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Air defence to be strengthened

looks like MarkSien was right, it is very possible PAF will enter in a joint venture with South Africa and their T-Darter.

Denel offered us a partnership in developing a ramjet-powered missile in 1999 and this is after our nuclear tests by the way. insha'Allah, hopefully this means we will jump onto the 5th generation missile bandwagon indigenously.

a joint venture with China and France is highly unlikely, so the idea that Mark had is looking more realistic. we already have leaked info that PAF's H-2 or H-4 are similar to Denel's precision guided glide bomb, the Raptor. which means PAF and Denel cooperation is already there.
Indeed, cooperation with South Africa in advanced AAM technology is fairly likely, but don't discount cooperation with China and France either. There is no doubt that Pakistan will draw from as many areas as possible and cooperate with interested partners to achieve ends. I honestly don't think there is much of an issue working with S.Africa, we are already working quite closely with at least one NATO country - Turkey.

As for SAMs, I think the Spada-2000, BAMSE & possibly ESSM will hold the fort in the Armed Forces until a standard locally produced system is ready. The new SAM would likely be developed in cooperation with South Africa, Turkey, South Korea - i.e. countries seeking to develop similar technology. From countries such as China and France, I expect cooperation in phased-array AESA form radars, data-link & guidance technology...we may require more assistance in solid fuel rocket technology as well.

Now I am wondering if Pakistan would procure the Skyshield AA system to replace Skyguard, or is Turkey planning on developing a system similar in concept. The Turks are already developing standard gun systems like Aselsan STAMP and STOP. IMO such an AA gun system could be useful on naval vessels in conjunction with point-defence missile systems (PDMS) - similar to a SeaRAM configuration.
 
In the recent past, there were news of some contracts for SAM systems by both PAF and PA.

A SAM system's important parts are its radar(s) and its missiles. Here I present some thoughts on the SAM systems and what should be checked in a system before buying it...obviously according to my understanding only.........

Originally I intended to do a full analysis but then I decided not to do so and just mention the earlier errors in a few lines.

A SAM should not be of liquid-fuel motor. Field trials must be done of the radar before buying it, no matter what type of radar. Without telling the exact type, "Reportedly", a radar of Pak Army was jammed during Kargil conflict of 1999.

Now I would search examples of EW from outside Pakistan.

During Iran-Iraq war, an Iranian F-14 Tomcat was destroyed by their own HAWK SAM battery. The HAWk battery personnel insisted that the US E-3 Sentry planted false IFF data into their system. Here it should be mentioned
that US ships and aircrafts helped Iraqis against Iranians till the very end of the war in 1988.(1)

On the 19 July 1988, two Iranian F-14 Tomcats and an F-4E Phantom were shot down by Iraqi Mirage F1Es using french-built Super-530D BVR AAMs. The missiles had homed on radar emissions of the Iranian fighters. At the start

of this combat, the Iranian fighter radars were jammed so they could not use their AIM-54 Phoeinx long-range BVR AAMs.(2)

During the whole Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqis were unable to jam the superior AWG-9 radar of F-14A and Tomcats destroyed lots of Iraqi jets. Near the end of the war, Iraqis managed to defeat the Tomcats.

So keeping radar functional is vital for both a fighter jet, a SAM unit, artillery radars, army air defence units etc. We should shift our attention from beard to radar.

Perhaps one of the main reasons behind the Indian Air purchase of Mirage-2000 was Super-530D.

For the moment, we focus on SAM systems...

Coming back to the current scenario, the possession of Israeli anti-radiation missiles+drones by India poses a threat to all our surveillance and fire-control/tracking radars. AEW&C can help even if the surveillance radars are gone but I think that fire-control radars cant be replaced by it. In the SEAD missions, the main targets are the fire-control/tracking radars, not the surveillance/early warning ones.

TV cameras and IR sensors are used in jamming conditions instead of radar but only at close range. we should try to separate the TV cameras and IR sensors from the tracking/fire-controll radars of the SAM units. TV+IR systems should be installed on separate vehicles and connected to Surveillance and Tracking radars for providing target information. This requirement should also be conveyed to MBDA for the new PAF's SPADA system and in PA's BAMSE. This way TV+IR can be saved in case of anti-rad missile or drone attack or standoff precision attack on the SAM radar.

As the anti-radiation missile hits the antenna of the radar itself (the source of radiation), we may buy several antennas and antenna mounts with the SAM radars. The vehicle on the which fire-control radar is mounted should be
an armoured vehicle with Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) on the top and sides. This armoured vehicle should be prepared separately than those used by army because the army armoured vehicles and tanks use a thinner armour at the top. The armour and ERA shall ensure the safety of crew inside.

