A state adrift…and at war with itself

[third eye]

A state adrift…and at war with itself - Ayaz Amir

Islamabad diary

Is this for real? Are we serious? Brand name Pakistan already has not much going for it, and those in charge, pilots at the helm, seem so determined on turning it into a bigger joke.

Peace comes only through strength. Is there anything profound about this truism? But we are striving for peace by revealing our exhaustion and lack of spine. The peace of exhaustion only leads to concessions. How much is the state of Pakistan willing to concede?

Hasn’t General Headquarters thought this through? Or does it consider the present peace talks – let’s not go into any details – as a ploy opening the way for the use of arms at a later stage? But even if a ploy is it serving any useful purpose? Far from creating unity of purpose it is sowing the seeds of further confusion and division. And when these efforts go up in smoke, as everything in the atmosphere suggests they are likely to, the religious right throughout the country will shout to the heavens about government lack of seriousness and military insincerity.

The Taliban are all over the news, dominating it completely. Whatever happens later this is already a propaganda coup for them. And the government or rather the state of Pakistan looks as if it is drifting with the tide, caught up in events beyond its control.

Not in everything but in some respects this is reminiscent of the situation in East Pakistan before the army action in March, 1971. The Awami League was everywhere and the institutions of government were paralysed. Then the army struck and tried to crush the Awami League and while it immediately gained control over the major administrative centres it had lost the political battle. The army controlled the cities, the Mukti Bahini ruled the countryside. India exploited this heaven-sent opportunity and a new history was written.

It was the West Pakistani state plus the army versus the people of East Pakistan. The division couldn’t have been deeper. It is different with the Taliban. They do not represent the people. They are just a faction armed with the power of the gun and ensconced in a geographical area which gives them natural cover and protection. But if being a faction is their weakness, the state’s weakness lies in its divided mind. This is a split state, a divided polity, not sure of itself, not sure of what to do, torn betwixt the siren calls of a false peace and the uncertainties of war.

This is a state which has not just lost its way but its confidence in itself. That is why it is playing blind man’s buff in the dark, flailing about and hoping to catch something, anything. The will to power, the will to fight, is everything. Lose that and not all the nukes in the world can make up for the shortfall. Pakistan today is glorifying weakness and irresolution and giving them the names of statesmanship and statecraft. Not taken in by this joke the adversary on the other side, made of slightly sterner stuff, is running rings around the Pakistani state.

Only the Americans can put us out of our misery by launching just one drone strike and everyone can then go home and say that they have sabotaged the peace process. But they won’t do it, not to oblige us. The Americans are getting out of Afghanistan. They have mentally come to terms with the inconclusiveness of this the longest war in their history. They have mentally comes to terms with the Taliban (Al-Qaeda being a different affair). What they haven’t come to terms with is us and what they perceive to be our double games. So in our hour of desperate need it is foolish to think they will come to our rescue. We should be offering collective prayers for one drone strike but my guess is our American friends would be in a sadistic mood.

Don’t we read history? Forget about Roman history, haven’t we imbibed any lessons from history closer to home? For India the Kashmir uprising in 1989 was a serious affair. How did the Indians crush it? By force, unbridled force and not, alas, by convening all-parties conferences. Today our Kashmir liberators such as those of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed are more a nuisance for us than they are for India or the authorities. They keep marching up and down Punjab along with the leaders of that other fearsome organisation, the Defence of Pakistan Council. How does this bring the liberation of Kashmir any closer?

Sikh unrest in Indian Punjab following the assault on the Golden Temple was a very serious affair. How was it quelled? By giving the Sikh police chief of the state, Sardar Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, a free hand. And a free hand he used, his methods utterly ruthless, drawing accusations of gross human rights violations. But he achieved what he had set out to do and the Sikh insurgency was crushed. He has been widely consulted on counterterrorism issues, helping Sri Lanka draw up a counterterrorism strategy. We are finding it difficult to think through our own counterterrorism strategy. Why don’t we get Sardar Gill to lighten our confusion?

