I'd like to describe JBG's reproduction as his tactical nuke used during the course of a discussion that we were having, but that is unfair to him: he had already composed his arguments based on the discussions that take place from time to time.
Coming to your own remarks,
- it's true that HAL had nothing to do with the LCA; it was, finally, the production shop after everything had been accepted by the air force.
- The Air Force has nil capacity to build, to assemble or to maintain, forget about specifying or designing new aircraft, or re-designing older aircraft. For all those, it has to have a production shop; that shop is nothing but HAL.
- The Air Force is panicky now only because the production rate is so slow. The problem is precisely with the production rate; 4 a year is the speed of a glacier.
- The Air Force has only itself to blame. A larger requirement will help HAL (and whoever it gets from private sector to finance setting up additional lines) to continue to manufacture for a longer period. It is not frightfully difficult to set up lines for 20 to 24 a year.
The most obvious requirements have not been met. The Tejas is today a good, short range interceptor most amenable to GCI missions; it can play an expanded role if ADA takes another couple of years to build in data links (compatible to the SU 30 in the first instance) enables them as AWACS or SU 30 controlled aircraft. Both AWACS and SU 30 have very long legs; both can loiter and call up swarms of Tejas carrying BVR missiles at short notice, without coming under attack themselves. Neither the F16 nor their magic weapon the JF-17 can do Jack Squat about it; the Swedish AWACS they have, and the Chinese AWACS they are planning to buy are far greater threats.
The Arjun deal is a straight walk-over for the Arjun, and I have carefully listed the reasons on another thread. There is really nothing to be done but either shove it down the throat of the DG in question, and his next three successors. At the moment, it will cream the very questionable junk that it will face, but that is in the western theatre; it cannot be deployed in Ladakh and in Arunachal; there is no way to deploy it in Ladakh and that has nothing to do with terrain. It has everything to do with the long maintenance trail. Arunachal has everything to do with terrain, unless the Army plans to fight in the Brahmaputra Valley. Those who think that being able to transport bulldozers shows that armour can play a role there need to be tied hand and foot and put in front of those same bulldozers; armour needs space to move about.
There is no point in discussing these outside Indian interlocutors.
IN PRINCIPLE, yes; I have serious problems with the specific examples quoted.
The ATAGS is a brilliant example of the way to go.
To take the discussion forward, I will pick a few sentences, without taking them out of context and having read through the post in it's entirety.
"The Air Force has nil capacity to build, to assemble or to maintain, forget about specifying or designing new aircraft, or re-designing older aircraft. For all those, it has to have a production shop; that shop is nothing but HAL."
And that remains my frustrations. Instead of leveraging HAL's expertise in the Aero industry, IAF and Drdo wanted to stick it to HAL, by undercutting it and creating ADA. Although I have never had an opportunity to directly work with them, But the grape-wine both from the engineers side and test pilots were not very flaterring about the organisation and it's culture.
there are multiple gopher heads popping out of IAF grounds squeaking thier criticism and vanishing. Two of the most prominent ones being; Performance of the aircraft (FOC/IOC) AoA, Speed, Weapon systems, range and the second one being Production rate.
Lets address the LCA performance and HAL's role in it first.
"The most obvious requirements have not been met. The Tejas is today a good, short range interceptor most amenable to GCI missions"
When ADA froze the design specifications of the LCA,the airframe had been selected with a committee of IAF representatives, so was the engine specifications, and the CFD analysis of comparative airframe configurations was presented. This is the G1 of the Project, Zero look approach, conducted, all requirements frozen.
Today IAF cannot go back and say we are not satisfied with the range or payload, this is exactly what you asked ADA to build. IAF cannot behave like my wife at a restaurant ordering Pasta at a spanish restaurant and then hogging my paella instead. IAF was in the process all along,
G0> Scope and role
G1> Zero look approach must have systems
G2> First look approach, alternate subsystems
G3> Prototype, Second look approach (FG404, Engine, recalibration, Weapons system)
and the rest of the project gates which were severely effed up by ada.
Today IAF cannot say they are not satisfied with range, or performance or weapons systems. They picked all of it.
Now the second critique usually is extremely slow paced production of the aircraft:
And here is where I will do my bit to play devils advocate. I am primarily addressing two of you on the thread, and both of you are well aware that there is no MRP sheets without Production rate. And due to the nature of the system the Plant layout for a final assembly hangar plays an immensely important role in number of units produced. This layout is based on the takt time needed to meet the production rate.
If my guideline is that you have to build 8 LSP series aircraft where the MRP will change on each of the aircraft and all of these will be used to validate system and will have continued changes in Part numbers, guess what I will not have a MRP, I will not conduct value stream analysis to increase labor productivity, I will not address bottlenecks, I will not have visual standard work for technicians, and I will not have a takt time to live upto. When there is nothing to measure, there is nothing to improve. The same HAL can crank out 14 MKI in a year in Nasik and struggles with 4 LCA? All I would request is for the ajai shuklas of the world to go and talk to the Grade 5 chief manager of the final assembly for LCA hanger, not the GM or MD of the complex but the actual CM of the hangar and the issue will be clear beyond the doubt.
The same IAF when places an order with say a Dassault: Places 36 rafales or 59 mirages, with the specified systems,without changes in tranches. But when it comes to LCA, 5 with this radar, the next 5 with the other radar, the next 5 with a different MFD, the next 5 with a different nose cone. That's not how production works.
My argument is not to absolve HAL of it's sins which I can count a thousand in the way they have handled their business with MoD and IAF. But it is high time that HAL should start focusing on it's service and product portfolio to attract other clients than the IAF. It is true that Indian military is not responsible for development of domestic defense industry, and given that the world is willing to sell to Indian forces now, Indian domestic industry should also be looking at the same two way street to find clients that fit their culture.
W.r.t to Arjun , unlike LCA, key subsystems that were to be developed within the program Arjun was from the beginning set to be a system with imported powerplant with the hull and gun developed by CVRDE. From project delivery this was totally copy book example of correct delivery of a system required by the Army and MoD. when it comes to overall performance with the imported components it has today , the tank is an excellent overall fighting system. IA not accepting this tank for frivolous reasons and setting it up for failure is very disappointing as here the army was involved again from the beginning. I dont remember which show this was on, but the I was watching an interview of the young officer from 17th bat of Brigade of guards, and you could see the esteem that the men held for the Arjun, crews operating the tank love it, but there is a good chunk of others who are hell bent of seeing the end of this system. Remember this is the same establishment which bought WZT garbage from Poland. So I absolutely do not buy Army's argument that a partly German tank is more difficult to maintain that Russian tank.
Another part is the Arjun's weight, this was not a 20 year surprise arrange marriage where an overweight spouse was tied to the army. Army specified the specs, directed the performance characteristics to the be similar to the Leopard 2 and then expect it weigh like the t72, that is just ridiculous. The entire contention of 58 tons of arjun being too heavy is absolute rubbish as the army from the outset wanted to build something on the lines of the 62 Ton Leopard 2. And to add to my frustrations here, the production rate is not even an issue as HVF is a hige factory and will crank our as many Arjuns as the army can buy so this doesn't even have a LCA like issue with production space or resource constraints.