A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

[CENTCOM]

Dear BaburCM,

The fight against terrorism is a global war and the effects of terrorism are being seen all over the world. To suggest that Pakistan is getting sucked into someone else’s war is a big misperception and simply not true. The truth is that these violent extremists are as much, if not more, of an enemy of Pakistan as they are to anyone else. Al Qaeda, Taliban and their member have been killing thousands of innocent people with no mercy in order to destabilize the country. They have waged war against your country’s civilian institutions and infrastructure during a time when Pakistan already faces economic troubles, and even the disastrous floods from this summer have not caused them to show mercy or restraint. Billions of dollars provided in aid, which you are referring to as “nickels and dimes” contradicts you idea of United States manipulating Pakistan for “malign purposes”. We consider Pakistan a close friend and continue to offer support in difficult times. During the recent flooding, which was one of the worst devastation the country has ever seen; United States in close partnership with the Pakistan military, have transported more than 13.5 million pounds of relief supplies and evacuated more than 20,000 people, delivering much-needed aid and providing transport to people who urgently need emergency assistance. The internal terrorist threat in Pakistan has made it that much more important for both governments to continually support each other in order to win the war.

So Mr. BaburCM, the facts are available for us to see that same terrorists are posing as much of a threat to Pakistan as they are to United States or anyone else, and in order to save innocent lives, our countries should continue to work together.

LCDR Bill Speaks

DET, United States Central Command
centcom(.)mil

 

[somebozo]

Pakistan is being sucked into this war due to our own mistake and US embargoes at a time when we needed an economic boost to a post war emerging nation. Sudden loss of economic activity caused them to remain suckered in jihadist victory celebrations giving rise to the Taliban cult. Always a coin has two sides!

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: Time to wake up to reality

Dailytime
October 11, 2010

After a contentious 10-day standoff between Pakistani authorities and NATO forces in Afghanistan, the Torkham border crossing has been reopened for the transport of supplies to NATO forces embroiled in battle across the border. This resumption of the major NATO supply route comes after an official US apology from US Ambassador Anne Patterson and expressions of regret from Commander ISAF David Petraeus and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen. It was obvious right from the start that Pakistan would sooner or later reopen the route. A permanent closure would come at the unacceptably high cost of US support. However, now that the Pakistani authorities feel that they have made their point to the US administration, it is back to business as usual. It has also been agreed that NATO officials will investigate how the NATO helicopter attack on Pakistani soil occurred, in which three Pakistani soldiers were killed. Both sides have also agreed on closer coordination to prevent the recurrence of such attacks.

Now that the Pakistani government and military authorities have shown to the Pakistani people their ‘concern’ for the country’s sovereignty, a word of caution: one should not get carried away with euphoria at having cornered a superpower. The US has a long and begrudging memory, one that does not allow it to easily forgive and forget when it has been backed into a tight spot. Pakistan may be feeling vindicated right now but this glory may well be short lived. If this incident compels the US to find alternative supply routes, we may find ourselves deprived of US support in financial and political terms. As it is there is talk of Pakistan demanding compensation of millions of dollars for the damage and wear and tear to our highways because of Nato traffic, as well as a proposal to tax Nato trucks passing through our territory.

And when it comes to sovereignty, following a schizophrenic policy is ill advised. It seems that our sovereignty is compromised when NATO choppers cross into our territory but drone strikes are perfectly acceptable (they continue unabated). This does not make sense unless there are specific jihadi safe havens or rear bases we wish to protect, which could unravel if NATO takes matters into its own hands like it did in the ‘hot pursuit’ incident.

The establishment’s dual policy of giving sanctuary to a particular breed of terrorist it thinks may give it an edge in Afghanistan once the US and NATO troop withdrawal begins in July 2011 will most likely give diminishing returns as the withdrawal deadline approaches. There is considerable domestic political pressure on the Obama administration to withdraw with a significant victory intact. If that means targeting the sanctuaries we have given terror networks, our authorities should not be foolish enough to believe that the US will not do so.

In an ironic twist to the Torkham crossing reopening, 29 more NATO oil tankers were torched by militants in the Mithari area of Balochistan. These were supplies making their way to troops via the Chaman crossing. It must be kept in mind that the US will be mighty peeved at the continuous destruction of costly and vital NATO supplies in Pakistan, even if it is the TTP that is behind it. As an ally in this war, it is the responsibility of the Pakistani authorities, in the government as well as security establishment, to give protection to these convoys. The US may not look too kindly upon this complete lack of security for its convoys.

