pkpatriotic
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A way out of the security nightmare
Nasim Zehra
Against the backdrop of the intensification of military operations in the tribal areas, we are witnessing the emergence of local lashkars and the increase in suicide attacks. Reportedly about 11 local lashkars of different sizes have been raised in Dir, Bajaur, Tank, Khyber and other areas. Simultaneously there has been a marked increase in suicide attacks in places beyond the tribal areas and the NWFP. This emergence of heightened trends, one positive and one negative, may be the harbinger of some hope in the handling of the acute internal security crisis that we have been experiencing. Will these trends lead us out of our current security nightmare will depend on what other steps the government decides to take. Clearly a viable roadmap out of Pakistan's security nightmare solution requires more than just use of force and more than just Pakistan.
The suicide attacks are taking a heavy toll on the morale of the nation. The response to these suicide attacks seems to be on political lines. The Jamaat and the PML-N are increasingly critical of the current military operations in the tribal areas. They are not familiar with the government's detailed policy parameters, if there are any, within which these operations are being conducted. Delinked, therefore, from any policy debate and the actual policy implementation the non-coalition parties are the lead critics of the operation. The president's less than clearly stated position vis-à-vis the US drones and attempted ground attacks which kill mostly innocent Pakistanis, prompts this criticism. Also these parties have either failed to fully analyse the nature of the militancy problem or are opting for politics above all else.
Suicide bombings are a deeply traumatic and tragic aspect of Pakistan's current security dilemma. Videos of training camps show how mostly our young, lovely-looking but deadly misguided boys are trained as suicide bombers. Their motivations are often a combination of ideological and financial and driven by revenge for personal loss. Reportedly, training camps for suicide bombers have been identified in South Waziristan but the numbers trained are unknown. They opt for high-profile targets ranging from party leaders to key landmark buildings like the Marriott.
These deadly suicide bombings are the climax of Gen Zia-ul-Haq's and subsequently of Gen Parvez Musharraf's blundering decisions to partner Washington's jihad of the eighties and then of the post-9/11 period. The writ of the Pakistani state was therefore compromised twice. Pakistan's two military rulers concluded that Pakistan's security agenda would be promoted in these two rounds of partnerships. These partnerships, plus the US attack and occupation of Afghanistan, has proved extremely costly for the society and the state of Pakistan. No less for Afghanistan itself and for the neighbouring regions.
For Pakistan the cost in security terms of especially the post 9/11 period has come, above all, in the terror if incessant suicide bombings, death of innocent Pakistanis, engaging the Pakistani army in battle largely with Pakistanis in the tribal areas and therefore undermining the writ of the state and the security of our homeland.
However, the emergence of the local lashkars indicates some initial discontinuity in the ostensibly sharp and sustained state-security divide in the tribal areas. The lashkars, led by tribal leaders and voluntarily manned by the tribesmen, are encouraged by the political agents through probably financial support. They generally depend on their own weapons and collective punishment as a means of expelling the militants or making them surrender. The potential risk of the government arming the lashkars, covertly or overtly and on a scale disproportionate to their numerical strength and social standing, would be of upsetting the balance of power vis-à-vis the government itself.
Meanwhile the Lashkars draw strength from the military operations, of varying intensity, launched to battle in the militants in areas like Bajaur, Khyber Agency, Kurram. Given the huge issues of the writ of the State in an environment in which the locals seemed completely alienated from the government and enamored by the militants this is a significant development.
If these Lashkars remain intact and so does their objective of reclaiming the control of their own geographical, social and ideological space from the militants, then Pakistan's seemingly endless security nightmare may just be headed for a break. The dreadful pattern of endless battling in the tribal areas with its expanding effects in the rest of the country, may just begin to alter. Sustained lashkar activity will also translate into social isolation of the militants and of their supporters.
