ANALYSIS: Terrorism and the denial problem Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
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sparklingway
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Search the JSTOR and EBSCO databases for Hasan Askari Rizvi's academic publications and you'll find that he's been publishing in the same breath for quite long. He didn't wake up late, the article appeared on PDF quite late.
Prof Rizvi was appointed as Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Punjab last month and was awarded the SI as well.
Update : I searched the databases and while it seems that his recent publications have been on civilian-miliatry relations, I have come across many of his opinion pieces in the media in the past year where he emphasized that the main problem would not be fighting the TTP but fighting the "Jihadi culture". For example :-
New trends in counter-terrorism
By: Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi
Posted On:Sun,Jul 19,2009
The next two months will show if Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities will exert more pressure on Punjab based militant groups and ensure that they do not force a foreign policy situation on Pakistan in its interaction with India
The completion of the Malakand security operation and initiation of a new security operation in South Waziristan represents a turning point in Pakistan’s efforts to deal with extremism and terrorism. There is a widespread view in official and non official circles that the security forces will also succeed in South Waziristan which would be a major achievement in Pakistan’s drive against terrorism.The new counter terrorism policy stands out on four major counts.
First the army and the paramilitary have demonstrated that they have the commitment and capability to deal effectively with the Taliban and their allies. In the past the army was periodically criticised for lacking the determination to fight the Taliban because it was alleged the army viewed them as a ‘strategic asset’ and thus took action against them half heartedly and gave them enough space to survive. The other criticism raised doubts about the army’s counter insurgency capacity. These criticisms have now been set aside by the security operations in Malakand and South Waziristan.
Second the civilian leadership and the top brass of the military are now unanimous in their view that the Taliban and their allies are the major threat to Pakistan’s internal harmony and stability. In addition to the federal government the ANP led provincial government in the NWFP is also on board for the on going security operations.
Third the civilian leadership made a conscious effort to mobilise popular support for the security operation against the Taliban. This effort has been quite successful and has boosted the morale of the army and paramilitary personnel fighting the Taliban. Major political parties support the security operation the exceptions are Islamist parties and Imran Khan’s PTI. A large number of societal groups also extend support to counter insurgency. The media’s tone has also showed significant change — from varying degrees of sympathy for the Taliban to support for the security operation.
Fourth the security operation has helped to rehabilitate the army’s image at the popular level. Around 140 army personnel including officers have been killed in the Malakand operation which has won popular sympathy and appreciation of the efforts of the army. The role of the Pakistan Air Force which has been actively involved in the security operations has been equally appreciated.
The shift in the orientation of the key institutions and leaders of the Pakistani state towards Islamic militancy and how to cope with it is a remarkable development. In the past the Musharraf government lacked unity of mind on countering terrorism The same could be said about the military/intelligence agencies that were not fully convinced about the total elimination of militancy especially the Taliban.
The Islamist MMA government in the NWFP 2002 2007 was supportive of the Taliban and allowed them to expand their influence to settled districts of the province. The Musharraf government ignored such activities because it needed the MMA’s support to sustain his rule. When the army went into Swat to control Taliban activity the MMA government refused to grant permission for a full fledged security operation. The Army got greater freedom of action in Swat after the exit of the MMA government in 2007.
The real shift came in March April 2009 when the Taliban got fully entrenched in Swat and the efforts of the NWFP government to defuse the situation by agreeing to implement a sharia based judicial system failed. The Taliban viewed this as a weakness of the government and expanded their domain to Buner thereby mounting more pressure on the civilian and military authorities in the area and elsewhere.
Further violent incidents in Lahore like the attack on Sri Lankan cricket team and the attack at a police training school perturbed both military and civilian authorities. Several violent incidents including suicide attacks took place in other parts of the country especially Punjab. In the first 100 days of 2009 twenty suicide attacks caused 332 deaths.
These developments threatened the writ of the state in unambiguous terms. The civilian leadership was left with no choice but to stop the Taliban onslaught or let them take control of more and more territory which would have opened their way to overwhelming the Pakistani state.The top military commanders came to the conclusion that the militant groups were threatening the primacy of the army as the key security institution. They felt that the Taliban and their allies would have to be checked in their bid to grab more Pakistani territory.These developments also improved the Pakistani state’s credibility at the international level. The United States was already asking Pakistan to adopt a tough policy towards the Taliban and other militant groups.