It is time for Pakistan to revisit the strategic depth in Afghanistan policy. Whatever benefits are hoped for through support to the Afghan Taliban in that country’s approaching endgame could end up costing Pakistan far more than can be imagined at present.

 

[Tuahaa]

Dear BaburCM,

The fight against terrorism is a global war and the effects of terrorism are being seen all over the world. To suggest that Pakistan is getting sucked into someone else’s war is a big misperception and simply not true. The truth is that these violent extremists are as much, if not more, of an enemy of Pakistan as they are to anyone else. Al Qaeda, Taliban and their member have been killing thousands of innocent people with no mercy in order to destabilize the country. They have waged war against your country’s civilian institutions and infrastructure during a time when Pakistan already faces economic troubles, and even the disastrous floods from this summer have not caused them to show mercy or restraint. Billions of dollars provided in aid, which you are referring to as “nickels and dimes” contradicts you idea of United States manipulating Pakistan for “malign purposes”. We consider Pakistan a close friend and continue to offer support in difficult times. During the recent flooding, which was one of the worst devastation the country has ever seen; United States in close partnership with the Pakistan military, have transported more than 13.5 million pounds of relief supplies and evacuated more than 20,000 people, delivering much-needed aid and providing transport to people who urgently need emergency assistance. The internal terrorist threat in Pakistan has made it that much more important for both governments to continually support each other in order to win the war.

So Mr. BaburCM, the facts are available for us to see that same terrorists are posing as much of a threat to Pakistan as they are to United States or anyone else, and in order to save innocent lives, our countries should continue to work together.

LCDR Bill Speaks

DET, United States Central Command
centcom(.)mil

If we did not fight in the war, if we did not even associate ourselves with the war, we would've been better off.

The innocent lives stuff is a bit off the truth. Pakistan and US are working together so that US can kill civilians in Pakistan via drone strikes.

The reason why Afghanistan, similar to Iraq, is so necessary for US is because it secures many things- a puppet next to Iran, oil to the north and let's just say that Afghanistan isn't exactly lacking valuable resources.

I roll my eyes when leaders talk of friendship between Pakistan and the US. It simply does not exist. And propaganda isn't helping.

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: Pak-US talks

Daily Times
October 19, 2010


After the last round of Pak-US dialogue in July this year, another round of talks is set to take place on October 22. It is for this reason that President Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani and Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani met recently at the Presidency to discuss and deliberate the issues that will be tackled during the talks. These include the drone strikes and reimbursement of coalition fund arrears amongst others but teeming below the surface is an issue that is going to dominate the dialogue. That issue is the increased friction between the two countries and the trust deficit that continues to grow wider.

Recent events such as the US’s delayed realisation that the military/intelligence establishment was playing a dual game when it came to the Afghan Taliban and their safe havens inside North Waziristan (NW), the ‘hot pursuit’ incident where NATO helicopters killed three FC troops, the closing of the Torkham border and the incendiary torching spree of the NATO convoys that were parked in Pakistan or en route to Afghanistan have caused the gulf to grow even wider.

Pakistan and the US have found themselves at a critical juncture in their oft fragile, seldom problem-free relationship. A recent statement from Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen saying that Kayani has agreed to mount a major offensive in NW to tackle the Haqqani network of Afghan militants must be seen as a welcome change in Pakistan’s attitude by Washington but it is still weary of the military’s dual policy when it comes to NW. Selective targeting of the militants is not what the US is demanding and the military will need to reject its support for militant groups now. Pakistan, on the other hand, is weary of the US’s constant attempts at brokering a post withdrawal deal with the Afghan Taliban and Karzai sans Pakistan. Various such attempts by the US have been thwarted by Pakistan, the arrest of Mullah Baradar being one such strategy. This is where the US must realise that for all the damage Pakistan has withstood for its strategic depth in Afghanistan, it will not agree on anything less than a central role in all talks relating to post-US Afghanistan.

All diplomatic niceties and cosmetic issues aside, these talks are monumental in addressing the severe trust deficit that exists. If the gulf is not bridged, Pakistan has a lot more to lose than the US. If the incidents of hot pursuit have taught us anything, it should be to remain cautious and to abandon our adventurism as much worse could happen.

