UR’S ADVICE FOR PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF
MENCIUS MOLDBUG · NOVEMBER 9, 2007
Since it’s never nice to criticize without offering positive suggestions, here’s what I’d do if I were President Musharraf.
One, abolish the Pakistani constitution. Don’t suspend it—abolish it.
I am not a Pakistani. Nor am I closely familiar with events in Pakistan. But it strikes me, just on a casual perusal of the papers, that if your constitution were a nuclear reactor, it would be Chernobyl. If it was a bassist, it would be Sid Vicious. If it was a ship, it would be the Edmund Fitzgerald. Etc., etc., etc. While a leaky reactor, a homicidal rhythm section, or an overloaded ore carrier are not exactly things you want in your living room, each one beats the
hell out of a malfunctioning constitution.
And do you really want to go in there with a wrench? Just toss the thing. History is littered with discarded failed constitutions. The failure of the Pakistani constitution does not reflect in any way on the residents of Pakistan. It reflects on whoever wrote the Pakistani constitution. In fact, it doesn’t even reflect on them. It’s an engineering failure. It happens.
Two, abolish politics in Pakistan. Politicized democracy in the Indian subcontinent has failed. Its record is murderous at worst, criminal on average, and disgraceful at best. Your present enemies are not in any way, shape or form atypical. Except of course that the Soros people have done so much for their PR.
Here is how to abolish politics: involuntarily retire all Pakistani judges, journalists and editors, teachers and professors, NGO employees, and politicians. Pardon them fully and unconditionally for any crimes they may have committed. In fact, award them half-pay pensions for their service to Pakistan, which was counterproductive but often sincere.
Seize and permanently confiscate all media and publishing firms in Pakistan, all party buildings and funds, all private schools and universities, and all nongovernmental organizations. Abolish the parties permanently. Reorganize and rename the schools and universities, confining their mission to science and engineering. Import Western or Western-trained scientists and engineers, at competitive salaries, to bootstrap university departments. Put army officers in charge of the NGOs, and handle them case by case.
Invite any Pakistani entrepreneurs who feel sympathy with the old regime to join this purge. They can sell their companies to the Pakistani state for their full present market value. You can pay for this by printing money—cancelling the proceeds when you reprivatize the company will equalize the inflationary balance. Let anyone who is considering selling know, however, that the offer will not be repeated.
Three, expel all Western official journalists, and imprison or expel (their choice) the stringers. Make any contact with the Western official press illegal.
Pakistan is a modern, civilized country. Or at least many parts of it are. It is not North Korea, it cannot be turned into North Korea, and it should not be turned into North Korea. Pakistan cannot be made opaque to the West.
However, the West can be compelled to get all its news from Pakistan via the Internet. There will be both pro-military and anti-military Pakistani bloggers. Some of them may even be the journalists you have just retired. This is totally fine and normal.
Except inasmuch as they are directly organizing violence, demonstrations, rioting, etc., do not interfere in any way, shape or form with bloggers. Censorship is difficult to reverse, because when you lift a system of censorship, you look weak. And when you impose censorship, you also look weak. So you get it both ways, as we say in San Francisco.
In fact, it might be a good idea to run official contests for the best supportive, neutral, and dissident blogs, using independent judges and awarding fat prizes. Your goal is to create a situation where anti-government intellectuals have nothing to complain about except the fact that they are not in charge of the government—and in which this fact has no conceivable prospect of changing.
Once this is achieved, your enemies can blog up any kind of storm, without threatening the state in the slightest. As Bismarck put it: “they say what they want. I do what I want.” This was probably not really true for Bismarck. But there’s no reason you can’t make it true for you.
Four, declare independence from the West. Starting now, politely decline all aid, military or financial, from any Western country. You won’t be able to buy Western-quality arms or parts anywhere, but you can get stuff almost as good from Russia and China.
Follow Putin’s lead in prohibiting any financial traffic or organizational affiliation between any Pakistani organization and any non-Pakistani, except of course for genuine commercial or financial links. The NGOs are your enemy. There is no way to buy them off. It’s them or you.
Five, announce that you will respond to any invasion of Pakistan with a nuclear strike on Delhi. This is known to be within your plausible power. It is sufficient to deter the West. And it will not strike Westerners as aggressive, except possibly toward India.
Make peace with India by unconditionally accepting the status-quo Line of Control in Kashmir as the permanent international border. Open talks on the technical details of normalization.
For your new nuclear posture, your objective is defense against any adversary with stronger conventional and nuclear forces. Declare that your standard response to any sustained infringement of Pakistani sovereignty will be to destroy one foreign city, perhaps Delhi although anything big will do, then surrender unconditionally.
The key to this strategy is that it is plausible—an attacker has no good reason to doubt that you will follow through. The goal is not to win a war, but to prevent one from happening. The adversary has to decide which he prefers: (a) the status quo, or (b) the status quo, plus ownership of Pakistan—but assuming the destruction of one city. Ideally his own, but any hostage will do.
In my humble opinion, as long as Pakistan is not itself behaving aggressively, there is no superpower on earth today that would even consider considering (b). Perhaps such a power is conceivable. But it is hard to conceive, given how demented its rulers would have to be.
Six, crush the Islamists. Give any armed organization on Pakistani territory thirty days to disarm and surrender, flee the country, or be destroyed by the Pakistani Army. You are equally amenable to all of these options. Offer unconditional amnesty to all rebels who surrender within this period.
Require all Islamic schools to register, and all Islamic teachers and scholars to be licensed, by the State. Prohibit them from promoting violence. Pay them for their good work.
Fortify the border with Afghanistan, sealing it except for border posts, until further notice. The Americans will be really pissed at you for a while, but they are not utterly stupid, and they will be happy with the results. Suggest that the Americans add their own layer of fence, so the border will be double-sealed, and allow them to do this with Pakistani labor if needed. There is no good reason to allow informal pedestrian traffic across the Durand Line.
Seven, for extra credit, declare that the future of Pakistan looks like Dubai, only better. Not all Pakistanis have been to Dubai, but they pretty much all get the idea.
You can get a leg up on Dubai by converting Pakistan into the world’s first
sovereign corporate republic. An SCR is a little like the monarchist structure used in the UAE, except that it works even better. It’s a government design that should be at least as efficient as any modern Western corporation. It is designed to be invulnerable to any kind of systematic corruption. While the thing has never been tried and its success may be debatable, the SCR design certainly scales much better than the old medieval family-business approach.
In my humble opinion, a Pakistani SCR will make Dubai look backward. Your goal should be nothing less than a new equivalent of the Mughal period. Westerner tourists should be astonished and envious when they see Pakistan, as they already are in Dubai. Except more. The region now Pakistan was once one of the jewels of the world. It can become one again.
Any Pakistani SCR must start with a single initial owner: the Pakistani army. At present, this is unavoidable, because the army holds all physical power in the country. Formal and informal power should always be identical. However, military rule is not a desirable structure over the long term—not for the military, and not for anyone else.
Therefore, the army should convey ownership of the Pakistani corporate republic to its own officers (active and retired) and soldiers, distributing shares by rank and seniority. Whatever this distribution, it must be final—there are no further automatic dilutions. All new hires are just employees, whatever their rank.
A state, like any organization, is stable and efficient when those who own it are those who control it. However, this does not mean the owners and the employees must be the same people. If agent (employee) and principal (owner) can separate, the state will be much more stable and much more efficient. Owners need not even be residents of Pakistan, although this restriction should be retained for the foreseeable future—the twentieth century is not dead yet.
But in principle, any geographical pattern of residency among sovereign owners is undesirable. For maximum stability in a corporate republic, shareholders should be distributed around the financial world. Thus, there is no method by which a subset of shareholders can benefit themselves, and only themselves, by using their voting power to induce the republic’s managers to mismanage it in a way that produces selective profit.
