A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

[RabzonKhan]

Pakistan’s Failure to Hit Militant Sanctuary Has Positive Side for U.S.

NY Times
By ERIC SCHMITT
January 17, 2011


WASHINGTON — Pakistan’s refusal to attack militants in a notorious sanctuary on its northwest border may have created a magnet there for hundreds of Islamic fighters seeking a safe haven where they can train and organize attacks against NATO forces in Afghanistan. But theirs is a congregation in the cross hairs.

A growing number of senior United States intelligence and counterinsurgency officials say that by bunching up there, insurgents are ultimately making it easier for American drone strikes to hit them from afar.

American officials are loath to talk about this silver lining to the storm cloud that they have long described building up in the tribal area of North Waziristan, where the insurgents run a virtual mini-state the size of Rhode Island. This is because they do not want to undermine the Obama administration’s urgent public pleas for Pakistan to order troops into the area, or to give Pakistan an excuse for inaction.

“We cannot succeed in Afghanistan without shutting down those safe havens,” Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said last week, underscoring a major conclusion of the White House’s strategic review of Afghanistan policy last month.

But as long as the safe havens exist, they provide a rich hunting ground, however inadvertent it may be.

Pakistani Army operations in the other six of seven tribal areas near the border with Afghanistan have helped drive fighters from Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Haqqani network and other militant groups into North Waziristan, the one tribal area that Pakistan has not yet assaulted.

With several hundred insurgents largely bottled up there, and with few worries about accidentally hitting Pakistani soldiers battling militants or civilians fleeing a combat zone, the Central Intelligence Agency’s drones have attacked targets in North Waziristan with increasing effectiveness and have degraded Al Qaeda’s ability to carry out a major attack against the United States, the senior officials said.

The number of strikes in North Waziristan grew to 104 in 2010 from 22 in 2009, according to the Long War Journal, a Web site that tracks the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There have been five strikes in North Waziristan so far this year.

While the overall effectiveness of the strikes is impossible to ascertain, there are many accounts to confirm that insurgent fighters and leaders have indeed been killed.

To be sure, a wide array of administration officials have acknowledged the limitations of drone strikes and emphasized the need for Pakistan to use ground troops to clear out militants who have used the refuge in North Waziristan to rest and rearm, a point Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. made to Pakistani civilian leaders and ranking generals on a visit to Pakistan last week.

A senior counterterrorism official concurred, saying: “We’ve seen in the past what happens when terrorists are given a de facto safe haven. It tends to turn out ugly for both Pakistan and the United States. It’s absolutely critical that Pakistan stay focused on rooting out militants in North Waziristan.”

The C.I.A. director, Leon E. Panetta, discussed counterterrorism issues with the president of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, and the head of Pakistan’s main spy agency, Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, in a meeting in Washington on Friday, a C.I.A. spokesman said.

But half a dozen senior intelligence, counterterrorism and military officials interviewed in the past several days said a bright side had unexpectedly emerged from Pakistan’s delay. Pounding the militants consolidated in the North Waziristan enclave with airstrikes will leave the insurgents in a weakened state if the Pakistani offensive comes later this year, the officials said.

“In some ways, it’s to our benefit to keep them bottled up, mostly in North Waziristan,” said a senior intelligence official, who like others interviewed agreed to speak candidly about the Pakistan strategy if he was not identified. “This is not intentional. That wasn’t the design to bottle them up. That’s just where they are, and they’re there for a reason. They don’t have a lot of options.”

Another senior administration official added, “We’d still prefer the Pakistani Army to operate in North Waziristan, but consolidating the insurgents in one place is not such a bad thing.”

Senior Pakistani politicians and commanders, including Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the army chief of staff, say their troops are already stretched thin and will carry out an offensive in North Waziristan on their timetable, not Washington’s. Lt. Gen. Asif Yasin Malik, the main Pakistan commander in the northwest, said in October that it would take at least six months to clear militants from two other restive tribal areas, called agencies, before considering an offensive in North Waziristan.

“It’s only a matter of how, when and in what manner do we conduct operations there,” Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, said in a statement. He said Pakistan had 38,000 military and paramilitary troops in North Waziristan.

Senior United States officials praise Pakistan for carrying out operations in the rugged tribal areas, but many of these officials say they are not convinced that the Pakistani Army is willing or able to clear North Waziristan.

Counterterrorism specialists say that attacking militants in North Waziristan would be a much more difficult campaign than previous operations in Swat, Bajaur and South Waziristan. The region has mountainous terrain as well as urban centers, like Miram Shah, that if attacked could result in many civilian casualties or produce hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the fighting, as happened in previous clearing operations.

Moreover, no effective civilian police force exists to take over security duties after military operations. The Pakistani Army still remains in Swat, Bajaur and South Waziristan, months after major campaigns.

And to be truly effective, American officials say, a North Waziristan offensive would have to single out not just Qaeda and Taliban fighters, but also militants in the Haqqani network. That group has long enjoyed support from Pakistan’s military and intelligence services because it represents a strategic hedge against what Pakistan views as encroachment by its archrival, India, in Afghanistan.