 

[RabzonKhan]

U.S. Plans Increased Military Aid for Pakistan

Administration Seeks More Action by Islamabad Against Militants.

By ADAM ENTOUS And JULIAN E. BARNES

WASHINGTON—The Obama administration is planning to ramp up military support to the Pakistani army as part of an effort to persuade Islamabad to do far more to combat Islamic militants.

Top U.S. policy makers, who will meet with their Pakistani counterparts in Washington this week, say they doubt Islamabad will agree in the near term to mount a major army campaign against al Qaeda-linked militants in their biggest sanctuary bordering Afghanistan, officials say. Instead, American officials are pushing Pakistan to agree to interim steps to increase pressure on the militant groups, such as by carrying out more targeted operations using U.S.-trained special operations units, according to officials close to the deliberations.

U.S. frustration with Pakistan has grown over what American officials see as Islamabad's unwillingness to mount a campaign against militants who have havens in North Waziristan and Baluchistan. North Waziristan is the main base for operations for the Haqqani network, an extremist group that frequently attacks U.S. forces in eastern Afghanistan and has close ties to al Qaeda, which also takes refuge in the area. Leaders of the Afghan Taliban are based in Baluchistan.

Pakistani officials said Islamabad is willing to step up the current level of surgical strikes. But they said a full-scale clearing operation in North Waziristan isn't possible because large numbers of its troops and equipment are being used to respond to recent devastating flooding, the country's worst yet, and are being used to rout militants from other areas.

The new military aid, which is contingent on congressional approval, is expected to amount to more than $2 billion over five years, would pay for equipment Pakistan can use for counterinsurgency and counterterror operations. U.S. officials say they hope the new aid could effectively eliminate Pakistan's objections that it doesn't have the equipment needed to launch more operations in tribal areas.

Department of Defense officials, including Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will meet on Wednesday with Pakistani Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani at the Pentagon.

In a recent report to Congress, the White House said it believed the Pakistani military was avoiding direct conflict with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda forces for political reasons. Despite the U.S. calls for a crackdown on the Haqqani network, some Pakistani officials continue to support the group, viewing it as a longtime ally that has steadfastly opposed Indian involvement in Afghanistan.

Pakistan received about $1.9 billion in military assistance from the U.S. in fiscal 2010, which ended Sept. 30, including about $300 million in grants to buy U.S. defense equipment. The new package of defense equipment would average out to an additional $100 million a year in aid, although the size of the grants would start lower and grow over time.

By seeking assurances from Pakistan that the new equipment will be used only to combat militants in the border areas, the U.S. hopes to reassure India that it isn't trying to further boost the power of Pakistan's conventional military.

Officials from both the U.S. and Pakistan rejected the notion that the military assistance and talks were a quid pro quo, arguing that they are trying to build a partnership, not cut a deal.

U.S. officials, although they denied that the increased aid was part of an explicit deal to get Islamabad to mount a ground offensive in North Waziristan, said they hoped increased Pakistani military capabilities would translate into increased action on the ground.

"It would seem natural that they could become more aggressive" in the tribal areas, said one American official.

The U.S. trains Pakistan's paramilitary Frontier Corps, as well as members of the country's regular army, air force and navy. In 2010 alone, more than 1,100 Pakistani special operations troops were trained by the U.S., according to a recent White House report to Congress.

U.S. officials hope that this week's talks also result in an agreement on ways to make joint border-control centers and intelligence fusion centers more effective. The border-control centers, most on the Afghan side, help Pakistan, Afghanistan and the U.S. share information and coordinate cross-border operations. Intelligence fusion centers, most in Pakistan, share video feeds from drones and help develop target lists.

U.S. and Pakistani officials also emphasized that if Washington pushes too much it could undermine recent progress and erode Islamabad's will to fight in the tribal areas. "This is our war now; that is the biggest achievement of the last two years," said a Pakistani official.

The new military aid, which would complement an existing five-year, $7.5 billion nonmilitary package approved last year, will require U.S. congressional approval. Key members of Congress, upset by Pakistan's inaction in North Waziristan and concerned about the Pakistani army's human-rights record in the tribal areas, could hold up part or all of the funding and impose conditions of their own. "There is a lot of skepticism," said one a senior aide of the sentiment in Congress.