The Sri Lankans have managed to stamp out their Tamil insurgency. Their methods were not gentle or tender and they weren’t forever ‘consulting all stakeholders’, the silly phrase which has become an alibi for doing nothing. Incidentally, many of the tactics used against the Tamil Tigers were similar to Gill’s methods in Punjab.

But Gill could be appointed in Punjab and given a free hand and Tamil Tigers defeated in Sri Lanka because in both instances there was leadership. We have an army and men ready to die, and so many men already dead, but what we don’t have is leadership. That is why all this dithering and drifting and Pakistan on this issue becoming more and more of a joke.

Irfan Siddiqui, Rustam Shah and the former ISI man, Major Amir, are all nice souls but if war and peace are to hinge on their endeavours we might as well head north and take up permanent abode on some remote mountaintop, practicing yoga and watching the stars. Jihadi policies have brought us to this pass and now Taliban sympathisers from both sides are supposed to take us out of this mess – beemar huay jis ke sabab, usee atar kay launday se dawa lete hain.

Consensus and being on the same page – in a divided polity there can be no such thing. Taliban apologists will remain that and nothing can change this. Between the Taliban and the state of Pakistan there can be no meeting point, no halfway house, because these are different elements and cannot mix. It’s like mixing fire and water. But living in the realm of delusion there are people who think this can be done.

Fighting anyone comes later. Recasting our thinking, eschewing all this jihadi nonsense, turning our backs upon the Afghan and jihad policies of the last 30 years…these are the imperatives of survival, the prerequisites for moving in a different direction. This is easier said than done for there is bound to be enormous resistance on the way and more mayhem and chaos and disorder.

But the question is one of survival. Either we do this or we become – and these are not words lightly said – another Yugoslavia candidate. There are forces and events pulling things apart but to look at us, our collective behaviour, it is hard to get the feeling that we are overly concerned. Dilli hunooz door ast….Delhi is still far away about sums up our attitude.

So how do we get the basics right? How do we get stronger leadership? When does the army leave the legacy of Zia behind? Who clears the cobwebs from our minds? Questions, loads of them, but no answers. We’ll muddle through of course but it’s going to be a hard slog.

 

[OrionHunter]

Isn't it ironical that Pakistanis are more concerned with and busy celebrating the so called 'Kashmir Solidarity Day' instead of concentrating on far more important issues concerning them? At the present juncture, are Kashmirs more important than Pakistanis themselves?

Due to their skewered priorities, Pakistan will continue to flounder with the myriad issues it needs to solve first within Pakistan itself, but they are busy playing to the gallery for brownie points by concentrating all their energies on celebrating solidarity days that are not going to solve Pakistan's problems.

Fighting anyone comes later. Recasting our thinking, eschewing all this jihadi nonsense, turning our backs upon the Afghan and jihad policies of the last 30 years…these are the imperatives of survival, the prerequisites for moving in a different direction.

When Kayani himself said that these Jehadis are Pakistan's 'strategic assets', then what can one expect? It's part of the PAs strategic doctrine set in stone. So nothing is going to change. It seems it will me more of the same, probably get even worse before realization dawns of the futility of such a doctrine.

 

[That Guy]

Isn't it ironical that Pakistanis are more concerned with and busy celebrating the so called 'Kashmir Solidarity Day' instead of concentrating on far more important issues concerning them? At the present juncture, are Kashmirs more important than Pakistanis themselves?

Due to their skewered priorities, Pakistan will continue to flounder with the myriad issues it needs to solve first within Pakistan itself, but they are busy playing to the gallery for brownie points by concentrating all their energies on celebrating solidarity days that are not going to solve Pakistan's problems.

Are you really making such a poor argument? Think about it, it's not one person we're talking about here, it's an entire nation, which is capable of multitasking.

What you're saying is that Pakistan shouldn't invest in science and energy projects, because it's army is fighting the Taliban right now. How about India? It shouldn't invest in the FGFA, because it's security forces are in the middle of fighting the naxalites.

Kashmir is a national-political issue, the insurgency is a military-political issue; Two different things.

What I'm trying to say is that your comparison is bad.

