a newcomer to the Congress ranks, avowedly for the sake of the office – and did not carry with his colleague in the Cabinet, anything of the influence which a Syed Mahmud or Yaqub Hassan would carry. Bereft of any following, and any mission, that he was to watch the Muslim interests – and in many cases, even the support of a contented conscience – the Muslim Minister was a pathetic figure, and deprived of his frank advice, the Congress Governments took several steps, which caused deep resentment amongst the Muslims – as well as by Hindu untouchables – and a committee has reported on the hardships, to which Muslims were exposed under the Congress rule.

The second half of the year 1937 was one of the darkest periods through which Indian Muslims have had to pass since 1857. Their central political organization had failed to show any effectiveness at the polls. Over the greater part of the country, where the Congress ministries held sway, they felt that the Hindu Raj had come. They suddenly realized that all the fears, which Sir Syed and Viqar-ul-Mulk had expressed about their future, were coming true. They were most disheartened and sore at heart. They saw no way out of their predicament, and thought that soon the Congress, with its vast organization, and the policy of corrupting a few ambitious, un-principled Muslims, would extend its sway over the Muslim majority provinces and the while country would be come a vast prison-house for them.

The prospects for the Muslims were most gloomy and many faint hearts began to suggest that they should settle with the Congress on its own terms. There was however one light which burned bright and clear. Jinnah has been called a proud and haughty person, and this trait of character may have caused him as his people occasional difficulties. This was, however, the time when just these qualities were needed. In the midst of the storm he stood like a rock. He was the proud representative of a proud people and he hurled defiance at the pretensions and the dreams of the Congress. He was not going to lower his flag to come to terms with the Congress. Far from his accepting conditions while being offered seats in the Congress Governments, it would be he, who would impose conditions!



Indian Muslims are not likely to forget the resolve stand which Jinnah, without any visible following, without much support in the legislatures, and inspired solely by his sense of duty and his faith in his people, took at this juncture. But there was another great Muslim who, although in the background, gave Jinnah powerful and effective moral support. Jinnah had written about Iqbal.

“To me he was a friend, guide and philosopher, and during the darkest moments through which the Muslim League had to go, he stood like a rock and never flinched one single moment.”

Gradually the darkness began to lift. The Muslims saw the light and rallied round. Those in the Muslim majority provinces saw what was happening to their co-religionists in the Congress provinces and were deeply touched. They now realised that except through a powerful, All-India organization they had no means of saving themselves. So after having decisively defeated the League in the elections, the Muslim premiers of the Punjab, Bengal and Sind, came to terms with Jinnah and agreed to abide by the policy and decisions of All-India Muslim League in all-India matters.

​

These decisions which were announced at the annual sessions of the League, held at Lucknow, toward end of 1937, not only opened a new chapter for the League but marked a turning point in the history of Muslim India. The session was held in the face of heavy odds but, thanks to the help of the young Raja of Mahmudabad the arrangements were perfect, Jinnah, in his presidential address hurled defiance at the Congress, but now it was not the defiance of one who had nothing but faith and courage, to succour him. He had the premier of the Punjab and Bengal on his right and left and he knew that he had the support of almost every selfrespecting Muslim. The Muslim India had relied the round the rallying-post!

Search For Security

The significance of the Lucknow session of the League was not on the Congress leaders. They realize that their treatment of the Muslims in the Congress provinces had been taken as a challenge by the entire Muslim India, which was prepared to meet it. The firm, disciplinarian policy of the iron dictator – the Sardar – had given results, quite different from what he expected. Thinking Hindus began to criticize the want of statesmanship shown by the Congress leadership in dealing with the Muslims. Tairsee, president of Hindu Gymkhana of Bombay, criticised, in the columns of Bombay Chronicle, the unstatesmanlike attitude which the Congress leadership had shown in refusing genuine representation to the Muslims in Congress Cabinets. Sardar Sardhul Singh Caveeshar of the Punjab expressed the same view in a long letter to Mahatma Gandhi. Sir Chiman Lal Sitalved criticised the unhappy development in the presidential address delivered in December 1937 at Calcutta session of All-India Liberal Federation and contrasted the unwise rigidity shown by the Congress leaders with the statesmanship displayed by the Muslim premier like Sir Sikandar Hayat.

The Congress leaders realized that they had blundered and appeared willing to take Muslim representatives in the Congress Cabinet on less exacting terms. Now it was Jinnah’s turn to be firm and unbending. The numerous unity talks which started between him and the Congress leaders, usually broke down on the question of the representative character of the Muslim League. His plea was that in 1916, when alone there was an agreement between Hindus and Muslims, the League had been taken as the sole and the authoritative representative of the Muslims and the Congress should now acknowledge its position in the same way. This, the Congress considered incompatible with its claim of speaking on behalf of entire India, and the negotiations broke down. Perhaps the truth in that what had happened in 1937, had not only embittered Jinnah but had finally convinced him that there was no safety for the Muslims in the goodwill of the Congress or the Hindus.