Islamabad remains skeptical of U.S. pressure to push into North Waziristan, playing down the region's importance as a safe haven for terrorists. Gen. Athar Abbas, spokesman for the Pakistan army, said the importance of North Waziristan as a base for hardened Taliban fighters had been exaggerated by U.S. officials.

"The effect of the Haqqani network in disturbing the U.S. in Afghanistan has been overblown," he said.

American officials hope that expanding the work of the joint U.S.-Pakistani intelligence fusion centers could help the Central Intelligence Agency improve its targeting of members of the Haqqani network and other militants.

The CIA has stepped up strikes on militant targets in the region using armed aerial drones, in part to add to pressure on the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban, but also to try to disrupt a suspected terrorist plot to strike Western Europe.

Speaking to a small group of reporters on Tuesday, CIA Director Leon Panetta said the stepped-up campaign were "taking a serious toll" on the Haqqani network. "All of that, I think, must be having an impact," he said.

—Tom Wright in Islamabad contributed to this article.

 

[RabzonKhan]

Get Tough on Pakistan

By ZALMAY KHALILZAD
October 19, 2010

WHEN I visited Kabul a few weeks ago, President Hamid Karzai told me that the United States has yet to offer a credible strategy for how to resolve a critical issue: Pakistan’s role in the war in Afghanistan.

In the region and in the wider war against terrorism, Pakistan has long played a vital positive part — and a troublingly negative one. With Pakistani civilian and military leaders meeting with Obama administration officials this week in Washington — and with the news that Afghan leaders are holding direct talks with Taliban leaders to end the war — cutting through this Gordian knot has become more urgent and more difficult than ever before.

Pakistan has done, and continues to do, a great deal of good: many of the supply lines and much of the logistical support for NATO forces in Afghanistan run through Pakistan. Drones striking terrorists and militants in the tribal areas do so with the Pakistani government’s blessing and rely on Pakistani bases. And Pakistani security services have worked with the Central Intelligence Agency to capture hundreds of Qaeda operatives.

At the same time, Pakistan gives not only sanctuary but also support to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani terrorist network. This has hampered our military efforts; contributed to American, coalition and Afghan deaths; and helped sour relations between Kabul and Washington.

What’s more, Pakistani military leaders believe that our current surge will be the last push before we begin a face-saving troop drawdown next July. They are confident that if they continue to frustrate our military and political strategy — even actively impede reconciliation between Kabul and Taliban groups willing to make peace — pro-Pakistani forces will have the upper hand in Afghanistan after the United States departs.

When dealing with Pakistan, the Obama administration, like the George W. Bush administration, has pursued two lines of action. First, it has tried building up Afghan security forces, providing military assistance and supporting the Afghan economy and state institutions, all in hopes of hardening the country against Pakistan-backed insurgents.

Second, the U.S. has tried to soften Pakistan’s support of extremist militants through enhanced engagement as well as humanitarian, economic and military assistance; indeed, Congress last year approved a five-year, $7.5 billion package of nonmilitary aid, and among the options being discussed by American and Pakistani officials this week is a security pact that would mean billions of dollars more. But such efforts have led to only the most incremental shifts in Pakistan’s policy.

To induce quicker and more significant changes, Washington must offer Islamabad a stark choice between positive incentives and negative consequences.

The United States should demand that Pakistan shut down all sanctuaries and military support programs for insurgents or else we will carry out operations against those insurgent havens, with or without Pakistani consent. Arguments that such pressure would cause Pakistan to disintegrate are overstated. Pakistan’s institutions, particularly the country’s security organs, are sufficiently strong to preclude such an outcome.

Nonetheless, this aggressive approach would require the United States to think through a series of likely Pakistani responses. To deal with an interruption of our supply lines to Afghanistan, for example, we must stockpile supplies and start bringing in more materiél through the northern supply routes and via air.

At the same time, we should present clear, significant incentives. In exchange for demonstrable Pakistani cooperation, the United States should offer to mediate disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan; help establish a trade corridor from Pakistan into Central Asia; and ensure that Pakistan’s adversaries do not use Afghanistan’s territory to support insurgents in Pakistani Baluchistan.

More fundamentally, the United States needs to demonstrate that, even after our troops depart Afghanistan, we are resolved to stay engaged in the region. To that end, the United States should provide long-term assistance to Pakistan focused on developing not only its security apparatus, but also its civil society, economy and democratic institutions.