In Bekaa Valley conflict of 1982, the Israeli drones caused the syrian SAM units to believe them as actual aircraft and fired all ready-to-fire missiles on them. This opened a window of opportunity for the Isr AF to attack the SAM
units before the reloading of launchers. Normally the speed of flying objects is visible clearly on the radar screens. It is amazing if SAM radars were fooled by slow-speed drones. If they were jet drones, then its understandable. Jet drones were used successfully in Vietnam war too, ending in 1975.

However we can draw two lessons. First the SAM radar must be capable of measuring the true RCS of the target. Field tests should be carried out to see if the radar can distinguish between a fighter and a drone with radar reflectors and a UAV. Secondly, the SAM units be capable of quick reloading, not more than a few seconds for those rounds that are lying in-line. This means that there must be ready-to-load rounds in addition to ready-to-fire rounds on the launcher. Taking more rounds from the supply vehicle and loading them on the launcher may take a long time. For example the Roland-3 short-range (8km) SAM, which reloads automatically in 10 seconds. SPADA/BAMSE should be checked in this regard.

Intelligent computer algorithms in the SAM can make it resistant to jamming and fooling. As fighters carry self-defence jammers and there are always jamming efforts in any conflict, home-on-radar and home-on-jam modes in
the SAM system will be a real progress. Missile seeker shall home on any jamming emitter. Pakistan can demand to
install these home-on-jam/home-on-radiation modes in SPADA/BAMSE or in future orders. But I believe these things are not new, they are in use from decades and by now must be incorporated in standard military hardware.

Another important algorithm, which is perhaps also used by AMRAAM, is the rejection of chaff, jaff, emissive chaff, absroptive chaff and towed decoys by the SAM radar. Emissive chaff are special because they emit IR energy too,
making it efficient against heat-seeker missiles too. The aircraft flies fast but the chaff,jaff etc start losing velocity soon and the difference of relative velocities is used as alogrithm by the AMRAAM. This should be implemented in our SAMs too. Field trails of the SAM radar should be carried out to test its resistance to all types of chaff and maintaining "lock" of the true target.

Now towed decoys have the same speed as aircraft, here the fire-control radar's capability to measure the true RCS and distinguish between radar decoys and true aircraft is vital. Another successful counter to towed decoys is the ripple fire capability of the SAM battery like that of S-300, SA-15 systems. Even if the first missile hits the towed decoy, the second would score a hit.

Field trails of ripple fire and tracking radar's capability against towed radar decoys must be checked.

Hidden algorithms stored in the PROM chips or other device of the SAM radars must be checked. According to some reports, some Iraqi radars stopped working when the US aircraft made certain in-flight maneuvers. The SAM

manufacturer should give access to the algorithms (eg written in the PROM chips) of the radars and missile itself. Resistance of SAM radar against various known jamming types like noise jamming, barrage jamming, spot jamming,
cross-eye and cross-pole jamming, range gate stealing (RGS), velocity gate stealing etc is the most vital element in the current scenario. Only frequency agility is almost useless. Pulse interval, pulse length, pulse width, scan
pattern of the radars should also be variable in addition to minimum side-lobes.

Since every radar has its limit of power, its hard for a traditional radar to counter the jamming completely. keeping in view this fact, "burn-through range" of tracking radar must be known against typical jammers. If the SAM
battery uses multiple tracking radars, then the distance between radars can be made equal to burn-through range against the most-likely jammer.

A solution to this problem may be AESA technology. For future, at least the tracking radars should be changed to AESA technology, while the early warning one can remain as usual, because they need long range and it is said that if we increase the T/R modules in AESA for better resistance to jamming, its range reduces. If not AESA, then counter techniques may be adopted, without gaurantee of success. The future integration of an AESA radar with SAM batteries may be included in contract.

I dont know if PAF and Pak Army have conducted such field trials before finalizing thier SAM systems. I hope they have done them. The Indo-Israeli cooperation in militray ECM equipment means we must ready ourself for a tougher electronic battle. For us this is defensive, as SAM is only a defense asset.

Even if some trials are not done and are being done now, and if we find them not satisfactory, we can reduce the numbers ordered, if we cant cancel the contract.

when the Iran or Greece bought their SA-15 SAM systems, they did field trials and the results were communicated to the people. It would be worthwhile to share the details of non-confidential field trails, if any, with the public.

Also we should more and more go towards tailor-made solutions instead of selecting one SAM from the market. I would appreciate the Indian development of BRAHMOS, they did not select just one system from those available in the market. They set their specifications and then saw how they can be fulfilled.

On this forum, the members always just point out available SAMs in the market, why not make ur specifications and give them to european or russian company for development or co-development with Pakistan like the Indian BRAHMOS project. It can be a joint project with tracking radars from west and early warning radar, missile and carrying vehicles from Russia with a completey new idea of guidance like the Track-via-missile was a new and jam-resisant method some time ago.

