ANALYSIS: The good, the bad and the ugly —Salman Tarik Kureshi

[fatman17]

ANALYSIS: The good, the bad and the ugly —Salman Tarik Kureshi

The distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ insurrectionists is meaningless. To do deals with the ‘good’ ones, as opposed to the ‘bad’ ones, will only be a repetition of past tactics. And will bring us that bit closer to a final collapse into anarchic state failure

In a previous article, welcoming Prime Minister Gilani’s announcement of military action against the insurgency in Swat, three questions were raised by this commentator:

[B]“First: is this meant only for Swat? What about the rest of the NWFP; what about FATA, particularly the two Waziristans; what about the alleged Taliban GHQ in Quetta; what about the killer squads, arms caches and sleeper cells scattered all over Pakistan, from Islamabad to Karachi? Will these all be taken out by our men in khaki?”[/B]

Since then, of course, our armed forces, following formidable initial success in the Swat/ Malakand campaign, have announced preparation for a major assault on South Waziristan and Baitullah Mehsud of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan. We also learn that a Mr Turkistan Bhittani, another formidable warlord, has broken away from the TTP (perhaps not unlike some of our parliamentarians, known for forming ‘forward blocs’ when changing allegiances) and will now be fighting on ‘our’ side. Thus, Mr Bhittani is no more amongst the ranks of the ‘bad’ anti-state terrorists, but will join the ranks of the ‘good’ anti-state terrorists. And this is a development we are expected to applaud as a portent of the forthcoming victory of the state!

Now, I do not know whether there are accusations against Mr Bhittani and am unwilling to consider anyone guilty until proven so, but there is surely a principle here. ‘Good’ Taliban or ‘bad’ Taliban, both factions stand accused of extreme violence, of cold-blooded mass murder and of waging war against the state of Pakistan. There are no accusations more heinous than these: the most vicious kind of murder and the highest kind of treason and — given that these criminals regularly misuse the sacred name of Islam — the most sacrilegious blasphemy.

Is there then any distinction between the ‘good’ Taliban and the ‘bad’ Taliban? Are they not equally ugly? Equally deadly for our state and society?

One realises that selective amnesties and tactical battlefield alliances are necessary parts of serious counterinsurgency campaigns. But — and this is the point — such ‘adjustments’ need to be highly selective and well thought through. Otherwise, one is simply unleashing a further species of monster to fight the monsters one has already unleashed.

Let us remember that, as the great Chinese revolutionary Mao Zedong said, “Power grows from the barrel of a gun.” Mao therefore proceeded to capture the guns, first from the Japanese occupation army and then from the Kuomingtang government of Chiang Kai-Shek. After his revolution came to its conclusion and the Chinese state was re-established, his enormous country was still awash with guns and those who had wielded them.

Let us be clear of the truism that the nature of states is such that they must enjoy a quasi-monopoly of armed force within their territory. If a state is not to collapse and ‘fail’, if a society is to not to become critically dysfunctional, it is necessary for the military, the paramilitaries and the police to establish and rigidly assert exclusive control over serious weaponry. Side by side, those individuals who are adept at the use of such weaponry must be subject to the disciplines of the security organs of the state.

Mao’s government understood, back in 1949, that the presence of all the leftover weaponry from the war and the revolution would pose critical challenges to the Chinese state they intended to build. Therefore, they set about absorbing their own partisans, as well as the many other arms-wielding Chinese citizens, into the Red Army.

Similarly, the countries of Europe, replete with former Resistance fighters after World War II, carefully absorbed them into various arms of their government. The Americans used their GI Bill to fund university education for demobilised soldiers. And so in Vietnam. And in Cambodia.

In the aftermath of great wars and/or revolutions, which have left behind an enormous detritus of weapons and armed, militarily experienced persons, the means of absorbing those weapons into the state’s armoury and those persons into remunerative employment have been vigorously pursued and implemented by most countries.

We, too, live in a country bristling with guns and bulging with bombs — left over, we are told, from the jihad in Afghanistan. And it is the armed and trained remnants of the partisans who fought that war — whether as mujahideen or as Taliban — that are responsible for the disorder and terrorism in our country.

Minimal common sense and at least some honesty of purpose would have suggested precisely the kinds of prescriptions that have been followed elsewhere. But our elites — beyond even the bounds of ordinary common sense — further equipped these warriors, made deals with them, pampered them as intelligence ‘assets’ and sought to use them to project the force of the Pakistan state beyond our borders.

There are three kinds of persons, other than the ‘legitimate’ state actors, who bear arms: straightforward criminals; the armed brigades associated with certain political parties and movements; and the insurrectionists and terrorists lumped together under the rubric of ‘Islamic militants’.