Finally, the United States should facilitate a major diplomatic effort focused on stabilizing South Asia. This must involve efforts to improve relations between India and Pakistan. Based on my recent discussions with Pakistani officials, including President Asif Ali Zardari, I believe the civilian leadership would welcome such a move.

Without inducing a change in Pakistan’s posture, the United States will have to choose between fighting a longer and bloodier war in Afghanistan than is necessary, at the cost of many young American lives and many billions of dollars, or accepting a major setback in Afghanistan and in the surrounding region. Both are undesirable options.

Instead, the Obama administration should be forcing Pakistan to make some choices — between supporting the United States or supporting extremists.

 

[fatman17]

^^ZALMAY KHALILZAD - a sworn 'enemy' of Pakistan - says it all !!!

 

[Muhammad-Bin-Qasim]

I have a feeling that someone very cunning in Pakistan wants America to stay in Afghanistan...

I cant help shake my head when I read about how poor American tax payers money is going into the Taliban's pockets... tsk tsk


http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/opinion/17kristof.html?_r=1

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: The many faces of ‘national interest’

Daily Times
October 21, 2010

Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said in a talk at Harvard University that Pakistan will preserve its national interests as a frontline ally of the US in fighting the war on terror. “What we are trying to create is a long-term, mature and mutually beneficial partnership,” he said. To call ‘national interest’ a disputed term would not be wrong, especially in Pakistan. This term has so many connotations that anyone and everyone can invoke ‘national interest’ in their own cause. The military and the civilians have different definitions of national interest. Saying that the Pak-US dialogue and the coordination of our policies “will define the direction and future of our bilateral relationship, as well as the success of the containment of terrorism and, quite possibly, the very future of the region” makes one believe that Mr Qureshi’s use of the term ‘national interest’ is close to what the GHQ has in mind.

Ever since the war on terror started, the strategic partnership between Pakistan and the US has been based on a carrot and stick policy. More often than not, Pakistan has dragged its feet on launching military offensives against the Afghan Taliban and their cohorts. The US-led NATO forces and the Afghan government have criticised Pakistan many a time for not doing enough to counter cross-border terrorism. That the local Taliban unleashed a major terror offensive on our soil finally led to military operations in Swat and South Waziristan. But since the major troublemakers reside in North Waziristan, the Americans continue to insist that Pakistan should launch a military offensive there. To date, we have resisted this ‘request’ while the Americans have stepped up drone attacks in the said area. It is time we understand what really is in our national interest and instead of blindly following the military establishment’s security policies, which have led to many disasters over the years, North Waziristan must be cleared of all the terrorist networks present there, including the notorious Haqqani network.

That said, Pakistan needs international aid to deal with the aftermath of the recent devastating floods. Our economy was already in the doldrums and with the floods, we are on the verge of an economic meltdown. Our duality in policy vis-à-vis the war on terror has made the west weary of our leadership, both civilian and military. Corruption is rampant in society, which is why most international donors are reluctant to send more money to Pakistan. The only way to deal with this is that the international community should put in a proper monitoring mechanism and not let the flood affectees suffer due to the shortcomings of our leadership.

On the other hand, it must be understood that our national interest does not lie in fighting proxy wars in Afghanistan or taking ‘control’ of the Afghan government. The Afghan resentment against us goes back a long way, more so after the Afghan jihad and the subsequent takeover by the Taliban. Our real national interest lies in peace with our neighbours and not in exporting terror to the region or the world. Pakistan needs to maintain peaceful, friendly and close ties with all its neighbours, be it India, Afghanistan, Iran, China, or other countries. If we continue to irritate our neighbours for this so-called national interest, it will backfire and damage us. Democracy, an independent judiciary, a free and responsible media, a military under civilian control, land reforms, education, a corruption-free and equitable society are things that are vital to Pakistan’s national interest. Let us not confuse this term with anything else.

 

[Muhammad-Bin-Qasim]

I disagree with the Daily times editorial... The editor is ignoring the dimensions of the conflict... Wishful thinking apart, the so called National interest of Pakistan lies in keeping maximum influence within Afghanistan at all costs...

 

[LeGenD]

I have a feeling that someone very cunning in Pakistan wants America to stay in Afghanistan...

