Are the UNSC sanctions on Iran Legal and logical

[The SC]

Are the UNSC sanctions on Iran Legal or even logical?

On 27 December 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1737 (2006) imposing sanctions in relation to Iran in response to the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear program and, in this context, by Iran's continuing failure to meet the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006). The sanctions were extended by UNSC resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010).

The following sanctions apply to Iran:

Prohibitions relating to goods and technology
Prohibitions relating to services
Prohibitions relating to investment and business dealings
Targeted financial sanctions
Travel bans
Authorisations and inquiries
Australia's autonomous sanctions on Iran

United Nations Security Council Sanctions - Iran

China says sanctions no "fundamental" answer on Iran:

"We hope the IAEA will be fair and objective, and actively committed to clarifying the salient issues through cooperation with Iran," he said. "This is the pressing task at this stage."

China says sanctions no fundamental answer on Iran | Reuters

 

[LEGENDARY WARRIOR]

Obviously they're not LEGAL.. But one has to live with it because UNCLE SAM says soooo...

 

[The SC]

Brazil Slams UN Security Council Sanctions Resolution Against Iran:

Brazil considers it unnatural to rush to sanctions before the parties concerned can sit and talk about the implementation of the Declaration. The Vienna Group’s replies to the Iranian letter of 24 May, which confirmed Iran’s commitment to the contents of the Declaration, were received just hours ago. No time has been given for Iran to react to the opinions of the Vienna Group, including to the proposal of a technical meeting to address details.

The adoption of sanctions in such circumstances sends the wrong signal to what could be the beginning of a constructive engagement in Vienna.

It was also a matter of grave concern the way in which the permanent members, together with a country that is not a member of the Security Council, negotiated among themselves for months at closed doors.

Brazil Slams UN Security Council Sanctions Resolution Against Iran

 

[The SC]

The Iranian Nuclear Issue: Achieving a Win-Win Diplomatic Solution:

The first major goal in solving Iran’s nuclear impasse is for the Agency to be able to draw a “broad conclusion” that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran, and that Iran’s declarations to the IAEA are correct and complete. To reach such a conclusion within a reasonable period of time, and considering the loopholes of the Additional Protocol (AP),4 Iran would have to conclude with the IAEA and fully implement a Temporary Complementary Protocol (TCP). A TCP should enable the Agency to verify and evaluate in a timely manner the absence of undeclared nuclear material, equipment and activities in a state that is found to be in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement.5

In case Iran agrees to fully implement the TCP, the IAEA Board of Governors should commit to accord Iran a grace period during which Iran would not be penalized should it voluntarily disclose the existence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, and/or acknowledge any past violations of the NPT or of its safeguards agreement.6 On the contrary, Iran would be praised for its cooperation with the IAEA and its additional breaches would be reported to the UNSC for "information purposes only" (as was done for Libya). Without such a grace period, there is no reason to expect that Iran would fully cooperate with the IAEA or voluntarily declare any past violations.

Until the IAEA has drawn a “broad conclusion,” Iran should commit to send abroad its domestic stockpile of LEU every six months for incorporation into fabricated fuel assemblies for the Bushehr reactor and possibly other light water reactors, while continuing to enrich uranium below 5% U-235. It would also be important that Iran concludes an Infcirc/66-type safeguards agreement with the IAEA for all nuclear fuel cycle facilities.7

As long as Iran does not suspend its enrichment-related activities or the IAEA does not reach a “broad conclusion,” it is very unlikely that the UNSC would lift present sanctions. However, as soon (and as long) as Iran agrees to implement the TCP and the other requirements mentioned above, the P5+1 could commit to not implement additional sanctions and the US and the EU could commit to progressively suspend sanctions going beyond those decided by the UNSC under Chapter VII resolutions as a function of progress reported by the IAEA.8 In parallel, the P5+1 would negotiate with Iran over how best to further define, expand, and implement the long-term cooperation agreement specified in Annex IV of UNSC Resolution 1929.

Once the IAEA has reached a “broad conclusion,” Iran would no longer be obliged to export its domestic production of LEU, and UNSC sanctions would progressively be lifted.

m.ceip.org

This sounds like saying we -the US- want 50% of your resources and technologies, otherwise we'll accuse you of wanting to develop an a nuclear device!!!

 

[The SC]

(Reuters) - The United States, European allies and even Israel generally agree on three things about Iran's nuclear program: Tehran does not have a bomb, has not decided to build one, and is probably years away from having a deliverable nuclear warhead.

Special Report: Intel shows Iran nuclear threat not imminent - Yahoo! News

So why the sanctions exist, and what this fuss is about?

 

[The SC]

Nuclear watchdog chief accused of pro-western bias over Iran

Hans Blix, a former IAEA director general, also raised concerns over the agency's credibility. "There is a distinction between information and evidence, and if you are a responsible agency you have to make sure that you ask questions and do not base conclusions on information that has not been verified," he said.

"The agency has a certain credibility. It should guard it by being meticulous in checking the evidence. If certain governments want a blessing for the intelligence they provide the IAEA, they should provide convincing evidence. Otherwise, the agency should not give its stamp of approval." Blix said he could not say for certain whether that had happened under Amano's watch.

Nuclear watchdog chief accused of pro-western bias over Iran | World news | The Guardian

 

[The SC]

Even as the regime seeks talks with world powers, Iranian officials refused last week to provide IAEA inspectors access to Parchin, a key military installation, and dismissed the concerns of inspectors as based on "unfounded allegations."

"We want to know what's going on in those sites," she said. "And the fact that they are secret, heavily protected sites seems to suggest something's going on the Iranians don't want the IAEA or the world to know about. That can only raise suspicions even higher than they already are."

The "P5 plus one" is ready to meet with the Iranians, Clinton said, "if they came to the table prepared to talk about their nuclear program."


Hypocrisy at its best; now it is not the the nuclear sites anymore, it is the sensitive military sites of The Islamic Republic of Iran!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!