Selective profit exists whenever a corporation’s dividends are not distributed formally and equally among its shares. Selective profit is always and in every case corruption. If a company favors one subset of shareholders, or of creditors in general, in any way not contractually specified, it is corrupt. ( The other general form of corporate corruption is agency profit, in which employees abuse their power of agency to skim off cream which should be going to the principals. Agency profit in governments is much better understood.)
Since selective and agency profit are generally (contrary to popular belief) rare in the Western corporate world, they should be equally easy to defeat in a sovereign corporate republic. Pakistan today has a reputation for corruption. In an SCR, this reputation will adhere to its proper target—the old constitution. The goal of any newly established SCR is to move to #1 on international transparency rankings, and stay there.
Eight, for serious extra credit, create at least one special economic zone whose currency of both exchange and accounting is gold. You may be surprised at how many people this annoys, and how much it annoys them. You may also be surprised at how profitable it will be for Pakistan.
To be precise, a 21st-century gold standard implies a 100%-reserve banking system run on the principles of
Austrian economics, with strict maturity matching on all loans of any kind. This is not unlike certain interpretations of Islamic finance, and perhaps the point could be finessed.
Transitioning from a fiat currency to a gold standard is tricky. It’s not unlike landing a plane. There are many ways to do it wrong, and one way to do it right. However, once the problem is solved correctly, it remains solved indefinitely.
And, at least if the Austrian analysis is correct, it is very clear that the first sovereign state to succeed in the transition will have at least the option of becoming the new financial capital of the world, as London was in the 19th century and New York for most of the 20th. You might want to talk to
Benn Steil—I bet he has some ideas for how to pull it off.
(Update: please see the comment thread. There are many interesting discussions. I promise that I will actually answer questions in a reasonably prompt and diligent manner!)
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MUSHARRAF’S REBELLION, OR: HOW TO READ A NEWSPAPER
MENCIUS MOLDBUG · NOVEMBER 8, 2007
Sometimes history just serves you up really juicy examples.
Days when the papers are this easy to read are rare. They are not complex and must be drunk young, like a Beaujolais. In Campagna they say a mozzarella di bufala is over the hill after sunset on the day it’s made—and some say afternoon. I suspect this post will be obsolete at most within the next month. But it might be tomorrow.
But with that caveat: today there are a couple of cute articles about Pakistan in the WSJ.
These articles don’t actually tell us what’s going on in Pakistan. In fact, they are active, if quite unconscious, attempts to mislead us about what’s going on in Pakistan.
But this is just the art of reading a newspaper. The newspaper’s adaptive goal is to persuade its readers, who include you, to adopt some perspective on the subject of Pakistan. Without in any way adopting, or even considering, this perspective—frankly, why should it be worth considering?—we can understand Pakistan by understanding the effect that the text is designed to have on its unwary reader. Of course we also need to know who wrote it, and why.
And first, we need some background about what’s going on in Pakistan.
There are three factions fighting for power in Pakistan today: the Islamists, the civilists, and the army. The Islamists are too well-known to describe. The civilists are basically the Soros people, the “civil society” types, lawyers, judges, journalists and politicians. The army is the Pakistani military: Musharraf and his people.
The basic plot of the story is that Musharraf is rebelling against Washcorp. His motivation for taking this step is that he believes that if he doesn’t, he will end up either exiled, dead or in prison. In my opinion, this perception is accurate.
These events are taking place now because of the weakening of the Pentagon and White House faction, the neoconservative defense hawks, who have controlled the US military since 2001. This weakening is a natural consequence of the fact that the Bush administration is timing out, a normal structural phenomenon in Washcorp power politics.
Neocons are really best described as retro-Universalists. Their great dream is to try to restore a kind of faded 1950s vision of Universalism. There is no possibility of success in this effort. But they certainly can keep themselves employed by trying.
As for their neo-Universalist adversaries, the
Polygon proper, there must be some avian mascot that fits the bill. But it is certainly no member of the pigeon family. I have a pair of semi-tame ravens that come regularly to my deck for peanuts, which I’ve taught them to catch in the air. I think the Polygon’s bird has to be some kind of corvid—the only real question is whether it’s a bluejay, a crow, or a raven. For now I’ll stick with the last.
When the hawks were strong, they could afford to protect Musharraf. Weak, they forced to sacrifice him. Thus the neoconservative near-unanimity on the subject, with only a few dissenters. Many neocons can still stomach ol’ Mushy, but they are politically unable to afford to avoid attaching their John Hancock to a demand for elections within three months.
While this is a ludicrous demand, it creates a point of bipartisan unanimity within Washcorp, and all major players in the postwar period automatically defer to any unanimous demand of Washcorp—whose internal structure they understand far better than the average Plainlander.
(For example, if you read the
Tiananmen Papers, which narrate the decisions of the leaders of China during the Tiananmen Square incident—there is
some debate over the authenticity of these documents, but if they are not real they are a very convincing fiction—the Chinese Politburo and Elders receive and read not a daily summary of State Department communiques, not of Pentagon press releases, not of White House statements, but of the Western press. And access, as they always say, is power. The modern official press is a coordination signal orders of magnitude more reliable than any other diplomatic channel.)
In any case, the Pakistani army is primarily aligned with the Washcorp hawks, and the Pakistani civilists are primarily aligned with the Washcorp ravens. The Islamists, of course, have no alliance with any Washcorp faction. At least, no
direct alliance.
Therefore, the events in Pakistan follow the usual pattern of Western colonial proxy wars. The two factions struggling for power within Washcorp nurture and support corresponding Pakistani factions. The provincial struggle is often a bit more rowdy. But it exists solely because of the invisible power struggles within the Beltway. We can therefore use events in Pakistan as a sort of amplifier to help us observe the delicate game in Washington. (Think of it as a sort of Beltwology.)
In terms of Pakistani politics alone, however, the structure of the conflict is simple. The army is side A, presently dominant. The civilists and Islamists are side B, presently subordinate.
(Yes, I am aware that this is not the conflict as we normally hear it described. That’s kind of the point. As usual, the only way to test an alternate analysis is to simply adopt it, at least rhetorically, work within its context for a while and see how generally true it rings.)
If side A loses, it can only lose decisively. After all, it’s the army. The resulting fight will be between the civilists and Islamists. The Islamists will win with a first-round knockout, the civilists and the top rung of the officer corps will end up exiled, dead or in prison, and the rest of the army will be subordinated. The Islamist-army alliance of the ’80s will be re-established, probably in a more virulent form, and Pakistan will become an open ally of Iran.
If side A wins decisively, the Islamists and civilists will end up exiled, dead, politically irrelevant or in prison. If side A wins weakly, the outcome is effectively a draw (as the IRA used to say, “we only have to be lucky once”), the conflict will continue in its present state indefinitely, and Pakistan will remain unstable. The army has been forced to roll the dice, however, because of its weakening as the result of trends within Washcorp.
Obviously, the outcome I prefer is the middle: decisive victory for side A. If you disagree with this result, either you do not agree with the decision analysis, or your position is objectively hostile to Pakistan. (Which is totally fine, by the way. Not everyone has to be friends.)
Note that there are no pleasant outcomes for the civilists in this decision tree. This is normal for those who accept the role of shills, puppets and collaborators. Quislings can always be found. The ugly fact is that the civilist movement in Pakistan is basically a criminal mafia. Or, more precisely, a consortium of several criminal mafias. It is fundamentally corrupt and utterly irredeemable. I’m quite confident in saying that nothing good will ever come of it.
For example, read
this article by one
Jemima Khan about Ms. Bhutto.
Now isn’t that interesting? Who does that make you think of? Well, obviously, one name looms large:
Michael Corleone. But for anyone who’s seen
The Departed, as I just did (I’m afraid this is what I’m supposed to say, but
Infernal Affairs really was much better), there is another figure:
Whitey Bulger. Jack Nicholson’s character in
The Departed is an obvious impression of the notorious Mr. Bulger.