I cant help shake my head when I read about how poor American tax payers money is going into the Taliban's pockets... tsk tsk


http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/opinion/17kristof.html?_r=1

We need to end this war ASAP. It has proven to be too costly in terms of loss of life and resources. The costs of previous war seems to pale in comparison.

The longer the NATO stays, the more trouble it will create for us. NATO is actually trying to split Taliban and this is why those talks are taking place in Kabul.

Some hint comes from here:

AFP: Obama briefed on Afghan-Taliban talks

Only idiots would try to prolong this messy war.

The more they stay long, the more they will make things difficult for us. We need to kick Americans out from Afghanistan.

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: US: a friend or foe?

Daily Times
October 22, 2010


Three days of meetings between Pak-US civilian and military delegations started on Wednesday in Washington to consider a 13-point agenda. President Obama also met the delegation to reassure Pakistan that the US will not compromise on democracy in the country.

General Ashfaq Kayani and Defence Secretary Robert Gates discussed the need for better cooperation and communication along the Pak-Afghan border. The dialogue takes place amid US media reports that the Obama administration is putting the final touches on a military aid package for Pakistan, totalling $ 2 billion — to be distributed over five years — under the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme. The question is, what does the US want in return? The Obama administration for a while now has been asking Pakistan to launch a military operation in North Waziristan. It is an open secret that North Waziristan is the ‘safe haven’ being used by the Haqqani network to attack NATO and US forces in Afghanistan.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai stated in Kabul that the hope for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan has increased with the help of the international community, neighbouring countries and the Afghan people. He believes a political solution can be reached with the Afghan Taliban. In all probability his comments come in the face of claims made by The New York Times (NYT) that four high level Taliban leaders, three from the Quetta Shura and a member of the Haqqani network, have met Afghan officials. The NYT report also claims that US and NATO troops gave these men a safe passage to Kabul. It is questionable how feasible it is to leave out the Pakistani intelligence agencies from such negotiations. Also, the decision by the Afghan president to negotiate with hardliner militants may not bear fruit, given the diametrically opposed demands made by both sides.

US patience is running out with our dual policy of fighting the Pakistani Taliban and harbouring the Afghan Taliban. The time has come to decide which way we should go. Do we launch a military operation against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan or let our economic, political, security situation deteriorate due to terrorism? Becoming an ally of the Americans will be in the self-interest and national interest of Pakistan. Choose to continue our dual policy and we will be isolated and find the country in even worse circumstances. The option is clear.

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: Talking through their teeth

Daily Times
October 24, 2010

Diplomatic niceties aside, the Pak-US strategic dialogue in Washington has seen both sides come to the table with their own agendas, issues and apprehensions. With the talks taking place against the backdrop of deep-rooted suspicion and unease, it is not surprising that Shah Mahmood Qureshi has stated that this dialogue is the “start” of a process. That process is trying to bridge the trust deficit that exists between the US and its “strongest” ally in the war on terror. Miracles should not be expected.

The most interesting revelation during the talks — and an indicator that the trust deficit is being bridged somewhat — has been the US administration’s approval of $ 2 billion in military aid for the purchase of US-made arms and accessories specifically for counter-insurgency purposes. This bill has yet to be approved by Congress. Seeing that this aid is to be available only from 2012 to 2016, the military’s satisfaction at it will have to wait for Congress’ decision. The US has experienced an unreliable Pakistani military when, during Musharraf’s time, US military aid was used to amass weapons that had nothing to do with counter-insurgency but had everything to do with stockpiling against India. The Pakistani military can be sure that this aid will be subject to extremely close scrutiny and audit. This is also perhaps why the US has been slow in paying the Coalition Support Fund arrears, an issue COAS General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani took up during the dialogue.

Efforts to bolster Pakistan’s counter-insurgency capabilities are intended to nudge its military towards an all-out offensive in North Waziristan (NW) where safe havens exist, not just for the Haqqani network but for the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and also, allegedly, al Qaeda. Pakistan is clearly seen as dragging its feet in this matter saying that if and when it conducts an operation in NW, it will be in the light of its ‘national interest’. It is clear to the US that the military’s definition of national interest has been keeping the Afghan Taliban intact until the last US soldier has left Afghanistan. The US has not backtracked during this session on its insistence on an offensive in NW. It does not seem likely that Pakistan will abandon its Afghan cohorts whom it may like to have represented in a post-US withdrawal Afghan dispensation. The Pakistani military has staked too much on strategic depth in Afghanistan and if the US tries to keep Pakistan out of any Afghan talks, the Pakistani military is likely to use its leverage through the Afghan Taliban, irrespective of diplomacy and dialogue.

