pakistani342
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I must protest a bit - I was hoping for a more rigorous debate where you use references and structured arguments - I feel you have made assertions without really backing them up and you have not responded point by point to the arguments that I have presented.
Never the less I think I'll respond to this post in two or three posts because there is simply a lot to cover.
I think we're jumping ahead here - we should look at the trends, facts, compare them to similar situations in other regions/countries/times.
I feel we are going in circles - but I guess I'll give it one more go at least.
I think your logic is flawed, at least how you are presenting your arguments. They don't seem to build on a -> b, b->c and hence a -> c; let me illustrate:
1. I find it hard how you make the inference that since the Afghans are not concerned about the Taliban they face a promising future -- this is akin to saying that an overweight man who does not care about his high calorie intake will fare well health wise? or am I missing something here.
2. Now onto this: "Afghans ask is why are we giving so much attention to a proxy group, make institutions stronger, focus on the economy and the Taliban will be irrelevant." - of course the part about *institutions stronger* would be nirvana but the open questions (and I'll venture some answers) are:
a. can Afghans pay for these institutions: not really not in the next ten years (see below)?
b. is the World going to continue to pay for a kleptocratic Afghan regime - unlikely - the world has no strong affinity or apathy towards the Afghan people - everyone wishes you well, but everyone has their own problems which I hope you understand take precedence over yours. I think it was Stephen Cohen who once quipped that Pakistan would be treated at par with Congo had it not had nuclear weapons - I would encourage you to see how the Congo is faring in terms of international support - that is a realistic baseline if you want to see how Afghanistan will fare past 2014 - and by the way Congo's human development index is 0.534, Afghanistan's is 0.374 and Pakistan's is 0.515
c. Do Afghans have the capacity to build their institutions - no - again see my earlier comments on the available talent pool - as a yard stick the skills shortage is so acute that even the hated semi skilled Pakistani workers have to be brought in to work on construction gigs - now extrapolate this to experienced, schooled technocrats - another example, the ANA is the most trusted institution in Afghanistan yet roughly 90% of recruits do not have a 3rd grade schooling, 9/10 (need a reference) are drug addicts and 30% of the force deserts every year.
d. Can the Afghans leverage their mineral resources given the outlined challenges - no - I would encourage your to read up on two phenomenon: "stranded gas" and "the resource curse" - further you can see how the investors at Aynak, Haji Gak, Amu-Darya Basin are all scaling back - again we're talking about the Afghans tapping these resource over the next 10 years not 20-50 years. Oh and did I forget you are a landlocked nation with poor relations with the neighbors that really matter: Pakistan and Iran.
3. Now onto: "Have you seen the reaction of the Afghan of the government and the civil society to the opening of the Taliban office" - the reading of the sharp reaction of the Afghan government and nascent Afghan civil society by journalistic publications was more of fear rather than indifference - not knowing more about this point I would tend to agree with the fear interpretation: if the prospect of the Taliban being accommodated in a Lebanon style formula was pure fantasy it would not have resulted in a full court press by the Afghan elite (no ?)
4. On: "hey think that peace talk is worth a shot but not at the expense of what we have achieved over the last 10 years" - I think the point of "not at the expense of ..." is really moot - it's more a matter of what you can afford and what you cannot afford - do the current stake holders in the current Afghan dispensation have the wherewithal to keep the Taliban at bay no not - that is simply the questions [for example you can see that even Pakistan with it's much better trained and lead military and much bigger economy is having a hard time effectively dealing with the Taliban]
More on your other points later.
Never the less I think I'll respond to this post in two or three posts because there is simply a lot to cover.
Although I can acknowledge some of your points but I don’t share your gloomy picture of the current state and the future of Afghanistan.
I think we're jumping ahead here - we should look at the trends, facts, compare them to similar situations in other regions/countries/times.
To be frank Afghans are more concerned with corruption in the state apparatus than the Taliban, Afghans ask is why are we giving so much attention to a proxy group, make institutions stronger, focus on the economy and the Taliban will be irrelevant. Have you seen the reaction of the Afghan of the government and the civil society to the opening of the Taliban office, they think that peace talk is worth a shot but not at the expense of what we have achieved over the last 10 years.
I feel we are going in circles - but I guess I'll give it one more go at least.
I think your logic is flawed, at least how you are presenting your arguments. They don't seem to build on a -> b, b->c and hence a -> c; let me illustrate:
1. I find it hard how you make the inference that since the Afghans are not concerned about the Taliban they face a promising future -- this is akin to saying that an overweight man who does not care about his high calorie intake will fare well health wise? or am I missing something here.
2. Now onto this: "Afghans ask is why are we giving so much attention to a proxy group, make institutions stronger, focus on the economy and the Taliban will be irrelevant." - of course the part about *institutions stronger* would be nirvana but the open questions (and I'll venture some answers) are:
a. can Afghans pay for these institutions: not really not in the next ten years (see below)?
b. is the World going to continue to pay for a kleptocratic Afghan regime - unlikely - the world has no strong affinity or apathy towards the Afghan people - everyone wishes you well, but everyone has their own problems which I hope you understand take precedence over yours. I think it was Stephen Cohen who once quipped that Pakistan would be treated at par with Congo had it not had nuclear weapons - I would encourage you to see how the Congo is faring in terms of international support - that is a realistic baseline if you want to see how Afghanistan will fare past 2014 - and by the way Congo's human development index is 0.534, Afghanistan's is 0.374 and Pakistan's is 0.515
c. Do Afghans have the capacity to build their institutions - no - again see my earlier comments on the available talent pool - as a yard stick the skills shortage is so acute that even the hated semi skilled Pakistani workers have to be brought in to work on construction gigs - now extrapolate this to experienced, schooled technocrats - another example, the ANA is the most trusted institution in Afghanistan yet roughly 90% of recruits do not have a 3rd grade schooling, 9/10 (need a reference) are drug addicts and 30% of the force deserts every year.
d. Can the Afghans leverage their mineral resources given the outlined challenges - no - I would encourage your to read up on two phenomenon: "stranded gas" and "the resource curse" - further you can see how the investors at Aynak, Haji Gak, Amu-Darya Basin are all scaling back - again we're talking about the Afghans tapping these resource over the next 10 years not 20-50 years. Oh and did I forget you are a landlocked nation with poor relations with the neighbors that really matter: Pakistan and Iran.
3. Now onto: "Have you seen the reaction of the Afghan of the government and the civil society to the opening of the Taliban office" - the reading of the sharp reaction of the Afghan government and nascent Afghan civil society by journalistic publications was more of fear rather than indifference - not knowing more about this point I would tend to agree with the fear interpretation: if the prospect of the Taliban being accommodated in a Lebanon style formula was pure fantasy it would not have resulted in a full court press by the Afghan elite (no ?)
4. On: "hey think that peace talk is worth a shot but not at the expense of what we have achieved over the last 10 years" - I think the point of "not at the expense of ..." is really moot - it's more a matter of what you can afford and what you cannot afford - do the current stake holders in the current Afghan dispensation have the wherewithal to keep the Taliban at bay no not - that is simply the questions [for example you can see that even Pakistan with it's much better trained and lead military and much bigger economy is having a hard time effectively dealing with the Taliban]
More on your other points later.