Deployment Strategies?......it is not a completely different topic from that of technincal aspects of SAM but still need be discussed in a separate post in future.
 
In the recent past, there were news of some contracts for SAM systems by both PAF and PA.

A SAM system's important parts are its radar(s) and its missiles. Here I present some thoughts on the SAM systems and what should be checked in a system before buying it...obviously according to my understanding only.........

Originally I intended to do a full analysis but then I decided not to do so and just mention the earlier errors in a few lines.

A SAM should not be of liquid-fuel motor. Field trials must be done of the radar before buying it, no matter what type of radar. Without telling the exact type, "Reportedly", a radar of Pak Army was jammed during Kargil conflict of 1999.

Now I would search examples of EW from outside Pakistan.

During Iran-Iraq war, an Iranian F-14 Tomcat was destroyed by their own HAWK SAM battery. The HAWk battery personnel insisted that the US E-3 Sentry planted false IFF data into their system. Here it should be mentioned
that US ships and aircrafts helped Iraqis against Iranians till the very end of the war in 1988.(1)

On the 19 July 1988, two Iranian F-14 Tomcats and an F-4E Phantom were shot down by Iraqi Mirage F1Es using french-built Super-530D BVR AAMs. The missiles had homed on radar emissions of the Iranian fighters. At the start

of this combat, the Iranian fighter radars were jammed so they could not use their AIM-54 Phoeinx long-range BVR AAMs.(2)

During the whole Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqis were unable to jam the superior AWG-9 radar of F-14A and Tomcats destroyed lots of Iraqi jets. Near the end of the war, Iraqis managed to defeat the Tomcats.

So keeping radar functional is vital for both a fighter jet, a SAM unit, artillery radars, army air defence units etc. We should shift our attention from beard to radar.

Perhaps one of the main reasons behind the Indian Air purchase of Mirage-2000 was Super-530D.

For the moment, we focus on SAM systems...

Coming back to the current scenario, the possession of Israeli anti-radiation missiles+drones by India poses a threat to all our surveillance and fire-control/tracking radars. AEW&C can help even if the surveillance radars are gone but I think that fire-control radars cant be replaced by it. In the SEAD missions, the main targets are the fire-control/tracking radars, not the surveillance/early warning ones.

TV cameras and IR sensors are used in jamming conditions instead of radar but only at close range. we should try to separate the TV cameras and IR sensors from the tracking/fire-controll radars of the SAM units. TV+IR systems should be installed on separate vehicles and connected to Surveillance and Tracking radars for providing target information. This requirement should also be conveyed to MBDA for the new PAF's SPADA system and in PA's BAMSE. This way TV+IR can be saved in case of anti-rad missile or drone attack or standoff precision attack on the SAM radar.

As the anti-radiation missile hits the antenna of the radar itself (the source of radiation), we may buy several antennas and antenna mounts with the SAM radars. The vehicle on the which fire-control radar is mounted should be
an armoured vehicle with Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) on the top and sides. This armoured vehicle should be prepared separately than those used by army because the army armoured vehicles and tanks use a thinner armour at the top. The armour and ERA shall ensure the safety of crew inside.

In Bekaa Valley conflict of 1982, the Israeli drones caused the syrian SAM units to believe them as actual aircraft and fired all ready-to-fire missiles on them. This opened a window of opportunity for the Isr AF to attack the SAM
units before the reloading of launchers. Normally the speed of flying objects is visible clearly on the radar screens. It is amazing if SAM radars were fooled by slow-speed drones. If they were jet drones, then its understandable. Jet drones were used successfully in Vietnam war too, ending in 1975.

However we can draw two lessons. First the SAM radar must be capable of measuring the true RCS of the target. Field tests should be carried out to see if the radar can distinguish between a fighter and a drone with radar reflectors and a UAV. Secondly, the SAM units be capable of quick reloading, not more than a few seconds for those rounds that are lying in-line. This means that there must be ready-to-load rounds in addition to ready-to-fire rounds on the launcher. Taking more rounds from the supply vehicle and loading them on the launcher may take a long time. For example the Roland-3 short-range (8km) SAM, which reloads automatically in 10 seconds. SPADA/BAMSE should be checked in this regard.

Intelligent computer algorithms in the SAM can make it resistant to jamming and fooling. As fighters carry self-defence jammers and there are always jamming efforts in any conflict, home-on-radar and home-on-jam modes in
the SAM system will be a real progress. Missile seeker shall home on any jamming emitter. Pakistan can demand to
install these home-on-jam/home-on-radiation modes in SPADA/BAMSE or in future orders. But I believe these things are not new, they are in use from decades and by now must be incorporated in standard military hardware.

