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It was a dawn like any other. Streaks of sun rays were fanning out of the eastern sky. In Karachi harbor and outside it was peaceful and quiet. Merchant ships of various nations lay at berths inside or at anchors in approaches to the port with deck lights on. The night shift was unloading cargoes without which many of our nation building activities would come to a grinding halt. Warships of the Pakistan Navy at their berths or at moorings in harbor showed the slightest of activities where the watch on deck was performing multifarious duties preparing to proceed to sea for the Weekly Exercise Program. Usual columns of smoke were rising from the Flotilla ship’s funnels as engineers gave life to cold boilers.
There was a mere tinge of winter in the air. It was cool and dry. Officers and men who had just been called from sleep were beginning to go about their daily chores. There was still an hour and a half before proceeding to sea. Nobody was aware that this dawn of September 6, 1965 had already unleashed events of momentous nature for Pakistan.
Most of us were still at breakfast when a signal arrived from the Senior Officer, “Come to immediate notice for steam. Report readiness.” We thought it was another of those exercises where the Commodore S.M. Anwar, Commanding the Pakistan Navy Flotilla, wished to test our efficiency. No one wanted his ship to be second. Breakfast was finished in an instant like only sailors can do and officers and men rushed to their leaving harbor stations.
Just then an order was received over the radio: “Assume first degree of readiness for war.” This could not be an exercise; such signals were not used in peace time. Another signal soon after confirmed that India had declared war and attacked on the Lahore Front. ‘Action Stations’ was immediately sounded and ship companies closed up at their stations, ammunitions were pushed up to the guns and all weapons and equipment brought to full readiness. Looking back, everything had transitioned very smoothly.
Much earlier during March an important incident had taken place when Indian forces occupied our border post at Biar Bet in the Rann of Kutch sector. They were given a sound drubbing and soon evicted by the Pakistan Army. At that time the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had vowed a response at a place and time of Indian choosing.
The cumulative effect of Rann of Kutch Emergency (March/April 1965) and Indian PM’s threat was to galvanize the Pakistan Navy Flotilla then under the command of Commodore S.B. Salimi to train itself into a well-knit and highly efficient strike force capable of performing a wide variety of offensive and defensive missions at sea, near or far from Pakistan’s shores. Thus the Flotilla was at the peak of readiness when the Indians launched their dastardly attack on Lahore in the early hours of September 6, 1965.
Amongst the larger ships, destroyer ALAMGIR under my command was the first to report readiness at ten past seven. Steam boilers of that period required four hours of lighting up and this early readiness amounted to a saving of one hour. ALAMGIR was ordered to slip at 7:30 a.m. and lead out of harbor. Other ships followed in the sequence directed by COMPAK and once clear of the entrance ships proceeded directly to assigned patrolling stations on an arc fifty miles off Karachi. This was to ensure no ship could approach Karachi before identification or any aircraft arrive from seaward undetected. Further, as deployed the Flotilla could quickly regroup into an offensive or defensive formation as required for surface action.
The Indian Navy being much bigger in size including an aircraft carrier and two cruisers both larger than BABUR and having 8 inch guns against 5.25 inch of latter, we could counter this disparity only by superior tactics and training as well as higher efficiency. We were certain that God willing we would give a good account of ourselves. The units had really been fine tuned for war and we eagerly looked forward to an opportunity to test our mettle against any Indian force.
By the forenoon of September 7, just 24 hours into war, with Radio Pakistan's reports of important land and air battles in the north, tension in every one’s mind onboard ALAMGIR was really excruciating. The war melodies of Ms. Noor Jahan and the stirring voice of the newscaster Shakeel Ahmed on Radio Pakistan added fervor to the spirit for battle. Just then a signal arrived from Naval Headquarters ordering the Flotilla to bombard at midnight a Radio Beacon at Dwarka that was directing Indian air strikes on Karachi from Jamnagar. It was electrifying and the strain vanished from our minds – at last we had something to do – and that too right in the enemy’s den itself. For security considerations I announced the news of the mission after sunset on ship's general broadcast system and the ship immediately resounded with three shouts of Allah-o-Akbar.
The force at sea consisted of seven ships BABUR (under command of Captain Lodhi), KHAIBAR (Captain Hanif), BADR (Commander Malick), TIPU SULTAN (Commander Amir Aslam), JAHANGIR (Commander K.M. Hussain), SHAH JAHAN (Commander Zafar Shamsie) and ALAMGIR (Commander Iqbal F. Quadir). The signal for bombardment had arrived just before noon and to be off Dwarka after midnight, speed was increased to twenty knots. Not to give away the target just in case the force was discovered by any Indian recce aircraft initially the force headed for Bombay (now Mumbai). The Indian Navy had no night flying capabilities and after sunset course was altered for the initial position for bombardment. The intelligence about the Indian fleet being still in harbor was not available to ships and we assumed the aircraft carrier and at least one cruiser were most likely at sea.