“There may be an offensive in North Waziristan, but I think it’ll be very carefully orchestrated to preserve Pakistan’s assets in the region,” said Bruce O. Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, who led President Obama’s first Afghanistan policy review.

American intelligence officials say that pressure from the airstrikes has forced small numbers of Haqqani fighters and other militants to slip into other tribal areas, including Kurram and South Waziristan. “The Haqqanis aren’t stupid,” one counterterrorism official said. “They’re feeling some serious pressure in North Waziristan, so it should come as no surprise that they’re looking for places they might think are safer.”

All the more reason proponents of Pakistani action say time is of the essence. “I’ve been very clear in my conversations with General Kayani over the last year or so that there needs to be a focus, from my perspective, on North Waziristan,” Admiral Mullen told reporters in Islamabad last month. “That’s where Al Qaeda leadership resides, that’s where the Haqqani network, in particular, is headquartered, and the Haqqanis are leading the way and coming across the border and killing American and allied forces. And that has got to cease.”


Ismail Khan contributed reporting from Peshawar, Pakistan.

 

[DV RULES]

Nothing effective can be supposed from Pakistan till US will not give guaranty to protect the interest of Pakistan in Afghanistan & guaranty over limited Indian involvement in Afghanistan as Pakistan desire.

 

[RabzonKhan]

President Karzai’s Latest

NY Times
Editorial
January 20, 2011


It took particular audacity for President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan to order Parliament to delay this weekend’s opening session while an unconstitutional court he appointed re-investigates charges of fraud in last fall’s parliamentary vote.

Mr. Karzai’s own re-election two years ago was marred by blatant ballot tampering, and his legitimacy — in the eyes of his own people and the world — hasn’t recovered. Beyond that hypocrisy, this sort of cynical meddling is exactly what Afghanistan doesn’t need at this critical moment in the NATO-backed struggle to win hearts, minds and territory from the Taliban.

American-led military forces have reportedly made progress loosening the Taliban’s grip on the southern province of Kandahar. But those hard-won gains could quickly unravel unless Afghans start seeing their government as legitimate and competent.

Mr. Karzai’s seemingly unlimited tolerance for corrupt relatives and cronies and his inability to deliver basic services are already two of the insurgents’ biggest recruiting points. Another blatant power grab will make things even worse.

Kandahar is the heartland of Mr. Karzai’s Pashtun ethnic group, which ended up with far fewer seats in the new Parliament than it held in the last one. The threat of violence, but also discontent with Mr. Karzai, led to a low turnout, and disqualifications for fraud further reduced the number of Pashtun seats.

Mr. Karzai’s delay of Parliament seems intended, at a minimum, to tamp down Pashtun discontent during the Kandahar offensive. What it surely will do is exacerbate tensions across Afghanistan, especially in the non-Pashtun areas where Taliban activity is rising.

Afghanistan needs an accountable government, and one in which all groups and regions are fairly represented. The longer Parliament is kept from convening (it is already five months since the election) the longer Mr. Karzai gets to rule by decree.

This Parliament should be seated without further delay so that it can get to work on serious problems like national reconciliation, pressing for more effective governance and reining in Mr. Karzai’s increasingly arbitrary and capricious actions.

September’s vote was indeed tainted by wholesale irregularities. No one disputes that, or argues that voter fraud should simply be overlooked, as it was in Mr. Karzai’s own re-election race. These returns have already been investigated and adjudicated by the only legal body constitutionally empowered to do so — Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission — and those findings have been fully backed by the international community. Mr. Karzai’s court has no legal standing and should not be allowed to have the last word.

Members of the new Parliament are saying they will meet on Sunday in another location if Mr. Karzai tries to prevent them from using the Parliament building. We hope their determination, coupled with strong pressure from the United Nations, NATO and Washington, can persuade Mr. Karzai to back off.

Defeating the Taliban requires an effective Afghan partner, and, for better or for worse (and too often it is the latter), Mr. Karzai is the president of Afghanistan. Washington has to work with him. Sometimes, as now, that requires standing up to him in order to extricate him, and Afghanistan, from the consequences of his anti-democratic impulses.

President Obama must make it clear to Mr. Karzai, publicly and privately, that he is not an uncrowned king, but a president accountable to his people and his country’s Constitution.

 

[monitor]

The Afghan endgame

The foremost reality is that the Afghans have a fierce sense of independence, and have never been pacified by foreign forces.

