Analysis by Najmuddin A Shaikh
Undoing the damage done over thirty years will be a long process requiring the cooperation of all moderate political forces and, of course, the armed forces, where again extremist beliefs took root both because of ideological propaganda and opportunism
The in-camera military briefing on the current situation in our tribal areas has not satisfied many of the parliamentarians. There have been complaints that the briefing was purely tactical and did not explain the strategic vision that is driving the military action on the ground. But from the political perspective, this briefing was significant because for the first time the military and security establishment acknowledged the supremacy of parliament.
However, it was not the task of the military to lay out the strategy or vision. That has to come from the political leaders. They should explain how the new vision, which has yet to be fully formulated, departs from the incorrectly conceived and flawed vision that had governed the actions of our intelligence agencies and the military for the last seven years. It is parliaments task to help the government formulate this vision, but even more importantly, it is the task of the peoples representatives to explain this vision to the people of Pakistan and garner popular support needed to bring the vision to fruition.
Clearly if the government is to be responsive to the wishes of the Pakistani people and if the PPP, as the leader of the governing coalition, is to be true to the vision of Benazir Bhutto, the objective of the strategy must be to bring all the people of Pakistan into the mainstream of a polity that is moderate and tolerant. Further, it must be one that eschews the extremist beliefs and practices of a small minority while remaining true to the principles of Islam.
Of equal and perhaps greater importance to the people of Pakistan is the hope they entertain of bettering their economic lot. For most Pakistanis, despite the spate of terrorist attacks in Pakistans heartland and the ongoing military action in Bajaur and Swat, the principal issue is the economic crisis reflected in the phenomenal rise in the cost of living, the flight of foreign and domestic capital and the consequent shrinking of employment opportunities for a hardworking but badly educated youth.
A close second is the quality of governance, which has been steadily deteriorating over the years largely because merit has become the last factor to be considered in recruitment for the administrative services or law enforcement agencies.
Our economic development has been fundamentally flawed. Infrastructure development, particularly power and water, has been ignored. Agriculture, the backbone of our economy, has not been developed as it should have been. Low domestic prices have encouraged the smuggling out of our agricultural produce, forcing us to import basic foodstuffs at exorbitant prices. Moreover, owing to a skewed taxation structure, agriculture has not made the expected contribution to the national exchequer or the provincial budgets.
Certain factors have to be taken account of while formulating a strategy for the current national situation. These include: the situation in Afghanistan the prospects of improved governance, the strength of the Taliban and the support they enjoy, including funding from drug traffickers; strategies being considered by the Coalition to bring peace to Afghanistan, and the commitment of the US, ISAF, Afghanistans neighbours and regional powers to bring peace to the country.
In addition, Pakistans interests in Afghanistan must be considered, especially in light of the presence of Afghans in Pakistan; influence of the Taliban in the tribal borderlands and their nexus with Al Qaeda; doubts entertained by Pakistanis, particularly those in the border areas, about the commitment of the state to counter terrorism; details of the politico-economic strategy for winning hearts and minds; the degree of international support needed to stabilise Pakistans economy; and the durability of American interest in Pakistans stability and development.
It has to be recognised that the strategy thus evolved will not be a magic wand.
Undoing the damage done over thirty years will be a long process requiring the cooperation of all moderate political forces and, of course, the armed forces, where again extremist beliefs took root both because of ideological propaganda and opportunism.
The principal weapon that the government will have is the mandate of the people, who in February, through their vote, showed that they reject extremism. Perhaps it also showed that they did not want to give religion a determining role in politics, but that could change if the government does not show serious commitment, and if, more importantly, the economic crisis is not solved.
Today, official figures put inflation at 25 percent. The rupee has devalued 30 percent against the dollar. Both domestic and foreign capital is fleeing the country. It was estimated that using the calorie intake criteria, some 56 million Pakistanis were living under the poverty line before the economic crisis acquired its current proportions. By now, many millions more must have slipped under this line.
Hard-pressed workers are withdrawing their children from schools and enrolling them in madrassas. Many unemployed youth are now looking to extremist/terrorist organisations for employment. Suicides are on the rise and many contemplating such desperate acts may become suicide bombers not because of ideology but because it would at least provide some means of support for surviving members of their families.
A new vision for economic development is needed. We need to meet our energy needs; devise policies to conserve and wisely deploy our limited water resources; effectively control the growth of our population; and formulate policies that, while encouraging capital formation, do not widen the gap between the privileged few and the poverty stricken masses. All this at a time when shortage of resources is placing question marks on the governments ability to meet the funding requirement for the rather modest programme of assistance for the poorest of the country.
External assistance will be needed to help us through the current difficulties and to support us in the much-needed restructuring of the economy. Creating a better perception of the part Pakistans new government will play in fighting terrorism in its border areas and the effect this will have on Taliban activity in Afghanistan will undoubtedly influence the attitude of donor countries that are themselves financially strapped by the current global crisis. Donors have found reassuring the governments statements that this is Pakistans own war. They appreciate the determination with which the Bajaur operation is being pursued.
From the governments point of view, it would be fatal to its goal of garnering domestic public support if the owning of the war were to be seen as flowing from our need for assistance. We must be able to emphasise that international support is a bonus but pursuing the goal of eliminating extremism is something dictated by our own needs.
We must also formulate a realistic policy towards Afghanistan, bearing in mind the elements that I have identified. My next article will deal with what this can be.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