Whichever way the lashkar factor evolves, it alone is no solution to Pakistan's security nightmare. Three additional factors are necessary to put together a viable roadmap needed to establish Pakistan's Homeland security:
One, the expedited return of the almost 2.7 million Afghan refugees is essential. Gone are the days of brotherhood when the state of Pakistan could accommodate our Afghan brothers. Toady when a troubled Pakistan is trying to pull itself out of a seemingly chronic crisis of security, the world community must be categorically told that the Afghan refugees must be gently but firmly sent home. They are a strain on Pakistan's security and sociology crisis, one that the international community has no justification to expect us to bear. We have our hands full with our own issues.
Two, Pakistan must announce that, while making adjustments for monitored but free people's movement for social, tourist and trade interaction across the Durand Line, it will fence the Durand Line. Islamabad must come up with a proper package to appropriately fence the border along which personnel and weapons movement has become a reason for the international community to accuse Pakistan on many scores. Pakistan needs to take practical steps to address the international community's concerns, no less Kabul's concerns and its own too, relating to cross-border movement. To-date Pakistan has failed to make a comprehensively reasoned case to fence the Durand Line. Every time Islamabad raises the issues criticism from multiple directions makes it retract. After all, if Pakistan is considering overland trade transit facility to its neighbours as a trading hub, it cannot allow its borders to function as ungoverned and lawless territory.
Three, the government must take steps to reclaim the relationship of trust with the tribals. With the mayhem created over the last few decades, partially owing to Islamabad's own policies, we may be witnessing the both the local tribal structures of power and influence coming full circle and simultaneously the state structures of authority and administration located in the tribal areas. To win the confidence and trust of the locals, irrespective of their ideological orientation, the government needs to actively facilitate the resurrection of both sets of structures, with appropriate changes agreed upon by consensus.
Reclaiming security will not be possible without some additional and bloody costs. Tragically, more suicide bombings may take place but the only way away from Pakistan's security crisis is for the state to re-establish its writ, whatever the cost in the interim. The government must work on finding ways to keep the cost low, to take the society along and to create a consensus among the country's political class, as it must strive to work on multiple fronts to tread on a workable roadmap towards genuine internal security.
Nasim Zehra
Against the backdrop of the intensification of military operations in the tribal areas, we are witnessing the emergence of local lashkars and the increase in suicide attacks. Reportedly about 11 local lashkars of different sizes have been raised in Dir, Bajaur, Tank, Khyber and other areas. Simultaneously there has been a marked increase in suicide attacks in places beyond the tribal areas and the NWFP. This emergence of heightened trends, one positive and one negative, may be the harbinger of some hope in the handling of the acute internal security crisis that we have been experiencing. Will these trends lead us out of our current security nightmare will depend on what other steps the government decides to take. Clearly a viable roadmap out of Pakistan's security nightmare solution requires more than just use of force and more than just Pakistan.
The suicide attacks are taking a heavy toll on the morale of the nation. The response to these suicide attacks seems to be on political lines. The Jamaat and the PML-N are increasingly critical of the current military operations in the tribal areas. They are not familiar with the government's detailed policy parameters, if there are any, within which these operations are being conducted. Delinked, therefore, from any policy debate and the actual policy implementation the non-coalition parties are the lead critics of the operation. The president's less than clearly stated position vis-à-vis the US drones and attempted ground attacks which kill mostly innocent Pakistanis, prompts this criticism. Also these parties have either failed to fully analyse the nature of the militancy problem or are opting for politics above all else.
Suicide bombings are a deeply traumatic and tragic aspect of Pakistan's current security dilemma. Videos of training camps show how mostly our young, lovely-looking but deadly misguided boys are trained as suicide bombers. Their motivations are often a combination of ideological and financial and driven by revenge for personal loss. Reportedly, training camps for suicide bombers have been identified in South Waziristan but the numbers trained are unknown. They opt for high-profile targets ranging from party leaders to key landmark buildings like the Marriott.