By mid April tough action against the Taliban had become Pakistan’s own imperative. Had the Taliban and their allies not over played their hand in Malakand and not stepped up their activities in Punjab civilian leaders and the army top brass would have continued with their ambiguous disposition towards militancy.Discussions between the president prime minister and army chief produced a consensus among them to take a firm action against the Taliban and their allies. The NWFP government was also on board for this decision.
The security operation in Swat was initiated on April 26 although its formal announcement was made by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani on May 6. Since then there has been no going back on the part of the federal government and the army top brass on counter terrorism.The key decision makers in Pakistan — the president the prime minister and the army chief — regularly consult each other on counter terrorism. They held three meetings on July 1 4 and 7 for winding up the Malakand operation and initiating a new operation in South Waziristan. The Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee also met the president on July 7. They issued public statements from time to time in support of the security operation for popular mobilisation and to boost the morale of the troops.
It is however difficult to suggest if the top civilian and military leadership has come to a similar decision regarding the militant groups based in Punjab who are known for violent activities in Indian administered Kashmir and mainland India. Some of these groups have Islamic sectarian orientations and function exclusively within Pakistan. The recent incident in Mian Channun shows that militancy is deep rooted in the province.
It seems that these groups are no longer favoured by Pakistan’s security and intelligence authorities. These have been put on hold because the army is busy in the tribal areas and does not want to open a new front in mainland Pakistan. Further it does not want to seen as taking action against these groups under Indian pressure.The Punjab security and intelligence apparatus is now targeting activists of these organisations and monitoring the madrassas that have a reputation for militancy and maintain links with the Taliban. This effort is aimed at destroying their networks isolating them and discouraging recruitment.
The next two months will show if Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities will exert more pressure on Punjab based militant groups and ensure that they do not force a foreign policy situation on Pakistan in its interaction with India. If the role of these groups is neutralised it will be possible to argue that Pakistan’s counter terrorism policy has made a historical shift.
Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst.
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sparklingway
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and this
Topic:Militancy in mainland Pakistan
By: Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi
Posted On:Sun,May 31,2009
The on going Swat operation has inflicted serious damage on the Taliban and the myth of their invincibility has been damaged to such an extent that new recruits will think twice before signing up.
The massive May 27 terrorist bombing in Lahore is the latest evidence as if further evidence is still needed of the Taliban’s growing challenge to Pakistan’s internal stability and security. The Lahore attack was followed by two more bombings in Peshawar and a suicide attack in Dera Ismail Khan the next day.
Deputy chief of the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan Hakimullah Mehsud claimed responsibility for the Lahore attack and asked people to vacate Lahore Rawalpindi Islamabad and Multan as the Taliban were planning “major attacks on government facilities in the coming days and weeks” in these cities.
Pakistan now faces a serious internal war something its official circles denied in the past spearheaded by religious militants that are attempting to overwhelm the Pakistani state government and society. These extremists use religion to cover up their actual agenda of establishing a territorial domain to pursue their international religious ideological plans.
The Taliban and their allied groups based in Punjab have resorted to these bombings in order to deter the government and the army from pursuing the Swat operation. They also want to restrain Pakistan from taking similar action in the tribal areas. The militants think that a number of bombings in quick succession will build enough public pressure to stop military action in Malakand.
The other message from the Taliban is that they will take their war to any part of Pakistan if the security forces do not pull back. They have connections with local militant and sectarian groups that act as their hosts and facilitators in cities across Pakistan. These local facilitators could be a local extremist/sectarian group based at a mosque or a madrassa where the terrorists park themselves and work towards completing their terrorist mission.
Punjab especially Lahore has been selected for some major terrorist attacks in the recent past because of the province’s (and the city’s) importance in Pakistan politics and economy. Punjab is also well represented in the army the bureaucracy and intelligence agencies. From the Taliban perspective instability in Punjab will have negative implications for a large number of people and would deeply affect the Pakistani civil and military establishment.
Militancy has developed deep roots in Punjab over the years. Some of the most well known militant and sectarian groups are based in the province. These groups have cultivated links with the Taliban for training and safe havens in the tribal areas. Some Punjabi militants are said to be fighting with the Taliban in the tribal areas and Afghanistan. Naturally it is easy for the Taliban to operate in the Punjab through these linkages.