The force reached the firing position seven miles off Dwarka at twenty five minutes past midnight. Firing was ordered and completed within four minutes. Shells were observed to burst all over the target area. As the bombardment commenced gunfire from shore was reported by some ships but nothing fell near anyone. Whatever fire was observed from shore was soon silenced.
The target for bombardment was the mobile Air Beacon whose coordinates were not certain. In ALAMGIR I decided to target the Railway Marshaling Yard and was happy that the Indian records show damage to a building and railway stocks in the Marshaling Yard. This showed the accuracy of gunfire as also of our Hydrographic Department’s Navigation Chart – a great credit to all concerned. On completion of bombardment, anticipating reaction from Jamnagar Air Base forty miles away, the force assumed an air defence formation and some things happened in quick succession.
During bombardment, the moon was full and bright but immediately after its completion low clouds appeared over the ships just as three ships BABAR, BADR and ALAMGIR reported an aircraft on radar approaching from the east. According to what I personally observed on the radar, the aircraft echoes crossed over the ships three times and perhaps because of the low cloud base, could do nothing.
A little later the clouds disappeared as suddenly as they had appeared and just as I returned to my cabin I heard one of my ship’s heavy guns go off. In an instant back on the bridge I saw a low white light approaching the ship. Before anything could be said the ‘B’ 4.7 inch gun fired again, there was a flash in the sky and the light disappeared. Soon BABUR reported splashes from falling debris on her starboard bow.
The gun’s crew with Petty Officer Ghulam Hussain in charge deserves all praise for their initiative in engaging without receiving any orders from the Bridge or the Gun Control Officer. As the gun mounting was not under radar control at that time it showed the expertise, efficiency and accuracy of the layer and trainer of that 4.7 inch heavy gun by shooting down that aircraft with the second round.
Meanwhile NHQ informed that two PAF fighters had been sent for air support but no radio or radar contact was established and the aircraft returned to Mauripur. The ship’s Chief Radio Radar and Electronics Artificer also deserves special mention for modifications to the ship’s radars doubling their detection ranges.
The improvements in ALAMGIR radars proved their worth during an incident on the forenoon of September 18 with the Flotilla on patrol about 60 miles southwest of Karachi on course towards Kutch, when the radar in search mode picked up radar transmissions from the direction of Kutch right ahead. After a while woolly echoes appeared on radar at 58 miles distance. At 52 miles distance they were confirmed as one large and four small ship contacts. The two forces were heading towards each other at a combined speed of thirty knots. COMPAK then onboard BABUR was kept informed by flag and light signals.
The cruiser’s gun range being about thirty thousand yards (fifteen nautical miles) a battle was likely to commence in about an hour. The Indians seemed unaware of our presence and at the range of forty nautical miles ALAMGIR picked up Indian ships’ ultra-high frequency radio nets both on Tactical Net on which command orders were given, and on Information Net on which a variety of information were exchanged.
The Pakistani Flotilla was observing complete radio silence and it was surprising that the Indian force was non-stop talking amongst it ships in a manner we would not allow even in peacetime. However, at the range of thirty two miles both BABUR and the Indians detected each other on radar. Both force commanders made enemy contact reports (these were always made in plain language – English in Pakistan and India) to their headquarters and the Indian force immediately turned about and headed back towards Kutch at high speed. With identical maximum speeds a successful chase was not possible and the Flotilla was cheated of an opportunity to test its mettle. Later from books published in India it appears that Rear Admiral Sampson onboard cruiser MYSORE was leading the Indian force.
Soon thereafter a ceasefire was announced but patrolling by ships at sea continued for another fortnight before ships retuned to harbor and peacetime state of alert was reverted. The overall effect of bombardment was thus much greater and more effective than mere psychological and according to Admiral Kohli, an ex-Indian Navy Chief, in his book “We Dared” the senior Indian naval officers felt ashamed and could not hold their heads high. A British author described the Dwarka Operation as daring and executed in classical fashion. For Pakistan Navy it was a mission accomplished with courage against a vastly superior force. Credit for this must go to Vice Admiral A.R. Khan, the Commander in Chief who ordered the bombardment, Commodore S.B. Salimi who tirelessly trained the Flotilla and brought it to the peak of efficiency, Commodore S.M. Anwar who commanded the force during the period of war, the Commanding Officers of ships who ably led their ship’s companies and most of all the officers and men who resolutely and fearlessly executed the various tasks assigned to them.