Shamshad Ahmad

America's Afghan war is in its tenth year and Washington still doesn't seem to have a plan to end it. It has been one of the costliest wars lasting longer than the Second World War. There is no sign of a finale soon coming to this unwinnable war that has not gone beyond retribution and retaliation. No wonder people in the US and the European countries are sick of this conflict and want their troops to be out of the war theatre.
To mollify this sentiment, the US is working on alibis of all sorts. The one agreed at the last NATO summit in Lisbon envisages limited withdrawal from Afghanistan in July as a prelude to a transition plan, with an eye to ending their combat mission in Afghanistan by 2014. According to the Lisbon Declaration, the transition process was on track and, by the end of 2014, Afghan forces will be assuming full responsibility for security across their country. In the Afghan context, that is easier said than done.
The Lisbon decision was qualified with a caveat that "the transition would be conditions-based, not calendar-driven. In his concluding remarks, President Obama also clarified the intent of the NATO decision on withdrawal by 2014 by stressing that "it is a goal to make sure that we are not still engaged in combat operations of the sort that we're involved with now," but "it's hard to anticipate exactly what is going to be necessary." He added, "We are much more unified and clear about how we're going to achieve our ultimate end-state in Afghanistan."
However, the Obama strategy spells out no long-term "end-state" and only aims at "setting the conditions" for a small but unspecified number of US troops in July 2011. An unclassified strategic policy review released by the White House on Dec 16 was cautious in claiming operational gains in the war. The assessment found "substantial improvement in the international training of Afghan army and police forces and increased cooperation by Pakistan's military in targeting insurgents on its side of a porous border," but admitted that "recent gains in the south remain reversible."
Whatever it's real intent and content, the Afghan endgame in its present form shows clear divergence in NATO and US positions. America's NATO allies are looking for a military exit from Afghanistan, limiting their presence in the war-ravaged country beyond the stipulated timeline only to a supporting role in nation-building. On its part, the US does not rule out a military role for its forces in Afghanistan even beyond 2014.
Vice President Joe Biden was in Kabul and Islamabad last week on a mission to assess the ground situation preparatory to the scheduled limited withdrawal in July this year in the run-up to the 2014 deadline. His talks in both capitals were described as useful and constructive, though each side had its own narrative of the areas of "concern" in the US withdrawal plan.
While the US wants Afghanistan and Pakistan to do more to facilitate the transition, there are serious doubts and apprehensions in both countries on the very viability of the whole process. For them, the US withdrawal is not the issue. They would welcome it. The issue of concern to them is the premises on which the execution of the transition is based, in complete disregard of the Afghan realities.
The foremost reality is that the Afghans have a fierce sense of independence, and have never been pacified by foreign forces. The post-Soviet chaos and the post-9/11 US-led military campaign both have only deepened the Afghan ethnic divide. The experience of centuries, especially of the last two decades, should make one thing abundantly clear. No reconciliation imposed from outside will work in Afghanistan, and no exit strategy will succeed by further deepening the ethnic divide in this war-torn country.
Henry Kissinger, who opposes any time-bound US withdrawal, sees the Afghan reality in its true character. In his view, Afghanistan is a nation, not a state in the conventional sense, and any exit strategy must be based on the historic reality that the writ of the Afghan government has traditionally been confined to Kabul and its environs, leaving the rest of the country to be run by local warlords or tribal influentials as almost semi-autonomous regions configured largely on the basis of ethnicity, dealing with each other by tacit or explicit understandings.
Historically, for reasons of its difficult geography and multiple ethnicities, the country has rarely been able to achieve a strong central government. Now to expect President Hamid Karzai to create a modern central government within a given timeframe is not realistic. Given the structure of his society based on personal affinities and tribal traditions, the demand for him to deliver in matter of months is beyond his capacity. The country is too large, the ethnic composition too varied, and the population too heavily armed. No army or police force without genuinely reflecting the ethnic reality can deliver in this scenario.
Another lesson from history is that no military occupation for an indefinite period has ever worked. Also different theatres of war require different approaches. Iraq's "Anbar" blueprint will not work in Afghanistan. Gen Petraeus must understand that any plan that precipitates intra-Afghan conflict as part of his anti-Taliban strategy will seriously jeopardise the reconciliation process and throw this ill-fated country in another fratricidal civil war. It would be a dangerous mistake which will not be without grave implications for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Washington must understand that the Afghans are not the only victims of the Afghan tragedy. Pakistan as the key frontline state in the last Afghan war suffered irreparably in multiple ways in terms of millions of refugees, socio-economic burden, a culture of drugs and guns, rampant terrorism and protracted conflict in its border areas with Afghanistan, and now as its pivotal non-NATO ally in the war on terror is waging a full-scale war on its own territory.
The US may have its own political compulsions in the run-up to next year's presidential election but both Afghanistan and Pakistan have suffered for too long and cannot afford another cataclysm. The effectiveness of their role and capability in this process will suffer if other conflicts and disputes continue to engage and divert their attention and resources.
Whatever the end-game, durable peace in Afghanistan will remain elusive as long as Pakistan's legitimate security concerns in the region remain addressed. Pakistan has already staked everything in support of this war and is constantly paying a heavy price in terms of violence, massive displacement, trade and production slowdown, export stagnation, investor hesitation and a worsening law and order situation. It is also suffering the consequences of US insensitivity to Pakistan's legitimate concerns about India's preponderant role in the region, especially its nuisance potential in its backyard.
A coercive and, at times, accusatory and slanderous approach towards Pakistan and its armed forces and security agencies is both reprehensible and counterproductive. Instead of using Pakistan as an easy scapegoat for their own failures in this war, the US and its allies must accept the reality that Afghanistan is an area of fundamental strategic importance for Pakistan. If the Soviet presence in Cuba almost triggered a nuclear war in the early 1960s, India's continued ascendancy in Afghanistan will remain a danger of no less gravity to the already volatile security environment of this nuclearised region.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Pakistan's army chief seeks stable Afghanistan

Washington Post
By Pamela Constable
February 2, 2010

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN -- Pakistan's army chief said Monday that his country wants a "peaceful, stable and friendly" Afghanistan as its western neighbor and that achieving this goal would guarantee Pakistan the "strategic depth" it once sought by supporting the Islamist Taliban regime in Kabul.

Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani, in a rare meeting with foreign journalists at army headquarters in the garrison city of Rawalpindi, said that Pakistan is eager to help the elected government in Afghanistan become capable of defending the country and that his army would like to help the United States train recruits for the new Afghan National Army.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have a history of tense relations and mutual grievances, and their leaders have often accused each other of fomenting Islamist insurgency. But now both countries are facing sustained extremist violence, and Kiyani said Pakistan has suffered even more attacks than Afghanistan.

In an informal presentation that drew on material from an address he delivered to NATO officials in Brussels last week, Kiyani listed Pakistan's multiple contributions to the war in Afghanistan, including logistical support for U.S. supply lines and military operations along the Afghan border.

"We can't have Talibanization. We want to remain modern and progressive," Kiyani told reporters in a windowless conference room. "We cannot wish for Afghanistan what we don't wish for Pakistan." Pakistan once backed the Taliban regime in Kabul but abruptly abandoned it at Washington's request after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Kiyani's wide-ranging remarks seemed aimed at refuting the American demand that Pakistan "do more" to fight Islamist terrorism at home, as well as criticism that it is reluctant to turn against the Afghan Taliban in case it ends up in power after Western forces leave the country.

Kiyani briefly touched on proposals for reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban, saying the group's fighters should be "weaned and reintegrated" into society. But he described most Afghans as "sitting at a crossroad, waiting to see who is winning and losing" before deciding whether to back the insurgents or the state.

The army chief said Pakistan has no desire to control Afghanistan, adding, "No one has ever been able to control Afghanistan in history." He said the army wants to "get more involved" in Afghanistan, but only as military trainers, and he noted that it could take years to build a professional army and officer corps there.

"We want to have strategic depth in Afghanistan, but that does not imply controlling it," he said. "If we have a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan, automatically we will have our strategic depth because our western border will be secure, and we will not be looking at two fronts."

Pakistan has one of the largest and best-equipped conventional armies in the world, with a force of nearly half a million. But the military was built to fight the country's neighboring rival, Hindu-majority India, and has had little experience with guerrilla conflict.

 

[RabzonKhan]

`Complicated` ties

Dawn
Feb 19 2011

THE testimony of two American security chiefs before a Senate committee epitomises the `complicated relationship` that characterises Islamabad`s ties with Washington. While they admitted that, thanks to Pakistan, Al Qaeda was at its weakest since 9/11, both CIA chief Leon Panetta and counter-terrorism chairman Michael Leiter orchestrated the decade-old `do more` mantra but admitted that Pakistan had its way of looking at things. Said Mr Panetta: “They look at issues related to their national interest and take steps that complicate the relationship.” What else does the CIA chief expect Pakistan to do except to look at all issues from the point of view of its own interests? Surely America too looks — as it must — at all international questions from its own perspective. That`s why governments interact to decide whether or not there is a commonality of interest to bring them together.

There is a lot at stake for both Pakistan and America in whatever has been going on in the region and beyond since 9/11. One fact should overshadow all other considerations: no country has suffered more civilian and military casualties than Pakistan at the hands of a common enemy — terrorists of all hues. The sites bombed by the Taliban grouping include not only Pakistani mosques and shrines but also premises universally regarded as sacrosanct — hospitals and schools. Some American diplomats — among them the late Richard Holbrooke — never hesitated to admit the trauma Pakistan has suffered because of its commitment to the war on terror.

The two security chiefs` comments and Senator Dianne Feinstein`s bit about “both sides of the street” come four months ahead of the beginning of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some concerns are valid because of Pakistan`s reluctance to go for an all-out military operation in North Waziristan seen as one of the biggest havens for local and foreign militants. However, surely, the Obama administration`s Afghan policy has more than America`s national interests dear to it. With voters having already handed over the lower house to the Republicans in the mid-term election, the least the Democratic Party can do for the 2012 presidential election is to minimise casualties, regional states` interest being of less consequence. Besides, while America sees reluctance on Islamabad`s part to `do more`, it has entered into a dialogue with militant groups to cover its retreat. If common interests brought Pakistan and America together, let Washington ensure that the long-term ties it has pledged do not fall victim to passing irritants as the Raymond Davis affair or its view of the ISI`s purported walk on “both sides”. The hazards of the future should serve to cement their relationship.

 

[monitor]

Afghan militias

This new programme reveals the Obama administration's serious difficulty in learning the right lessons from history.