 

[third eye]

Are you really making such a poor argument? Think about it, it's not one person we're talking about here, it's an entire nation, which is capable of multitasking.

Of course a nation can multi task.

Here the quoted post relates to J&K and the enemy-at- the gates - TTP.

An evaluation of the performance on both fronts should give answers to Pakistan where this multi tasking has taken the nation to . Where its policy has led the nation to & what it has achieved or not achieved may give pointers to the changes needed if any to the directions taken thus far.

 

[That Guy]

Of course a nation can multi task.

Here the quoted post relates to J&K and the enemy-at- the gates - TTP.

An evaluation of the performance on both fronts should give answers to Pakistan where this multi tasking has taken the nation to . Where its policy has led the nation to & what it has achieved or not achieved may give pointers to the changes needed if any to the directions taken thus far.

Neither of which are easy to evaluate, and can't simply be put down to "because Pakistan is bad at multitasking". One thing has no affect on the other, so to make such a comparison and to try and relate them is a fool's errand.

 

[third eye]

Neither of which are easy to evaluate, and can't simply be put down to "because Pakistan is bad at multitasking". One thing has no affect on the other, so to make such a comparison and to try and relate them is a fool's errand.

This is strange to read & lies at the root of the flawed approach Pak has had whereby it feels that ' non state actors' can be spawned , controlled & made uni directional.

Good luck

 

[illusion8]

No one talks to terrorists, they are shot at..
The only discussion that happens is when they have thrown down their weapons and come to the table on their knees.

having said that,

I think the Pakistani situation with the TTP is similar to India's situation with the Naxals. We think of them of as "our people" and resist from using extreme force in the fear that it will blow into a wider unrest due to the possible deaths of locals among whom both the TTp and the Naxals live.

Pakistan or at least a sizable portion of Pakistani's consider the TTP as their own - similar to how many in India consider the Naxals to be their own. Both, the naxals and the TTP follow ideologies and look to implement on the entire state itself. Both engage in killings of civilians, bureaucrats and security forces.

As the author infers to the situation in Kashmir circa 89 and the Khalistan movement as something similar to the TTP.

The past unrest in Kashmir or Punjab can be equated to the present Pakistani unrest in Baluchistan or the past unrest in East Pakistan. The TTP can be equated to our naxals.

It remains to be seen how effectively India puts down the naxals and how Pakistan puts down the TTP.

 

[That Guy]

No one talks to terrorists, they are shot at..
The only discussion that happens is when they have thrown down their weapons and come to the table on their knees.

having said that,

I think the Pakistani situation with the TTP is similar to India's situation with the Naxals. We think of them of as "our people" and resist from using extreme force in the fear that it will blow into a wider unrest due to the possible deaths of locals among whom both the TTp and the Naxals live.

Pakistan or at least a sizable portion of Pakistani's consider the TTP as their own - similar to how many in India consider the Naxals to be their own. Both, the naxals and the TTP follow ideologies and look to implement on the entire state itself. Both engage in killings of civilians, bureaucrats and security forces.

As the author infers to the situation in Kashmir circa 89 and the Khalistan movement as something similar to the TTP.

The past unrest in Kashmir or Punjab can be equated to the present Pakistani unrest in Baluchistan or the past unrest in East Pakistan. The TTP can be equated to our naxals.

It remains to be seen how effectively India puts down the naxals and how Pakistan puts down the TTP.

I think, whatever ends the war in Pakistan will set a trend in the entire region.

 

[third eye]

I think, whatever ends the war in Pakistan will set a trend in the entire region.

If by the region you mean Af then it may be close to the truth.

No where else will it apply because the systems of governance & national institutions are different.

One hopes that this war in Pakistan will end someday.

 

[That Guy]

If by the region you mean Af then it may be close to the truth.

No where else will it apply because the systems of governance & national institutions are different.

One hopes that this war in Pakistan will end someday.

Not so different, Pakistan's governance is similar to the British system, which is used throughout a large chunk of the world. If the war ends in Pakistan in a certain way, who knows, maybe the naxals and/or the indian government may end up using the same method.

