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Afghan endgame: US withdraws military equipment via Pakistan
- Thread starter Devil Soul
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Racial Tolerance Map Shows Most And Least Racially Welcoming Countries Globally
Do you think Britain is an intolerant society?
With all the talk of "immigrants taking our jobs", Islam being "incompatible" with being British not to mention swathes of MPs wanting to retreat behind our borders to fend off the rest of Europe, you'd be forgiven for thinking the answer is "yes".
Well, some new research has vindicated Brits and shows we are perhaps a more welcoming society than the headlines would lead you to believe.
Two Swedish economists embarked upon a project to test whether economic freedom made people more or less racist.
The findings were then translated into this map by the Washington Post. Red areas show high levels of intolerance, blue low levels.
Participants in the study were asked to identify people they would not want to live next to.
One of the options was "people of a different race" which is the response shown on the map.
A few points of note:
Western countries and Latin America appear to be the most tolerant
India is by far the most intolerant closely followed by Jordan, Bangladesh and Hong Kong
Pakistan, sandwiched between India and Iran, is surprisingly tolerant
While the methodology may not be foolproof the visualisation of the data does make for interesting viewing.
As for the the original study, the two Swedish researchers concluded there was no correlation between economic freedom and racial tolerance.
Interestingly however, they did find a link between economic freedom and tolerance towards homosexuals.
Racial Tolerance Map
The things I do to prove people wrong
Devil Soul
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Afghan revelations: Pakistan-US secret diplomacy created Doha roadmap
ISLAMABAD: Months-long painstaking and secret negotiations involving Islamabad and Washington have yielded a detailed roadmap for steering negotiations with the Afghan Taliban which will start to unfold with the release of five Afghan prisoners from Guantanamo Bay and the return of the captured US soldier PFC Bowe Bergdahl, at present in Taliban custody.
While the opening of the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar, has captured headlines across the world, wide-ranging interviews with highly-placed diplomatic, military and foreign office sources reveal that this office is but one of the many elements of a complex process, the ultimate aim of which is for all stakeholders in Afghanistan to share power through an inclusive election process under a possibly modified Afghanistan constitution.
“The journey begins now and if all goes well should co-terminate with the exit of the American combat troops and holding of elections in Afghanistan that brings everyone onboard,” says a diplomatic source who has been involved in this process.
Other elements of this process are complete reconciliation with the Taliban led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, multiple-level dialogue between the Taliban and non- Pashtoon groups, agreement on the constitutional framework to govern Afghanistan after safe and trouble-free exit of the US forces from the Afghan soil, gradual cessation of kinetic operations and crucially, dispensing with Hamid Karzai in the political sense in case he tries to subvert peace efforts.
There is little doubt in anyone’s mind that this road is slippery and with no guaranteed success. However, a near-complete and rare alignment of views between the US administration and Pakistan’s policymakers achieved through a robust and out-of-media-glare talks has created space for ‘pulling this one off’, says the source. “There has been some direct dialing between Pakistan and John Kerry, the US secretary of state, working under clear guidelines from president Obama,” says one of Pakistan’s top negotiators.
This direct dialing sometimes bypassed the US embassy in Islamabad while Pakistan’s mission in Washington too stayed pretty much on the margins of what was transpiring between the two capitals.
The main issues that the two sides have had to grapple with all centered around the Taliban’s core leadership led by Mullah Omar.
“The Americans had three solutions for the Taliban problem. First, the Alpha solution, was to beat them into submission and retard their capacity to fight permanently. This failed. The Bravo solution was to fight them hard through a troop surge and force them to accept Afghanistan’s new realities like the presentday Afghan constitution and the leadership of president Karzai. That too did not work. The third, the Charlie solution, was more of a compulsion. Accept Taliban as a legitimate power in Afghanistan, talk to them, accommodate their main demands even it meant abandoning assets like Karzai. I think you are looking at the Charlie solution being played out,” says a military official.
The clearest indication of this radical shift in the US outlook towards the Taliban is in their acceptance that the onceroundly condemned Haqqani Network is essential to peace and deserves to be on the table in Doha. The Haqqanis, who dominate Afghanistan’s troubled and violence-infested eastern provinces, have been Washington hard-liners’ favourite punching bag and recipient of most of the military operations conducted by Isaf and Nato led by the US. Declared as international terrorists their leaders have also been the focus of drone attacks inside Pakistan besides being at the centre of the US accusations of Pakistan being a sanctuary and a safe haven for forces killing American soldiers in Afghanistan.
“The Haqqanis are no longer the bull’s eye of US military operations. They are no longer in the ‘kill or capture and be rewarded’ category. They are part and parcel of the team that would represent Mullah Omar with which Washington is deeply engaged,” says another source at the foreign office.
This ‘deep engagement’ is trilateral and would not have come about without Washington getting exhausted with its stand-alone efforts to cultivate the Taliban minus Islamabad. Pakistani officials say that Washington tried several dialogue processes, in many capitals of the world, some even with low-ranking members of the Haqqani Network, but each time they hit a dead end. No faction could move ahead without the sanction of the Taliban top leadership.
As the costs of war in Afghanistan mounted, and the withdrawal deadline neared, the Obama administration found itself in a bind that could only be circumvented if Mullah Omar agreed to be part of the dialogue.
“The hardliners among the Taliban ranks did not want to give any space to US forces. They had realised that by stalemating international forces they had actually won militarily. They would not concede an inch of diplomatic space to the US who, in their perception, had lost out in the battlefield,” explained a high-ranking foreign office official involved in talking to the Taliban.
“It was then Pakistan’s turn to use its influence even though everyone in Washington had deep doubts about the Taliban showing flexibility. Our pitch to the Taliban was that by becoming part of the dialogue process they could gain international sanction, end conflict peacefully and achieve their goals of foreign forces exiting their country much more swiftly than through perpetual conflict that offered total victory to nobody.
“We also had to argue long and hard with Washington to change the sequence of its demands and instead of asking for the Taliban to straightway accept the Afghan constitution and abjure violence let confidence-building measures take place that would start the process of reconciliation,” says the foreign office official. The same sources also said that the real breakthrough in these negotiations came through personal diplomacy between John Kerry and Pakistan’s Army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.
“With the election fever gripping the country the (outgoing) government in Pakistan had lost all interest in even looking at the notes of some of these important meetings much less taking active interest in spearheading the country’s role in this regard. Kerry-Kayani duo was the centerpiece of this heightened diplomacy. The two had an excellent equation even before Kerry became the secretary of state. Now they talk more frequently than anyone in the press gets to report on,” said the foreign office source.
What transpires in these frequent calls is anybody’s guess, but this interaction did yield a crucial breakthrough a few weeks ago when the Taliban shared a draft of their statement with Washington which was seen and appreciated by everyone at the State Department and the White House.
“The Taliban in that statement had shown an unequivocal commitment to peace and the constitutional process achieved through dialogue besides reiterating the stance that they would not let their soil be used for attacking the US. The same statement also included a critical element of the Taliban distancing themselves from al Qaeda,” says a diplomatic source who worked closely with Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul and claims to have seen several drafts of that letter. This statement was to be followed by statements of approval from Qatar, Pakistan and of course Washington, joined in by other western powers.
“This was much more than Washington was hoping to get out of the Taliban. Frankly, the situation that the US was in, they could have simply settled for the Taliban becoming part of the electoral process,” said a foreign office source. Washington’s glee was reflected in a string of congratulatory calls and messages senior diplomatic and military officers started to receive upon getting the final draft of the Taliban statement.
“This showed what a big deal it was for them (in Washington),” said the same source.
Prior to this engagement with Washington Pakistan also facilitated a quiet and effective dialogue process between the non-Pashtoon forces (the Northern Alliance) and the Taliban in which the two sides at a senior level agreed to bury the hatchet and work jointly for stabilising Afghanistan.
“This was a big breakthrough because this made our peace efforts truly all-inclusive and curtailed the voices of discord and divisiveness that could have raised questions about our motives”, said a senior military source.
One such voice was and continues to be that of Afghanistan’s maverick president Hamid Karzai, who according to Pakistani officials, tried his level best to somehow prevent a direct interface between the Americans and the Taliban and create an impression that he and not Islamabad holds the key to the Afghan endgame.
“Even in opening the office of the Taliban in Doha his concern was that this should be done through his offices in Kabul, an effort that had no takers from any other quarter and therefore fell flat,” says a senior foreign office official.
Karzai’s increasing isolation was proven yet again when Washington, his main backer, stopped counting on him and accepted direct dialogue with the Taliban as the mainstay of their diplomatic push in Afghanistan. This fulfilled a major demand of the Taliban leadership that does not recognise the government in Kabul and wants to have no truck with Karzai.
The beleaguered Afghan president got squeezed on the other fronts as well. As non- Pasthoons began to open up to the Taliban even the High Peace Council, headed distanced itself from the daily barrage of Karzai’s brutal criticism of Pakistan.
A diplomatic source shared with this scribe some contents of recent meetings between Pakistani officials and members of the High Peace Council which clearly indicate a gaping chasm between them and Karzai. He is variously described as ‘unstable’, ‘a threat to Afghan peace’ and even as a ‘poisonous roadblock’.
Unfortunately for Karzai Washington increasingly finds itself in agreement with these assessments, some of which echo those done by senior US officials themselves of the man. That is why when day before yesterday the Afghanistan president raised hell over the Taliban’s office in Doha styling itself as a mission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Washington calmed him down and itself downplayed this characterisation to dilute his accusation that the Taliban were ‘rogues only he could handle’, said a foreign diplomat.
However, the Afghan president’s retribution has been swift. His suspension of talks with the United States on a new security deal, to protest the way his government was being left out of initial peace negotiations with the Taliban, is his most vocal statement of anger of so far.
“In view of the contradiction between acts and the statements made by the United States of America in regard to the peace process, the Afghan government suspended the negotiations, currently under way in Kabul between Afghan and US delegations on the bilateral security agreement,” Karzai’s statement said.
But that might backfire because Washington is about the only international player willing to put up with Karzai. Pakistan has not pulled any punches against Karzai. Islamabad’s military negotiators have curtly told Washington that they “can either save their man (Karzai) or Afghan peace”. Pakistan has shared volumes of evidence with Washington of the Afghan president’s deliberate encouragement of forces operating against Pakistan from across the border including, more recently, the directions that came for Kandahar for the attackers of the Quaid’s residency in Ziarat. “We do not rule out the possibility of Kabul-sponsored elements making a last-ditch effort to inflict damage on Pakistan with the approval of President Karzai, whose recent conduct borders on strange behaviour, to say the least,” says a senior government official posted in Balochistan.