S.M. Ikram was a member of the Indian civil service and after partition held a number of important positions in the civil service of Pakistan. He has also published books in both Urdu and English on a variety of topics related to the history and culture of the Muslims of the subcontinent. In the excerpt quoted above, taken from a series of biographical sketches of Indian Muslim leaders, he discusses of the re-organization of the Muslim League in the thirties under the leadership of Jinnah.

Source: Muhammad Ali Jinnah Makers of Modern Pakistan. Edited by: Sheila McDonough (Sir George Williams University) D.C. Health and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, USA.

 

[ghazi52]

Jinnah: the man, the myth and the vision
Dr Muhammad Reza Kazimi

December 25, 2019

As a man Jinnah was forthcoming, as a lawyer, he was prudent.
MOHAMMAD Ali Jinnah was the first political leader to protest against the Salt Tax, calling it “iniquitous, unheard of in any other country”. [B.R. Nanda, Road to Pakistan: The Life and Times of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, New Delhi, Routledge, 2010, p.6] Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the legislator who tabled the resolution calling upon tenders for the Government of India to be opened in India in rupees, rather than in England, in pounds as had been the practice. [Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1989, p.81] Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the Muslim who questioned the representative status of the Simla Deputation in 1906. [Ian Bryant Wells, Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity, New Delhi, Permanent Black, 2005, p. 27] Yet it was the same Mohammad Ali Jinnah who brought about the partition of India.

We need closer acquaintance with the man to understand how his approach changed over the years.

The man: The one personality trait of Jinnah that has been most commented upon, is his pride. H. V. Hodson, Louise Fischer and John Kenneth Galbraith attribute the creation of Pakistan to Jinnah’s pride. Is it true? Jinnah was a Khoja, most of whom were Anglicised, never spoke their mother tongue in public and never wore their religion on their sleeves. What separated Jinnah from his political contemporaries were his class traits, not individual traits.

In 1925, Jinnah openly said that "he had learnt politics at the feet of Sir Surinder Nath Bannerji". [Legislative Assembly Debates, March 1925, Vol. V, Part III, p.2478] Can anyone imagine Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru or Sardar Patel speaking with such humility?

Later, while recalling his years in the wilderness, Jinnah had said: "I was considered a plague and shunned. But I thrust myself, and forced my way through and went from place to place uninvited and unwanted. But now, the position had changed." [S.W. Jinnah of Pakistan, p.239]

A man who was proud would die before risking humiliation, much less admit it. As a man Jinnah was forthcoming, as a lawyer, he was prudent. While fighting for the lives of millions, he could not rely on expressions of goodwill. He wanted everything written, signed, sealed and delivered. That is why Sardar Vallabhai Patel said that Jinnah was an impossible person to work with.

A closer look at the life of Jinnah reveals how and why his approach changed over the years and why he proposed the Two-Nation Theory that was not his original position at all.

The myth: This exasperation was rather curious. Jinnah was a close friend of Vittalbhai Patel, the Sardar’s brother, and also a very close friend of Motilal Nehru, Pandit Nehru’s father. If there was a psychological factor to the partition of India, it was Jawaharlal Nehru’s aversion to his father. [Michael Brecher, Nehru A Political Biography, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 40 and Judith Brown, Nehru A Political Life, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.46] Jawaharlal Nehru disliked Jinnah, the friend of his real father, Motilal Nehru, but the rival of his political Bapu.

This was played out at the Nagpur 1920 Congress Session. It was Motilal Nehru who had primed Jinnah to oppose Gandhi’s Non-Cooperation Resolution. Since the Non-Cooperation Movement was bound up with the Khilafat Movement, Maulana Shaukat Ali was incensed at Jinnah’s stand. A Muslim majority had been contrived at in Nagpur, and it was a Muslim majority that had shouted down Jinnah there. [Kanji Dwarka Das, India’ Fight for Freedom Bombay, Popular Prakashan, 1966, pp.286-287]

However, when the time came to vote, Jawaharlal Nehru "emotionally blackmailed" his father to side with Gandhi. [Sheela Reddy, Mr and Mrs Jinnah New Delhi, Penguin/Viking, 2017, p.235] Jawaharlal Nehru knew firsthand that it was his father who had set in motion Jinnah’s resignation from Congress, yet he never tired of writing and saying that Jinnah left Congress because he abhorred mass politics! If Jinnah abhorred mass politics, how was it that he led a public demonstration and procession against Lord Willingdon, then Governor of Bombay?