Another important algorithm, which is perhaps also used by AMRAAM, is the rejection of chaff, jaff, emissive chaff, absroptive chaff and towed decoys by the SAM radar. Emissive chaff are special because they emit IR energy too,
making it efficient against heat-seeker missiles too. The aircraft flies fast but the chaff,jaff etc start losing velocity soon and the difference of relative velocities is used as alogrithm by the AMRAAM. This should be implemented in our SAMs too. Field trails of the SAM radar should be carried out to test its resistance to all types of chaff and maintaining "lock" of the true target.

Now towed decoys have the same speed as aircraft, here the fire-control radar's capability to measure the true RCS and distinguish between radar decoys and true aircraft is vital. Another successful counter to towed decoys is the ripple fire capability of the SAM battery like that of S-300, SA-15 systems. Even if the first missile hits the towed decoy, the second would score a hit.

Field trails of ripple fire and tracking radar's capability against towed radar decoys must be checked.

Hidden algorithms stored in the PROM chips or other device of the SAM radars must be checked. According to some reports, some Iraqi radars stopped working when the US aircraft made certain in-flight maneuvers. The SAM

manufacturer should give access to the algorithms (eg written in the PROM chips) of the radars and missile itself. Resistance of SAM radar against various known jamming types like noise jamming, barrage jamming, spot jamming,
cross-eye and cross-pole jamming, range gate stealing (RGS), velocity gate stealing etc is the most vital element in the current scenario. Only frequency agility is almost useless. Pulse interval, pulse length, pulse width, scan
pattern of the radars should also be variable in addition to minimum side-lobes.

Since every radar has its limit of power, its hard for a traditional radar to counter the jamming completely. keeping in view this fact, "burn-through range" of tracking radar must be known against typical jammers. If the SAM
battery uses multiple tracking radars, then the distance between radars can be made equal to burn-through range against the most-likely jammer.

A solution to this problem may be AESA technology. For future, at least the tracking radars should be changed to AESA technology, while the early warning one can remain as usual, because they need long range and it is said that if we increase the T/R modules in AESA for better resistance to jamming, its range reduces. If not AESA, then counter techniques may be adopted, without gaurantee of success. The future integration of an AESA radar with SAM batteries may be included in contract.

I dont know if PAF and Pak Army have conducted such field trials before finalizing thier SAM systems. I hope they have done them. The Indo-Israeli cooperation in militray ECM equipment means we must ready ourself for a tougher electronic battle. For us this is defensive, as SAM is only a defense asset.

Even if some trials are not done and are being done now, and if we find them not satisfactory, we can reduce the numbers ordered, if we cant cancel the contract.

when the Iran or Greece bought their SA-15 SAM systems, they did field trials and the results were communicated to the people. It would be worthwhile to share the details of non-confidential field trails, if any, with the public.

Also we should more and more go towards tailor-made solutions instead of selecting one SAM from the market. I would appreciate the Indian development of BRAHMOS, they did not select just one system from those available in the market. They set their specifications and then saw how they can be fulfilled.

On this forum, the members always just point out available SAMs in the market, why not make ur specifications and give them to european or russian company for development or co-development with Pakistan like the Indian BRAHMOS project. It can be a joint project with tracking radars from west and early warning radar, missile and carrying vehicles from Russia with a completey new idea of guidance like the Track-via-missile was a new and jam-resisant method some time ago.

Deployment Strategies?......it is not a completely different topic from that of technincal aspects of SAM but still need be discussed in a separate post in future.


very informative and interesting thx for the information..........:yahoo::yahoo:
 
Behind Enemy Lines

Almost everyone of this forum would have seen this movie, and for me the best scene was the SAM vs F/A-18E duel. But I think that duel was not realistic. I want to share it with you guys, some experts may explain it.
In the movie,it is shown that the SAM "follow" the tail of aircraft or does a pure pursuit trajectory. While the documentaries and books show that a missile aims for the expected point in space where the aircraft "will" be in next seconds............not where the aircraft "is" right now.......

In other words, a missile follows a collision course with aircraft.......mostly through proportional navigation..... It means that the Director of the movie did not have the knowledge of SAMs???????? what u guys think?
 
Behind Enemy Lines

Almost everyone of this forum would have seen this movie, and for me the best scene was the SAM vs F/A-18E duel. But I think that duel was not realistic. I want to share it with you guys, some experts may explain it.
In the movie,it is shown that the SAM "follow" the tail of aircraft or does a pure pursuit trajectory. While the documentaries and books show that a missile aims for the expected point in space where the aircraft "will" be in next seconds............not where the aircraft "is" right now.......

In other words, a missile follows a collision course with aircraft.......mostly through proportional navigation..... It means that the Director of the movie did not have the knowledge of SAMs???????? what u guys think?