Pakistan’s more subtle message to Washington about its aversion to Karzai has been just as firm. Last week’s trilateral meeting involving Afghan and Isaf commanders was supposed to take place in Afghanistan. Pakistan insisted that it should be relocated to Pakistan because Gen Kayani did not want to go to Afghanistan and pay even a courtesy call on Karzai.
“We have left Karzai’s handling to the Americans. He is their man. They invested in him. They should tackle him. We are not pulling any stops for him,” said a high-ranking foreign office source.
The newly-elected prime minister, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who is now in charge of the country’s foreign and defence policies, got an early indication of how complex the Afghanistan peace process has become and how central is the role that the country he leads is playing in taking it forward. He dropped the idea of visiting Kabul any time soon immediately after this proposal was floated in the media. Since then he has been holding regular meetings with the army chief in the presence of Sartaj Aziz, special advisor on national security and foreign affairs, and key members of his core team including Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif.
“Most of these meetings have been about the big events happening around us including the Afghan peace process,” said a federal cabinet minister.
The prime minister’s briefings on Afghanistan have been detailed and a full extent of the background has been given to him. According to foreign office sources the prime minister is ‘fully clued up’ and on the day of the opening of the Doha office he was informed of all the developments on practically ‘minute-to-minute basis’. Pakistan Muslim League sources confirm that the first visitor to call on premier Sharif after he was sworn in was General Kayani and the major portion of this meet-up was ‘developments in Afghanistan’.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 20th, 2013.
ISLAMABAD: Months-long painstaking and secret negotiations involving Islamabad and Washington have yielded a detailed roadmap for steering negotiations with the Afghan Taliban which will start to unfold with the release of five Afghan prisoners from Guantanamo Bay and the return of the captured US soldier PFC Bowe Bergdahl, at present in Taliban custody.
While the opening of the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar, has captured headlines across the world, wide-ranging interviews with highly-placed diplomatic, military and foreign office sources reveal that this office is but one of the many elements of a complex process, the ultimate aim of which is for all stakeholders in Afghanistan to share power through an inclusive election process under a possibly modified Afghanistan constitution.
“The journey begins now and if all goes well should co-terminate with the exit of the American combat troops and holding of elections in Afghanistan that brings everyone onboard,” says a diplomatic source who has been involved in this process.
Other elements of this process are complete reconciliation with the Taliban led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, multiple-level dialogue between the Taliban and non- Pashtoon groups, agreement on the constitutional framework to govern Afghanistan after safe and trouble-free exit of the US forces from the Afghan soil, gradual cessation of kinetic operations and crucially, dispensing with Hamid Karzai in the political sense in case he tries to subvert peace efforts.
There is little doubt in anyone’s mind that this road is slippery and with no guaranteed success. However, a near-complete and rare alignment of views between the US administration and Pakistan’s policymakers achieved through a robust and out-of-media-glare talks has created space for ‘pulling this one off’, says the source. “There has been some direct dialing between Pakistan and John Kerry, the US secretary of state, working under clear guidelines from president Obama,” says one of Pakistan’s top negotiators.
This direct dialing sometimes bypassed the US embassy in Islamabad while Pakistan’s mission in Washington too stayed pretty much on the margins of what was transpiring between the two capitals.
The main issues that the two sides have had to grapple with all centered around the Taliban’s core leadership led by Mullah Omar.
“The Americans had three solutions for the Taliban problem. First, the Alpha solution, was to beat them into submission and retard their capacity to fight permanently. This failed. The Bravo solution was to fight them hard through a troop surge and force them to accept Afghanistan’s new realities like the presentday Afghan constitution and the leadership of president Karzai. That too did not work. The third, the Charlie solution, was more of a compulsion. Accept Taliban as a legitimate power in Afghanistan, talk to them, accommodate their main demands even it meant abandoning assets like Karzai. I think you are looking at the Charlie solution being played out,” says a military official.
The clearest indication of this radical shift in the US outlook towards the Taliban is in their acceptance that the onceroundly condemned Haqqani Network is essential to peace and deserves to be on the table in Doha. The Haqqanis, who dominate Afghanistan’s troubled and violence-infested eastern provinces, have been Washington hard-liners’ favourite punching bag and recipient of most of the military operations conducted by Isaf and Nato led by the US. Declared as international terrorists their leaders have also been the focus of drone attacks inside Pakistan besides being at the centre of the US accusations of Pakistan being a sanctuary and a safe haven for forces killing American soldiers in Afghanistan.
“The Haqqanis are no longer the bull’s eye of US military operations. They are no longer in the ‘kill or capture and be rewarded’ category. They are part and parcel of the team that would represent Mullah Omar with which Washington is deeply engaged,” says another source at the foreign office.
This ‘deep engagement’ is trilateral and would not have come about without Washington getting exhausted with its stand-alone efforts to cultivate the Taliban minus Islamabad. Pakistani officials say that Washington tried several dialogue processes, in many capitals of the world, some even with low-ranking members of the Haqqani Network, but each time they hit a dead end. No faction could move ahead without the sanction of the Taliban top leadership.
As the costs of war in Afghanistan mounted, and the withdrawal deadline neared, the Obama administration found itself in a bind that could only be circumvented if Mullah Omar agreed to be part of the dialogue.
“The hardliners among the Taliban ranks did not want to give any space to US forces. They had realised that by stalemating international forces they had actually won militarily. They would not concede an inch of diplomatic space to the US who, in their perception, had lost out in the battlefield,” explained a high-ranking foreign office official involved in talking to the Taliban.
“It was then Pakistan’s turn to use its influence even though everyone in Washington had deep doubts about the Taliban showing flexibility. Our pitch to the Taliban was that by becoming part of the dialogue process they could gain international sanction, end conflict peacefully and achieve their goals of foreign forces exiting their country much more swiftly than through perpetual conflict that offered total victory to nobody.
“We also had to argue long and hard with Washington to change the sequence of its demands and instead of asking for the Taliban to straightway accept the Afghan constitution and abjure violence let confidence-building measures take place that would start the process of reconciliation,” says the foreign office official. The same sources also said that the real breakthrough in these negotiations came through personal diplomacy between John Kerry and Pakistan’s Army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani.
“With the election fever gripping the country the (outgoing) government in Pakistan had lost all interest in even looking at the notes of some of these important meetings much less taking active interest in spearheading the country’s role in this regard. Kerry-Kayani duo was the centerpiece of this heightened diplomacy. The two had an excellent equation even before Kerry became the secretary of state. Now they talk more frequently than anyone in the press gets to report on,” said the foreign office source.
What transpires in these frequent calls is anybody’s guess, but this interaction did yield a crucial breakthrough a few weeks ago when the Taliban shared a draft of their statement with Washington which was seen and appreciated by everyone at the State Department and the White House.
“The Taliban in that statement had shown an unequivocal commitment to peace and the constitutional process achieved through dialogue besides reiterating the stance that they would not let their soil be used for attacking the US. The same statement also included a critical element of the Taliban distancing themselves from al Qaeda,” says a diplomatic source who worked closely with Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul and claims to have seen several drafts of that letter. This statement was to be followed by statements of approval from Qatar, Pakistan and of course Washington, joined in by other western powers.
“This was much more than Washington was hoping to get out of the Taliban. Frankly, the situation that the US was in, they could have simply settled for the Taliban becoming part of the electoral process,” said a foreign office source. Washington’s glee was reflected in a string of congratulatory calls and messages senior diplomatic and military officers started to receive upon getting the final draft of the Taliban statement.
“This showed what a big deal it was for them (in Washington),” said the same source.
Prior to this engagement with Washington Pakistan also facilitated a quiet and effective dialogue process between the non-Pashtoon forces (the Northern Alliance) and the Taliban in which the two sides at a senior level agreed to bury the hatchet and work jointly for stabilising Afghanistan.
“This was a big breakthrough because this made our peace efforts truly all-inclusive and curtailed the voices of discord and divisiveness that could have raised questions about our motives”, said a senior military source.
One such voice was and continues to be that of Afghanistan’s maverick president Hamid Karzai, who according to Pakistani officials, tried his level best to somehow prevent a direct interface between the Americans and the Taliban and create an impression that he and not Islamabad holds the key to the Afghan endgame.
“Even in opening the office of the Taliban in Doha his concern was that this should be done through his offices in Kabul, an effort that had no takers from any other quarter and therefore fell flat,” says a senior foreign office official.
Karzai’s increasing isolation was proven yet again when Washington, his main backer, stopped counting on him and accepted direct dialogue with the Taliban as the mainstay of their diplomatic push in Afghanistan. This fulfilled a major demand of the Taliban leadership that does not recognise the government in Kabul and wants to have no truck with Karzai.
The beleaguered Afghan president got squeezed on the other fronts as well. As non- Pasthoons began to open up to the Taliban even the High Peace Council, headed distanced itself from the daily barrage of Karzai’s brutal criticism of Pakistan.
A diplomatic source shared with this scribe some contents of recent meetings between Pakistani officials and members of the High Peace Council which clearly indicate a gaping chasm between them and Karzai. He is variously described as ‘unstable’, ‘a threat to Afghan peace’ and even as a ‘poisonous roadblock’.
Unfortunately for Karzai Washington increasingly finds itself in agreement with these assessments, some of which echo those done by senior US officials themselves of the man. That is why when day before yesterday the Afghanistan president raised hell over the Taliban’s office in Doha styling itself as a mission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Washington calmed him down and itself downplayed this characterisation to dilute his accusation that the Taliban were ‘rogues only he could handle’, said a foreign diplomat.
However, the Afghan president’s retribution has been swift. His suspension of talks with the United States on a new security deal, to protest the way his government was being left out of initial peace negotiations with the Taliban, is his most vocal statement of anger of so far.
“In view of the contradiction between acts and the statements made by the United States of America in regard to the peace process, the Afghan government suspended the negotiations, currently under way in Kabul between Afghan and US delegations on the bilateral security agreement,” Karzai’s statement said.