Paradoxically, had there been a Hindu majority at Nagpur, Jinnah would have prevailed. Gandhi prevailed because of a Muslim majority. Earlier that year, Mahatma Gandhi had clearly written: "I have been experimenting with myself and my friends by introducing religion into politics." [Young India, 12 May 1920]

The mission: The die was cast and with the induction of religion, it was no longer possible to keep the Two-Nation Theory out of consideration, especially since Mahatma Gandhi had preceded Jinnah in broadcasting it. After inspecting the Sabarmati camp of the Hindu Mahasabha, Gandhi wrote: “Every community is entitled, even bound to organise itself, if it is to live as a separate entity.” [Young India, 6 January 1929]

When the majority community organises separately, the minority community is automatically rendered separate. When Quaid-i-Azam said at Lahore that the "Hindus and Muslims belong to two different philosophies, social customs, literature...", he was not being original. Even at Lahore, he had buttressed his claim by quoting Lala Lajpat Rai. Was that the end of the matter? No, when Sarat Chandar Bose, Kiran Shankar Roy and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy had drawn up a scheme for a united and sovereign Bengal in early 1947, Quaid-i-Azam and the Muslim League had agreed. However, Pandit Nehru told Sir Eric Mieville that "there was no chance of Hindus there agreeing to put themselves under permanent Muslim domination". [ S.M. Burke & Salim Al-Din Quraishi, The British Raj in India , Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.513]

Approached from the other end, it is still the Two-Nation Theory. The British Prime Minister Clement Atlee had hoped till June 2, 1947, that Bengal would opt to be a separate country. [Dawn 28 December 2018, p.14] Thus it was the Two-Nation Theory of Nehru, not the Two-Nation Theory of Jinnah that was drowned in 1971.

But regardless of what Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru or anyone else said, the question is, was the Two-Nation Theory intrinsically valid? A theory does not validate experience; it is experience that validates theory. Had India and Pakistan emerged on the map as friendly neighbours, the Two-Nation Theory would have died a natural death. Such a course was preempted because Lord Mountbatten had told the Congress that Pakistan was not viable and would collapse within six months.

To ensure that outcome, As Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck has testified [John Connell, Auchinleck, London, Cassell, 1959, pp. 920, 921], the India’s Cabinet was doing everything in its power to prevent the establishment of Pakistan on a firm basis. Had India not withheld the strategic and financial assets of Pakistan, relations would have been based on cooperation.

Today, it is manifest that this hostility is based on Kashmir. The current plight of Kashmiris in their bitterest winter of discontent bears testimony to it. Here I agree with Pandit Nehru when he said that Kashmir was a symptom, not the disease. During the war of 1971, Kashmir was not the cause; yet this is what Anthony Mascarenhas reported: "Everyone I spoke to in Delhi — editors, businessmen, civil servants — said bluntly that 24 years was too long for India to be burdened with the problem of Pakistan." [The Sunday Times, London, 5 December 1971]

As for Kashmir, M. A. Jinnah said on May 29, 1944: “Whenever Pakistan comes into existence, we shall not force Kashmir to join it. It may like to stay outside and enjoy complete autonomy. We shall not stand in its way to do so.” [Mehrunnisa Ali (ed.) Jinnah on World Affairs, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2007, p.242] On the other hand, Congress was resolved that Pakistan be denied Kashmir. This is what caused the misfortune of this paradise. In the brief prepared for the Cabinet Delegation’s discussion with Jinnah it was proposed to offer him a sovereign Pakistan except perhaps Gurdaspur. [Penderel Moon (ed.) Wavell The Viceroy’s Journal, Karachi. OUP, 1974, p.245]

The Congress and their insiders in the government had calculated the strategic importance of Gurdaspur, a Muslim majority district. On June 14, 1947, Krishna Menon threatened Britain with dire consequences if Kashmir were allowed to go to Pakistan [Nicholas Mansergh et al. The Transfer of Power Papers, London, HMSO, 1982, Vol. XI, No. 201] despite Menon’s plea that Mountbatten destroy this letter, he preserved it. On June 17, 1947, V.P. Menon asked specifi cally for Gurdaspur to be given to India. [The British Raj in India, p.587]