But wait—who is Jemima Khan? How do you get a name like “Jemima Khan,” anyway? For those too busy to follow the links, Jemima Khan is a British socialite who happens to be married to cricket star and Pakistani politician Imran Khan. Who happens to have been arrested the other day. One suspects Jemima does not approve. But one also suspects that her motivation for informing Telegraph readers about the true nature of Ms. Bhutto and her “party” is slightly less than altruistic. It’s not a rose garden out there, kids.
We are now prepared to read the
first piece in the WSJ—an op-ed by one
Husain Haqqani.
It’s important to note that the back two pages of the A section of the WSJ are composed by an entirely separate organization from the rest of the paper. Call them WSJr and WSJl. WSJr is a reliable indicator of official neoconservative doctrine, inasmuch as any such thing exists. WSJl is one of the most orthodox Universalist newsrooms in Washcorp. The fact that the two are sending more or less the same message makes the Pakistan situation unusually easy to understand. Which is why it’s so like a good Beaujolais.
Anyway, Mr. Haqqani is, as a little note at the end of the piece informs us:
director of Boston University’s Center for International Relations and the author of “Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). He also has served as adviser to several Pakistani prime ministers, including Ms. Bhutto.
This is a ripe, rich turd in a suit. A mob lawyer, an abettor of thieves, a peddler of lies. In a decent world, this man would be in prison. Here are
his words, in WSJr, 11/8/2007. The whole piece is priceless, and I have quoted it all.
Pakistanis Say NoBy HUSAIN HAQQANINovember 8, 2007; Page A23
When Gen. Pervez Musharraf suspended Pakistan’s Constitution, declared a state of emergency and put the nation once again under martial law, he expected limited civilian resistance and only ritual international condemnation, in view of his role in the war against terrorism. On both counts, Mr. Musharraf appears to have badly miscalculated.
Translation:
You’ve fucked with the wrong people. Now, we’re going to **** you.
(Note also how Haqqani declines to use General Musharraf’s title. I’m not sure of the Pakistani military etiquette on this. Perhaps it’s not quite as serious as pissing on his mother’s grave.)
More Haqqani:
Pakistan’s burgeoning civil society, led by lawyers and encouraged by judges ousted from the Supreme Court, is refusing to be cowed.
Translation:
Your time is over, you little Pentagon poodle. Quit while you still can.
Haqqani:
Protests are spreading despite thousands of arrests and the use of tear gas and batons against peaceful demonstrators.
Translation:
Your pathetic “policemen” will never dare to resist our vast rent-a-mobs. They don’t even have the guts to shoot—let alone keep shooting.
Haqqani:
More than 1,700 attorneys have been jailed but still more are taking to the streets. University students have joined the lawyers, and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has vowed to violate a ban on public meetings by leading a rally on Friday.
Translation:
Look—Rupert Murdoch has donated the top of his op-ed page to help us whip our mobs into a frenzy of lawless street violence. You have no chance, buster. None.
Haqqani:
There are a number of important reasons why Pakistan’s attorneys are leading the protests against Mr. Musharraf. They have a long tradition of activism for rule of law and human-rights issues. In 1968–69, the lawyers started the campaign that resulted in the ouster of Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan. They also were at the forefront of the campaign against Mr. Zia-ul-Haq, whose 11-year military rule ended when he died in a 1988 plane crash.
Translation:
Our trained lawyers have been scheming for power since you were in short pants. They’re pretty good at it now. Isn’t it time you clicked over to Orbitz.com? Flights out of Islamabad are pretty crowded this time of year.
Haqqani:
The legal fraternity has another advantage, in that they can afford to confront the government without fearing starvation for their families. Some 65 million of Pakistan’s 160 million people subsist on less than $1 a day, while another 65 million survive just above the poverty line. The poor are willing to participate in organized rallies, such as the one that welcomed Ms. Bhutto back to Pakistan on Oct. 18 (and was targeted by a suicide terrorist), but they generally avoid protest demonstrations where getting arrested and missing work is almost inevitable.
Translation:
Our lawyers are already fat with graft. They can do this all day, every day, for as long as you’re willing to sit on the pot. But if we start to get bored, maybe we’ll call out the real mobs.
Haqqani:
That could change in the days and weeks to come. Although Mr. Musharraf has taken all private and international television channels off the air, images of the protests are being seen all over Pakistan through the Internet and with satellite dishes. Middle-class Pakistanis, and increasingly the poor, are making it clear that they want political freedom, along with an improvement in their economic prospects, and do not consider prosperity and democracy to be mutually exclusive.
Translation:
And we don’t want to have to go that far, now, do we? Try reading my lips, bro. I’m not sure we’re really connecting here.
Haqqani:
The international community has also responded more strongly than Mr. Musharraf expected. The Netherlands has suspended aid, and several donors are reviewing their policy on military and economic assistance. The Bush administration is hoping to defuse the situation through assertive diplomacy. But withdrawal of aid, supported by several congressional leaders, remains a possibility.
Translation:
The New York mob is 100% with us. The Washington people are leaning our way. **** with the bull—get a horn in the ***.
Haqqani:
Since 9/11, Mr. Musharraf has positioned himself as the key Western ally in the global war against terrorism.
Translation:
This part of my message is for the Pentagon.
Haqqani:
But in recent months, he has been too distracted with domestic politics to play an effective role.
Translation:
We can neutralize Musharraf completely. You will never get anywhere with him.
Haqqani:
The more he has to repress critics and political opponents, the less Pakistan will be able to fight terrorism. After all, when troops have to be deployed to detain Supreme Court judges, journalists, lawyers and politicians, there are fewer troops available to fight terrorists. Pakistan’s intelligence services can either spy on dissenting Pakistani civilians or focus their energies on finding Osama bin Laden and his ever increasing number of deputies and operatives around Pakistan.
Translation:
We’re so tight with State, we can piss on your boots and tell you it’s raining.
Haqqani:
But Pakistan needs to fight terrorism for Pakistan’s sake. Mr. Musharraf cannot endlessly blackmail Washington by hinting that he would withdraw antiterror cooperation if the U.S. pressures him on other issues, including democracy and human-rights violations.
Translation:
Besides—you think you’re using Musharraf. But it’s the other way around.
Haqqani:
One thing is clear: Mr. Musharraf’s authoritarianism is being challenged by diverse elements in Pakistani society.
Translation:
We have two Mexicans, a spade, and a tranny who calls herself “Marquetta.” She can shoot the asshole out of a sparrow at fifty meters. But she says she likes you. Don’t make her have to change her mind.
Haqqani:
His self-cultivated image as a benign dictator is a thing of the past, and his recent harsh measures have failed to frighten Pakistan’s civil society and political opposition into submission.
Translation:
Have I mentioned yet that you’re DOOMED?
Haqqani:
The defiance of the judiciary and the media might not immediately topple Mr. Musharraf, but it could render him ineffective to a point where the military rethinks its options. The army will soon recognize that the only thing keeping the general and his civilian cronies in power is the army’s support. It risks further alienating the Pakistani people and losing their respect as long as it continues to act solely in the interests of Mr. Musharraf and his small band of political allies. At some point, the professional soldiers will wonder whether they should risk their institution’s position to keep him in power.
The army is Mr. Musharraf’s support base. It is a major beneficiary of U.S. security assistance, having received $17 billion since 1954 with equipment worth several hundred million dollars currently in the pipeline. Since 2002, the U.S. has subsidized the Pakistani army to the tune of $150 million per month. The army is also a stakeholder in Pakistan’s growing economy, which benefits from international aid and investment. If Mr. Musharraf’s autocratic policies threaten Pakistan’s prosperity, the army is likely to be less unanimous in its support of its commander.
Translation:
Perhaps you’re not ready to hear it yet. But maybe your people are. Are you sure they’re all still loyal? Anyone can read the writing on the wall, old man.
Haqqani:
Already, there are signs of economic fallout from the political turmoil. Rumors of an anti-Musharraf military coup on Monday caused the biggest one-day decline in 16 months on the Karachi Stock Exchange, resulting in losses of an estimated $1.3 billion. Pakistan’s credit rating has been revised downward in anticipation of further civic unrest and international sanctions.