But that might backfire because Washington is about the only international player willing to put up with Karzai. Pakistan has not pulled any punches against Karzai. Islamabad’s military negotiators have curtly told Washington that they “can either save their man (Karzai) or Afghan peace”. Pakistan has shared volumes of evidence with Washington of the Afghan president’s deliberate encouragement of forces operating against Pakistan from across the border including, more recently, the directions that came for Kandahar for the attackers of the Quaid’s residency in Ziarat. “We do not rule out the possibility of Kabul-sponsored elements making a last-ditch effort to inflict damage on Pakistan with the approval of President Karzai, whose recent conduct borders on strange behaviour, to say the least,” says a senior government official posted in Balochistan.
Pakistan’s more subtle message to Washington about its aversion to Karzai has been just as firm. Last week’s trilateral meeting involving Afghan and Isaf commanders was supposed to take place in Afghanistan. Pakistan insisted that it should be relocated to Pakistan because Gen Kayani did not want to go to Afghanistan and pay even a courtesy call on Karzai.
“We have left Karzai’s handling to the Americans. He is their man. They invested in him. They should tackle him. We are not pulling any stops for him,” said a high-ranking foreign office source.
The newly-elected prime minister, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who is now in charge of the country’s foreign and defence policies, got an early indication of how complex the Afghanistan peace process has become and how central is the role that the country he leads is playing in taking it forward. He dropped the idea of visiting Kabul any time soon immediately after this proposal was floated in the media. Since then he has been holding regular meetings with the army chief in the presence of Sartaj Aziz, special advisor on national security and foreign affairs, and key members of his core team including Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif.
“Most of these meetings have been about the big events happening around us including the Afghan peace process,” said a federal cabinet minister.
The prime minister’s briefings on Afghanistan have been detailed and a full extent of the background has been given to him. According to foreign office sources the prime minister is ‘fully clued up’ and on the day of the opening of the Doha office he was informed of all the developments on practically ‘minute-to-minute basis’. Pakistan Muslim League sources confirm that the first visitor to call on premier Sharif after he was sworn in was General Kayani and the major portion of this meet-up was ‘developments in Afghanistan’.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 20th, 2013.
Devil Soul
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Afghan endgame: Doha office may be shut down, Kerry warns Taliban
By Reuters Published: June 23, 2013
DOHA:
US Secretary of State John Kerry put the onus on the Taliban to revive stalled efforts to end Afghanistan’s 12-year-old war and warned the ultraconservative militia on Saturday they might lose their new office in Qatar if the peace bid collapsed.
US officials were due to hold preliminary discussions with the Taliban in Qatar last Thursday, but they were called off after the Afghan government objected to the fanfare surrounding the militants’ opening of an office in Doha.
“We need to see if we can get back on track … I don’t know whether that’s possible or not,” Kerry told a news conference in Qatar. “If there is not a decision … to move forward by the Taliban in short order, then we may have to consider whether or not the office has to be closed.”
Kerry did not spell out what steps he wanted the militants to take to revive the preliminary meeting, but according to Afghan government officials they had been particularly angered by the Taliban’s decoration of their building with a flag and plaques that suggested the group had achieved some level of international recognition.
The decorations had broken agreements on how the build-up to the talks would be handled, the government officials said. The plaques bore the name of the ‘Political Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’, the name the Taliban used for the country when they controlled it.
The Taliban’s flag was later lowered, but not removed. A nameplate outside the office was taken down but a similar one inside was still in place.
US special envoy arrives
Kerry said the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, James Dobbins, had arrived in Qatar for the talks, but added: “We are waiting to find out whether or not the Taliban will respond in order to follow the sequence, which has been very painstakingly established.”
“We have performed our part in good faith. Regrettably, the agreement was not adhered to in the early hours,” Kerry said.
US officials had said the Taliban was expected to use the talks to seek the return of former commanders now held by Washington at Guantanamo Bay. The United States wants the return of the only known US prisoner of war from the conflict, Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who is believed to be held by the Taliban.
Kerry on Saturday declined to comment on the prospect of Taliban prisoners being freed. “It’s just not where the process is,” he said.
By Reuters Published: June 23, 2013
DOHA:
US Secretary of State John Kerry put the onus on the Taliban to revive stalled efforts to end Afghanistan’s 12-year-old war and warned the ultraconservative militia on Saturday they might lose their new office in Qatar if the peace bid collapsed.
US officials were due to hold preliminary discussions with the Taliban in Qatar last Thursday, but they were called off after the Afghan government objected to the fanfare surrounding the militants’ opening of an office in Doha.
“We need to see if we can get back on track … I don’t know whether that’s possible or not,” Kerry told a news conference in Qatar. “If there is not a decision … to move forward by the Taliban in short order, then we may have to consider whether or not the office has to be closed.”
Kerry did not spell out what steps he wanted the militants to take to revive the preliminary meeting, but according to Afghan government officials they had been particularly angered by the Taliban’s decoration of their building with a flag and plaques that suggested the group had achieved some level of international recognition.
The decorations had broken agreements on how the build-up to the talks would be handled, the government officials said. The plaques bore the name of the ‘Political Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’, the name the Taliban used for the country when they controlled it.
The Taliban’s flag was later lowered, but not removed. A nameplate outside the office was taken down but a similar one inside was still in place.
US special envoy arrives
Kerry said the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, James Dobbins, had arrived in Qatar for the talks, but added: “We are waiting to find out whether or not the Taliban will respond in order to follow the sequence, which has been very painstakingly established.”
“We have performed our part in good faith. Regrettably, the agreement was not adhered to in the early hours,” Kerry said.
US officials had said the Taliban was expected to use the talks to seek the return of former commanders now held by Washington at Guantanamo Bay. The United States wants the return of the only known US prisoner of war from the conflict, Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who is believed to be held by the Taliban.
Kerry on Saturday declined to comment on the prospect of Taliban prisoners being freed. “It’s just not where the process is,” he said.
Devil Soul
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Afghan endgame: Pakistan has greatest influence on Taliban, says Af-Pak envoy
By APP Published: June 26, 2013
ISLAMABAD: Acknowledging Pakistan’s “supportive role”, the US special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan James Dobbins said on Tuesday that Pakistan does wield significant influence over the Taliban.
Speaking at the US embassy after talks with the Pakistan leadership during the day, including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Army Chief Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the ambassador said that Pakistan had expressed its commitment to continue its support and to use its influence in the Afghan peace process.
“I don’t think anybody controls the Taliban, but I think Pakistan probably has the greatest influence.”
Dobbins though clarified he said he believes Pakistan does not have a controlling influence on the Taliban, but does enjoy more influence than others.
The envoy also sought to allay Pakistan’s apprehensions it will be abandoned following the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. “History doesn’t necessarily repeat itself, and I think we have learnt some lessons too.”
“We have achieved a fairly stable and positive level and I anticipate we will expand that cooperation.”
Taliban office
Dobbins spoke about the dispute over the Taliban office in Qatar which has threatened to scupper the delicately crafted window to speak peace over Afghanistan.
The dispute arose after the Taliban put up a plaque of “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” and the white flag at their Doha office, which did not go well first with the Afghan President Hamid Karzai and then the US government with the office being seen as a Taliban government in exile.
The envoy said that the United States was the first to react and informed the government of Qatar that it was inconsistent with the assurances given to it before the initiation of talks. He termed the office as a “misunderstanding” and an attempt by the Taliban to “stage a propaganda coup in an exaggerated manner.”
Dobbins said the US then asked for the signs to be removed. “This has been done. We are waiting to see if they [Taliban] are willing to engage.”
Taliban can’t roll clock back
Even as the US gears up for bringing the Taliban back into mainstream by talking with the Taliban, given they are “still a significant military force”, Dobbins ruled out that the group that ruled Afghanistan prior to 2001, would be able to make things as they were once before.
However, he did predict that the situation may get worse once the US troops pull out.
The situation could only get slightly worse Dobbins said, before adding that there was already a civil war in the country, but it could not get worse like in the 90s.
“Afghanistan has changed in fairly fundamental ways that make it difficult for it to get back to a decade or more,” he said and mentioned the large number of schools, hospitals, paved roads and other basic facilities that did now exist in the country.
“They [Taliban] can’t roll the clock back.”
By APP Published: June 26, 2013
ISLAMABAD: Acknowledging Pakistan’s “supportive role”, the US special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan James Dobbins said on Tuesday that Pakistan does wield significant influence over the Taliban.
Speaking at the US embassy after talks with the Pakistan leadership during the day, including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Army Chief Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the ambassador said that Pakistan had expressed its commitment to continue its support and to use its influence in the Afghan peace process.
“I don’t think anybody controls the Taliban, but I think Pakistan probably has the greatest influence.”
Dobbins though clarified he said he believes Pakistan does not have a controlling influence on the Taliban, but does enjoy more influence than others.
The envoy also sought to allay Pakistan’s apprehensions it will be abandoned following the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan. “History doesn’t necessarily repeat itself, and I think we have learnt some lessons too.”
“We have achieved a fairly stable and positive level and I anticipate we will expand that cooperation.”
Taliban office
Dobbins spoke about the dispute over the Taliban office in Qatar which has threatened to scupper the delicately crafted window to speak peace over Afghanistan.
The dispute arose after the Taliban put up a plaque of “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” and the white flag at their Doha office, which did not go well first with the Afghan President Hamid Karzai and then the US government with the office being seen as a Taliban government in exile.
The envoy said that the United States was the first to react and informed the government of Qatar that it was inconsistent with the assurances given to it before the initiation of talks. He termed the office as a “misunderstanding” and an attempt by the Taliban to “stage a propaganda coup in an exaggerated manner.”
Dobbins said the US then asked for the signs to be removed. “This has been done. We are waiting to see if they [Taliban] are willing to engage.”
Taliban can’t roll clock back
Even as the US gears up for bringing the Taliban back into mainstream by talking with the Taliban, given they are “still a significant military force”, Dobbins ruled out that the group that ruled Afghanistan prior to 2001, would be able to make things as they were once before.
However, he did predict that the situation may get worse once the US troops pull out.
The situation could only get slightly worse Dobbins said, before adding that there was already a civil war in the country, but it could not get worse like in the 90s.
“Afghanistan has changed in fairly fundamental ways that make it difficult for it to get back to a decade or more,” he said and mentioned the large number of schools, hospitals, paved roads and other basic facilities that did now exist in the country.
“They [Taliban] can’t roll the clock back.”
Devil Soul
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US considering speeding up Afghan pullout: report
By AFP
July 09, 2013 - Updated 1234 PKT
From Web Edition
WASHINGTON: The United States is seriously considering speeding up the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan because of frustration with President Hamid Karzai, the New York Times reported.