The strongest opposition to the current security operation in Malakand is coming from Islamist elements in Punjab. The Jama’at e Islami spearheading opposition to the Swat operation has its headquarters in Lahore. A number of other religious parties opposed to military operations are also primarily based in Punjab. A good number of religious leaders demanding an end to the Swat operation also hail from the Punjab. Most non Pashtun militant groups such as the Lashkar e Tayba and Sipah e Sahaba have a strong Punjabi background.
It is interesting to note that a large number of journalists political commentators and writers in the vernacular press that express varying degrees of support to militancy and oppose the current military operation hail from Punjab. They raise a host of themes i.e. direct or indirect opposition to military operation sympathy for the Taliban accusing Pakistani authorities of killing its Muslim citizens in order to satisfy the US or to get economic assistance and that Pakistani rulers should be afraid of God rather than the US.
There are similar dynamics of opposition to US drone attacks in the tribal areas. Most vocal criticism comes from the activists of Islamist political parties all over Pakistan or from political activists from Punjab. The issue does not resonate so much with political activists from other provinces that do not identify with Islamist parties.
This does not mean that there is no support for the Swat operation in Punjab. In fact this support is more pronounced than the opposition by Islamist parties. Similarly there is enough evidence available to suggest that politically active circles societal groups and others oppose religious extremism and militancy. This sentiment has increased against the backdrop of the political developments leading up to the operation and the pushing back of the Taliban by the military in Malakand. The only exceptions to this approach are Islamist parties a section of pro Taliban religious leaders and Imran Khan’s PTI.
The key issue is that sympathy and support for Islamist militancy and the Taliban and criticism of the Swat operation is also pronounced in Punjab. A logical follow up of this argument is that anti Americanism is equally pronounced in the province.
Given the centrality of Punjab in Pakistani politics and administration as well as the dynamics of support for Islamist militancy the Taliban leadership made an understandable decision to take the internal war into Punjab. More attacks can take place here in the future and the Taliban through these attacks hope to compel the government to review its counterinsurgency policy.
The Swat operation has for the first time dislodged the Taliban from some areas. They are expected to lose effective control of the Swat valley and adjoining areas very shortly. This setback will have three major implications for the Taliban movement.
First the Taliban will find it difficult to find new recruits. In the past participation in the Taliban movement gave status and power to the poor and dispossessed. There was hardly any cost for the militants because the Pakistani state did not fully challenge them. The on going Swat operation has inflicted serious damage on the Taliban and the myth of their invincibility has been damaged to such an extent that new recruits will think twice before signing up.
Second the success of the Swat operation will be a morale booster for the security forces and the government. The top civilian and military leadership appears to have come to the conclusion now that the Taliban and similar groups can no longer be allowed to function in defiance of the state.
Third this will also help remove doubts at the international level about the capacity and willingness of the Pakistan military and government to take on the Taliban. This will also weaken the propaganda that the Taliban might one day overwhelm the Pakistani state and gain access to nuclear weapons and materials.
Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities must be pleased about the successes in Swat. But there is a long way to go to restore the primacy of the state and remove the causes of extremism and militancy. Challenges exist not only in the tribal areas but also in mainland Pakistan where some militant groups continue to hold ground and disparate Islamist elements tend to support or sympathise with them for one reason or another.
Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
Topic:Militancy in mainland Pakistan
By: Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi
Posted On:Sun,May 31,2009
The on going Swat operation has inflicted serious damage on the Taliban and the myth of their invincibility has been damaged to such an extent that new recruits will think twice before signing up.
The massive May 27 terrorist bombing in Lahore is the latest evidence as if further evidence is still needed of the Taliban’s growing challenge to Pakistan’s internal stability and security. The Lahore attack was followed by two more bombings in Peshawar and a suicide attack in Dera Ismail Khan the next day.
Deputy chief of the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan Hakimullah Mehsud claimed responsibility for the Lahore attack and asked people to vacate Lahore Rawalpindi Islamabad and Multan as the Taliban were planning “major attacks on government facilities in the coming days and weeks” in these cities.
Pakistan now faces a serious internal war something its official circles denied in the past spearheaded by religious militants that are attempting to overwhelm the Pakistani state government and society. These extremists use religion to cover up their actual agenda of establishing a territorial domain to pursue their international religious ideological plans.
The Taliban and their allied groups based in Punjab have resorted to these bombings in order to deter the government and the army from pursuing the Swat operation. They also want to restrain Pakistan from taking similar action in the tribal areas. The militants think that a number of bombings in quick succession will build enough public pressure to stop military action in Malakand.