Translation:
Our guys are lawyers—they can always find work. We don’t care if we have to destroy the economy. But perhaps someone on your side does. Are you counting on him? I wouldn’t be so fast, old chap.
Haqqani:
Pakistanis are used to coups d’état where the army takes the helm of government. Things are different this time. In the past, generals have suspended the constitution to remove from power unpopular rulers, usually weakened civilians rightly or wrongly accused of corruption (as was the case when Mr. Musharraf ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1999).
Translation:
I’m too smart to say whether Nawaz Sharif was corrupt or not. After all, you never know. The future can hold anything.
Haqqani:
This is the first time an unpopular military ruler has suspended the constitution to preserve his own rule. In doing so, Mr. Musharraf has clearly overplayed his hand.
Translation:
You started it. But now, we’re going to end this crap one way or another.
Haqqani:
Mr. Musharraf cannot blame a civilian predecessor for bringing the country to the brink. If there is internal chaos in Pakistan today, it is of the general’s making. After all, it was his arbitrary decision to remove Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry in March that initiated the political crisis which has led to the current “state of emergency.”
Translation:
And your boots are still getting wet. How dare you resist us? How dare you?
Haqqani:
Justice Chaudhry, on the other hand, has become a symbol of resistance to arbitrary rule—the man who refused to roll over and disappear, unlike earlier judges who cooperated with military rulers or simply went home when their conscience dictated otherwise. Justice Chaudhry’s call upon the legal fraternity to “Go to every corner of Pakistan and give the message that this is the time to sacrifice” for the supremacy of Pakistan’s Constitution has drawn elements disillusioned with existing political leaders to anti-Musharraf protests.
Translation:
Article 37 of the Pakistani Constitution specifically states that all disputes shall be resolved by mob violence. Cut it out with this martial-law shit. If you have people, let’s see ’em. If not, why the **** are you still here?
Haqqani:
Among Pakistani political leaders, Ms. Bhutto has emerged as the viable civilian alternative to Mr. Musharraf, with public support at home and acceptance abroad. As the only politician in Pakistan to publicly describe Islamist extremism and terrorism as the principal threat to the nation, Ms. Bhutto was initially measured in her response to Mr. Musharraf’s reckless actions. She demanded that he restore the constitution and call elections as scheduled.
Translation:
Look—Pinkie has been very patient with you.
Haqqani:
She demanded that he restore the constitution and call elections as scheduled. She hoped to change his attitude with the threat of putting hundreds of thousands of supporters in the streets, without actually doing so. But Mr. Musharraf’s stubbornness is changing that position.
Translation:
But she’s starting to get a little fed up.
Haqqani:
Like many in the U.S., Ms. Bhutto appears worried about directing attention away from fighting terrorism and destabilizing Pakistan further. But leaving the anti-Musharraf campaign leaderless is not an option. She has positioned herself as an opposition leader who represents the sentiment of the people, but is also willing to accept a negotiated settlement that restores the constitution, ends persecution, and results in free and fair elections leading to full civilian rule.
Translation:
As you see, Pinkie is prepared to be quite reasonable.
Haqqani:
So far Mr. Musharraf has shown no inclination to negotiate in good faith with Ms. Bhutto or the international community. With each passing day, the Bush administration’s hopes—that with its help there could be a transition to democracy in Pakistan with a continuing role for Mr. Musharraf—are diminishing. Unless Mr. Musharraf changes course quickly, the U.S. will be compelled to start looking beyond him to a more legitimate leader.
Translation:
Perhaps you should be reasonable as well.
Haqqani:
Mr. Musharraf seems determined to put his own political survival before the rule of law—actions that warrant the label dictator. Pakistan’s attorneys, and increasingly the rest of its citizenry, seem equally determined to prevent this from happening.
Translation:
In summary: JOIN US OR DIE!
Thanks, I’m all done here. A big hand to Rupert for helping make this message possible. Mr. Murdoch, you’ve come a long way in your efforts to avoid the fate of Lord Black. And to all the good folks at Washcorp: remember, we’re on your side.
And that’s the entire article.
Anyway. I don’t mean to be too flippant here. This is obviously a serious business. But if Marx was right about anything, he was right about history and farce.
Now, here’s another article. Same day, same paper, but this one is on the bottom of the front page—WSJl, as it were. This is hard news.
Failed Courtship of WarlordTrips Up U.S. in AfghanistanEager for Allies, ArmyTries Turning Insurgents;Chaos Embroils PakistanBy JAY SOLOMONNovember 8, 2007; Page A1
I have no idea who “Jay Solomon” is. But does it matter?
Not at all. Perhaps you have seen
All the President’s Men and you think the life of the elite Washington journalist is all about diving through dumpsters and making secret rendezvous with anonymous informants in scruffy phonebooths. I’m afraid this is not how it is.
If you are someone who can get his articles on the front page of the WSJ, as many prewritten stories as you could possibly ask for will show up in your email every day. These are not even press releases. They are messages directly to you. But if you don’t print them or if you screw them up in some way, they will stop coming and you will fall off the front page. The task, however, is basically the normal journalist’s task of rewriting official information dumps, to make them seem as if they were written by an intelligent person with judgment and character.
This one, as we’ll see, is obviously from the State Department.
The U.S. is struggling to find tribal allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan as it tries to beat back the resurgence of al Qaeda and the Taliban.
I hate to break it to you, kids. But when you’re winning, the allies struggle to find you.
In alienating a powerful warlord named Jalaluddin Haqqani a few years ago, however, some U.S. and Afghan officials argue the Americans may have shot themselves in the foot.
Okay, here is the money. First, note the sourcing. Clearly “officials” means State and/or CIA. In case you’ve been in a cave for the last 30 years, these two are like
this these days.
Second, note the reason Mr. Haqqani (I’m sure the coincidence of name is, um, coincidental) is fighting. He is fighting for
emotional reasons. He is obviously a deeply troubled young man who only needs time and peace to heal.
This is absolutely typical of the rhetoric of these stupid little wars. To the hawks, our enemies fight because they hate us. They will always hate us, so they must be destroyed. To the ravens, our enemies fight because they hate us. Their hearts have been hardened by our callous and cruel treatment, but with enough hugs and candy they can be made to love us again.
Do I need to tell you how insane both these attitudes are? They are both perfect examples of Conquest’s three laws. And they are exactly the reason I support a complete shutdown of US foreign policy, with no exceptions at all, dissolving State completely and folding Defense into Homeland Security. Perhaps we can rename it “National Security.”
Anyway, more:
Mr. Haqqani is now one of the major rebel leaders roiling Afghanistan. But back in autumn 2002, he secretly sent word that he could ally with the new U.S.-friendly Afghan government. The warlord had once been a partner of the Central Intelligence Agency, and later closely collaborated with Osama bin Laden and the ruling Taliban. CIA officers held talks with his brother, Ibrahim, and made plans to meet with Mr. Haqqani, who was leading some of the Taliban’s troops.
But U.S. military forces operating separately from the CIA arrested Ibrahim—cutting off the talks and entrenching his brother as a nemesis. Mr. Haqqani is still fighting U.S. troops along the Pakistan border. “We blew our chance,” contends one of the CIA officers involved who had worked with Mr. Haqqani in the 1980s. “I truly believe he could have been on our side.”
Just like Uncle Ho! I’m telling you, man. History as farce.
Other senior officials in the CIA and Pentagon are less certain.
We’ll quote anyone. But the ledes go only to our real friends.
But Washington’s aborted courtship of Mr. Haqqani epitomizes the conflicts and calculations that are complicating U.S. involvement in the region.
Sometimes I like to just say nothing at all.