Email: ifq12@yahoo.com
http://hilal.gov.pk/index.php/layouts/item/2289-a-veteran-s-account-remembering-the-1965-war-at-sea
There was a mere tinge of winter in the air. It was cool and dry. Officers and men who had just been called from sleep were beginning to go about their daily chores. There was still an hour and a half before proceeding to sea. Nobody was aware that this dawn of September 6, 1965 had already unleashed events of momentous nature for Pakistan.
Most of us were still at breakfast when a signal arrived from the Senior Officer, “Come to immediate notice for steam. Report readiness.” We thought it was another of those exercises where the Commodore S.M. Anwar, Commanding the Pakistan Navy Flotilla, wished to test our efficiency. No one wanted his ship to be second. Breakfast was finished in an instant like only sailors can do and officers and men rushed to their leaving harbor stations.
Just then an order was received over the radio: “Assume first degree of readiness for war.” This could not be an exercise; such signals were not used in peace time. Another signal soon after confirmed that India had declared war and attacked on the Lahore Front. ‘Action Stations’ was immediately sounded and ship companies closed up at their stations, ammunitions were pushed up to the guns and all weapons and equipment brought to full readiness. Looking back, everything had transitioned very smoothly.
Much earlier during March an important incident had taken place when Indian forces occupied our border post at Biar Bet in the Rann of Kutch sector. They were given a sound drubbing and soon evicted by the Pakistan Army. At that time the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri had vowed a response at a place and time of Indian choosing.
The cumulative effect of Rann of Kutch Emergency (March/April 1965) and Indian PM’s threat was to galvanize the Pakistan Navy Flotilla then under the command of Commodore S.B. Salimi to train itself into a well-knit and highly efficient strike force capable of performing a wide variety of offensive and defensive missions at sea, near or far from Pakistan’s shores. Thus the Flotilla was at the peak of readiness when the Indians launched their dastardly attack on Lahore in the early hours of September 6, 1965.
Amongst the larger ships, destroyer ALAMGIR under my command was the first to report readiness at ten past seven. Steam boilers of that period required four hours of lighting up and this early readiness amounted to a saving of one hour. ALAMGIR was ordered to slip at 7:30 a.m. and lead out of harbor. Other ships followed in the sequence directed by COMPAK and once clear of the entrance ships proceeded directly to assigned patrolling stations on an arc fifty miles off Karachi. This was to ensure no ship could approach Karachi before identification or any aircraft arrive from seaward undetected. Further, as deployed the Flotilla could quickly regroup into an offensive or defensive formation as required for surface action.
The Indian Navy being much bigger in size including an aircraft carrier and two cruisers both larger than BABUR and having 8 inch guns against 5.25 inch of latter, we could counter this disparity only by superior tactics and training as well as higher efficiency. We were certain that God willing we would give a good account of ourselves. The units had really been fine tuned for war and we eagerly looked forward to an opportunity to test our mettle against any Indian force.
By the forenoon of September 7, just 24 hours into war, with Radio Pakistan's reports of important land and air battles in the north, tension in every one’s mind onboard ALAMGIR was really excruciating. The war melodies of Ms. Noor Jahan and the stirring voice of the newscaster Shakeel Ahmed on Radio Pakistan added fervor to the spirit for battle. Just then a signal arrived from Naval Headquarters ordering the Flotilla to bombard at midnight a Radio Beacon at Dwarka that was directing Indian air strikes on Karachi from Jamnagar. It was electrifying and the strain vanished from our minds – at last we had something to do – and that too right in the enemy’s den itself. For security considerations I announced the news of the mission after sunset on ship's general broadcast system and the ship immediately resounded with three shouts of Allah-o-Akbar.
The force at sea consisted of seven ships BABUR (under command of Captain Lodhi), KHAIBAR (Captain Hanif), BADR (Commander Malick), TIPU SULTAN (Commander Amir Aslam), JAHANGIR (Commander K.M. Hussain), SHAH JAHAN (Commander Zafar Shamsie) and ALAMGIR (Commander Iqbal F. Quadir). The signal for bombardment had arrived just before noon and to be off Dwarka after midnight, speed was increased to twenty knots. Not to give away the target just in case the force was discovered by any Indian recce aircraft initially the force headed for Bombay (now Mumbai). The Indian Navy had no night flying capabilities and after sunset course was altered for the initial position for bombardment. The intelligence about the Indian fleet being still in harbor was not available to ships and we assumed the aircraft carrier and at least one cruiser were most likely at sea.