And a so called 'zero option' -- having no US troops in Afghanistan after 2014 -- is also on the cards, the daily said late Monday, quoting US and European officials.
US President Barack Obama is committed to ending the US military involvement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, and his administration has been negotiating with Kabul about leaving behind a "residual force."
But Obama's relationship with Karzai has been deteriorating and suffered a big and new blow last month with an effort by the United States to open peace talks with the Taliban in Qatar.
Karzai opposed the talks, and halted negotiations with the Americans on a long-term security deal needed to keep US forces in Afghanistan after 2014, the Times said.
To defuse tensions, the two presidents spoke by videoconference June 27 but it went badly, the paper said, quoting American and Afghan officials familiar with the exchange.
They said Karzai accused the United States of trying to negotiate a separate peace with both the Taliban and Pakistan. Karzai felt this would leave his country exposed to its enemies.
No decision has been made on the pace of the US pullout or how many US troops to leave behind, the report said. Officials say the goal is still to reach a long term security deal.
But negotiating stances are hardening, the Times quoted officials as saying.
"There has always been a zero option, but it was not seen as the main option," said one senior Western official in Kabul. "It is now becoming one of them, and if you listen to some people in Washington, it is maybe now being seen as a realistic path."
The official added however that he hoped the Afghans were beginning to realize that the zero option is a distinct possibility.
Currently, half of the 68,000 US troops in Afghanistan are set to exit by February, and the newly-trained Afghan army and police are increasingly taking the lead in the security battle.
By AFP
July 09, 2013 - Updated 1234 PKT
From Web Edition
WASHINGTON: The United States is seriously considering speeding up the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan because of frustration with President Hamid Karzai, the New York Times reported.
And a so called 'zero option' -- having no US troops in Afghanistan after 2014 -- is also on the cards, the daily said late Monday, quoting US and European officials.
US President Barack Obama is committed to ending the US military involvement in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, and his administration has been negotiating with Kabul about leaving behind a "residual force."
But Obama's relationship with Karzai has been deteriorating and suffered a big and new blow last month with an effort by the United States to open peace talks with the Taliban in Qatar.
Karzai opposed the talks, and halted negotiations with the Americans on a long-term security deal needed to keep US forces in Afghanistan after 2014, the Times said.
To defuse tensions, the two presidents spoke by videoconference June 27 but it went badly, the paper said, quoting American and Afghan officials familiar with the exchange.
They said Karzai accused the United States of trying to negotiate a separate peace with both the Taliban and Pakistan. Karzai felt this would leave his country exposed to its enemies.
No decision has been made on the pace of the US pullout or how many US troops to leave behind, the report said. Officials say the goal is still to reach a long term security deal.
But negotiating stances are hardening, the Times quoted officials as saying.
"There has always been a zero option, but it was not seen as the main option," said one senior Western official in Kabul. "It is now becoming one of them, and if you listen to some people in Washington, it is maybe now being seen as a realistic path."
The official added however that he hoped the Afghans were beginning to realize that the zero option is a distinct possibility.
Currently, half of the 68,000 US troops in Afghanistan are set to exit by February, and the newly-trained Afghan army and police are increasingly taking the lead in the security battle.
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Pakistani journalist and Afghan expert Ahmed Rashid discusses with David Watts the potential crises facing Afghanistan once foreign forces withdraw.
Devil Soul
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Afghanistan Forces Will Need Help Beyond 2014: Pentagon
Civilian Casualties Up 23 Pct In Afghan War: UN
WASHINGTON, July 31, (Agencies): The Pentagon said Tuesday it is offering no “zero option” for the number of troops that would remain in Afghanistan after the US combat mission ends in December 2014. It said in a report to Congress that “substantial” long-term military support will be needed to ensure that Afghans can hold off the Taliban insurgency.
The White House has not ruled out leaving no troops behind after 2014, although officials say the most likely option is a residual training force of roughly 9,000.
In its twice-a-year report to Congress on war progress, the Pentagon said Afghanistan’s military is growing stronger but will require a lot more training, advising and foreign financial aid after the American and NATO combat mission ends.
The Pentagon’s assessment was an implicit rejection of the “zero option.” Zero is considered an unlikely choice by President Barack Obama, not least because his administration has pledged to stand with the Afghans for the long term. But Obama has grown frustrated in his dealings with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Peter Lavoy, the Pentagon’s top Afghan policy official, told a news conference that a number of post-2014 options have been developed, taking into account the Afghans’ need for additional training and advising, as well as what the Pentagon views as a longer-term requirement for US counterterrorism forces in Afghanistan.
“In none of these cases have we developed an option that is zero,” Lavoy said.
It remains possible that the administration will be left with no option other than zero if it cannot successfully negotiate a security deal with Kabul that gives the US a legal basis for having forces in Afghanistan after 2014.
Talks on a security deal began last year but have made little recent headway. Karzai suspended negotiations following a disagreement this month over a Taliban political office in the Gulf state of Qatar that was to host peace talks. The office, which has the support of the United States and other countries, infuriated Karzai after the Taliban opened it with a display of the name and flag it used when it ruled Afghanistan. Relations between Afghanistan and the United States plunged after that incident.
In its report to Congress, which is required by law every six months, the Pentagon made no recommendation on the number of US troops to keep in Afghanistan after 2014. There are currently about 60,000 US troops there – down from a 2010 peak of 100,000 – and the total is to shrink to 34,000 by February.
Meanwhile, civilian casualties in the Afghan war rose 23 percent in the first half of this year due to Taliban attacks and increased fighting between insurgents and government forces, the UN said Wednesday.
The increase reverses a decline in 2012 and raises questions about how Afghan government troops can protect civilians as US-led NATO troops withdraw from the 12-year war against the Taliban.
The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) said 1,319 civilians died and 2,533 were injured as a result of the war from January 1 to June 30, up 23 percent on the same period in 2012.
UNAMA said there was a 14 percent increase in total civilian deaths and a 28 percent increase in total civilian injuries.
Female civilian casualties rose 61 percent, most caused by fighting on the ground between pro-government and insurgent forces, the UN said in a report.
Child casualties were up 30 percent with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the Taliban weapon of choice, the leading cause.
“The rise in civilian casualties in the first half of 2013 reverses the decline recorded in 2012, and marks a return to the high numbers of civilian deaths and injuries documented in 2011,” the report said.
The UN said 74 percent of the casualties were caused by insurgents, nine percent by pro-government forces and 12 percent as a result of ground fighting between the two sides.
Civilian Casualties Up 23 Pct In Afghan War: UN
WASHINGTON, July 31, (Agencies): The Pentagon said Tuesday it is offering no “zero option” for the number of troops that would remain in Afghanistan after the US combat mission ends in December 2014. It said in a report to Congress that “substantial” long-term military support will be needed to ensure that Afghans can hold off the Taliban insurgency.
The White House has not ruled out leaving no troops behind after 2014, although officials say the most likely option is a residual training force of roughly 9,000.
In its twice-a-year report to Congress on war progress, the Pentagon said Afghanistan’s military is growing stronger but will require a lot more training, advising and foreign financial aid after the American and NATO combat mission ends.
The Pentagon’s assessment was an implicit rejection of the “zero option.” Zero is considered an unlikely choice by President Barack Obama, not least because his administration has pledged to stand with the Afghans for the long term. But Obama has grown frustrated in his dealings with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Peter Lavoy, the Pentagon’s top Afghan policy official, told a news conference that a number of post-2014 options have been developed, taking into account the Afghans’ need for additional training and advising, as well as what the Pentagon views as a longer-term requirement for US counterterrorism forces in Afghanistan.
“In none of these cases have we developed an option that is zero,” Lavoy said.
It remains possible that the administration will be left with no option other than zero if it cannot successfully negotiate a security deal with Kabul that gives the US a legal basis for having forces in Afghanistan after 2014.
Talks on a security deal began last year but have made little recent headway. Karzai suspended negotiations following a disagreement this month over a Taliban political office in the Gulf state of Qatar that was to host peace talks. The office, which has the support of the United States and other countries, infuriated Karzai after the Taliban opened it with a display of the name and flag it used when it ruled Afghanistan. Relations between Afghanistan and the United States plunged after that incident.
In its report to Congress, which is required by law every six months, the Pentagon made no recommendation on the number of US troops to keep in Afghanistan after 2014. There are currently about 60,000 US troops there – down from a 2010 peak of 100,000 – and the total is to shrink to 34,000 by February.
Meanwhile, civilian casualties in the Afghan war rose 23 percent in the first half of this year due to Taliban attacks and increased fighting between insurgents and government forces, the UN said Wednesday.
The increase reverses a decline in 2012 and raises questions about how Afghan government troops can protect civilians as US-led NATO troops withdraw from the 12-year war against the Taliban.
The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) said 1,319 civilians died and 2,533 were injured as a result of the war from January 1 to June 30, up 23 percent on the same period in 2012.
UNAMA said there was a 14 percent increase in total civilian deaths and a 28 percent increase in total civilian injuries.
Female civilian casualties rose 61 percent, most caused by fighting on the ground between pro-government and insurgent forces, the UN said in a report.
Child casualties were up 30 percent with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the Taliban weapon of choice, the leading cause.
“The rise in civilian casualties in the first half of 2013 reverses the decline recorded in 2012, and marks a return to the high numbers of civilian deaths and injuries documented in 2011,” the report said.
The UN said 74 percent of the casualties were caused by insurgents, nine percent by pro-government forces and 12 percent as a result of ground fighting between the two sides.
Devil Soul
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As Afghanistan endgame looms, a deadly edge to India-Pakistan rivalry
By Reuters Published: August 13, 2013
BARAMULLA / NEW DELHI: Pakistan-based militants are preparing to take on India across the subcontinent once Western troops leave Afghanistan next year, several sources say, raising the risk of a dramatic spike in tensions between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan.
Intelligence source in India believe that a botched suicide bombing of an Indian consulate in Afghanistan, which was followed within days last week by a lethal cross-border ambush on Indian soldiers in disputed Kashmir, suggest that the new campaign by Islamic militants may already be underway.
Members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militant outfit in Pakistan, the group blamed for the 2008 commando-style raid on Mumbai that killed 166 people, told Reuters they were preparing to take the fight to India once again, this time across the region.
And a US counter-terrorism official, referring to the attack in Afghanistan, said “LeT has long pursued Indian targets, so it would be natural for the group to plot against them in its own backyard”.