The war in Afghanistan is a major factor in the chaos unfolding in neighboring Pakistan. A spreading Islamic insurgency inside Pakistan is one reason Gen. Pervez Musharraf cited Saturday when he declared emergency rule, though the opposition contends the move was more about extending his stay in power. Militants in Pakistan’s tribal belt are suspected of fighting in both countries, dramatically widening the conflict from the days that it was largely confined to Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, some officials report that bears are shitting in the woods.
With U.S. intelligence officials concerned that al Qaeda is using Pakistan as a base to plot new attacks in Afghanistan and elsewhere, winning back tribal leaders like Mr. Haqqani—or eradicating those who refuse to be wooed—has climbed to the top of Washington’s strategic agenda. The State Department recently pledged $750 million in new aid to Pakistan’s border regions, hoping to use economic development and education to peel local leaders away from al Qaeda and militants such as Mr. Haqqani.
Whoa! Okay, let’s stop right here. I don’t think we need to quote any more of this article.
Question: “Who controls Pakistan’s border regions?”
Answer: “The Taliban.”
Question: “So when State sends $750 million to Pakistan’s border regions, who are they sending $750 million to?”
Answer: “What are you, anyway? Some kind of a neo-McCarthyist?”
In other words, here is what Washcorp is up to in Pakistan. This is its favorite trick. It does this all the time. It just needs to make sure you don’t see the aces in its sleeves.
Washcorp is fighting a war against itself. Through one arm, it is funding the Taliban. Through another arm, American soldiers are fighting the Taliban. If you think this is the first time this sort of thing has happened, perhaps you need to think about switching your history provider.
The delusional belief that allows Washington to fight a war against itself, without State and Defense actually coming to actual fisticuffs in the National Security Council, is that you can pay people to love you. The folks over at State genuinely believe that the Pashtun tribes can be bought off. If not $750 million, how about a cool 1.5 bil? What’s 1.5 billion when we’re talking about peace? Besides, it’s not really our money, anyway.
Meanwhile, up in Peshawar, they’re not exactly stupid. They’re perfectly aware that they are being paid to fight the Pentagon, just as they were paid to fight the Soviets. New century, new evil empire, same difference. “After all, if we stopped fighting, wouldn’t State just stop paying? The more we fight, the more we seem to get paid. Funny how that works. Why, it’s almost like having an actual job!”
The same exact thing is going on with Bhutto and her cronies. And even with Musharraf.
Après moi, le déluge ! If Musharraf actually destroys the Islamists, his cash pipeline from Arlington will dry up. “Sorry, old chap, Ben’s having a little trouble with the printer. He’s out in his helicopter today, anyway. Something about ‘jumbo loans?’ But we’ll call you just as soon as he gets back. Cheerio!”
But at least Musharraf is actually capable of fighting the Islamists. Whereas Bhutto’s only solution is to pay them, pay them and pay them again. She will smother those poor, broken, mistreated men with her warm, wise Cambridge-educated love. And surely they will love her, and us, etc., etc., etc. If there are any remaining disputes, perhaps the United Nations can settle it. Wouldn’t it be nice if the United Nations could trust America again?
This is the entire pattern of Washcorp’s foreign relations for the last 65 years. At least. It’s a sort of MySpace diplomacy, with buckets of cash. The entire point is to pay people, typically extremely sordid and nasty people, to let us be their “friend.” And look! How many friends America has. Conquest’s third law, dear reader, I rest my case.
Meanwhile, the poor bastards in the US military are fighting against suicide bombers whose wallets are stuffed to the gills with their own tax dollars. We’re raining so much money on northern Pakistan, you probably can’t get a latte in Peshawar for less than $20.
(Couldn’t we at least mark the bills, so we can see where it’s going? I mean, when you send $750M to the North-West Frontier Provinces, how do you do it? Do you send in Ben Bernanke, in a heavily armored Apache, and have him dumping bales from the tailgunner’s seat? Or do you just write a check to Mullah Omar? If so, where does he bank?)
Of course, Mullah Omar is happy to take cash. Even dollars! And he’s certainly not afraid of all the lawyers in Pakistan. What are they going to do, sue him? I am not an expert in the Quran, but somehow I don’t think it says anything about “batons and tear gas.”
So it’s fairly clear what we can expect if Musharraf loses and Bhutto wins: Khomeini 2.0, with nukes and ICBMs. Hey, it worked for Carter. Perhaps Condoleeza Rice will get the Nobel. Or Rice and al-Zawahiri? Could they be meeting already?
Anyway. Enough of this mockery. The bottom line, in my deeply humble and quite sincere opinion, is that it’s time for an independent Pakistan.
In case you’re not familiar with this word “independent,” let me go through its etymology. It starts with “in,” which oddly enough is a kind of Latin word for “not.” Then the second part is this “dependent” bit. I’m not quite sure what that means. But the whole construct would seem to imply that Pakistan, or the Pakistani government, or someone, is not, in some way, dependent.
On, I don’t know, anyone else. Like, as in, it can do whatever it wants. And nobody will cut its allowance. And nobody will raise its allowance. Because it has no allowance. And if it decides that the best way to handle a mob of lawyers is a couple of bored sergeants and a
Dushka, nobody who’s not actually within at most a thousand kilometers of Rawalpindi has any reason to care. Not even the Wall Street Journal. Unless it’s, like, a slow news day or something.
(Thanks to reader ZK, who may or may not endorse the result, for much useful background.)
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https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2007/11/musharrafs-rebellion-or-how-to-read/
BENAZIR BHUTTO: MOB HIT IN PAKISTAN
MENCIUS MOLDBUG · DECEMBER 27, 2007
Iusually avoid mentioning current events. It attracts too many readers. However, Benazir Bhutto has just been
whacked in Pakistan, and since I have
discussed Pakistan in
the past, I thought I’d say a few words.
Memo to Washington: this is what happens when you let the Times run your foreign policy.
According to some early reports, which may of course be wrong, Ms. Bhutto was actually assassinated
twice. First she was shot in the head by a sniper, and then a little later her whole entourage was blown up by a suicide bomber. You can’t say these people aren’t thorough. Of course, using multiple assassins isn’t exactly a
new idea, but it’s always impressive when more than one gets through. You might say it sends something of a message.
Who whacked Benazir Bhutto? And why? Obviously, I have no idea at all. (All rumors that I, or the select group of international arms executives, oil sheiks and gold speculators I advise, are involved in any clandestine activities, are unsubstantiated.*)
Let me start, however, by explaining the power dynamics of Pakistan. You probably already know this and if you don’t I discussed it earlier, but it is certainly worth refreshing.
Political power in Pakistan is shared among a huge variety of parties, gangs, cliques, alliances, mafias, liberation fronts, Islamic sects, human-rights groups, military units, and the like. All of them have one goal: to maximize their capture of the economic production of the
Indus River basin. You may think of this area as a shithole, and it would be going too far to say that you are utterly wrong, but it is also a traditionally prosperous and influential region. It continues to be inhabited by many productive and civilized individuals. And anyone who owns or commands any share in its government or revenue can become almost arbitrarily wealthy.
At the risk of oversimplifying, the Pakistani movements are presently aligned in three major factions. None of these factions has yet been able to defeat either of the others. However, each has its own vision of a Pakistan in which it prevails totally, and any of them could win.
The first and simplest faction is the
Pakistani military. Call it
PakMil. PakMil’s assets are a (relatively) cohesive command structure, military superiority in all conventional conflicts, and a fat-walleted, well-muscled Western patron in the US DoD.
In PakMil’s vision of the future, Pakistan looks a lot like Singapore or Dubai. It is a peaceful, wealthy country with strong internal order and as little politics as possible. PakMil retains many organizational traditions from the British Empire, which had it survived would surely have maintained the Indus River basin in just this manner.
Unfortunately, PakMil is the weakest faction in Pakistan. At least, I think it’s the least likely to win. PakMil’s problem is that its American patron is on the Republican side of the fence (i.e., it is a client of the
Red Empire), and historically this is not a stable position. Ask Ngo Dinh Diem, Ferdinand Marcos or Fulgencio Batista how well that one worked out. To be identified as a client of the Red Empire, a horrible dictatorship etc., and survive, your regime pretty much needs to be sitting on a trillion barrels of oil. Which PakMil ain’t. (See
my advice for PakMil, which I think is still pretty much valid.)