Now, all societies have their criminal underworlds and Pakistan too is richly endowed with such. Whether Karachi’s car and cell-phone snatchers, the dharels of interior Sindh, the badmashes of Punjab, ordinary murderers or the drug peddlers universal in our pious country, there is a colourful variety of armed law breakers to be found in our towns and villages. After all, every society, every country, has its dark underside. Crime pays (or not) everywhere in the world. And everywhere criminals are organised and armed.

But Colombia and the United States and Russia and Italy and all the other countries with armed criminal gangs are in no way threatened with state ‘failure’ or social collapse. Do criminals erode the foundations of a society or a state? Not really; they are too marginal in the wider sweep of social processes. Society does not collapse; the state does not fail.

But it is something else that has happened in Pakistan. The proliferation and arming of certain, fitfully favoured political groups — most prominently in the 1980s, but prevalent before and continuing thereafter — and the establishment’s failure to adequately confront them is where the serious destabilisation of Pakistani society began. It was a short step from there to today’s large-scale militias of armed militants and terrorists, against whom the Pakistani authorities claim to be fighting their ‘war on terror’.

Let us also be clear. The distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ insurrectionists is meaningless. They are all guilty of the same, incredible level of criminal behaviour. To do deals with the ‘good’ ones, as opposed to the ‘bad’ ones, will only be a repetition of past tactics. And will bring us that bit closer to a final collapse into anarchic state failure.

The writer is a marketing consultant based in Karachi. He is also a poet

 

[Ratus Ratus]

Is there then any distinction between the ‘good’ Taliban and the ‘bad’ Taliban? Are they not equally ugly? Equally deadly for our state and society?

A significiant point as at some point after you get rid of the "bad" Taliban the so called "good" will turn bad. back to square one.

Similarly, the countries of Europe, replete with former Resistance fighters after World War II, carefully absorbed them into various arms of their government. The Americans used their GI Bill to fund university education for demobilised soldiers. And so in Vietnam. And in Cambodia.

In the aftermath of great wars and/or revolutions, which have left behind an enormous detritus of weapons and armed, militarily experienced persons, the means of absorbing those weapons into the state’s armoury and those persons into remunerative employment have been vigorously pursued and implemented by most countries.

We, too, live in a country bristling with guns and bulging with bombs — left over, we are told, from the jihad in Afghanistan. And it is the armed and trained remnants of the partisans who fought that war — whether as mujahideen or as Taliban — that are responsible for the disorder and terrorism in our country.

Minimal common sense and at least some honesty of purpose would have suggested precisely the kinds of prescriptions that have been followed elsewhere. But our elites — beyond even the bounds of ordinary common sense — further equipped these warriors, made deals with them, pampered them as intelligence ‘assets’ and sought to use them to project the force of the Pakistan state beyond our borders.

It would have made some semblance of sense to have absorbed the residue if Pakistan nationals that had been fighting into the military or at worst the FC.
Though it is hard at times for some to accept such a move. We came back to status and other minor ego issues.

Let us also be clear. The distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ insurrectionists is meaningless. They are all guilty of the same, incredible level of criminal behaviour. To do deals with the ‘good’ ones, as opposed to the ‘bad’ ones, will only be a repetition of past tactics. And will bring us that bit closer to a final collapse into anarchic state failure.

May not bring things a 'bit closer to a final collapse into anarchic state failure', but they will not assist in the progression of the state for the total benefit of all.

Nice article but possibly has too many issue some will never appreciate..

 

[muse]

Underlying sentiment in militancy



Monday, June 29, 2009
Shehzad Chaudhry

The intellectuals and thinking minds in Islamabad are besieged with one single issue – what should be made of the current morass in Pakistan’s west and in Afghanistan? What should be Pakistan’s best move ahead, and what may Pakistan hope to see and share in terms of region’s future?

With most of these central figures also variously engaged with the television talk-shows – the latest entertainment industry in Pakistan – either as anchors or guests, where the current dominates any reflection into the future, given that is what brings revenue, the debate is rather stagnated. In such an instance reflective thinking is no-man’s land. In the garb of dealing with only facts, or in TV lingo – proprietary information – we are but mostly restricted to recounting the past, or sifting what we consider is in our hands. What we may have in our hands, however, is precious little, since Islamabad is devoid of any such commodity, with only ad-hocism and opportunism ruling the roost. The mantra is – see through the day, tomorrow will bring its own challenges.

There are a few things happening concurrently. It will help to list those: Islam as a religion is going through perhaps the biggest internal challenge, on its future construct, its beliefs, the sense of its diversity and permissiveness to plurality, the single most important issue of exclusivity or inclusiveness, and perhaps, even most importantly, its relevance and juxtaposition with the ever-emerging and evolving world social order. It is an issue which should seize the 56, or thereabouts, Muslim countries of the world in terms of their future placement in the world order. Will it be giving meaning to the ill-considered, howsoever prophetic “clash of civilisations,” or securing the soul in a “clash within civilisations” from the puritan but archaic notions of a religion which is meant to live and survive the end of the world on the basis of intellectual relevance, sustainable logic and applicable wisdom.