If I'm not wrong pure heat-seeking missiles do need to "follow" the aircraft.

Radar guided missiles do not need to follow the aircraft but can do so.

I may be wrong though.
 
oh, there is an important base for chinese air force, but on this forum, i do think it is suitable to say something more concisely.
 
Behind Enemy Lines

Almost everyone of this forum would have seen this movie, and for me the best scene was the SAM vs F/A-18E duel. But I think that duel was not realistic. I want to share it with you guys, some experts may explain it.
In the movie,it is shown that the SAM "follow" the tail of aircraft or does a pure pursuit trajectory. While the documentaries and books show that a missile aims for the expected point in space where the aircraft "will" be in next seconds............not where the aircraft "is" right now.......

In other words, a missile follows a collision course with aircraft.......mostly through proportional navigation..... It means that the Director of the movie did not have the knowledge of SAMs???????? what u guys think?

In the movie, Behind Enemy Lines, it was a cartoon type show, director just wanted to create excitement in the scene, nothing real.
Actually , The the movie depicted the actual scenes of an F-16, which was shot down in Bosnia by Russian made SA-6 missile. SA-6 is a radar guided and it is not a 'Fire & Forget' type. I dont think, once it misses the target it can be streered back to the target aircarft. Reason being, it has its own proximity sensor fuze. And if set on proximity destruction mode, missile will explode, when it is maximum near to aircraft.
All SAM missile have a feature to self destruct in air after determined time of flight. This is because, missile do not cause any damage if they fall on ground.

The movie showed unlimited capacity of rocket motor of the missile to keep it flying. Wrong. Missile rocket motors burn for a specific time(definitely not to an extent, as shown in BEL), before its fuel is exhauseted, and missile become a dud and starts falling on ground like a rock. Yet by this time, the serlf destructive mechanism has already functioned.
 
A interesting Video about the Pakistan Air defence !

 
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1.we have ca 2500 Anti -air -craft -Guns from 35mm- to 37mm to 57mm.

2.Also about 10000 12,7mm Anti air craft Guns for low level action against Aircraft!

3.We have ca. 4000-5000 AnzaI-III Manpads

4.We have ca. 200-300 Stinger!

4. We have ca. 500-1000 RBS ( Manpads)

5. We have ca. 500-1000 Mistral ( Manpads)

6. We have ca. 300 Skygurads Guns !

7. We have 15-25 Crotale Batteries

All this systems, stations, batteries works in the cooperation of a radar and will cooperate with the new Awacs !

Sir with due respect Skyguards,crotale,Stingers,Mistrals all old as many as 30 years or so they do not offer better airdefence against a fighter jet who flies higher and faster than those jets against those systems was made only RBS and Spada are good other wise it is run on a park for IAF they just keep talking for last 20 years nothing have hapened we need more Anti airfcraft new guns 3 types of airdefence missile systems look india what they have got AKASHMissile, Israeli Dome system , Russian S 300 what we have nothing we need more work to be done in SAM sites and radars for pakistan if we can't get those from USA and russia go for Germany france and UK we can get these systems from them
 
Tunguska-M1 is a gun/missile system for low-level air defence. The system was designed by the KBP Instrument Design Bureau in Tula, Russia and is manufactured by the Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant, Ulyanovsk, Russia. It can engage targets while stationary and on the move, using missiles for long-range targets and guns for close-in defence. It is designed for defence against both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters and can also fire on ground targets.

Tunguska entered service with the Russian army in 1988 and has been exported to Germany, India, Peru and Ukraine. Morocco ordered 12 Tunguska M1 systems in December 2004.

ARMAMENT

The Tunguska-M1 vehicle carries eight 9M311-M1 surface-to-air missiles. The missile (NATO designation SA-19 Grison) has semi-automatic radar command to line-of-sight guidance, weighs 40kg with a 9kg warhead. It is 2.5m long with a diameter of 1.7m and wingspan of 2.2m. The missile's maximum speed is 900m/s and can engage targets travelling at speeds up to 500m/s. Range is from 15 to 6,000m for ground targets and 15 to 10,000m for air targets.

Two twin-barrel 30mm anti-aircraft guns are mounted on the vehicle. These guns have a maximum firing rate of 5,000 rounds per minute and a range of 3,000m against air targets. This extends to 4,000m against ground targets.

FIRE CONTROL

The system has target acquisition radar and target tracking radar, optical sight, digital computing system, tilt angle measuring system and navigation equipment. Radar detection range is 18km and tracking range is 16km.

VEHICLE

The Tunguska-M1 system is mounted on a 34t tracked vehicle with multi-fuel engine. It has hydromechanical transmission, hydropneumatic suspension which allows for changing road clearance and hydraulic track-tensioning. The armoured turret has both laying and stabilisation drives and power supply. Air-conditioning, heating and filtration systems are fitted.