Rizwan Asghar

President Obama, in his recent State of the Union address, has reiterated his promise to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan this year. He also appeared very confident that the US will succeed in Afghanistan despite the fact that over the past two years all the Obama administration's policies aimed at stabilising Afghanistan have ended in complete failure.
In a bid to counter the intensifying insurgency, the Afghan government and NATO troops have been setting up community-based armed militias. To date, thousands of men have been recruited to such bodies in various parts of Afghanistan. The growing resentment against foreign troops and the withdrawal from ISAF of troop contributing states this year have made it difficult for the US to continue its occupation of Afghanistan. So NATO military units in Afghanistan are turning to the 'private militias' of warlords for help.
This new programme reveals the Obama administration's serious difficulty in learning the right lessons from history. A few years ago, tribal militias were formed in specific parts of the country but were disbanded after they were deemed ineffective. In many cases, the militias turned to criminal activity or took part in tribal feuds.
General Stanley McChrystal, the former US commander in Afghanistan, also opposed the formation of armed militias. He said that "This is an area where warlords and militias got a very, very bad name, so we don't want to create anything that makes the Afghan people think we're going the wrong direction". The tribal warlords and their private armies are already despised for their role in ravaging Afghanistan after Soviet troops withdrew in 1989.
General Petraeus is of the view that this policy is part of a broad American push to forge relations with Afghanistan's tribes and armed militias will be more like police - trained, uniformed and paid by Karzai government. But according to senior US military officials, despite the fact that some of the militias have been given uniforms, training and identity badges they remain loyal to the warlords who recruited them.
The irregular armed groups have been formed without any proper coordination with local tribes who want peace. There are also frequent cases of Afghan soldiers turning their guns on NATO soldiers - an indication of the disenchantment surrounding the war effort.
In the southern city of Kandahar these militias are feared more than the militants and referred to as 'death squads'. The armed groups publicly carry out killings of innocent people under the protection of both the Afghan government and foreign troops.
The irregular forces have frequently been found responsible for human rights abuses and have threatened the stability and peace of northern Afghanistan. Interestingly, the very idea of creating militias is in contravention of the Geneva Conventions that make it illegal to use civilians in war.
The militia commanders are also hiring underage boys in their ranks for different illicit purposes in an environment of criminal impunity. This turmoil has also opened the door to the re-emergence of Taliban influence in the area and will possibly allow the Taliban to infiltrate the militias. According to the Afghanistan Rights Monitor, "in terms of insecurity, 2010 has been the worst year since the demise of the Taliban regime in late 2001".
The last nine years have proved that the US cannot win the war in Afghanistan. There is dire need to defeat the Taliban politically, and here the US has failed miserably.

 

[RabzonKhan]

All of the right-wings propaganda goes in the dustbin! Pakistan military officer openly admit that most of “those killed were hardcore Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists and a fairly large number of them were of foreign origin.”


Most of those killed in drone attacks were terrorists: military

Dawn
By Zahir Shah Sherazi

MIRAMSHAH: In a rather rare move, the Pakistan military for the first time gave the official version of US drone attacks in the tribal region and said that most of those killed were hardcore Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists and a fairly large number of them were of foreign origin.

General Officer Commanding 7-Division Maj-Gen Ghayur Mehmood said in a briefing here: “Myths and rumours about US predator strikes and the casualty figures are many, but it’s a reality that many of those being killed in these strikes are hardcore elements, a sizeable number of them foreigners.

“Yes there are a few civilian casualties in such precision strikes, but a majority of those eliminated are terrorists, including foreign terrorist elements.”

The Military’s 7-Dvision’s official paper on the attacks till Monday said that between 2007 and 2011 about 164 predator strikes had been carried out and over 964 terrorists had been killed.

Of those killed, 793 were locals and 171 foreigners, including Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Filipinos and Moroccans.

In 2007, one missile strike left one militant dead while the year 2010 was the deadliest when the attacks had left more than 423 terrorists dead.

In 2008, 23 drone strikes killed 152 militants, 12 of them were foreigners or affiliated with Al Qaeda.

In 2009, around 20 predator strikes were carried out, killing 179 militants, including 20 foreigners, and in the following year 423 militants, including 133 foreigners, were killed in 103 strikes.

In attacks till March 7 this year, 39 militants, including five foreigners, were killed.

Maj-Gen Ghayur, who is in-charge of troops in North Waziristan, admitted that the drone attacks had negative fallout, scaring the local population and causing their migration to other places.

Gen Ghayur said the drone attacks also had social and political repercussions and law-enforcement agencies often felt the heat.

About the cross-border movement of terrorists along the Pak-Afghan border, he said: “Well we have over 820 checkposts along the border to stop militant movement and there is strict vigilance, but unfrequented routes are an exception for which alternate means, including intelligence-sharing between coalition troops and the army, are in place.”

 

[RabzonKhan]

Drone myth put to rest?

Editorial
Published in The Express Tribune, March 10th, 2011.


The General Officer Commanding 7-Division, a two-star major-general, has said on record, speaking at a briefing in Mirali in North Waziristan, that “many of those killed in drone strikes are hardcore elements” and that “a sizeable number” were “foreigners”. He added that “there are a few civilian casualties in such precision strikes, but a majority of those eliminated are terrorists”. According to the officer, between 2007 and 2011 about 164 predator strikes had been carried out and over 964 terrorists killed. Of those killed, 793 were locals and 171 foreigners. Under US President Barack Obama, 2010 was the deadliest year, with the attacks leaving more than 423 terrorists dead.