Given the quiet backing – or at least blind eye – that many militant groups enjoy from Pakistan’s shadowy intelligence services, tensions from a new militant campaign are bound to spill over. Adding to the volatility, the two nations’ armies are trading mortar and gunfire across the heavily militarised frontier that divides Kashmir, and accusing each other of killing troops.
Hindu-majority India and Islamic Pakistan have fought three wars since independence in 1947 and came close to a fourth in 1999. The tension now brewing may not escalate into open hostilities, but it could thwart efforts to forge a lasting peace and open trade between two countries that make up a quarter of the world’s population.
“With the Americans leaving Afghanistan, the restraint on the Pakistani security/****** establishment is going too,” said a former top official at India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the external intelligence arm.
“We are concerned about 2014 in either scenario. If the jihadis claim success in Afghanistan, they could turn their attention to us. Equally, if they fail, they will attack in wrath.”
But Pakistan, which has a border with India to the east and with Afghanistan to the west, has concerns of its own. It sees India’s expansive diplomacy in Afghanistan as a ploy to disrupt it from the rear as it battles its own deadly militancy and separatist forces. Vying for influence in a post-2014 Afghanistan, it worries about India’s assistance to the Afghan army, heightening a sense of encirclement.
“I’m shocked by these allegations. Pakistan has its own insurgency to deal with. It has no appetite for confrontations abroad,” said a Pakistani foreign ministry official referring to the Indian charges of stirring trouble in Afghanistan and on the Kashmir border.
“If anything, we are looking at our mistakes from the past very critically. These accusations are baseless. India needs to act with more maturity and avoid this sort of propaganda.”
Both US Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry spoke during visits to India recently of the need for New Delhi and Islamabad to resume their stalled peace process as the region heads into a period of uncertainty.
Full-scale jihad
At the core of that uncertainty is the pullback of militants from Afghanistan as US forces head home.
Hafiz Sayeed, founder of the LeT, has left no doubt that India’s side of Kashmir will become a target, telling an Indian weekly recently: “Full-scale armed Jihad (holy war) will begin soon in Kashmir after American forces withdraw from Afghanistan.”
The retreat of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 brought a wave of guerrillas into Kashmir to fight India’s rule there.
This time the additional risk will be the rivalry between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan itself, one that threatens to become as toxic as the 60-year dispute in Kashmir. The LeT has said it is fighting Indian forces in Afghanistan as well.
A senior LeT source in Pakistan told Reuters: “It is correct that the LeT cooperates with the Afghan Taliban (insurgents) when there is a question of attacking Indian interests.”
Tensions between India and Pakistan escalated last week after five Indian soldiers were killed close to the de facto border in Kashmir. India says Pakistani Special Forces joined militants to ambush a night patrol, a charge Pakistan denies.
Just days earlier, three men drove an explosives-laden car towards India’s consulate in the Afghan city of Jalalabad, near the border with Pakistan. The blast missed its target and killed nine civilians, six of them young Islamic scholars in a mosque.
It is too early to say conclusively who was behind these and other attacks, but Indian and Afghan officials see in them the handiwork of the LeT and its allies. Such groups have doubled their attempts to cross into Indian-controlled Kashmir this year, according to Indian defence ministry statistics.
The result has been the first increase in Kashmir militant violence since a 2003 ceasefire on the border, which led to a decline in attacks, partly because Pakistan and the ****** groups were preoccupied with Afghanistan during this time.
In the first eight months of this year, 103 casualties in militant-related violence were recorded in Indian Kashmir, compared to 57 in the same period of 2012, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, a think tank.
$10 million bounty
LeT was founded in 1990 in eastern Afghanistan by Sayeed, a Pakistani Islamic scholar whom India accuses of masterminding the rampage in Mumbai. The United States placed a $10 million bounty on his head for his alleged role in the attack, but he remains a free man in Pakistan, where he preached to thousands last week.
Although the group has global ambitions, LeT’s primary aim is to end India’s rule in Muslim-majority Kashmir. India and Pakistan each control a part of the heavily militarised land of lakes and orchards once known as “paradise on earth” and both assert claims over the whole Himalayan territory.
LeT has been working this year with several other outfits to train and push more Pakistani militants over the heavily guarded border into India’s side, a veteran LeT fighter told Reuters in Pakistan.
“Jihad is being stimulated and various militant outfits are cooperating with each other under the platform of the United Jihad Council,” said the veteran, referring to an umbrella body.
Pakistan’s new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, came to power in May vowing to improve ties with India and – until last week’s flare-up along the Kashmir border – the two sides looked set to resume talks. Their prime ministers were planning to meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York next month.
The trouble is, says a retired senior Pakistani diplomat, there are “spoilers” on both sides who are not interested in seeing a rapprochement. In Pakistan, these include the militant groups, which he said operate independently.
“They don’t seem to be able to control other non-government actors like the LeT. So that’s the biggest worry,” he said.
The Pakistan military’s refusal to dismantle groups such as LeT infuriates New Delhi and fuels hawkish demands for the kind of tough action that would risk escalation.
The senior LeT source in Pakistan denied the group was involved in the failed consulate strike in Afghanistan, but officials in New Delhi – citing intelligence intercepts – said they had been forewarned abo ut LeT-trained hit squads plotting the attack.
Pakistan, whose intelligence agency is regularly accused of quietly supporting Afghan Taliban insurgents, says India’s aid and missions are cover for carrying out covert operations there.
“Jalalabad was a message from the ISI in a long line of such messages,” said an Indian intelligence official, referring to Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).
Tight security
Further east, on the line dividing Kashmir between Pakistan and India, ceasefire violations are up 80 percent compared to last year, according to India. On Friday night, the two armies exchanged 7,000 rounds of mortar and gunfire, according to Indian media.
Anti-Indian sentiment in Kashmir provides fertile ground for groups seeking to revive the militancy that roiled the region through the 1990s, but New Delhi has two things in its favour.
First, despite the uptick, violence in the state is still close to the record low it reached last year. Second, the Indian army has to a large extent sealed the rugged, fenced and land-mined border that divides Kashmir, leaving militants with a critically small number of cadres and weapons.
“We cannot send jihadists into India in big numbers like in the past because of tight security at the Indian side,” the LeT source in Pakistan said.
Speaking on the lawn of his official bungalow in the restive Indian town of Baramulla, JP Singh, the police chief for northern border operations, told Reuters the army and police had stopped most attempted militant crossings this year.
Still, India is preparing for an influx.
“(Pakistan’s) agents and their proteges, the militants, are getting disengaged from the Afghan border and they have nowhere else to keep them and engage them, other than to push them to Kashmir,” Singh said. “Their presence inside Pakistan is dangerous for the internal security of Pakistan.”
By Reuters Published: August 13, 2013
BARAMULLA / NEW DELHI: Pakistan-based militants are preparing to take on India across the subcontinent once Western troops leave Afghanistan next year, several sources say, raising the risk of a dramatic spike in tensions between nuclear-armed rivals India and Pakistan.
Intelligence source in India believe that a botched suicide bombing of an Indian consulate in Afghanistan, which was followed within days last week by a lethal cross-border ambush on Indian soldiers in disputed Kashmir, suggest that the new campaign by Islamic militants may already be underway.
Members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militant outfit in Pakistan, the group blamed for the 2008 commando-style raid on Mumbai that killed 166 people, told Reuters they were preparing to take the fight to India once again, this time across the region.
And a US counter-terrorism official, referring to the attack in Afghanistan, said “LeT has long pursued Indian targets, so it would be natural for the group to plot against them in its own backyard”.
Given the quiet backing – or at least blind eye – that many militant groups enjoy from Pakistan’s shadowy intelligence services, tensions from a new militant campaign are bound to spill over. Adding to the volatility, the two nations’ armies are trading mortar and gunfire across the heavily militarised frontier that divides Kashmir, and accusing each other of killing troops.
Hindu-majority India and Islamic Pakistan have fought three wars since independence in 1947 and came close to a fourth in 1999. The tension now brewing may not escalate into open hostilities, but it could thwart efforts to forge a lasting peace and open trade between two countries that make up a quarter of the world’s population.
“With the Americans leaving Afghanistan, the restraint on the Pakistani security/****** establishment is going too,” said a former top official at India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the external intelligence arm.
“We are concerned about 2014 in either scenario. If the jihadis claim success in Afghanistan, they could turn their attention to us. Equally, if they fail, they will attack in wrath.”
But Pakistan, which has a border with India to the east and with Afghanistan to the west, has concerns of its own. It sees India’s expansive diplomacy in Afghanistan as a ploy to disrupt it from the rear as it battles its own deadly militancy and separatist forces. Vying for influence in a post-2014 Afghanistan, it worries about India’s assistance to the Afghan army, heightening a sense of encirclement.
“I’m shocked by these allegations. Pakistan has its own insurgency to deal with. It has no appetite for confrontations abroad,” said a Pakistani foreign ministry official referring to the Indian charges of stirring trouble in Afghanistan and on the Kashmir border.
“If anything, we are looking at our mistakes from the past very critically. These accusations are baseless. India needs to act with more maturity and avoid this sort of propaganda.”
Both US Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry spoke during visits to India recently of the need for New Delhi and Islamabad to resume their stalled peace process as the region heads into a period of uncertainty.
Full-scale jihad
At the core of that uncertainty is the pullback of militants from Afghanistan as US forces head home.
Hafiz Sayeed, founder of the LeT, has left no doubt that India’s side of Kashmir will become a target, telling an Indian weekly recently: “Full-scale armed Jihad (holy war) will begin soon in Kashmir after American forces withdraw from Afghanistan.”
The retreat of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 brought a wave of guerrillas into Kashmir to fight India’s rule there.
This time the additional risk will be the rivalry between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan itself, one that threatens to become as toxic as the 60-year dispute in Kashmir. The LeT has said it is fighting Indian forces in Afghanistan as well.
A senior LeT source in Pakistan told Reuters: “It is correct that the LeT cooperates with the Afghan Taliban (insurgents) when there is a question of attacking Indian interests.”
Tensions between India and Pakistan escalated last week after five Indian soldiers were killed close to the de facto border in Kashmir. India says Pakistani Special Forces joined militants to ambush a night patrol, a charge Pakistan denies.
Just days earlier, three men drove an explosives-laden car towards India’s consulate in the Afghan city of Jalalabad, near the border with Pakistan. The blast missed its target and killed nine civilians, six of them young Islamic scholars in a mosque.