H. Christopher Beaumont, private secretary to Sir Cyril Radcliffe, confessed publicly that Radcliffe had altered the Boundary Award at the behest “of powers in New Delhi”. Since Gurdaspur had, despite a Muslim majority, been awarded to India, Radcliffe made another gift of Muslim majority districts of Ferozpur and Zira. [For details see Muhammad Reza Kazimi, "Clearing the Confusion" Dawn, 28 March 1992] Lord Mountbatten’s Publicity Officer concocted the myth that Jinnah had nominated Radcliffe. [Alan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, Second ed. London, Robert Hale, 1972, p.124] This is completely belied by. [The Transfer of Power Papers, 1982, Vol.XI,pp.532,533] Now contrast Jawaharlal Nehru’s stance on Kashmir in 1947 with Jinnah’s stance of 1944. The real reason behind Nehru explained calling Kashmir a symptom rather than the disease: “Kashmir is going to be a drain on our resources, but they are going to be a greater drain on Pakistan.” [Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru Series II, Orient Longmans, 1982-1994, pp.346,347]

True, with utmost devotion, dedication, honesty and sacrifice the earliest batch of civil servants, the regrouped armed forces, even petty clerks as Nehru termed one of the prime ministers of Pakistan, laboured day and night to save Pakistan from imminent collapse. Nevertheless, the two long term destabilising factors had and are still taking their toll. The first being Nehru’s refusal to countenance the independence of Bengal, and the, second, his now revealed to be totally insincere promises of plebiscite in Kashmir. It is these two factors that have not only divided the country, but divided opinion across Pakistan. It is they that have led to the questioning of Jinnah’s vision.

Quaid-i-Azam’s vision for Pakistan: In 1944, in an interview to the APA representative, Jinnah defined Pakistan geographically. Politically, Pakistan would be a democracy. Economically, Jinnah hoped that major industries and services would be socialised. [Jamil-Ud-Din Ahmed(ed.) Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah, Lahore, Muhammad Ashraf, 1976, Vol. II, p,231] Now because India withheld the financial assets of Pakistan, and Muslim plutocrats rushed to the rescue this programme could not be given effect to.

Lest readers rush to condemn the Quaid-i-Azam or this writer, let me explain that the term “Islamic Socialism” had been used by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 on one side and Syed Qutb Shaheed and Mustafa al-Sibayi on the other, in the same year. It was them who explained the term: ‘In Islamic Socialism, there would be no atheism of Communism and there would be no exploitation of Capitalism’. [John L. Esposito, Unholy War, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.57] The term was suppressed in the Ayub Khan era, which is why Ulama could anathemise it.

The geographical definition could not be obtained because of the Congress and British adamance over the Rajgopalachari Formula, which demanded division of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam. Still between the areas demarcated by Chakrawarti Rajgopalachari and Sir Cyril Radcliffe, there were substantial differences. As to democracy, we all know that it has had a patchy existence. All this does not detract from the fact that the Quaid-i-Azam set out clearly what he meant by Pakistan. There was no deception.

As for democracy, there is the Governor-Generalship issue. That the powers of the Governor-General should have been under the strict scope of the Indian Independence Act 1947 is true. Liaquat Ali Khan was leader of the All-India Muslim League bloc in the interim government and as such his appointment as the first Prime Minister of Pakistan was only natural. That Jinnah had no intention of allowing Lord Mountbatten to become Governor-General of Pakistan, is also clear.

In the June 9, 1947, meeting of the AIML, "The Quaid said: 'I have finished my work. I am like a field marshal who is no longer needed when his army has become victorious. His duties are then transferred to other citizens who are expected to take charge'…. At this point Maulana Hasrat Mohani rose and said in a loud voice: 'This is not possible. We reject your decision… Pakistan’s Governor-General can only be a man who has won Pakistan for the Muslims'." [Inam Aziz, Stop Press, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2009, p.9]

When we understand that Quaid-i-Azam had not meant to nominate himself, then, other pieces fall in place.

He actually had the Nawab of Bhopal in mind. Thus his pride, which we discussed at the beginning of this paper, did not translate into accepting this office himself.

In keeping with his definition of Pakistan, Jinnah’s speech made one year earlier, (1943) in Calcutta, makes sense. "There are millions of people who hardly get one meal a day. Is this civilisation? Is this the aim of Pakistan? If that is Pakistan I would not have it."

We must understand that religion was the basis of discrimination. India was divided because of the discrimination. How, then, would he allow discrimination on the basis of religion in Pakistan? Pakistan was not an island that had sprung up from the sea. It was a territory that had to be carved out from British India, and before the British left. Once they left, there would have been no Pakistan and we would be living under the same benign rule that the people of Kashmir are living under.

Pakistan was an inadequate solution to the communal problem of India? Who denies that? But at least we have a state. Whether you like it or not, a nuclear state. Look at the Middle East. Look at the boundaries of Israel in 1948, in 1956, in 1967 and in 1973. The people of Israel are a minority in the Middle East, but because of state power, they have been able to receive patronage and support. In British India, the Muslims were a minority. Let us, therefore, be thankful and pay tribute to the leader who achieved this.

The writer has authored and edited books on M .A. Jinnah.
DAWN