The officer in charge of troops in North Waziristan has given reasons why Pakistan doesn’t like the US policy of drones: “The attacks have a negative fallout, scaring the local population and causing their migration”, bringing law enforcement agencies under pressure.

The statement is, however, an important rebuttal of the claim made by a part of the media: That the drones mostly kill innocent Pakistani tribesmen. Here, a distinction must be carefully recognised: Those killed are mostly local people but they fall in the category of terrorists. The tribesmen killed were mostly ‘not innocent’ and were considered as fighting for al Qaeda. Yet the tribesmen who gathered in Islamabad some time ago as ‘victims of drones’ all claimed to be innocent and strengthened the stance of the Islamabad government against the drones.

Once again, a distinction will have to be made between the terrorist tribesmen, who possibly did not come to Islamabad to register their protest and, those who lost their dear ones as ‘collateral damage’. Not even the Americans deny this collateral damage. The soldiers of 7-Division, who are valiantly fighting foreign and home-grown terrorists and their local henchmen, know very well who the bad guys are. They are certainly less influenced by the anti-American propaganda than the rest of us are.

Since the media in Pakistan is free — but not without its biases — a lonely voice of dissent about the drones has been raised too. The Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA), a thinktank of researchers and political activists from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Fata has contested the ‘official’ view that drone attacks are harming Pakistan. The AIIRA teams visited areas in South Waziristan, North Waziristan and Kurram Agency in 2009. The teams handed out 650 structured questionnaires to people in these areas. The questionnaires were answered by 550 respondents (100 declined to answer) from professions related to business, education, health and transport.

The following replies were received: Do you think the drones are accurate in their strikes? Response: ‘Yes’ 52 per cent, ‘no’ 48 per cent. Do you think anti-American feelings in the area increased due to drone attacks recently? Response: ‘Yes’ 42 per cent, ‘no’ 58 per cent. Should the Pakistan military carry out targeted strikes on members of militant organisations? Response: ‘Yes’ 70 per cent, ‘no’ 30 per cent. Do militant organisations get damaged due to drone attacks? Response: ‘Yes’ 60 per cent, ‘no’ 40 per cent. AIRRA drew the following conclusions: “The popular notion outside the Pakhtun belt that a large majority of the local population supports the Taliban movement lacks substance. The notion that anti-Americanism in the region has increased due to drone attacks is rejected by this survey. The study supports the notion that a large majority of the people in the Pakhtun belt wants to be incorporated with the state and integrate with the rest of the world.”

The fact is that Fata has been an ‘ungoverned space’ within Pakistan for a long time. The state has been drawing its non-state actors from this area for its covert wars. The area has been left undeveloped and foreign terrorist organisations have entered Fata and are using Pakistani territory for attacks across Pakistan’s borders, which greatly damages the legal ground for our demand that drone attacks be stopped. If we are so against foreign drones targeting the militants, we should be prepared to do this job ourselves.

 

[muse]

The following replies were received: Do you think the drones are accurate in their strikes? Response: ‘Yes’ 52 per cent, ‘no’ 48 per cent. Do you think anti-American feelings in the area increased due to drone attacks recently? Response: ‘Yes’ 42 per cent, ‘no’ 58 per cent. Should the Pakistan military carry out targeted strikes on members of militant organisations? Response: ‘Yes’ 70 per cent, ‘no’ 30 per cent. Do militant organisations get damaged due to drone attacks? Response: ‘Yes’ 60 per cent, ‘no’ 40 per cent. AIRRA drew the following conclusions: “The popular notion outside the Pakhtun belt that a large majority of the local population supports the Taliban movement lacks substance. The notion that anti-Americanism in the region has increased due to drone attacks is rejected by this survey. The study supports the notion that a large majority of the people in the Pakhtun belt wants to be incorporated with the state and integrate with the rest of the world.”

This too has been objected to by some - but Pakistan will soon have the capability to employ it's own UCAV, perhaps then more people in Pakistan will be less confused about where they stand and why

 

[RabzonKhan]

Drone attacks

Dawn
March 11 2011

THE effectiveness of the US drone attacks in taking out militants has been causing much controversy since 2007 when the strikes first began. Many doubt the utility of the tactic and suspect that the majority of the deaths are civilian. Publicly, the army and the government administration have so far condemned the drone attacks as a violation of Pakistan`s airspace — a position that has found echoes in the public`s resentment against the attacks and that has turned the issue into a politically divisive one. But is the line to which the politico-military administration has clung about to change? Some indication of that may be found in the statement made by the military on Wednesday, that most of those killed in drone strikes were Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists. Briefing journalists in Miramshah, General Officer Commanding 7 Division, Maj-Gen Ghayur Mehmood, who is in charge of the troops in North Waziristan, said that “many of those being killed in these strikes are hard-core elements, a sizeable number of them foreigners”. Conceding that there have been a few civilian casualties, he added that drone attacks also had social and political repercussions.