These deadly suicide bombings are the climax of Gen Zia-ul-Haq's and subsequently of Gen Parvez Musharraf's blundering decisions to partner Washington's jihad of the eighties and then of the post-9/11 period. The writ of the Pakistani state was therefore compromised twice. Pakistan's two military rulers concluded that Pakistan's security agenda would be promoted in these two rounds of partnerships. These partnerships, plus the US attack and occupation of Afghanistan, has proved extremely costly for the society and the state of Pakistan. No less for Afghanistan itself and for the neighbouring regions.
For Pakistan the cost in security terms of especially the post 9/11 period has come, above all, in the terror if incessant suicide bombings, death of innocent Pakistanis, engaging the Pakistani army in battle largely with Pakistanis in the tribal areas and therefore undermining the writ of the state and the security of our homeland.
However, the emergence of the local lashkars indicates some initial discontinuity in the ostensibly sharp and sustained state-security divide in the tribal areas. The lashkars, led by tribal leaders and voluntarily manned by the tribesmen, are encouraged by the political agents through probably financial support. They generally depend on their own weapons and collective punishment as a means of expelling the militants or making them surrender. The potential risk of the government arming the lashkars, covertly or overtly and on a scale disproportionate to their numerical strength and social standing, would be of upsetting the balance of power vis-à-vis the government itself.
Meanwhile the Lashkars draw strength from the military operations, of varying intensity, launched to battle in the militants in areas like Bajaur, Khyber Agency, Kurram. Given the huge issues of the writ of the State in an environment in which the locals seemed completely alienated from the government and enamored by the militants this is a significant development.
If these Lashkars remain intact and so does their objective of reclaiming the control of their own geographical, social and ideological space from the militants, then Pakistan's seemingly endless security nightmare may just be headed for a break. The dreadful pattern of endless battling in the tribal areas with its expanding effects in the rest of the country, may just begin to alter. Sustained lashkar activity will also translate into social isolation of the militants and of their supporters.
Whichever way the lashkar factor evolves, it alone is no solution to Pakistan's security nightmare. Three additional factors are necessary to put together a viable roadmap needed to establish Pakistan's Homeland security:
One, the expedited return of the almost 2.7 million Afghan refugees is essential. Gone are the days of brotherhood when the state of Pakistan could accommodate our Afghan brothers. Toady when a troubled Pakistan is trying to pull itself out of a seemingly chronic crisis of security, the world community must be categorically told that the Afghan refugees must be gently but firmly sent home. They are a strain on Pakistan's security and sociology crisis, one that the international community has no justification to expect us to bear. We have our hands full with our own issues.
Two, Pakistan must announce that, while making adjustments for monitored but free people's movement for social, tourist and trade interaction across the Durand Line, it will fence the Durand Line. Islamabad must come up with a proper package to appropriately fence the border along which personnel and weapons movement has become a reason for the international community to accuse Pakistan on many scores. Pakistan needs to take practical steps to address the international community's concerns, no less Kabul's concerns and its own too, relating to cross-border movement. To-date Pakistan has failed to make a comprehensively reasoned case to fence the Durand Line. Every time Islamabad raises the issues criticism from multiple directions makes it retract. After all, if Pakistan is considering overland trade transit facility to its neighbours as a trading hub, it cannot allow its borders to function as ungoverned and lawless territory.
Three, the government must take steps to reclaim the relationship of trust with the tribals. With the mayhem created over the last few decades, partially owing to Islamabad's own policies, we may be witnessing the both the local tribal structures of power and influence coming full circle and simultaneously the state structures of authority and administration located in the tribal areas. To win the confidence and trust of the locals, irrespective of their ideological orientation, the government needs to actively facilitate the resurrection of both sets of structures, with appropriate changes agreed upon by consensus.
Reclaiming security will not be possible without some additional and bloody costs. Tragically, more suicide bombings may take place but the only way away from Pakistan's security crisis is for the state to re-establish its writ, whatever the cost in the interim. The government must work on finding ways to keep the cost low, to take the society along and to create a consensus among the country's political class, as it must strive to work on multiple fronts to tread on a workable roadmap towards genuine internal security.