PakMil is of course losing strength because of the decline of the Bush Administration, which is now completely moribund and nonoperational. George W. Bush has about as much influence in Washington these days as the Pope. If not a little less. (Certainly less than Bono.)
The second faction in Pakistan, intermediate in power (i.e., probability of victory) is the Westernist faction: journalists, human-rights groups, lawyers, professors, and other well-heeled, well-educated mouth-flappers. Let’s call the Westernist polity
NGOstan.
In the vision of NGOstan, Pakistan turns into New Jersey. That is, it becomes a normal Third World country with a lot of corruption, but a government that is basically stable and secure, and has no significant enemies foreign or domestic. Such as, for example, India or Sri Lanka. While this state of affairs is by no means as profitable as the Dubai state of affairs, it still provides plenty of cash for all kinds of people. It also generates more government jobs, which is not an insignificant factor in that part of the world. (Or any part of the world.)
NGOstan is (or was) of course Bhutto’s faction. Its chief claim to fame is that it is sponsored by the Western establishment, i.e., the State Department, the Times, etc., etc. It is clean and sweet and true. At least, relatively clean and sweet and true.
Obviously, it is not a secret that Bhutto herself was a mob queen, at least that many of her associates were gangsters, but the Westernists had an easy solution for this. If they needed to come across as especially clean and sweet and true, they could just
condemn Bhutto as a mob queen. She was not offended, at least not unusually offended. You think she didn’t know she was a gangster? So, for example,
this article by
Jemima Khan did not terminate the membership of
Imran Khan as a leading capo in NGOstan. If Musharraf goes down, there will be plenty for everyone to eat.
The main disadvantage of the Westernists—as we’ve just seen—is that they have no significant military or paramilitary arm. They have loose connections to a wide variety of small-time gangsters, and they have a powerful base in the feudal Pakistani political parties. I’m sure Bhutto knew people who knew people who could get somebody whacked, but a really sustained campaign of terror and murder was just beyond her.
Since no one will ever be able to capture and hold Pakistan without some real muscle, the NGOstanis have only two options. One is to capture the military, the other to depend on the Islamists. Since they weren’t born yesterday, they work both angles. Obviously, this is a dangerous strategy, and obviously it has not worked out for the best.
Capturing and commanding PakMil is the only viable exit strategy for NGOstan. It is never a good idea to assume that powerful people are stupid, and I’m sure the human-rights groups recognize that if it’s them against the mullahs, the mullahs will kick their asses. We are talking about a country which is next door to
Iran, after all.
However, NGOstan needs the Islamists, because it cannot succeed without causing trouble, and the only people who can cause trouble in Pakistan are the Islamists. If there is no trouble in Pakistan, Pakistan gets no press in the West. People forget about it. And if Pakistan gets no press in the West, all of its human-rights groups and journalists and lawyers and other people who are good and clean and true might as well be on the dark side of Uranus for all the good their fancy Harvard and Oxford connections will do.
Obviously, the Islamists are our third faction. Call them Talibstan. There is very little to say about the Talibstanis, but my guess is that they will win in the end. Probably after an intermediate victory by the Westernists, exactly as in Iran.
The Islamists are the natural winners because, as today’s events proved, they are the baddest motherfuckers between the Hindu Kush, the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean. These niggaz make the Russian mob look like the Catholic Church. They are to the Crips as the Crips are to the Salvation Army. To MS-13 as MS-13 is to the Moose Lodge. We’re talking about some
stone cold thug killaz, and the smart money has to be on them.
The Islamists were suspicious of Bhutto because of the possibility that she might ally with Musharraf, and NGOstan and PakMil would get together and hunt them both down. Clearly, this is Washington’s official, bipartisan, centrist plan. It has little chance of working, because NGOstan has no incentive to eradicate Talibstan unless it attains full and permanent control over PakMil, and PakMil can frustrate this objective simply by refusing to fight Talibstan whenever civilian politicians seem to be gaining control over the Pakistani military.
But this alliance between State, Defense, Bhutto and Musharraf, while about as durable as a pile of eggs, was obviously serious enough to worry some people. And, as we’ve seen, these people are not exactly given to restraint. So Bhutto was walking a very delicate tightrope. She had to ride to power on the wave of Islamic terror. This is a very funky wave, full of logs, dead hogs and used tires, and you certainly don’t want to wipe out on it.
It’s essential to remember that within the Pakistani opposition to Musharraf, that there is no precise division between Westernist and Islamists. For example, Nawaz Sharif has ties to Westernist forces and ties to Islamist forces. There are people who have positioned themselves between Sharif and Bhutto, people who are between Sharif and Mullah Omar, etc., etc.
There is also a continuum between Musharraf and the Islamists, Musharraf and Bhutto, etc., etc. All of these allegiances can shift with the tides of fate. When affairs of state are decided by factions organized on the basis of opinion, opinions become remarkably flexible. This is not to say that there are no genuine convictions at all in Pakistan, but it is more or less impossible for an outside observer to distinguish them with any degree of confidence. What is very clear is that no two of the three groups can truly share power, and once one of them collapses either another will follow, or the conflict between the remaining two will become even more violent.
My guess is that Benazir Bhutto’s death makes some people in the Islamist movement happy, and some people unhappy. I suspect that the same can be said for the Pakistani military. Since these feelings are relatively private, you will probably not be able to read about them in the New York Times, or at UR for that matter. All will feign sadness. But some will be laughing, deep down inside. If you are under some illusion that modern politics, let alone modern Pakistani politics, is anything like a fit occupation for honorable gentlemen or ladies, I fear you are setting yourself up for nothing but disappointment.
When this whole idea of Bhutto returning to Pakistan started to crop up, I exchanged some emails on the subject with a friend of mine who is from Pakistan via Dubai. While my correspondent is 100% Westernized, his parents are not. And right up until Bhutto actually got off the plane, by his report, they were confident that no such thing could happen. Because the people at the State Department could not possibly be so stupid.
One interesting way to review these events is to read a series of articles on Pakistan that have appeared in the Times since my
first post on the crisis. I am not going to go into as much detail this time. I think the general concept ought to be clear.
First, on November 6, we have this op-ed by (or supposedly by) Bhutto herself,
Musharraf’s Martial Plan:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/opinion/07bhutto.html
In this piece, Pinkie, or at least Pinkie’s people, make the standard demands. Surrender or be crushed. Etc., etc. And they roll out the standard argument, which is that suspending habeas corpus is not only an
ineffective way to fight a civil war, but actually
counterproductive:
The United States can promote democracy—which is the only way to truly contain extremism and terrorism—by telling General Musharraf that it does not accept martial law, and that it expects him to conduct free, fair, impartial and internationally monitored elections within 60 days under a reconstituted election commission.
Tell it to
Seward’s little bell, kids. But no, Pinkie’s love for Pakistan is so great that she has no concern for her personal safety:
Very conveniently, the assassination attempt against me last month that resulted in the deaths of at least 140 people is being used as the rationale to stop the democratic process by which my party would most likely have swept parliamentary elections.
Ya think? In a best-case scenario, I imagine Benazir Bhutto as a sort of Pakistani Carmela Soprano, kind of semi-consciously turning a blind eye to
her husband’s profession. In that case, I suppose I should feel a little sympathy, and my real anger should be at the power brokers behind her pointless and astoundingly dangerous career as a political mafia queen.
Okay. So we move on to November 17, and this equally meretricious piece by David Rohde,
Envoy Elicits No New Promises. Note that this is not an op-ed or even “news analysis.” This here is hard news:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/17/world/asia/17cnd-pakistan.html
I am particularly fond of the detail that Ambassador Negroponte met with General Kaylani
alone. It’s sort of as if Little Carmine had dispatched Johnny Sack to meet privately with Paulie Walnuts. After which, Tony would have the privilege of a meeting with both of them.