It is too early to say conclusively who was behind these and other attacks, but Indian and Afghan officials see in them the handiwork of the LeT and its allies. Such groups have doubled their attempts to cross into Indian-controlled Kashmir this year, according to Indian defence ministry statistics.
The result has been the first increase in Kashmir militant violence since a 2003 ceasefire on the border, which led to a decline in attacks, partly because Pakistan and the ****** groups were preoccupied with Afghanistan during this time.
In the first eight months of this year, 103 casualties in militant-related violence were recorded in Indian Kashmir, compared to 57 in the same period of 2012, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, a think tank.
$10 million bounty
LeT was founded in 1990 in eastern Afghanistan by Sayeed, a Pakistani Islamic scholar whom India accuses of masterminding the rampage in Mumbai. The United States placed a $10 million bounty on his head for his alleged role in the attack, but he remains a free man in Pakistan, where he preached to thousands last week.
Although the group has global ambitions, LeT’s primary aim is to end India’s rule in Muslim-majority Kashmir. India and Pakistan each control a part of the heavily militarised land of lakes and orchards once known as “paradise on earth” and both assert claims over the whole Himalayan territory.
LeT has been working this year with several other outfits to train and push more Pakistani militants over the heavily guarded border into India’s side, a veteran LeT fighter told Reuters in Pakistan.
“Jihad is being stimulated and various militant outfits are cooperating with each other under the platform of the United Jihad Council,” said the veteran, referring to an umbrella body.
Pakistan’s new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, came to power in May vowing to improve ties with India and – until last week’s flare-up along the Kashmir border – the two sides looked set to resume talks. Their prime ministers were planning to meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York next month.
The trouble is, says a retired senior Pakistani diplomat, there are “spoilers” on both sides who are not interested in seeing a rapprochement. In Pakistan, these include the militant groups, which he said operate independently.
“They don’t seem to be able to control other non-government actors like the LeT. So that’s the biggest worry,” he said.
The Pakistan military’s refusal to dismantle groups such as LeT infuriates New Delhi and fuels hawkish demands for the kind of tough action that would risk escalation.
The senior LeT source in Pakistan denied the group was involved in the failed consulate strike in Afghanistan, but officials in New Delhi – citing intelligence intercepts – said they had been forewarned abo ut LeT-trained hit squads plotting the attack.
Pakistan, whose intelligence agency is regularly accused of quietly supporting Afghan Taliban insurgents, says India’s aid and missions are cover for carrying out covert operations there.
“Jalalabad was a message from the ISI in a long line of such messages,” said an Indian intelligence official, referring to Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).
Tight security
Further east, on the line dividing Kashmir between Pakistan and India, ceasefire violations are up 80 percent compared to last year, according to India. On Friday night, the two armies exchanged 7,000 rounds of mortar and gunfire, according to Indian media.
Anti-Indian sentiment in Kashmir provides fertile ground for groups seeking to revive the militancy that roiled the region through the 1990s, but New Delhi has two things in its favour.
First, despite the uptick, violence in the state is still close to the record low it reached last year. Second, the Indian army has to a large extent sealed the rugged, fenced and land-mined border that divides Kashmir, leaving militants with a critically small number of cadres and weapons.
“We cannot send jihadists into India in big numbers like in the past because of tight security at the Indian side,” the LeT source in Pakistan said.
Speaking on the lawn of his official bungalow in the restive Indian town of Baramulla, JP Singh, the police chief for northern border operations, told Reuters the army and police had stopped most attempted militant crossings this year.
Still, India is preparing for an influx.
“(Pakistan’s) agents and their proteges, the militants, are getting disengaged from the Afghan border and they have nowhere else to keep them and engage them, other than to push them to Kashmir,” Singh said. “Their presence inside Pakistan is dangerous for the internal security of Pakistan.”
Devil Soul
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NATO Reduces Scope of Its Afghanistan Plans
By THOM SHANKER
Published: October 27, 2013
BRUSSELS — After months of tense negotiations over the size and role of a postwar presence in Afghanistan, senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization officials say they are planning a more minimalist mission, with a force consisting of fewer combat trainers and more military managers to ensure that billions of dollars in security aid are not squandered or pilfered.
The shrinking ambitions for the postwar mission reflect fears that the United States Congress and European parliaments might cancel their financial commitments — amounting to more than $4 billion a year, the largest single military assistance program in the world — unless American and NATO troops are positioned at Afghan military and police headquarters to oversee how the money is spent in a country known for rampant corruption.
The reduced scope is also a result of conflicting interests among military and political leaders that have been on display throughout the 12-year war. Military commanders have advocated a postwar mission focused on training and advising Afghans, with a larger number of troops spread across the battlefield. Political leaders in Washington and other NATO capitals have opted for smaller numbers and assignments only at large Afghan headquarters.
Any enduring NATO military presence in Afghanistan “is tied directly to the $4.1 billion and our ability to oversee it and account for it,” a senior NATO diplomat said. “You need enough troops to responsibly administer, oversee and account for $4 billion a year of security assistance.”
The senior diplomat — who, like other military officials, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the alliance’s deliberations — described continued financing of Afghan security forces as vital to avoid political chaos and factional bloodshed after NATO’s combat role ends in December 2014. “It’s not just the shiny object, the number of troops,” he said. “Perhaps much more meaningful is, does the funding flow?”
NATO has endorsed an enduring presence of 8,000 to 12,000 troops, with two-thirds expected to be American. That is well below earlier recommendations by commanders, but senior alliance officials say larger numbers are unnecessary given the more limited goals now being set by political leaders.
The postwar plan depends on a security agreement between the United States and Afghanistan concerning the number, role and legal protection of American troops. But one lesson of the war in Iraq is that domestic politics in the war zone and in Washington can scuttle a security deal, resulting in zero American troops remaining. Afghanistan’s desire to assure the continued flow of billions of dollars in assistance is one reason American and NATO officials are expressing guarded optimism that an agreement will be reached.
A traditional Afghan council is expected to meet in the coming weeks to pass its judgment on the proposed United States-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement.
NATO officials say they are acutely aware that Afghanistan has been the scene of spectacular corruption, including bank fraud, drug trafficking and bribery for services, all of which undermines the credibility of the Afghan government and its Western benefactors.
The problems run to the very top of the Afghan government. Many of President Hamid Karzai’s most senior aides and cabinet ministers have grown wealthy in the past dozen years, parlaying political power into lucrative businesses serving foreign militaries and development projects — or simply demanding a cut of business from other Afghans, much as organized crime bosses offer protection in exchange for regular payoffs.
The NATO personnel overseeing the security aid would be assigned to Afghan ministries and military headquarters, where they would review payments to make sure the money went to its intended purposes, like fuel, supplies and training. They would review money allotted to and disbursed by those programs and provide regular reports to NATO leaders assessing whether the goals of the assistance were being met.
Military officials said that initial plans had envisioned a far larger enduring presence of foreign trainers and advisers, who would have been spread across the country and embedded within small units of Afghan troops as they carried on the tactical fight against the Taliban. Only over time would foreign troops have been reduced and withdrawn back to headquarters.
Under the new plans, NATO military personnel would be assigned only to the headquarters of the two security ministries, defense and interior; to the six Afghan National Army corps headquarters; and to the similar number of national police headquarters. They would also be well represented in army and police training institutions.
With that more restricted mission in mind, NATO has approved outlines for a smaller force than commanders advocated. Just before his retirement last spring, the top officer of United States Central Command, Gen. James N. Mattis, told the Senate that he recommended keeping 13,600 American troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014, resulting in an overall allied troop level of more than 20,000.
Military officials still hope the current plans will allow them to carry out a substantial mentoring mission from the larger headquarters and training centers, and some said the emphasis on financial accountability was overstated.
“While we do need to oversee the money to maintain donors’ confidence, a critical component of our presence is capability development,” one American military officer said. “If we are at the corps level and in the four corners, we could provide the right level of train, advise and assist, and ensure that the funds led to combat effectiveness.”
Pentagon officials say they want at least some American commandos to remain to carry out counterterrorism missions, unilaterally or in coordination with Afghan forces.
Allied military personnel who support a larger deployment say the United States and NATO have an obligation to send foreign advisers into the field with tactical-level units to ensure that forces armed by the coalition operate at standards deserving of financial support from other countries.
These officers note that the Afghan army is still developing its tactical prowess, evolving in its leadership skills and learning how to wage a war against an insurgency that hides among civilians. It has significant gaps in capability, especially in air transport and medical evacuation. There are concerns that assigning foreign advisers only to large headquarters may prevent the hands-on mentoring that field units need and allow Afghan troops to return to illegal and immoral methods learned over brutal years of Soviet and jihadist fighting.
Even so, some Afghanistan policy experts, including former military commanders, say the focus on the money makes sense.
David W. Barno, a retired lieutenant general who spent 19 months as the senior American officer in Afghanistan, agreed that sustained financial assistance was the “strategic center of gravity.”
“The most important thing we can do is keep writing checks so the Afghan National Security Forces can remain funded — fuel, food, weapons, salaries,” said General Barno, now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “If that continues, they will be at least able to maintain a stalemate with the Taliban, and that is enough to keep the state up and running.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/w...ed-in-afghanistan.html?pagewanted=2&ref=world
By THOM SHANKER
Published: October 27, 2013
BRUSSELS — After months of tense negotiations over the size and role of a postwar presence in Afghanistan, senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization officials say they are planning a more minimalist mission, with a force consisting of fewer combat trainers and more military managers to ensure that billions of dollars in security aid are not squandered or pilfered.
The shrinking ambitions for the postwar mission reflect fears that the United States Congress and European parliaments might cancel their financial commitments — amounting to more than $4 billion a year, the largest single military assistance program in the world — unless American and NATO troops are positioned at Afghan military and police headquarters to oversee how the money is spent in a country known for rampant corruption.
The reduced scope is also a result of conflicting interests among military and political leaders that have been on display throughout the 12-year war. Military commanders have advocated a postwar mission focused on training and advising Afghans, with a larger number of troops spread across the battlefield. Political leaders in Washington and other NATO capitals have opted for smaller numbers and assignments only at large Afghan headquarters.
Any enduring NATO military presence in Afghanistan “is tied directly to the $4.1 billion and our ability to oversee it and account for it,” a senior NATO diplomat said. “You need enough troops to responsibly administer, oversee and account for $4 billion a year of security assistance.”
