Solutions to the Kashmir issue
SAMAN MALIK
Several options (besides armed struggle) have been offered to solve the Kashmir issue. These include (a) Status quo (division of Kashmir along the present LoC with or without some local adjustments to facilitate the local population, (b) Complete or partial independence (creation of independent Muslim-majority tehsils of Rajauri, Poonch and Uri with Hindu-majority areas merged in India), (c) Plebiscite to be held in 5 to 10 years after putting Kashmir under UN trusteeship (Trieste-like solution), (d) Joint control, (e) Indus-basin-related solution, (f) Aland-island-like solution and (e) Permutations and combinations of the aforementioned options.
Maintaining the Status Quo: Following the China-India war in 1962, Swaran Singh, Foreign Minister of India, offered to cede to Azad Kashmir and the Northern Area additional 3,000 square miles (97,770 square kilometers) of territory from Indian-controlled Kashmir.
Six rounds of quadripartite ministerial talks (including the United Kingdom and the United States) were held in 1963 to discuss the Kashmir-partition plan. The plan proposed a boundary that followed the peaks of Pir Panjal Range in northern Jammu and included the districts of Riasi, Kotli, and Poonch in Pakistan. India was to control Riasi and parts of the other two districts. Riasi was to include the middle reach of Chenab River, vital to Pakistan. India demanded postponement of consideration of Kashmir Valley and Srinagar as communication to Ladakh was controlled through Srinagar. India insisted that the area was essential to its defence against China.
After the Tashkent Declaration, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India, offered to adjust the cease-fire line and give Pakistan additional territory to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Status quo is now no longer a solution. It is not acceptable to any of the “necessary” parties (particularly Kashmiris) to the dispute.
The other option is for India and Pakistan to grant independence to disputed areas under their control and let Kashmir emerge as a neutral country. An independent Kashmir, as a neutral country, was the favourite choice of Sheikh Abdullah and from the early 1950s to the beginning of the crisis in 1989 – “Sheikh Abdullah supported ‘safeguarding of autonomy’ to the fullest possible extent” (Report of the State Autonomy Committee, Jammu, p. 41). Abdullah irked Nehru so much that he had to put Abdullah behind the bars. How could India agree to independence, if she did not agree to the McNaughton Proposals (6,000 Azad Kashmiri irregulars versus 18,000 Indian regulars).
Bhabani Sen Gupta and Prem Shankar Jha assert that “if New Delhi sincerely wishes to break the deadlock in Kashmir, it has no other alternative except to accept and implement what is being termed as an ‘Autonomy Plus, Independence Minus’ formula, or to grant autonomy to the state to the point where it is indistinguishable from independence”. (Shri Prakash and Ghulam Mohammad Shah (ed.), Towards understanding the Kashmir crisis, New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2002, p.226).
A third alternative is a “Trieste” type solution, in which Kashmir would be divided along communal lines. The Hindu majority areas of Jammu and the Buddhist-dominated region of Ladakh would join India. The Northern Area would remain with Pakistan, and the Kashmir Valley along with Azad Kashmir would join Pakistan. Free access would be given to people living on both sides of Kashmir.
Trieste was partitioned based on an agreement between Italy and former Yugoslavia, and residents on either side of city were given free access to the other side. Such an agreement was discussed by President Ayub Khan and was discussed in principle with Nehru. Liaquat Ali Khan was due to visit India, and Mountbatten intended to confront the two leaders with this proposal.
Still another option is to put Kashmiris under the joint control of India and Pakistan. But, this option appears to be Utopian. One option floated in Kashmiri circles across the line of control is to carve out a solution on the lines of Indus Basin Water Treaty. The treaty divided the Indus River system and allocated three western rivers (Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum) to Pakistan and three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas) to India. The idea was that the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab Rivers and their basins should join Pakistan, and the Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas Rivers and their basins, as well as the remaining parts of Kashmir, should join India.
The Jhelum originates at Vernag Spring (more precisely at nearby Vitlnlvutur Spring), not far from Zoji La Pass. Below Kishinganga Junction, it forms the boundary between Jammu and Kashmir and the districts of Hazara and Rawalpindi. The basin of the Jhelum would fall within the exclusive domain of Pakistan. The source of the Chenab is on the southern flank of the main Himalayan chain, about 150 miles south of Leh. In general, the river flows parallel to the Indus to the northwest, then turns southwest to Pakistan. Below Akhnur, the river splits into smaller channels that could form the dividing line. Bilateral negotiations could amicably divide the Chenab Basin and address the question of Muslim majority districts in the area.
Aland Island solution: Agreement on the Aland Islands between Finland and Sweden offers guidance on how to solve the Kashmir tangle. Aland international accord settled the territorial dispute on the basis of the status quo. Any settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan requires a guaranteed special status for both halves of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Aland problem was solved as Finland was sincere, unlike India as concerns the Kashmir issue. When the dispute with Sweden arose after the First World War, Finland’s Parliament passed an autonomy law on May 6, 1920, for Aland. The aim was to strengthen Swedish stance before world opinion. The people of Aland demanded a plebiscite to determine their fate, whether accession to any disputants or secession from them. The League of Nations’ Rapporteurs ruled in favour of Finland. But they suggested Aland’s secession could be avoided by offering her iron-clad guarantees of autonomy.
The proposed guarantees related to proprietary rights of the natives, voting rights of immigrants and nomination of a governor who enjoyed trust of the Alandian people. By contrast, governors in occupied Kashmir continued to be superimposed on Kashmir by India’s central governments without consent of Kashmiris. New Delhi never trusted even its stooges in Srinagar.
United Nations’ Solution: The underlying assumption of the UN proposal is that Kashmir belongs neither to India nor to Pakistan; rather, it belongs to Kashmiris. Hence, the legitimate and democratic way to solve the problem is to ascertain the wishes of the people through an impartial plebiscite. India, Pakistan, Britain, France China, the United Nations, and US pledged to the world that a plebiscite would be held. This is what the people of Kashmir are struggling to achieve.
Fifteen United Nations’ resolutions granted Kashmiris their right of self-determination. A plebiscite, administered with a nonpartisan procedure, is a valid option. The proposal Sir Owen Dixon submitted to the United Nations in 1950 provides a reasonable framework, acknowledging geopolitical and ethnic differences. The inhabitants of the state would decide their own future by regional plebiscite and partition. India opposes even regional plebiscite and partition as proposed by Dixon.
Mushahid Hussain said “The US no longer supports a plebiscite in Kashmir. Both these positions were enunciated by US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, John Kelly during Congressional Testimony in Washington on March 6, 1990”. (“Kashmir Issue: The International Dimension”, as cited in Gul Mohd. Wanis’ Kashmir: From Autonomy to Azadi, 1996, Valley Book House, pp.237).
Mushahid and a host of other intellectuals were misguided by Kelly’s mis-speech. “John Mallot, the (US) department’s point man for South Asia, told Congress in April 1993 that John Kelly, former assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, ‘misspoke’ in 1990 when he said that the United States no longer believed a plebiscite was necessary in South Asia”. (Mushtaqur Rehman’s Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunites for India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri People, London, Lynne Reinner Publishers, London, 1996, pp. 162-163). India insists upon maintaining the status quo. But, this option is not acceptable to Pakistan, nor to international community or, above all, to the people of Kashmir. Bus or train services are no substitute for the real problem. Plebiscite is the best solution, preceded by demilitarisation and self-governance.
