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analysis: Friends in need Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Can the US really win the war on terror without Pakistans cooperation? Can it really force Pakistan to do whatever it wants done? Rationally speaking, the answer is no to both questions
The United States is the second superpower in three decades to occupy the same strategic patch across the Khyber Pass as the Soviet Union. Each of the great powers intervened in Afghanistan to defend or install a particular type of regime and reconstruct the country according to its concept of state and society, though under different geopolitical circumstances.
While the Soviet Union retreated from Afghanistan, and soon disintegrated, the United States and its NATO partners have been engaged in assisting security and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan for seven years now. They may stay much longer than originally planned. The twin task of state-building and security against the Taliban insurgency is complicated, and it may be decades before Afghanistan can defend itself and have a functional state.
Foreign intervention in Afghanistan, particularly by the great powers, affected all immediate neighbours politics, society and security. No country in the region has affected developments in Afghanistan or has been impacted more by its wars than Pakistan.
In both superpower interventions, Pakistan has been a key player. In the 1980s, it was on the side of the Afghan Mujahideen and the United States to roll back Soviet aggression. The effects the anti-Soviet frontline role on Pakistani state and society have been deep and lasting. Much of the cult of militancy that Pakistan is facing in the tribal borderlands took shape during the 1980s, and now threatens the stability and security of the country.
The United States and the western world could not escape the consequences of their embrace of Islamist militants in the 1980s either. The Taliban in Afghanistan and their Arab Al Qaeda allies have their origins in the Afghan resistance against the former USSR. The same transnational Islamist militant forces that fought against the Red Army are now confronting their former backers.
The point is that polarisation in and around Afghanistan is too complex and too rooted in past struggles to clearly separate it from the current confrontations. The only thing that has changed is the dominant players in the country and their relations with Pakistan and the militants. The new confrontation in our part of the world is between the Washington-centred global order and the Islamist militants that have sought refuge in countries and areas where state presence is minimal or non-existent. These areas include the tribal areas of Pakistan, where our security forces are fighting the Taliban insurgency.
The spilling over the borders of the Afghan conflict, as has been the case in the past, affects Pakistani state and society in a major way. It was mainly because of Pakistans capacity to defeat the militants and positively contribute to the revival of Afghanistan that it was brought into the international anti-terror coalition with a combination of threat and rewards.
Even if Pakistan had decided to stay neutral, which was not possible because of the circumstances under which the coalition, armed with UN authorisation, arrived to remove the Taliban, nobody would have trusted our neutrality. There is much critique of Pakistan making a U-turn on the Taliban and making many concessions to the Americans, but what is ignored is how Pakistans national interests would have suffered had it decided to be on the wrong side. Moral stands work well for individuals, but not for states when it comes to the national interest. The moral standing of states is judged solely on how they defend their interests.
While it will remain contested whether Pakistan has been able to secure its national interests by cooperating so closely with the US in the war on terror, it should be noted that terrorists do not respect any state, including Pakistan, or have any respect for humanity. They have hurt Pakistan badly, and their ability to hurt us has grown stronger, not weaker.
On the other hand, our relations with Afghanistan and the US have been tense over the last two years. As the Taliban insurgency has grown in strength, so has the blame game of Pakistan not doing enough to prevent militants from crossing over into Afghanistan. But this is a responsibility NATO and US forces share with Pakistan. Given the nature of the terrain and the border, no country can effectively check the movement of militants. This is a collective challenge, not the individual responsibility of Pakistan.
The question is: why are militants crossing the border into Afghanistan not attacked or arrested? Some may be, but a good number of them slip through. The problem is that interdicting the militants would require stationing a large number of ground forces along the border, which neither the US nor NATO wishes to do. Pakistan has the largest concentration of forces along the Durand Line. This presence may or may not be effective, but one has to understand the complex nature of the insurgency and consider the time it will take to defeat it.
Naturally, the surge in violence in Afghanistan has adversely affected relations between coalition partners inside and outside Pakistan. Pakistan has been under pressure to do more for a long time, which has contributed to a straining of relations.
There is now a clear shift in American policy to overtly hit targets inside Pakistan, disregarding the rage it will cause in Pakistan and the pressure it will put on the Pakistani government. No one can defend what American forces have done inside Pakistan.
There are serious questions about American interests as well: can the US really win the war on terror without Pakistans cooperation? Can it really force Pakistan to do whatever it wants done? Rationally speaking, the answer is no to both questions.
But Pakistan is not in a position to join the shrinking list of confrontational states either. It never was, and it cannot become one especially now that it is facing multiple confrontations and an economic meltdown. The plain truth is that the US and Pakistan need each other through this war to stabilise Afghanistan and the tribal borderlands.
Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
http://www,dailytimes.com.pk
Can the US really win the war on terror without Pakistans cooperation? Can it really force Pakistan to do whatever it wants done? Rationally speaking, the answer is no to both questions
The United States is the second superpower in three decades to occupy the same strategic patch across the Khyber Pass as the Soviet Union. Each of the great powers intervened in Afghanistan to defend or install a particular type of regime and reconstruct the country according to its concept of state and society, though under different geopolitical circumstances.
While the Soviet Union retreated from Afghanistan, and soon disintegrated, the United States and its NATO partners have been engaged in assisting security and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan for seven years now. They may stay much longer than originally planned. The twin task of state-building and security against the Taliban insurgency is complicated, and it may be decades before Afghanistan can defend itself and have a functional state.
Foreign intervention in Afghanistan, particularly by the great powers, affected all immediate neighbours politics, society and security. No country in the region has affected developments in Afghanistan or has been impacted more by its wars than Pakistan.
In both superpower interventions, Pakistan has been a key player. In the 1980s, it was on the side of the Afghan Mujahideen and the United States to roll back Soviet aggression. The effects the anti-Soviet frontline role on Pakistani state and society have been deep and lasting. Much of the cult of militancy that Pakistan is facing in the tribal borderlands took shape during the 1980s, and now threatens the stability and security of the country.
The United States and the western world could not escape the consequences of their embrace of Islamist militants in the 1980s either. The Taliban in Afghanistan and their Arab Al Qaeda allies have their origins in the Afghan resistance against the former USSR. The same transnational Islamist militant forces that fought against the Red Army are now confronting their former backers.
The point is that polarisation in and around Afghanistan is too complex and too rooted in past struggles to clearly separate it from the current confrontations. The only thing that has changed is the dominant players in the country and their relations with Pakistan and the militants. The new confrontation in our part of the world is between the Washington-centred global order and the Islamist militants that have sought refuge in countries and areas where state presence is minimal or non-existent. These areas include the tribal areas of Pakistan, where our security forces are fighting the Taliban insurgency.
The spilling over the borders of the Afghan conflict, as has been the case in the past, affects Pakistani state and society in a major way. It was mainly because of Pakistans capacity to defeat the militants and positively contribute to the revival of Afghanistan that it was brought into the international anti-terror coalition with a combination of threat and rewards.
Even if Pakistan had decided to stay neutral, which was not possible because of the circumstances under which the coalition, armed with UN authorisation, arrived to remove the Taliban, nobody would have trusted our neutrality. There is much critique of Pakistan making a U-turn on the Taliban and making many concessions to the Americans, but what is ignored is how Pakistans national interests would have suffered had it decided to be on the wrong side. Moral stands work well for individuals, but not for states when it comes to the national interest. The moral standing of states is judged solely on how they defend their interests.
While it will remain contested whether Pakistan has been able to secure its national interests by cooperating so closely with the US in the war on terror, it should be noted that terrorists do not respect any state, including Pakistan, or have any respect for humanity. They have hurt Pakistan badly, and their ability to hurt us has grown stronger, not weaker.
On the other hand, our relations with Afghanistan and the US have been tense over the last two years. As the Taliban insurgency has grown in strength, so has the blame game of Pakistan not doing enough to prevent militants from crossing over into Afghanistan. But this is a responsibility NATO and US forces share with Pakistan. Given the nature of the terrain and the border, no country can effectively check the movement of militants. This is a collective challenge, not the individual responsibility of Pakistan.
The question is: why are militants crossing the border into Afghanistan not attacked or arrested? Some may be, but a good number of them slip through. The problem is that interdicting the militants would require stationing a large number of ground forces along the border, which neither the US nor NATO wishes to do. Pakistan has the largest concentration of forces along the Durand Line. This presence may or may not be effective, but one has to understand the complex nature of the insurgency and consider the time it will take to defeat it.
Naturally, the surge in violence in Afghanistan has adversely affected relations between coalition partners inside and outside Pakistan. Pakistan has been under pressure to do more for a long time, which has contributed to a straining of relations.
There is now a clear shift in American policy to overtly hit targets inside Pakistan, disregarding the rage it will cause in Pakistan and the pressure it will put on the Pakistani government. No one can defend what American forces have done inside Pakistan.
There are serious questions about American interests as well: can the US really win the war on terror without Pakistans cooperation? Can it really force Pakistan to do whatever it wants done? Rationally speaking, the answer is no to both questions.
But Pakistan is not in a position to join the shrinking list of confrontational states either. It never was, and it cannot become one especially now that it is facing multiple confrontations and an economic meltdown. The plain truth is that the US and Pakistan need each other through this war to stabilise Afghanistan and the tribal borderlands.
Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk
http://www,dailytimes.com.pk