A Tunguska-M1 battery is composed of up to six vehicles and will also include a transloader as well as maintenance and training facilities.

The armoured turret has both laying and stabilisation drives and power supply. Air-conditioning, heating and filtration systems are fitted. A Tunguska-M1 battery is composed of up to six vehicles and will also include a transloader as well as maintenance and training facilities.




The THAAD (theatre high-altitude area defence) missile system is an easily transportable defensive weapon system to protect against hostile incoming threats such as tactical and theatre ballistic missiles at ranges of 200km and at altitudes up to 150km.

The THAAD system provides the upper tier of a 'layered defensive shield' to protect high value strategic or tactical sites such as airfields or populations centres. The THAAD missile intercepts exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric threats.

The sites would also be protected with lower and medium-tier defensive shield systems such as the Patriot PAC-3 which intercepts hostile incoming missiles at 20 to 100 times lower altitudes.

THAAD programme
The US Army is expected to acquire 80 to 99 THAAD launchers, 18 ground-based radars and a total of 1,422 THAAD missiles. Two THAAD battalions are planned, each with four batteries.

"The target object data and the predicted intercept point are downloaded to the missile prior to launch."In 1992 Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space and other industrial team partners were awarded a $689m contract to develop the THAAD system. Raytheon was selected as sub-contractor to develop the ground-based radar.

Raytheon is responsible for the solid-state receiver / transmitter modules. TRW is responsible for software development. The other main contractors are Raytheon for the traveling wave tubes, Datatape for the data recorders and EBCO for radar turrets.

The THAAD programme entered the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase in 2000. In May 2004, production of 16 flight test missiles began at Lockheed Martin's new production facilities in Pike County, Alabama.

Flight testing, at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, of the EMD system began in 2005. The first flight test of the entire system including missile, launcher, radar and fire control system took place in May 2006. Flight testing began at Pacific Missile Range, Kauai, Hawaii in January 2007 with a successful intercept test in the high endo-atmosphere.

A second successful test took place in April 2007 with intercept in the mid endo-atmosphere. The final White Sands test took place in June 2007, with a low endo-atmosphere test. In October 2007, THAAD performed a successful intercept of a unitary target outside the atmosphere (exo-atmospheric). In June 2008, THAAD successfully intercepted a separating target in mid-endo-atmosphere. Tests will continue at PMR till 2009.

In January 2007, Lockheed Martin was awarded a contract for the first two production THAAD systems, to include six launchers, 48 missiles, two radars and two tactical operations centers. Initial operating capability (IOC) is expected in 2009.

In May 2008, the US Army activated the first THAAD battery unit at Fort Bliss, Texas, which will receive 24 missiles, three launchers, one fire control and one radar unit for initial fielding. This is in preparation for full system fielding in 2009.

In August 2007, Lockheed Martin announced that THAAD launcher, fire control and communications units will be built at its Camden, Arkansas facility. The THAAD interceptor is built at its Pike County facility in Troy, Alabama.

In September 2008, the United Arab Emirates requested the sale of three THAAD fire units, 147 missiles, four THAAD radars, six fire control stations and nine launchers.

Battery
The THAAD battery will typically operate nine launch vehicles each carrying eight missiles, with two mobile tactical operations centres (TOCs) and a ground-based radar (GBR).

THAAD missile information
The target object data and the predicted intercept point are downloaded to the missile prior to launch. The updated target and intercept data are also transmitted to the missile in flight.

The missile is 6.17m in length and is equipped with a single stage solid fuel rocket motor with thrust vectoring. The rocket motor is supplied by Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne. The launch weight is 900kg.

"The THAAD (theatre high-altitude area defence) missile system is an easily transportable defensive weapon."A separation motor is installed at the interstage at the forward end of the booster section. The separation motor assists in the separation of the kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) and the spent boost motor.

The shroud separates from the KV before impact. The KV is equipped with a liquid-fuelled divert and attitude control system (DACS), developed by Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, for the terminal maneuvering towards the target intercept point.

A gimbal-mounted infrared seeker module in the nose section provides terminal homing to close in on the target missile in the terminal phase of approach.

During the initial fly-out phase of flight, the seeker window is covered with a two-piece clamshell protection shroud. Metal bladders installed in the shroud are inflated to eject the protective shroud before the seeker initiates target acquisition. The infrared seeker head, developed by BAe Systems, is an indium antimonide (InSb) staring focal plane array operating in the mid infrared 3 to 5 micron wavelength band.