The senior diplomat — who, like other military officials, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the alliance’s deliberations — described continued financing of Afghan security forces as vital to avoid political chaos and factional bloodshed after NATO’s combat role ends in December 2014. “It’s not just the shiny object, the number of troops,” he said. “Perhaps much more meaningful is, does the funding flow?”
NATO has endorsed an enduring presence of 8,000 to 12,000 troops, with two-thirds expected to be American. That is well below earlier recommendations by commanders, but senior alliance officials say larger numbers are unnecessary given the more limited goals now being set by political leaders.
The postwar plan depends on a security agreement between the United States and Afghanistan concerning the number, role and legal protection of American troops. But one lesson of the war in Iraq is that domestic politics in the war zone and in Washington can scuttle a security deal, resulting in zero American troops remaining. Afghanistan’s desire to assure the continued flow of billions of dollars in assistance is one reason American and NATO officials are expressing guarded optimism that an agreement will be reached.
A traditional Afghan council is expected to meet in the coming weeks to pass its judgment on the proposed United States-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement.
NATO officials say they are acutely aware that Afghanistan has been the scene of spectacular corruption, including bank fraud, drug trafficking and bribery for services, all of which undermines the credibility of the Afghan government and its Western benefactors.
The problems run to the very top of the Afghan government. Many of President Hamid Karzai’s most senior aides and cabinet ministers have grown wealthy in the past dozen years, parlaying political power into lucrative businesses serving foreign militaries and development projects — or simply demanding a cut of business from other Afghans, much as organized crime bosses offer protection in exchange for regular payoffs.
The NATO personnel overseeing the security aid would be assigned to Afghan ministries and military headquarters, where they would review payments to make sure the money went to its intended purposes, like fuel, supplies and training. They would review money allotted to and disbursed by those programs and provide regular reports to NATO leaders assessing whether the goals of the assistance were being met.
Military officials said that initial plans had envisioned a far larger enduring presence of foreign trainers and advisers, who would have been spread across the country and embedded within small units of Afghan troops as they carried on the tactical fight against the Taliban. Only over time would foreign troops have been reduced and withdrawn back to headquarters.
Under the new plans, NATO military personnel would be assigned only to the headquarters of the two security ministries, defense and interior; to the six Afghan National Army corps headquarters; and to the similar number of national police headquarters. They would also be well represented in army and police training institutions.
With that more restricted mission in mind, NATO has approved outlines for a smaller force than commanders advocated. Just before his retirement last spring, the top officer of United States Central Command, Gen. James N. Mattis, told the Senate that he recommended keeping 13,600 American troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014, resulting in an overall allied troop level of more than 20,000.
Military officials still hope the current plans will allow them to carry out a substantial mentoring mission from the larger headquarters and training centers, and some said the emphasis on financial accountability was overstated.
“While we do need to oversee the money to maintain donors’ confidence, a critical component of our presence is capability development,” one American military officer said. “If we are at the corps level and in the four corners, we could provide the right level of train, advise and assist, and ensure that the funds led to combat effectiveness.”
Pentagon officials say they want at least some American commandos to remain to carry out counterterrorism missions, unilaterally or in coordination with Afghan forces.
Allied military personnel who support a larger deployment say the United States and NATO have an obligation to send foreign advisers into the field with tactical-level units to ensure that forces armed by the coalition operate at standards deserving of financial support from other countries.
These officers note that the Afghan army is still developing its tactical prowess, evolving in its leadership skills and learning how to wage a war against an insurgency that hides among civilians. It has significant gaps in capability, especially in air transport and medical evacuation. There are concerns that assigning foreign advisers only to large headquarters may prevent the hands-on mentoring that field units need and allow Afghan troops to return to illegal and immoral methods learned over brutal years of Soviet and jihadist fighting.
Even so, some Afghanistan policy experts, including former military commanders, say the focus on the money makes sense.
David W. Barno, a retired lieutenant general who spent 19 months as the senior American officer in Afghanistan, agreed that sustained financial assistance was the “strategic center of gravity.”
“The most important thing we can do is keep writing checks so the Afghan National Security Forces can remain funded — fuel, food, weapons, salaries,” said General Barno, now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “If that continues, they will be at least able to maintain a stalemate with the Taliban, and that is enough to keep the state up and running.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/w...ed-in-afghanistan.html?pagewanted=2&ref=world
fatman17
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Afghan endgame
November 20, 2013
Imran Malik
Afghan endgame
The strategic environment in the Af-Pak Region (APR) is evolving rapidly. The US/NATO/ISAF Combine, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban (including the TTP), are all vying to shape it to suit their respective interests in the pre and post December 2014 periods.
Peripheral India, too, is endeavoring to find relevance and somehow influence it through its linkages with President Hamid Karzai and the NDS-RAW Combine. It’s clearly a spoiler’s role.
A clash of interests, divergent and vital for each belligerent as they might be, is so evident. It will get deadlier by the day!
The US/CIA has taken the lead by taking out Hakimullah Mehsud, the Ameer of the TTP. The timing of this drone attack has several far reaching strategic connotations. First, it fulfills US/CIA’s public pledge to avenge the loss of seven CIA agents in Khost, Afghanistan by the TTP through a Jordanian double agent. Second, it destabilizes the TTP as it selects a new leader who in turn would expend vital time and efforts in establishing himself, his writ, his own team and in reorganizing the terrorist outfit.
Third, it has already created fissures within the TTP ranks as its leadership moves out of very reluctant Mehsud hands and Waziristan for the first time. The resultant power struggle is seriously challenging Mullah Fazullah’s credibility and acceptability as a commander, amongst other factors.
Fourth, it has scuttled for good Pakistan Government’s (naïve) attempts to engage the TTP in negotiations.
Fifth, it ensures that TTP remains engaged within Pakistan thus obviating its interference with the US/NATO/ISAF’s plans to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Sixth, it may have pre-empted a Taliban-TTP strategy of fighting on two fronts; holding the Pakistan front through negotiations first, while freeing up assets to maneuver itself into a position of strength in Afghanistan as the US/NATO/ISAF egress from it. Thereafter, they would have turned their attention back to Pakistan!
Mullah Fazullah sought refuge in Kunar-Nuristan after he was hounded out of Swat by the Pakistan Army. He has apparently been cultivated, maintained and bankrolled all along as a joint Indo-Afghan venture. His (s)election as the new Ameer of the TTP is apparently the handiwork of the NDS-RAW Combine. The CIA, MI6 and Mossad might not be too displeased with this development either. (No drone attacks in Kunar and Nuristan!!).
Mullah Fazullah has spent his time to rest, recuperate, reorganize, re-equip, recruit, re-train and operate from his Afghan Government supported bases in Kunar and Nuristan. His group has emerged as one of the larger ones and that factor may have helped him in getting the mantle of TTP’s leadership, too. Mullah Fazlullah’s (s)election as the Ameer of the TTP thus becomes quite understandable. He has arrived here as an asset of the Indo-Afghan/NDS-RAW Combine; to further their interests and concomitantly those of the US/NATO/ISAF.
As the TTP is undergoing a change of command so is its main adversary - Pakistan. Pakistan will get a new CJCSC, COAS and a new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the next few weeks. Similarly, Afghanistan will have a new President and Government sometime in 2014. This makes for a very critical change of commands in the Af-Pak Region (APR) as the Afghan Endgame enters into its most sensitive and critical stage. (By delaying the nominations of the new COAS and CJCSC the Nawaz Sharif Government has as usual shot itself squarely where it hurts most; losing critical and vital time in the process!)
A thorough strategic appraisal of the situation will bring out certain areas for the Pakistan Government and its Armed Forces to exploit.
Mullah Fazullah’s foremost dilemma should be the location of his main Base of Operations and his HQs? If he maintains these in Kunar-Nuristan to get uninterrupted and intimate support from the Indo-Afghan/NDS-RAW Combine then that would leave it too far away from the main battle fields in FATA and the settled areas of Pakistan right up to Karachi. His Main Supply Routes would be too long and subject to easy interdiction. He cannot shift it to Swat, his erstwhile home territory, because of the Pakistan Army’s presence there. Furthermore, he would have lost much of his clout amongst the people there. He might be forced to base himself in FATA; somewhere in North Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber agencies etc. Here too he is likely to be viewed as an outsider and would not be able to get the respect and unstinted intimate support of the locals, especially from the Mehsud and Waziri tribes as Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud did. His (s)election is already causing fissures and frictions within the ranks of the TTP; divided loyalties might lead to its fracturing and dissipation.
Mullah Fazullah’s elevation as the Ameer of the TTP might turn out to be that critical turning point in this war that could eventually define his and the TTP’s future.
The Government of Pakistan must seize the opportunity and act boldly and expeditiously now. It must desist from meekly beseeching the TTP for negotiations or pleading for Mullah Omar’s benevolent intervention. It is a sure sign of weakness. And the meek have yet to rule the world or even their own territories. Pakistan must never cede the stronger negotiating position to the TTP, ever.
It must exploit the emerging fissures and not allow the TTP to settle down. It could drive a wedge between the Mehsuds and Waziris on the one side and the outsiders from Kunar-Nuristan-Swaton the other. It should divide and defeat them piecemeal. Their links to and their logistics supply chain from the NDS-RAW Combine needs to be severed immediately.
Pakistan must employ all elements of its national power to move into an unambiguous and unassailable position of strength. Thereafter it may hold an All Parties Conference and offer the TTP two choices - either to submit to the writ of the Government or face the consolidated political and military might of a unified and united nuclear Pakistan.
There is no other way out of this morass!
The author is a retired Brigadier, a former Defense Attache’ in Australia and New Zealand and is currently on the faculty of NUST (NIPCONS).
im_k@hotmail.com
@imk846m
November 20, 2013
Imran Malik
Afghan endgame
The strategic environment in the Af-Pak Region (APR) is evolving rapidly. The US/NATO/ISAF Combine, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban (including the TTP), are all vying to shape it to suit their respective interests in the pre and post December 2014 periods.
Peripheral India, too, is endeavoring to find relevance and somehow influence it through its linkages with President Hamid Karzai and the NDS-RAW Combine. It’s clearly a spoiler’s role.
A clash of interests, divergent and vital for each belligerent as they might be, is so evident. It will get deadlier by the day!