Is the army hinting that the strikes are a useful and precise tactic in neutralising identified militants and terrorists? If that is the case, then the military and political leaders should publicly change their stated position and matters should move on — the battle against local and foreign terrorists hiding in the country`s north-western regions is far from over. Some of the social and political repercussions to which Maj-Gen Mehmood referred would be reduced if the drone strikes were acknowledged as an effective technique and thus legitimised in the public discourse. More importantly, if the army is recognising the utility of such strikes, greater cooperation between Pakistani and US forces could yield success in the long term.

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: Condemnation that merits concern

Daily Times
Mar 20 2011

The sudden release and departure of Raymond Davis, the
deadly drone attack in Datta Khel and the harsh criticism that has been voiced by the highest echelons of the land; this certainly has been an eventful time in Pakistan. Of all these, the event that baffles the most is the tremendous amount of concern and objections that are emanating from the highest offices in the land after the Datta Khel drone strike where, reportedly, some 40 tribal elders were killed. The Foreign Office (FO) summoned the American Ambassador, Cameron Munter; he has been told that the US should not take Pakistan “for granted” nor should it treat the country as a client state. The FO has made it clear that Islamabad expects nothing less than an apology from Washington. In an unexpected outburst, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani condemned the attack by calling it “a complete violation of human rights”. Prime Minister Gilani followed suit by saying that the attack was unacceptable. Not just limiting their condemnation to mere words, officials in Islamabad have announced that Pakistan has pulled out of an upcoming trilateral meeting with Afghanistan and the US scheduled for next week. It is because of all these actions that we find ourselves once again asking: why now?

FATA, which is a part of Pakistan, has been at the mercy of drone strikes for quite a few years now, with a death toll of over 2,000, and never before have we heard even a whimper of protest from the government (cosmetic condemnations notwithstanding), the army or our intelligence establishment. Never before have we seen Pakistan being audacious enough to pull out of a meeting with the US (the last trilateral meeting saw the US pull out because of the Davis affair). Never before has the Pakistan Army positioned itself as a champion of human rights like it has now. So why the change of stance? If insider reports are to be believed, the target of the drone strike was not as innocent as some would have us believe. It is being said that a commander of the Haqqani network was among the dead in this strike. Yes, there was some collateral damage but, apparently, there were significant militant deaths also. Datta Khel is a known Taliban hub in North Waziristan, a place that has, so far, not been touched by the Pakistan Army.

It is common knowledge that drone attacks cannot be coordinated effectively without the active involvement of Pakistan’s intelligence establishment. It is also no secret that there may be targets that the US is keen to obliterate but is not given the help (and go-ahead) they need from an establishment that has made clear differentiations between what it deems as good Taliban and bad Taliban. Could it be that the loud condemnations are due to the fact that this strike was carried out without the establishment’s green signal? Could it be that the US, finally sick and tried of the dual policies of the establishment, have decided to go it alone when it comes to effectively rooting out the militants? Could it be that our military/intelligence system has been left out in the cold by a US that is now on the warpath? These are questions that cannot go unanswered. It is plain to see that Islamabad and the army have over-reacted to a situation they should have been condemning right from the beginning but did not.

It would be foolish of us to think that the Americans will feel differently towards the war on terror after the Davis release. Their only objectives are rooting out militancy and terror and they will do it with or without our help. Pakistan has not triumphed in the Raymond case. It will not triumph until it drops its support for the Afghan Taliban — the prime US target. It is time we see these over-reactions for what they may very well be: condemnations by the increasingly isolated.

 

[monitor]

Afghanistan: the threat of civil war

Strong military leadership is impossible in an environment where political and ethnic affiliations rather than merit are the basis of promotions.