M1075 truck-mounted launcher
There are nine M1075 truck mounted launchers in a typical THAAD battery. Launch vehicle is a modified Oshkosh Truck Corporation heavy expanded mobility tactical truck with load-handling system (HEMTT-LHS). The 12m-long by 3.25m-wide launch vehicle carries ten missile launch containers. While on the launcher, lead acid batteries provide the primary power. The batteries are recharged with a low-noise generator.

After firing, reloading the launch vehicle takes 30 minutes.

Ground-based radar
The cueing for the THAAD system is provided by the Raytheon Systems AN/TPY-2 ground-based radar (GBR) for surveillance, threat classification and threat identification. THAAD can also be cued by military surveillance satellites such as Brilliant Eyes.

The ground based radar units are C-130 air transportable. The AN/TPY-2 radar uses a 9.2m² aperture full field of view antenna phased array operating at I and J bands (X band) and containing 25,344 solid-state microwave transmit and receive modules. The radar has the capability to acquire missile threats at ranges up to 1,000km.

The first production radar is being tested at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. In September 2004, the THAAD radar tracked a tactical ballistic missile, cueing a successful intercept by a Patriot PAC-3 missile. A second radar was delivered to White Sands in June 2007.

Tactical operations centre

Each THAAD battery has two tactical operations centres (TOC). The TOC has been developed by Northrop Grumman, formerly Litton Data Systems Division. The TOC accommodates two operator stations and is equipped with three Hewlett-Packard HP-735 data processors.

"The THAAD missile uses kinetic energy, hit-to-kill technology."Mobile BMC3I units
The THAAD system is able to 'hand over' targets to other defence systems and can cue the targets to other weapons. THAAD is able to interface to other US or allied air defence data information networks and to the battle management and command control and communications centre.

Northrop Grumman has been contracted to develop the THAAD BMC3I. The battle management and command, control, computers and intelligence (BMC3I) units are installed in hardened shelters mounted on high-mobility multi-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs).

The THAAD communications system can use JTIDS, mobile subscriber equipment, SINCGARS and the joint tactical terminal for voice and data communications and for intelligence data transfer.




The Aster 30 SAMP/T (sol-air moyenne portée terrestre or surface-to-air medium range / land) is a land-based air defence system effective against high-speed threats such as tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, combat aircraft and UCAVs (unmanned combat air vehicles). The missile system has been developed by Eurosam, jointly owned by MBDA Missile Systems and Thales.

The French Ministry of Defence has placed orders for six SAMP/T systems for the French Army and six systems for the French Air Force. Eurosam has received an order for six SAMP/T systems for the Italian Army.

Full-scale development of the Aster 30 missile and the SAMP/T started in 1990, with production engineering and initial volume production in 1997. Qualification firing trials began in 1999.

The first qualification trial involving the whole system took place in July 2005. The successful trial included target acquisition and tracking by the Arabel radar and interception of a C-22 target at an altitude of 7,000m and range of 26km. A second successful test took place in December 2005. The third and final test took place in November 2006 and involved interception of the target at altitude 3,000m and range 11km.

SAMP/T began operational evaluation with the French and Italian armies in May 2008 with two successful test firings. Operational acceptance tests were concluded with the Italian Army and French Air Force in July 2008. In December 2008, a successful firing test took place, incorporating software changes suggested by the technical evaluation, prior to the delivery of the first serial production system to the French Air Force. SAMP/T is scheduled to enter service in late 2009.

MBDA is developing the ASTER block 2 missile for the SAMP/T launcher, which will have longer range and, with different trajectories, will be effective against future ballistic missile threats.

SAMP/T battery
A typical SAMP/T battery includes a command and control vehicle, Arabel radar and up to six transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicles, each with eight missiles and a store of reload missiles. The missile TEL vehicles are dispersed to launch sites located up to 10km from the Arabel radar.

The SAMP/T system uses MAGICS (modular architecture for graphics and image console systems) and MARA (modular architecture for real-time applications) computers.

"The Aster 30 SAMP/T (sol-air moyenne portée) is a land-based air defence system."The Arabel multi-function radar acquires and tracks the targets. The command system evaluates, prioritises and designates the targets. The data on primary and secondary targets is downloaded to the missile launchers and seeker and data link frequency channels are allocated.

The missile is launched and as it turns over in flight towards the target, the target's position and velocity data are transmitted via the uplink channel at one second intervals.

Arabel radar
The SAMP/T uses an upgraded version of the Arabel radar, with improved performance developed under the Aster 30 block 1 upgrade program, in order to extend the system's capability against higher speed targets and higher altitude targets. The SAMP/T system can intercept at 600km range (short range ballistic missile targets).

The Thales Arabel radar is a 3D phased array radar for surveillance, tracking and missile guidance. The rectangular, 4,000-element, phased array antenna rotates at one revolution a second. Arabel operates in the eight to 13GHz X band (I/J band) with 360° azimuthal and -5° to 90° elevation scanning.