The US/CIA has taken the lead by taking out Hakimullah Mehsud, the Ameer of the TTP. The timing of this drone attack has several far reaching strategic connotations. First, it fulfills US/CIA’s public pledge to avenge the loss of seven CIA agents in Khost, Afghanistan by the TTP through a Jordanian double agent. Second, it destabilizes the TTP as it selects a new leader who in turn would expend vital time and efforts in establishing himself, his writ, his own team and in reorganizing the terrorist outfit.
Third, it has already created fissures within the TTP ranks as its leadership moves out of very reluctant Mehsud hands and Waziristan for the first time. The resultant power struggle is seriously challenging Mullah Fazullah’s credibility and acceptability as a commander, amongst other factors.
Fourth, it has scuttled for good Pakistan Government’s (naïve) attempts to engage the TTP in negotiations.
Fifth, it ensures that TTP remains engaged within Pakistan thus obviating its interference with the US/NATO/ISAF’s plans to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Sixth, it may have pre-empted a Taliban-TTP strategy of fighting on two fronts; holding the Pakistan front through negotiations first, while freeing up assets to maneuver itself into a position of strength in Afghanistan as the US/NATO/ISAF egress from it. Thereafter, they would have turned their attention back to Pakistan!
Mullah Fazullah sought refuge in Kunar-Nuristan after he was hounded out of Swat by the Pakistan Army. He has apparently been cultivated, maintained and bankrolled all along as a joint Indo-Afghan venture. His (s)election as the new Ameer of the TTP is apparently the handiwork of the NDS-RAW Combine. The CIA, MI6 and Mossad might not be too displeased with this development either. (No drone attacks in Kunar and Nuristan!!).
Mullah Fazullah has spent his time to rest, recuperate, reorganize, re-equip, recruit, re-train and operate from his Afghan Government supported bases in Kunar and Nuristan. His group has emerged as one of the larger ones and that factor may have helped him in getting the mantle of TTP’s leadership, too. Mullah Fazlullah’s (s)election as the Ameer of the TTP thus becomes quite understandable. He has arrived here as an asset of the Indo-Afghan/NDS-RAW Combine; to further their interests and concomitantly those of the US/NATO/ISAF.
As the TTP is undergoing a change of command so is its main adversary - Pakistan. Pakistan will get a new CJCSC, COAS and a new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the next few weeks. Similarly, Afghanistan will have a new President and Government sometime in 2014. This makes for a very critical change of commands in the Af-Pak Region (APR) as the Afghan Endgame enters into its most sensitive and critical stage. (By delaying the nominations of the new COAS and CJCSC the Nawaz Sharif Government has as usual shot itself squarely where it hurts most; losing critical and vital time in the process!)
A thorough strategic appraisal of the situation will bring out certain areas for the Pakistan Government and its Armed Forces to exploit.
Mullah Fazullah’s foremost dilemma should be the location of his main Base of Operations and his HQs? If he maintains these in Kunar-Nuristan to get uninterrupted and intimate support from the Indo-Afghan/NDS-RAW Combine then that would leave it too far away from the main battle fields in FATA and the settled areas of Pakistan right up to Karachi. His Main Supply Routes would be too long and subject to easy interdiction. He cannot shift it to Swat, his erstwhile home territory, because of the Pakistan Army’s presence there. Furthermore, he would have lost much of his clout amongst the people there. He might be forced to base himself in FATA; somewhere in North Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber agencies etc. Here too he is likely to be viewed as an outsider and would not be able to get the respect and unstinted intimate support of the locals, especially from the Mehsud and Waziri tribes as Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud did. His (s)election is already causing fissures and frictions within the ranks of the TTP; divided loyalties might lead to its fracturing and dissipation.
Mullah Fazullah’s elevation as the Ameer of the TTP might turn out to be that critical turning point in this war that could eventually define his and the TTP’s future.
The Government of Pakistan must seize the opportunity and act boldly and expeditiously now. It must desist from meekly beseeching the TTP for negotiations or pleading for Mullah Omar’s benevolent intervention. It is a sure sign of weakness. And the meek have yet to rule the world or even their own territories. Pakistan must never cede the stronger negotiating position to the TTP, ever.
It must exploit the emerging fissures and not allow the TTP to settle down. It could drive a wedge between the Mehsuds and Waziris on the one side and the outsiders from Kunar-Nuristan-Swaton the other. It should divide and defeat them piecemeal. Their links to and their logistics supply chain from the NDS-RAW Combine needs to be severed immediately.
Pakistan must employ all elements of its national power to move into an unambiguous and unassailable position of strength. Thereafter it may hold an All Parties Conference and offer the TTP two choices - either to submit to the writ of the Government or face the consolidated political and military might of a unified and united nuclear Pakistan.
There is no other way out of this morass!
The author is a retired Brigadier, a former Defense Attache’ in Australia and New Zealand and is currently on the faculty of NUST (NIPCONS).
im_k@hotmail.com
@imk846m
Abu Zolfiqar
Rest in Peace
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Afghan endgame
November 20, 2013
Imran Malik
Afghan endgame
The strategic environment in the Af-Pak Region (APR) is evolving rapidly. The US/NATO/ISAF Combine, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban (including the TTP), are all vying to shape it to suit their respective interests in the pre and post December 2014 periods.
Peripheral India, too, is endeavoring to find relevance and somehow influence it through its linkages with President Hamid Karzai and the NDS-RAW Combine. It’s clearly a spoiler’s role.
A clash of interests, divergent and vital for each belligerent as they might be, is so evident. It will get deadlier by the day!
The US/CIA has taken the lead by taking out Hakimullah Mehsud, the Ameer of the TTP. The timing of this drone attack has several far reaching strategic connotations. First, it fulfills US/CIA’s public pledge to avenge the loss of seven CIA agents in Khost, Afghanistan by the TTP through a Jordanian double agent. Second, it destabilizes the TTP as it selects a new leader who in turn would expend vital time and efforts in establishing himself, his writ, his own team and in reorganizing the terrorist outfit.
Third, it has already created fissures within the TTP ranks as its leadership moves out of very reluctant Mehsud hands and Waziristan for the first time. The resultant power struggle is seriously challenging Mullah Fazullah’s credibility and acceptability as a commander, amongst other factors.
Fourth, it has scuttled for good Pakistan Government’s (naïve) attempts to engage the TTP in negotiations.
Fifth, it ensures that TTP remains engaged within Pakistan thus obviating its interference with the US/NATO/ISAF’s plans to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Sixth, it may have pre-empted a Taliban-TTP strategy of fighting on two fronts; holding the Pakistan front through negotiations first, while freeing up assets to maneuver itself into a position of strength in Afghanistan as the US/NATO/ISAF egress from it. Thereafter, they would have turned their attention back to Pakistan!
Mullah Fazullah sought refuge in Kunar-Nuristan after he was hounded out of Swat by the Pakistan Army. He has apparently been cultivated, maintained and bankrolled all along as a joint Indo-Afghan venture. His (s)election as the new Ameer of the TTP is apparently the handiwork of the NDS-RAW Combine. The CIA, MI6 and Mossad might not be too displeased with this development either. (No drone attacks in Kunar and Nuristan!!).
Mullah Fazullah has spent his time to rest, recuperate, reorganize, re-equip, recruit, re-train and operate from his Afghan Government supported bases in Kunar and Nuristan. His group has emerged as one of the larger ones and that factor may have helped him in getting the mantle of TTP’s leadership, too. Mullah Fazlullah’s (s)election as the Ameer of the TTP thus becomes quite understandable. He has arrived here as an asset of the Indo-Afghan/NDS-RAW Combine; to further their interests and concomitantly those of the US/NATO/ISAF.
As the TTP is undergoing a change of command so is its main adversary - Pakistan. Pakistan will get a new CJCSC, COAS and a new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the next few weeks. Similarly, Afghanistan will have a new President and Government sometime in 2014. This makes for a very critical change of commands in the Af-Pak Region (APR) as the Afghan Endgame enters into its most sensitive and critical stage. (By delaying the nominations of the new COAS and CJCSC the Nawaz Sharif Government has as usual shot itself squarely where it hurts most; losing critical and vital time in the process!)
A thorough strategic appraisal of the situation will bring out certain areas for the Pakistan Government and its Armed Forces to exploit.
Mullah Fazullah’s foremost dilemma should be the location of his main Base of Operations and his HQs? If he maintains these in Kunar-Nuristan to get uninterrupted and intimate support from the Indo-Afghan/NDS-RAW Combine then that would leave it too far away from the main battle fields in FATA and the settled areas of Pakistan right up to Karachi. His Main Supply Routes would be too long and subject to easy interdiction. He cannot shift it to Swat, his erstwhile home territory, because of the Pakistan Army’s presence there. Furthermore, he would have lost much of his clout amongst the people there. He might be forced to base himself in FATA; somewhere in North Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber agencies etc. Here too he is likely to be viewed as an outsider and would not be able to get the respect and unstinted intimate support of the locals, especially from the Mehsud and Waziri tribes as Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud did. His (s)election is already causing fissures and frictions within the ranks of the TTP; divided loyalties might lead to its fracturing and dissipation.
Mullah Fazullah’s elevation as the Ameer of the TTP might turn out to be that critical turning point in this war that could eventually define his and the TTP’s future.
The Government of Pakistan must seize the opportunity and act boldly and expeditiously now. It must desist from meekly beseeching the TTP for negotiations or pleading for Mullah Omar’s benevolent intervention. It is a sure sign of weakness. And the meek have yet to rule the world or even their own territories. Pakistan must never cede the stronger negotiating position to the TTP, ever.
It must exploit the emerging fissures and not allow the TTP to settle down. It could drive a wedge between the Mehsuds and Waziris on the one side and the outsiders from Kunar-Nuristan-Swaton the other. It should divide and defeat them piecemeal. Their links to and their logistics supply chain from the NDS-RAW Combine needs to be severed immediately.
Pakistan must employ all elements of its national power to move into an unambiguous and unassailable position of strength. Thereafter it may hold an All Parties Conference and offer the TTP two choices - either to submit to the writ of the Government or face the consolidated political and military might of a unified and united nuclear Pakistan.
There is no other way out of this morass!
The author is a retired Brigadier, a former Defense Attache’ in Australia and New Zealand and is currently on the faculty of NUST (NIPCONS).
im_k@hotmail.com
@imk846m
a sober and very realistic assessment by the Retd Brig.
ZohaibMumtaz
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so is this confirmed that pakistan will get us military equipment?
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