Musa Khan Jalalzai

The issue of mutual distrust between the US and NATO and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the killing of innocent civilians by the US-led coalition forces, has been a matter of great concern for Afghan politicians. The rising power of the Taliban insurgency, desertions of Afghan army soldiers, ethnic and sectarian rivalries and massive corruption in the government departments have threatened the US and NATO stabilising strategy for Afghanistan. These are a few reasons behind the rift that caused distrust between the Karzai regime and its NATO allies.
Having expressed deep regret over the recent US killings of innocent children in Kunar province, a source in the Afghan defence ministry told me that the entire military command is highly disturbed and the majority of officers are not willing to further cooperate with the coalition partners. President Karzai urged NATO to stop civilian killings by mistake. "We are very tolerant people but now our tolerance has run out," he said. The president cried as he held a girl who he said had her leg amputated following an attack. Now the issue of foreign occupation is openly discussed in military units.
Private debates in government offices, political circles and in military headquarters have recently focussed on the point that this unsuccessful war on terror has put in danger the territorial integrity of the country. According to the Afghan Human Rights Commission report, more than 520 children have been killed between 2009 and 2010 and some 200,000 children are living with disabilities as a result of wrongly directed US air strikes and crossfire among warring factions. In 2010, at least 2,800 civilians were killed and over 4,000 injured. The recent US resolve for permanent military bases in Afghanistan is seen by the ANA as a new formula of permanent colonisation of their country.
Nationalists in the defence and interior ministries have showed some reservations and disillusionment. They openly blame the Americans that they are pushing the country to the brink of civil war. A long-term US presence, according to sources in the defence ministry of Afghanistan, will bring further instability and undermine the hope of reconciliation with the Taliban and other militant groups. The Global Security Organisation in its situation report on Afghanistan has stated that the US war in Afghanistan has created many problems, neither addressing ethnicity nor factionalism. The Afghans loathe Americans and Americans are treating the Afghans like slaves. This mutual distrust has increased the importance of mercenaries like Blackwater to play their controversial role in the country.
Notwithstanding the US and NATO's billions of dollars investment in the Afghan National Army and the police, this army has now turned against the American presence. Traders and truckers complain they are paying monthly $ 1,000-10,000 bribes to the provincial governors, police chiefs, and local military units whose territory they pass through. According to a recent report, warlords pay millions of dollars to the officers of the ANA every month. Business relations between private contractors and the army are thriving. According to the US exit strategy, it wants to equip, train and arm the ANA and the police before the expected military withdrawal in 2014, but the widespread drug addiction within the police and the army ranks is a big hurdle in the way of building a well organised army in Afghanistan.
Some Afghan military officers and soldiers were recently removed from service for their involvement in drugs offences. Some officers are running their own businesses to support their families. Every month, one-fifth soldiers of the Afghan army become absent without informing their commanders. They are not able to pay the rent of their houses, their children are not schoolgoing, and they are not willing to fight for Americans and corrupt Afghan warlords. Soldiers and officers of the army are from three backgrounds and follow three different ideologies. The first group has a communist background, the second group were trained in Pakistan as mujahideen fighters, and the third has an American, NATO and European background. This ideological, sectarian and ethnic division within the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the police department can cause an unending civil war in the near future.
Recruitment on ethnic and sectarian basis has created many problems. In 2002, as defence minister, General Fahim made some appointments on ethnic basis. In these appointments, of 38 generals, 37 were Tajiks and one was Uzbek. In fact, all these generals were associated with the Northern Alliance. If we look at the list of the 100 generals appointed in 2002, 90 belonged to the Northern Alliance. The story has not ended there. These and other appointments in the defence and interior ministries were followed by the removal of Interior Minister Hanif Atmar and intelligence Chief Amrullah Saleh for their non-professional performance. Both these officials had challenged President Karzai on his plans to reconcile with the Taliban insurgents. Mr Amrullah Saleh was found involved in many torture cases of Pakistani and Afghan detainees.
The command selection of the ANA is based on ethnicity and personal connections at the corps, ANA general staff, or ministry of defence level. Strong military leadership is impossible in an environment where political and ethnic affiliations rather than merit are the basis of promotions. Enforcement of discipline is another problem faced by the ANA. According to a recent US military report, units of ANA sell vehicles, weapons, fuel and other military equipment and are involved in outright theft of food provided by the US. The transmogrified ethnic face of the ANA was unveiled in the 2010 ethnic war between the nomadic tribes and Hazara population in Behsood district of Wardak province. Military command in the defence ministry was ethnically divided on the issue.
Generals from both Sunni and Shia groups were trying to arm the nomads and Hazaras respectively. This massive shift in the ethnicnisation and sectarianisation of the Afghan army officers will lead to another civil war between the Pashtuns and Tajik warlords. General David Petraeus' plan of local defence is widely opposed in the military circles. He wants to copy the idea of the Pakistan Army qaumi lashkars (national militias) fighting Taliban terrorists in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This plan, military observers say, will not work in Afghanistan.
According to Petraeus' strategy, 10,000 unemployed Afghans will be put on the CIA payroll and prepared to fight against their countrymen. He wants to give them dollars and arms so that they can form a Pakistani style qaumi lashkar. This plan will not succeed, as the Afghans have now turned against the US presence in their country. Illegal detentions, searches and torture have ultimately changed their mind. Since 2001, hundreds of men, women and even teenagers have been arrested, tortured, and killed by the US forces. At present, NATO is fighting the Taliban, but doing nothing to address the ethnic divide, corruption and bridging the trust. In summation, the long-term US presence in Afghanistan will cause more problems, more casualties, destruction and violence.


The writer is the author of Britain's National Security Challenges and Punjabi Taliban. He can be reached at zai.musakhan222@gmail.com

 

[Abu Zolfiqar]

So, yeah.

After all these years, the only superpower in the world hasn't got rid of Taliban. They wear worn out sandals, have 2 pairs of clothing, ride around in dented tired old Hilux pickup trucks, not multi-million dollar war machines, no body armours or modern day state of the art equipments, but Afghanistan is their home and they will fight on for that reason. Their country not ours.

Countries win wars, not armies who don't know what the fight is about.

 

[Muhammad-Bin-Qasim]

So, yeah.

After all these years, the only superpower in the world hasn't got rid of Taliban. They wear worn out sandals, have 2 pairs of clothing, ride around in dented tired old Hilux pickup trucks, not multi-million dollar war machines, no body armours or modern day state of the art equipments, but Afghanistan is their home and they will fight on for that reason. Their country not ours.

Countries win wars, not armies who don't know what the fight is about.

Thumbs up to you Bu Zolfiqar!!!