The system can track up to 100 targets simultaneously and manage the uplink transmission of command update data to 16 missiles simultaneously. The standard Arabel radar operates at 150kW peak power and has a range of 100km.

The beam can be shaped to optimise the performance. The radar uses frequency agility and pulse compression ECCM (electronic counter-countermeasures) techniques.

Land vehicle
For the French Army, the SAMP/T is mounted on a Renault 8x4 Kerax transporter erector launcher vehicle or a similar vehicle. Each vehicle is fitted with eight ready-to-fire missile containers and all eight missiles from a single launcher can be salvo-fired in under ten seconds.

"The successful Aster SAMP/T trial included target acquisition and tracking by the Arabel radar."The SAMP/T for the Italian Army will be mounted on Astra 8x8 transporter erector launcher trucks, each truck with eight missiles.

Aster 30 block 1 missiles
SAMP/T uses Aster 30 block 1 missiles which are equipped with a modified seeker, fuse, signal processing and a directional blast warhead where larger warhead fragments are directed towards the target.

The Aster 30 missile has a tandem first stage solid propellant booster motor which is jettisoned after launch and turn-over and before the mid-course phase. The first stage booster motor, developed by Fiat Avio, has length 2.3m, weight 340kg, burn time 3.5 seconds. It has two steerable nozzles to provide the missile with thrust vector control during the initial stage of flight.

After jettisoning the first stage booster motor, the second stage missile has a weight of 110kg, length of 2.6m and diameter of 18cm. The body of the missile carries four long rectangular wings and four blunt-tipped triangular control fins at the rear. The second stage missile is fitted with solid propellant sustainer motor. The sustainer motor efflux tube carries the uplink receiver and the fin actuators.

The missile uses inertial mid-course guidance, with guidance correction update data being transmitted from the ground-based fire control centre via the Arabel multifunction radar's uplink data channel. The Sagem Agyle inertial guidance unit is fitted with a Sistemi Inersiali inertial guidance reference system and a Sagem miniature laser gyroscope.

The missile uses 'pilotage en force' (PIF) fine-controlled side thrust exhaust for manoeuvrability in the final phase of flight just before intercept, to ensure that the missile is within 2m of the target when the warhead is detonated. The missile's PIF system comprises a solid propellant gas generator which exhausts through four lateral nozzles in the long rectangular wings at a point close to the missile's centre of gravity.

The missile does not role in the final phase of flight. The guidance control system commands the PIF system to exhaust through one or two nozzles generating a controlled sideways thrust pulling up to 60g acceleration.

The missile and the target approach each other on a reciprocal flight path. As the missile approaches the target in the terminal phase, the missile uses an active pulse Doppler radar seeker, a derivative of the AD4 seeker design which incorporates a high-power travelling wave tube transmitter and wide antenna deflection, to home in on the target.

"Aster 30 SAMP/T has the capability to intercept targets at altitudes from 50m to 20km."The seeker is laid on the target using data transmitted via the ground to missile uplink. Once seeker lock-on has been conformed the missile operates autonomously. The modifications to the seeker include higher closing velocity capability, an adjustment to the duty cycle to increase the transmitted power, an additional high resolution range function, and modified target lock-on and tracking algorithms. The seeker has ECCM including home on jam and clutter suppression. The programmable J-band pulse Doppler AD4A radar seeker manufactured by Thales and Selex Sistemi Integrati, operates at 12GHz to 18GHz.

The missile, which weighs typically 100kg at target intercept, is fitted with a 15kg directional blast fragmentation warhead designed by Fiat Avio and MBDA. The warhead is fitted with a Ku-band proximity fuse, which generates a constant working pseudo random phase digital coded waveform. The warhead is loaded with two types of fragments, 4g and larger fragments, which are directed towards the target.

Performance
The maximum speed of Aster 30 is 1.4km/sec. Aster 30 has the capability to intercept targets at altitudes from 50m to 20km. Against aircraft targets flying at altitudes above 3km, the maximum range of the Aster 30 is 100km. At aircraft targets with altitudes below 3km, the range of Aster 30 is 50km.


The Aster 30 SAMP/T system is highly automated – it can fire eight missiles in ten seconds from each launcher, engage up to ten targets simultaneously and can be operated by two people.

we just went all out too short range air defence system we need more batteries for medium range system to help our spada system along too and buy good anti aircraft gun pantysr from russian it is damn good man and also thaad along with S 300 or Patriotic system will make life difficult for IAF pilots and IAF too
 
THAAD in action.

 
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Agreed with india getting Pak=fe we should have four different types of high altitudes of SAM system until we get our own stealth fighter jet
 

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