I’m also enchanted with this sentence:
The move—which General Musharraf has said is an effort to curb terrorism—is widely seen by Pakistanis as an effort by the increasingly unpopular ruler to cling to power.
I am quite confident that whoever is the next leader of Pakistan, he or she will not be
clinging to power, like a rat on a floating board. Rather, I would like to think that Pakistan will experience a period of
actual political stability. Somehow, I’m not sure Mr. Rohde’s efforts (I momentarily mistyped his name, and started to wonder if he was also responsible for the Jameson raid) have made that more likely.
I also wonder: there is such a thing as a mob lawyer. Is there such a thing as a mob journalist? The mind boggles.
Despite the promising headline above, in the month after Ambassador Sacrimoni’s visit, Musharraf and/or his people caved. He promised to step down as army chief and did. He promised elections, and banned Sharif while allowing Bhutto to run. He ended the state of emergency. The only steps he refused to take were those that obviously would have signaled the end of his regime and of PakMil as an independent power, such as restoring the suspended judges.
We quickly saw the truth of the matter on the alliance between Pinkie and the Islamists. On December 12, Carlotta Gall, who is well-named indeed, recounted a truly tear-jerking tale,
Picture of Secret Detentions Emerges in Pakistan:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/19/world/asia/19disappeared.html
No more Fort McHenry for the little Sewards of the Hindu Kush! I’m afraid that these days, if Pakistan wants to detain people like the murderers of Daniel Pearl—whom Carlotta Gall may well have known in person—it won’t just be able to starve them to death and toss them on a garbage heap. It will have to give them a five-star, gold-plated trial, with enough lawyers to invade Nepal. I’m sure Angelina Jolie will be happy to pay for all this.
So why not just let your prisoners go instead? If you have to play by these rules, why play at all? Just sit tight, things will go to hell, and the rules will change back again. They have to. If they don’t, it’s definitely time to buy those Emirates tickets.
Oh, I’m sure a few of these detainees are “innocent.” But frankly, the Romans had it right when they said that
the law is silent in time of war. If your country is invaded by an enemy army, you can’t arrest every soldier wearing the wrong uniform, and charge them with trespassing. And the same applies even if the enemy adopts an urban guerrilla strategy.
What’s going on in Pakistan is war, and the concept of “guilt” and “innocence” is not even meaningful in war. Your enemies are not criminals. They are enemies. The criminalization of war, the move to redefine every war as a
police action, creates nasty, interminable and recurring conflicts that cannot be won.
As Edward Luttwak
points out, all guerrilla wars, urban or rural (
urban guerrilla is a common euphemism, meaning
terrorist) can be won by detaining every human being who might possibly be an enemy, holding them securely until the war is over and the winner is clear, and then releasing them without punishment. Like, duh, man. Which has more negative impact on innocent civilians: internment in a civilized detention center, or involvement in a civil war?
As
Trinquier wrote in
Modern War, the service that the Westernists are performing on behalf of the Islamists is an absolute military necessity:
Modern warfare is a new experience for the majority of our fellow citizens. Even among our friends, the systematic conduct of raids will run into opposition, resulting generally from a total lack of understanding of the enemy and his methods of warfare. This will often be very difficult to overcome.
For example, the fact that the enemy’s warfare organization in a single city may consist of several thousand men will come as a surprise even to the majority of high administrative functionaries, who thought sincerely that they were dealing with only a few isolated criminals.
One of the first problems encountered, that of lodging the individuals arrested, will generally not have been anticipated. Prisons, designed essentially to accommodate offenders against common law, will rapidly become inadequate and will not meet our needs. We will be compelled to intern the prisoners under improvised, often deplorable conditions, which will lead to justifiable criticism our adversaries will exploit. From the beginning of hostilities, prison camps should be set up according to the conditions laid down by the Geneva Convention. They should be sufficiently large to take care of all prisoners until the end of the war.
By every means—and this is a quite legitimate tactic—our opponents will seek to slow down and, if possible, put an end to our operations. The fact that a state of war will generally not have been declared will be, as we have already indicated, one of their most effective means of achieving this. In particular, they will attempt to have arrested terrorists treated as ordinary criminals and to have members of their organization considered as minor peacetime offenders.
On this subject, the files of the Algiers terrorist organization divulged some particularly interesting documents. “We are no longer protected by legality,” wrote the chief of the Algiers F.L.N. in 1957, when the army had taken over the functions of the police. “We ask all our friends to do the impossible to have legality re-established; otherwise we are lost.”
Actually, the peacetime laws gave our enemies maximum opportunities for evading pursuit; it was vital to them that legality be strictly applied. The appeal was not launched in vain. Shortly thereafter, a violent press campaign was unleashed, both in France and abroad, demanding that peacetime laws be strictly adhered to in the course of police operations.
That’s life in the big city, kids. If your spectacles were more rosy, I am sorry to have to break it to you. Please do not blame the bearer of bad news.
Next, we have the anonymous and stentorian voice of the Times editors themselves (could even Pinch have taken an interest?), on December 22, in an aptly-titled editorial—
Weakening Pakistan:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/22/opinion/22sat1.html
This is the pure voice of power. When it has its dudgeon up, the Times does not ask. It tells. When it is displeased, it says so frankly. One does not make little jokes with the Times.
But perhaps someone there does have a sense of humor. On Christmas Eve, a whole gaggle of Timesmen and Timeswomen—perhaps already salivating about the Pulitzers to come—suggest that perhaps Mushie’s revenue stream from the US taxpayer should be cut off, in
U.S. Officials See Waste in Billions Sent to Pakistan (sometimes you just can’t make these headlines up):
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/24/world/asia/24military.html
I think this makes the relationship pretty clear, wouldn’t you say?
And finally, we have the Times obituary for Pinkie, obviously written well in advance, and not bad at all—
Benazir Bhutto, 54, Lived in Eye of Pakistan Storm:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/28/world/asia/28bhuttocnd.html
I love the bit about Zardari being the “Nelson Mandela of Pakistan.” Perhaps more the
Jacob Zuma of Pakistan. But might the label be more apt than it seems? Surely a topic for another day.
(*—No, I do not really advise a select group of international arms executives, oil sheiks and gold speculators. Although perhaps it’s not too late to start! If you are reading UR and you happen to be an international arms executive, oil sheik, or gold speculator…)
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TRANSLATING ASIF ALI ZARDARI
MENCIUS MOLDBUG · DECEMBER 10, 2008
Ican’t resist preceding our joint repose with a brief translation of
this:
The Terrorists Want To Destroy Pakistan, Too
If you believe this, you’ll believe anything. (The “terrorists” would certainly love to
control Pakistan. And they are well on their way, too.)
by Asif Ali Zardari
Or, at least, his people. The actual
Mr. Ten Percent, Foggy Bottom’s man in Islamabad, who may also soon be named as
Senate Candidate 6, has other strengths.
He probably did get to look over it, at least. But I wouldn’t be surprised if at least the outline came from Washington. This sort of material takes a long, strange bureaucratic trip on its way to the Web server—
“Satan’s Invisible World Displayed,” as Carlyle liked to put it.
THE recent death and destruction in Mumbai, India, brought to my mind the death and destruction in Karachi on Oct. 18, 2007, when terrorists attacked a festive homecoming rally for my wife, Benazir Bhutto. Nearly 150 Pakistanis were killed and more than 450 were injured. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai may be a news story for most of the world. For me it is a painful reality of shared experience. Having seen my wife escape death by a hairbreadth on that day in Karachi, I lost her in a second, unfortunately successful, attempt two months later.
As befits all opening paragraphs of Times op-eds, I think I’ll let
Harry Frankfurt speak for me on this one.
But if your faith remains strong, consider the case of
Baitullah Messud. As derived from deeds, not words, there is simply no evidence that President Ten Percent is in any way disturbed that Benazir got whacked. He has certainly benefited from the event.