 

[illusion8]

I think, whatever ends the war in Pakistan will set a trend in the entire region.

Such insurgencies / guerrilla groups / terrorist organizations have been there in plenty in the past and even now are there all around the world - so what Pakistan is facing is nothing extraordinary or different. The difference for Pakistan is it's been put in this situation against a terrorist group for the first time. It will be something special for "Pakistan only" if it can extricate itself out of this situation.

Even if Pakistan is successful with the TTP - the same cannot be applied for our naxal issue, though Afghanistan can draw some inspiration - but they are already doing from a while what Pakistan is just starting out to do..so you don't have a precedence there as well.

 

[PlanetWarrior]

Whilst referring to TTP sympathisers as mediators who are expected hasten the peace, the writer misses one important point. Who funds these terrorists ? How do they get their weapons? If the Pakistani military and intelligence are so efficient at countering any Indian threat to Pakistan and containing any Indian threat to Pakistan, why can't those establishments seal off their borders and prevent any weapons being brought in by these groups? And why is decisive action not being taken against them? Comparing the Naxals to the TTP is similar to comparing a severe headache to a spreading cancer in one's body if there is any truth about the damage the TTP does to Pakistan

 

[third eye]

Not so different, Pakistan's governance is similar to the British system, which is used throughout a large chunk of the world. If the war ends in Pakistan in a certain way, who knows, maybe the naxals and/or the indian government may end up using the same method.

No way.

Thats just the point, Pak system is governance has no parallel. No where does the Army play such a pivotal & active role as it does in Pakistan.

Other places have a release valve in the form of predictable time bound elections.

As far as naxals go they shall fall into the mainstream. The theme may be same but no two insurgencies have common methods of being addressed. In Punjab it was stamped out, in J&K it has been smothered.

No where can the terrorists call the shots and lay down terms for talks. The state , law of the land & constitution have to be supreme & non negotiable.

 

[That Guy]

Such insurgencies / guerrilla groups / terrorist organizations have been there in plenty in the past and even now are there all around the world - so what Pakistan is facing is nothing extraordinary or different. The difference for Pakistan is it's been put in this situation against a terrorist group for the first time. It will be something special for "Pakistan only" if it can extricate itself out of this situation.

Even if Pakistan is successful with the TTP - the same cannot be applied for our naxal issue, though Afghanistan can draw some inspiration - but they are already doing from a while what Pakistan is just starting out to do..so you don't have a precedence there as well.

That's an odd thing to say considering that Pakistan has been fighting baluchi terrorist separatists since practically independence.

 

[SrNair]

No one talks to terrorists, they are shot at..
The only discussion that happens is when they have thrown down their weapons and come to the table on their knees.

having said that,

I think the Pakistani situation with the TTP is similar to India's situation with the Naxals. We think of them of as "our people" and resist from using extreme force in the fear that it will blow into a wider unrest due to the possible deaths of locals among whom both the TTp and the Naxals live.

Pakistan or at least a sizable portion of Pakistani's consider the TTP as their own - similar to how many in India consider the Naxals to be their own. Both, the naxals and the TTP follow ideologies and look to implement on the entire state itself. Both engage in killings of civilians, bureaucrats and security forces.

As the author infers to the situation in Kashmir circa 89 and the Khalistan movement as something similar to the TTP.

The past unrest in Kashmir or Punjab can be equated to the present Pakistani unrest in Baluchistan or the past unrest in East Pakistan. The TTP can be equated to our naxals.

It remains to be seen how effectively India puts down the naxals and how Pakistan puts down the TTP.

Naxals issue is handle by Central police not by Indian Army.Naxals are there for long time.But now what we can see is that.A transformational disturbances transforming from poor country to fastest growing country.When India developing fast,it needed to address remote tribal area.And the Naxals take action against it because they lose their turf .But so far we implemented it carefully.But TTP is different .They are fight for medieval rules.And TTP capability is too high compared to Naxals.IF they use their full power they can surely bleed Pakistan and its army.TTP is equal to Khalistan movement in early 1980s in Punjab.