The US is aware of the fact that in this war on terror, Pakistan has been flexing its muscles to beat back the TTP. The US’s real enemy, however, is still operational and the US is not happy. That is why the superpower continues to use its policy of sweet-talking and coddling with occasional threats thrown in for good measure. This cat and mouse game cannot go on forever. If the present minuet breaks down, a conflict could occur between the two allies, one that Pakistan may end up on the losing side of.

The usual pies were thrown in the sky, namely Kashmir and our civil nuclear designs. In both cases, the US’s preference for India can be seen with the Obama administration siding with its strategic partner over its tactical one. Resolving Kashmir was Obama’s election pledge; it is now an issue that the US does not want to ‘mediate’ on. Our expecting to be treated like India when it comes to a civil nuclear pact is naïve since Pakistan stands accused of nuclear proliferation in the past and has been described as the epicentre of the region’s troubles. We have no choice therefore but to rely on China, a reliable friend and one that will not backtrack on Washington’s insistence.

All in all, the dialogue is bridging the gulf of mistrust to some extent but the same doubts and legacies remain, ‘process’ and $ 2 billion notwithstanding.

 

[RabzonKhan]

EDITORIAL: The great expectation

Daily Times
October 26, 2010

The development most telling about the US’s unchanged stance vis-à-vis North Waziristan (NW) in the recently conducted session of the Pak-US strategic dialogue was its grant of $ 2 billion in military aid. Supposedly a no-strings-attached aid package, the money is a guarantor of one thing: the US’s greatest expectation. A full-scale army offensive in NW before the July 2011 US withdrawal date is what the US is looking for. To think that a hefty aid package does not carry the weight of expectations amounts to fooling oneself. That is why Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi’s statement at a press conference after his arrival from Washington fails to inspire belief. Saying that Pakistan will work on its own “timeline” to fight the militants currently being given safe havens near the Pak-Afghan border will not go down well with the US, despite its reiteration at the dialogue that Pakistan is its “strongest” ally in this war. Such statements reflect that the civilian government has bought into GHQ’s formula on NW. The fact that the $ 2 billion will be made available (if approved by Congress) in 2012 gives the Americans plenty of time to sit back and watch how far Pakistan will go in its counter-insurgency efforts in NW. There are many rationalisations that the Pakistan Army may be able to bank upon to postpone the offensive further, such as the onset of winter and how the formidable terrain in NW will not allow an operation in harsh conditions. However, winter will surely fade, but US expectations will not. Such is the nature of the NW conundrum, one that comes with it a $ 2 billion price tag.

In all the years since 9/11, the great superpower has been unable to prevail in getting Pakistan’s dual policies — introduced by Musharraf when he agreed to hand over al Qaeda to the US but secretly nurtured the Afghan Taliban to gain a strong foothold in Afghanistan — changed. That is because the Pakistani military has played its cards exceptionally well, knowing that without its cooperation, any US plans for Afghanistan were bound to crumble. Hence the US’s immutable carrot and stick policy, of which this $ 2 billion is the latest lure. The $ 7.5 billion approved in the Kerry-Lugar Bill is also one of the US’s many carrots.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, the country has a militant onslaught on its hands, with the Afghan Taliban’s safe havens slowly giving the US reason to apply pressure, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) attacking urban and religious centres all over the country and Punjabi militants coming out of the woodwork. The struggle against jihadis has become all-encompassing now as the theological/ideological nexus has gelled the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban together. For the military to differentiate between them and choose sides will be tantamount to putting the Pakistani state at risk. It has yet to be seen just what kind of operation will be launched in NW, and when.

The situation has come to a pass where the US needs to start leaving Afghanistan by July 2011 and Pakistan needs to start facilitating that departure by curtailing its support to the Afghan Taliban. The two sides must weigh all the odds. If both stick to their guns, the withdrawal may be postponed and the region will continue to remain unstable.

Unfortunately, the strategic dialogue seems to relay as much. Both sides came to the table with their individual aims and objectives intact. Although the dialogue bridged the trust deficit somewhat, until the deep-rooted doubts and reliance on dual policies are erased, not much is likely to change.