The other message from the Taliban is that they will take their war to any part of Pakistan if the security forces do not pull back. They have connections with local militant and sectarian groups that act as their hosts and facilitators in cities across Pakistan. These local facilitators could be a local extremist/sectarian group based at a mosque or a madrassa where the terrorists park themselves and work towards completing their terrorist mission.
Punjab especially Lahore has been selected for some major terrorist attacks in the recent past because of the province’s (and the city’s) importance in Pakistan politics and economy. Punjab is also well represented in the army the bureaucracy and intelligence agencies. From the Taliban perspective instability in Punjab will have negative implications for a large number of people and would deeply affect the Pakistani civil and military establishment.
Militancy has developed deep roots in Punjab over the years. Some of the most well known militant and sectarian groups are based in the province. These groups have cultivated links with the Taliban for training and safe havens in the tribal areas. Some Punjabi militants are said to be fighting with the Taliban in the tribal areas and Afghanistan. Naturally it is easy for the Taliban to operate in the Punjab through these linkages.
The strongest opposition to the current security operation in Malakand is coming from Islamist elements in Punjab. The Jama’at e Islami spearheading opposition to the Swat operation has its headquarters in Lahore. A number of other religious parties opposed to military operations are also primarily based in Punjab. A good number of religious leaders demanding an end to the Swat operation also hail from the Punjab. Most non Pashtun militant groups such as the Lashkar e Tayba and Sipah e Sahaba have a strong Punjabi background.
It is interesting to note that a large number of journalists political commentators and writers in the vernacular press that express varying degrees of support to militancy and oppose the current military operation hail from Punjab. They raise a host of themes i.e. direct or indirect opposition to military operation sympathy for the Taliban accusing Pakistani authorities of killing its Muslim citizens in order to satisfy the US or to get economic assistance and that Pakistani rulers should be afraid of God rather than the US.
There are similar dynamics of opposition to US drone attacks in the tribal areas. Most vocal criticism comes from the activists of Islamist political parties all over Pakistan or from political activists from Punjab. The issue does not resonate so much with political activists from other provinces that do not identify with Islamist parties.
This does not mean that there is no support for the Swat operation in Punjab. In fact this support is more pronounced than the opposition by Islamist parties. Similarly there is enough evidence available to suggest that politically active circles societal groups and others oppose religious extremism and militancy. This sentiment has increased against the backdrop of the political developments leading up to the operation and the pushing back of the Taliban by the military in Malakand. The only exceptions to this approach are Islamist parties a section of pro Taliban religious leaders and Imran Khan’s PTI.
The key issue is that sympathy and support for Islamist militancy and the Taliban and criticism of the Swat operation is also pronounced in Punjab. A logical follow up of this argument is that anti Americanism is equally pronounced in the province.
Given the centrality of Punjab in Pakistani politics and administration as well as the dynamics of support for Islamist militancy the Taliban leadership made an understandable decision to take the internal war into Punjab. More attacks can take place here in the future and the Taliban through these attacks hope to compel the government to review its counterinsurgency policy.
The Swat operation has for the first time dislodged the Taliban from some areas. They are expected to lose effective control of the Swat valley and adjoining areas very shortly. This setback will have three major implications for the Taliban movement.
First the Taliban will find it difficult to find new recruits. In the past participation in the Taliban movement gave status and power to the poor and dispossessed. There was hardly any cost for the militants because the Pakistani state did not fully challenge them. The on going Swat operation has inflicted serious damage on the Taliban and the myth of their invincibility has been damaged to such an extent that new recruits will think twice before signing up.
Second the success of the Swat operation will be a morale booster for the security forces and the government. The top civilian and military leadership appears to have come to the conclusion now that the Taliban and similar groups can no longer be allowed to function in defiance of the state.
Third this will also help remove doubts at the international level about the capacity and willingness of the Pakistan military and government to take on the Taliban. This will also weaken the propaganda that the Taliban might one day overwhelm the Pakistani state and gain access to nuclear weapons and materials.
Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities must be pleased about the successes in Swat. But there is a long way to go to restore the primacy of the state and remove the causes of extremism and militancy. Challenges exist not only in the tribal areas but also in mainland Pakistan where some militant groups continue to hold ground and disparate Islamist elements tend to support or sympathise with them for one reason or another.
Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
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