This putsch has come from within, and in the history of the religion is perhaps the biggest challenge in determining its future shape. What may thus appear as an insurgency alone, or for that matter what might happen in Afghanistan as a result of the on-going war between the Afghan Taliban and the opposing forces, will also leave an indelible mark on the success or failure of this internal manifestation to establish a face of Islam currently incongruent to most socio-religious sensibilities of the region, and that of the large contiguous swathe from Kabul to Kuala Lumpur. That this most crucial battle within Islam happens to be taking place on the borders of Iran, where another most significant fissure within Islam resides, makes it all the more ominous.

Its roots in the Arab lands, especially Damascus during the times of the Prophet (Peace be upon him), and introduction to the subcontinent in the ‘Ajam ‘ with the arrival of Mahmud Ghaznavi on his many quests, continues to find periodic rejuvenation with an effort to root itself into wider acceptability. The downside of the movement, though, is hinged to its extremist hue aided through militancy which practically imposes an armed challenge to the larger Muslim sentiment creating yet another chasm. The obduracy of the movement, and its anti-social form with insistent exclusivity, has stunted its acceptability. Its inconsistence with the prevalent social mores, where Islam found widespread acceptability on the back of socio-cultural adjustments while still retaining its fundamental essence, will continue to cause significant resistance to efforts to impose the form. There is a need thus within Islam to rethink its future direction, with emphasis on keeping the great religion relevant to contemporary needs; value needs to be given to the notion of ijtihad. What Ghazali offered to Islam in the fifth century of its existence in terms of intellectual resurgence in what had by then become only a theonomous, dogmatic entity, is needed with an even greater intensity, considering that today’s competing intellect of western political and cultural thought finds support in eminent socio-political prevalence and universal acceptability.

The next big cataclysm too is inherent in the ongoing strife. More discernable, and finding voice with increasing frequency, is the sensitivity of the Pakhtun sentiment to this war – the Taliban largely belonging to this specific ethnic definition. Forty-three million of this great people inhabit a geographic contiguity that, based on socio-cultural disposition, appear as a monolith, though internal bifurcations with regional determinations too find traditional presence. Their struggle to survive the trends of religious militancy and armed conflict renders them acutely vulnerable. The tribes by themselves are naturally given to the comfort of the status quo, but remain susceptible to exploitable residual sentiment of alienation after such long exposure to strife and insecure existence. What influence sustains at the end of such struggle can be a matter of conjecture, but must keep the thinking minds engaged with possibilities of various fallouts – one possibility impacting existing socio-political structures. It may not be as disingenuous to suggest, then, that such socio-political awakening of a people, where long-sustaining social inertia may be ready to readjust and renew, could be more positively engaged to introduce graduated modernity in education, health, social mores and well-being of the tribal society; political variations can include repealing the FCR and mainstreaming the political process. The direction that such intellectual turmoil may take will greatly depend on the necessary initiative and mentoring of the emerging thought process; in its absence raw socio-religious sentiment is likely to be manipulated by vested interests towards sowing seeds of greater socio-political disorder.

There is thus a need to look beyond the superficiality of the ongoing strife. When it is claimed to be the fight for the soul of Pakistan, it definitely is the case, though the scope is far wider and impacts the world of Islam far beyond the geographical domains of Pakistan alone. Also, a meaning to the statement needs to be better fathomed and debated to unravel the inherent strains of intellectual discourse. Regionally, the underlying sense may be better understood in places like Iran, the Arab world, and even in the non-Muslim actors, but the elites within the two principally involved nations of Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to be hopelessly oblivious.

The presence of the above ideological sentiment in our midst needs careful and informed handling. Routine treatment unaware of the consequences will only render the state and the society to untold vulnerabilities. As the major global powers sit in our neighbourhood and indulge themselves in their own objectives, it is incumbent upon us as the most affected to intervene, state our interests, work to protect those, and bring home to those with greater resources and means to leave behind lasting solutions salutary to retaining the socio-political and religious flavour without rendering it to any further dispersion. The latter would need a more deliberate and applied process of rethinking and reaffirmation within the Islamic world of keeping the religion inclusive, progressive and embedded with relevance to the evolving global structures. “AfPak” will need to be revised beyond the superficial, even if only political ends were the eventual goal. We shall treat this the next time.

The writer is a retired air-vice marshal of the Pakistan Air Force and served as its deputy chief of staff. Email: shhzdchdhry@yahoo.com