And nor is there any evidence that you or I or anyone else should be disturbed, either, at the fate of “Pinkie.” It was a hit. Should we cry? Boo-hoo. She knew the game she was playing.
The Mumbai attacks were directed not only at India but also at Pakistan’s new democratic government and the peace process with India that we have initiated. Supporters of authoritarianism in Pakistan and non-state actors with a vested interest in perpetuating conflict do not want change in Pakistan to take root.
“Change.”
To foil the designs of the terrorists, the two great nations of Pakistan and India, born together from the same revolution and mandate in 1947, must continue to move forward with the peace process. Pakistan is shocked at the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. We can identify with India’s pain. I am especially empathetic. I feel this pain every time I look into the eyes of my children.
President Zardari is
especially empathetic.
Pakistan is committed to the pursuit, arrest, trial and punishment of anyone involved in these heinous attacks. But we caution against hasty judgments and inflammatory statements. As was demonstrated in Sunday’s raids, which resulted in the arrest of militants, Pakistan will take action against the non-state actors found within our territory, treating them as criminals, terrorists and murderers. Not only are the terrorists not linked to the government of Pakistan in any way, we are their targets and we continue to be their victims.
“Dear India: **** you. We didn’t have shit to do with this, and we won’t do shit for you. And if you were especially empathetic, too, you’d realize what a dick you are. P.S. I fucked your wife.”
(Note that
Abdul Qadeer Khan was under “arrest,” as well.)
India is a mature nation and a stable democracy. Pakistanis appreciate India’s democratic contributions. But as rage fueled by the Mumbai attacks catches on, Indians must pause and take a breath. India and Pakistan—and the rest of the world—must work together to track down the terrorists who caused mayhem in Mumbai, attacked New York, London and Madrid in the past, and destroyed the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September. The terrorists who killed my wife are connected by ideology to these enemies of civilization.
“Dear World: ignore the man behind the curtain. And please twiddle your thumbs, while we
find the real killer.”
These militants did not arise from whole cloth. Pakistan was an ally of the West throughout the cold war. The world worked to exploit religion against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by empowering the most fanatic extremists as an instrument of destruction of a superpower. The strategy worked, but its legacy was the creation of an extremist militia with its own dynamic.
“Dear America: it’s all your fault, anyway.”
Pakistan continues to pay the price: the legacy of dictatorship, the fatigue of fanaticism, the dismemberment of civil society and the destruction of our democratic infrastructure. The resulting poverty continues to fuel the extremists and has created a culture of grievance and victimhood.
Duh-huh. He said
“price.” Duh-huh.
The challenge of confronting terrorists who have a vast support network is huge; Pakistan’s fledgling democracy needs help from the rest of the world. We are on the frontlines of the war on terrorism. We have 150,000 soldiers fighting Al Qaeda, the Taliban and their extremist allies along the border with Afghanistan—far more troops than NATO has in Afghanistan.
“And all this shit costs money.
Lots of money. And we’re doing it just for y—oh, wait.”
Nearly 2,000 Pakistanis have lost their lives to terrorism in this year alone, including 1,400 civilians and 600 security personnel ranging in rank from ordinary soldier to three-star general. There have been more than 600 terrorism-related incidents in Pakistan this year. The terrorists have been set back by our aggressive war against them in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Pashtun-majority areas bordering Afghanistan. Six hundred militants have been killed in recent attacks, hundreds by Pakistani F-16 jet strikes in the last two months.
“Our people at the site are working their tails off. When you hire
Vito Spadafore’s guys, they don’t just sit there!”
Terrorism is a regional as well as a global threat, and it needs to be battled collectively. We understand the domestic political considerations in India in the aftermath of Mumbai. Nevertheless, accusations of complicity on Pakistan’s part only complicate the already complex situation.
“Dear India: did I mention that you need to **** off?”
For India, Pakistan and the United States, the best response to the Mumbai carnage is to coordinate in counteracting the scourge of terrorism. The world must act to strengthen Pakistan’s economy and democracy, help us build civil society and provide us with the law enforcement and counterterrorism capacities that will enable us to fight the terrorists effectively.
“Dear America and Europe: give us money. You already give us money, of course. It’s just that in these troubled times—you need to be giving us more. And if you don’t want to pay, expect more of this shit. Nothing personal, you understand. We’re just trying to run a business here.”
Benazir Bhutto once said that democracy is the best revenge against the abuses of dictatorship. In the current environment, reconciliation and rapprochement is the best revenge against the dark forces that are trying to provoke a confrontation between Pakistan and India, and ultimately a clash of civilizations.
And close, with more Harry Frankfurt.
In reality? There are no dark forces—just a bunch of poor assholes trying to make a living. This whole circus is produced for you, dear taxpayer. It may not be your most wasteful and frivolous enterprise, but it may be your nastiest and most dangerous.
Because this time I would not be surprised if Pakistan, like
Serbia, finds it has bitten off more than it can chew. The key question is whether Indian politics compel a genuine response. I am not an expert in Indian politics. Nor, I suspect, are the people in Pakistan who are doing this shit. Is anyone?
The result is a textbook case in the fundamentally unsafe nature of the inevitable uncertainty in the behavior of any internally conflicted sovereign institution. The game will either be mildly profitable for Pakistan, or wildly devastating to it. Its expected value is blatantly negative.
If Pakistan as a whole was managed the way, say, Singapore is managed, Pakistan would never play. But of course there is no “Pakistan as a whole,” just a loose network of informal, constantly shifting power centers. Of course this can be said of any democracy, but it is worse in Pakistan, where the gun, the ballot and the dollar are permanently engaged in an intricate opaque dance.
(If only President Zardari’s predecessor had taken
our advice. Pervez, Pervez!
Now more than ever! Against the abuses of democracy, what but dictatorship is the best revenge? The heresy grows:
India,
Thailand… hop on the bandwagon, before the bandwagon hops on you!)
But perhaps the good President, by “dark forces,” means UR itself. (Or at least the
War Nerd.) If so, I’m afraid I need to sign myself up—for the “confrontation” part as well.
Because I believe the interactions between sovereign states should be governed by
classical international law. And Davis and Sherman are, as usual, clear as glass on
the matter:
Marauding Expeditions. As a consequence of its sovereignty and independence, a state is entitled to an immunity from incursions by expeditions, or marauding parties, whose base of operations is in the territory of another state; when such incursions occur, the injured state will expect, and may demand, a prompt disavowal of the act, with reparation for its consequences, and the punishment of its perpetrators. When the sovereignty of a territory permits it to be made the base of hostilities, by outlaws and savages, against a country with which such sovereign is at peace, the government of the latter country is entitled, as a matter of necessity, to pursue the assailants wherever they may be, and to take such measures as are necessary to put an end to their aggressions.
Which means exactly what you think it means. Of course, Ambassador Davis and Professor Sherman are talking about
sovereign states. Not informal
protectorates of the lower Potomac:
Protectorates. The term “protectorate” is applied to the relation established between a stronger and a weaker state, by which the weaker is protected from foreign aggression and interference, but suffers in consequence some diminution of its rights of sovereignty and independence. This relation is established by treaty, by the terms of which the extent and character of the protectorate are determined. In most protectorates the foreign relations of the protected state, including the power to engage in war, are in great part regulated by the protector.
And thus the question reduces to Delhi’s testicles, or lack thereof. Can it grow a pair? If so, the show is on, and as usual Carlyle
put it best:
“Tumble and rage along, ye rotten waifs and wrecks; clash and collide as seems fittest to you; and smite each other into annihilation at your own good pleasure. In that huge conflict, dismal but unavoidable, we, thanks to our heroic ancestors, having got so far ahead of you, have now no interest at all. Our decided notion is, the dead ought to bury their dead in such a case: and so we have the honor to be, with distinguished consideration, your entirely devoted,–FLIMNAP, SEC. FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.”
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