The force reached the firing position seven miles off Dwarka at twenty five minutes past midnight. Firing was ordered and completed within four minutes. Shells were observed to burst all over the target area. As the bombardment commenced gunfire from shore was reported by some ships but nothing fell near anyone. Whatever fire was observed from shore was soon silenced.
The target for bombardment was the mobile Air Beacon whose coordinates were not certain. In ALAMGIR I decided to target the Railway Marshaling Yard and was happy that the Indian records show damage to a building and railway stocks in the Marshaling Yard. This showed the accuracy of gunfire as also of our Hydrographic Department’s Navigation Chart – a great credit to all concerned. On completion of bombardment, anticipating reaction from Jamnagar Air Base forty miles away, the force assumed an air defence formation and some things happened in quick succession.
During bombardment, the moon was full and bright but immediately after its completion low clouds appeared over the ships just as three ships BABAR, BADR and ALAMGIR reported an aircraft on radar approaching from the east. According to what I personally observed on the radar, the aircraft echoes crossed over the ships three times and perhaps because of the low cloud base, could do nothing.
A little later the clouds disappeared as suddenly as they had appeared and just as I returned to my cabin I heard one of my ship’s heavy guns go off. In an instant back on the bridge I saw a low white light approaching the ship. Before anything could be said the ‘B’ 4.7 inch gun fired again, there was a flash in the sky and the light disappeared. Soon BABUR reported splashes from falling debris on her starboard bow.
The gun’s crew with Petty Officer Ghulam Hussain in charge deserves all praise for their initiative in engaging without receiving any orders from the Bridge or the Gun Control Officer. As the gun mounting was not under radar control at that time it showed the expertise, efficiency and accuracy of the layer and trainer of that 4.7 inch heavy gun by shooting down that aircraft with the second round.
Meanwhile NHQ informed that two PAF fighters had been sent for air support but no radio or radar contact was established and the aircraft returned to Mauripur. The ship’s Chief Radio Radar and Electronics Artificer also deserves special mention for modifications to the ship’s radars doubling their detection ranges.
The improvements in ALAMGIR radars proved their worth during an incident on the forenoon of September 18 with the Flotilla on patrol about 60 miles southwest of Karachi on course towards Kutch, when the radar in search mode picked up radar transmissions from the direction of Kutch right ahead. After a while woolly echoes appeared on radar at 58 miles distance. At 52 miles distance they were confirmed as one large and four small ship contacts. The two forces were heading towards each other at a combined speed of thirty knots. COMPAK then onboard BABUR was kept informed by flag and light signals.
The cruiser’s gun range being about thirty thousand yards (fifteen nautical miles) a battle was likely to commence in about an hour. The Indians seemed unaware of our presence and at the range of forty nautical miles ALAMGIR picked up Indian ships’ ultra-high frequency radio nets both on Tactical Net on which command orders were given, and on Information Net on which a variety of information were exchanged.
The Pakistani Flotilla was observing complete radio silence and it was surprising that the Indian force was non-stop talking amongst it ships in a manner we would not allow even in peacetime. However, at the range of thirty two miles both BABUR and the Indians detected each other on radar. Both force commanders made enemy contact reports (these were always made in plain language – English in Pakistan and India) to their headquarters and the Indian force immediately turned about and headed back towards Kutch at high speed. With identical maximum speeds a successful chase was not possible and the Flotilla was cheated of an opportunity to test its mettle. Later from books published in India it appears that Rear Admiral Sampson onboard cruiser MYSORE was leading the Indian force.
Soon thereafter a ceasefire was announced but patrolling by ships at sea continued for another fortnight before ships retuned to harbor and peacetime state of alert was reverted. The overall effect of bombardment was thus much greater and more effective than mere psychological and according to Admiral Kohli, an ex-Indian Navy Chief, in his book “We Dared” the senior Indian naval officers felt ashamed and could not hold their heads high. A British author described the Dwarka Operation as daring and executed in classical fashion. For Pakistan Navy it was a mission accomplished with courage against a vastly superior force. Credit for this must go to Vice Admiral A.R. Khan, the Commander in Chief who ordered the bombardment, Commodore S.B. Salimi who tirelessly trained the Flotilla and brought it to the peak of efficiency, Commodore S.M. Anwar who commanded the force during the period of war, the Commanding Officers of ships who ably led their ship’s companies and most of all the officers and men who resolutely and fearlessly executed the various tasks assigned to them.
Email: ifq12@yahoo.com
http://hilal.gov.pk/index.php/layouts/item/2289-a-veteran-s-account-remembering-the-1965-war-at-sea
