A handy guide to the U-2 spy plane

[SvenSvensonov]

The venerable U-2 'Dragon Lady' is a spy plane born from Cold War necessity that soldiered on operationally for decades past anyone's wildest dreams. She went from sleek design to a bulging beast of burden whose silhouette can change as fast as her mission requires it to. Here's a guide to her many configurations.

The U-2 was designed in the 1950's by Kelly Johnson — a man that would become as famous in aeronautical circles as the aircraft he gave birth to — and his skunkworks team. Stories of white knuckle Cold War missions over the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the shooting down of Gary Powers in 1960, an event that proved that the time of surface to air missiles have finally arrived, are synonymous with the U-2. This machine has taken part in virtually every major American military operation for over the last half century and has provided signals, communications, electronic and image intelligence reliably since shortly after the dawn of the jet age. The U-2 has also proven itself to be a great atmospheric research platform, natural disaster life saver, cartographer and high flying testbed beyond its more celebrated spying duties.

With all these missions in mind, the U-2 can appear like an almost totally different aircraft depending on which unique mission it is configured for, and there is no better place to view the U-2 in its many guises than the home of its manufacturer, Lockheed Skunk Works, now located at the sprawling and shadowy Plant 42 in Palmdale, California. Plant 42 is basically a massive airport surrounded by sprawling hangar facilities where America's top aircraft manufacturers and clandestine design houses create cutting edge flying super weapons.

What happens behind the doors of these massive buildings is deeply classified, but some weapon systems do fly out in the open from the Plant 42, especially those that are unclassified and are going through critical upgrades, servicing or manufacturer testing. The U-2 is one of these machines. America's best aerospace engineers and subsystem developers are constantly tweaking the Dragon Lady's abilities to meet new mission requirements.

U-2S

The aircraft pictured above is a very rare, totally "clean" U-2S. In fact she is not even packing the weight of her normal matte black paint (that is rumored to have radar absorbing qualities). Flying the U-2S, with its powerful F-118 motor, in this absolutely stripped configuration must be a real thrill. Its huge wings, high thrust and almost no payload should combine to produce some pretty outstanding climb rates. On the other hand, I bet she is a pain to land as those long wings do not want to stop flying even when there is the normal payload of thousands upon thousands of pounds of sensors and fuel onboard, not to mention the parasitic drag from a ton tacked on pods and antennas.

TU-2S Trainer

Once again, here we have a totally clean Dragon Lady, albeit a trainer model known as the TU-2S. The stepped cockpits provide both the pilot in training and instructor as good of visibility as possible, a key feature when attempting to land the notoriously squirrely U-2.

U2-S with Super-Pod

This is a standard U-2S with "super-pods" attached underneath its wings. Super-pods are used for carrying many types of surveillance equipment, including various data-links, although they can also be totally empty. When in use, which in this picture they do not appear to be, they usually house the"Senior Glass" communications, signals, and electronic intelligence packages (COMINT, SIGINT and ELINT). This system began as three separate installations, known as Senior Sear, Senior Ruby and Senior Glass, but after a mid 1990's initiative to integrate all these systems together in a modular configuration they can now fly and work together to some degree. These three forms of intelligence gathering capability intercept, and in some cases geo-locate, both communications, such a radio calls, signals such as encrypted data streams, and enemy radar emissions. Together, they are used to build a "picture" of the electronic battlefield, to be exploited in either near-real time via data-linking the data to a ground station, or collected data can be stored for analysis once the aircraft returns to base.

Obviously having the ability to listen to your enemy's radio transmissions and data streams gives you a huge leg up on defeating them on the battlefield, as does knowing the location of their enemy's surface to air missile sites and air defense connectivity nodes. By "sniffing out" the enemy's radar emissions, especially over time via utilizing the U-2s long endurance, commanders can employ air power in a way that maximizes their assets' ability to survive and provides essential targeting and mission planning information for fighter and attack aircraft, as well as standoff missiles such as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (T-LAM).

This data is especially crucial for stealth aircraft, as they would be some of the first air vehicles to enter enemy air space during the opening stages of hostilities, and their survival depends on careful mission planning, which directly leverages the ELINT information collected by the U-2 and other assets. The idea is to only expose a stealthy aircraft's most reflective aspects to certain radars for the minimum amount of time possible. This is called "flying the blue line" in low observable (stealth) communities as this "best course for survivability" is shown as a blue line in mission planning software and on in-cockpit displays. Using modern data-link technology and satellite communications, "pop-up" threats, such as mobile SAM sites, that are detected from a U-2 orbiting just outside enemy territory can even be sent via data-link to aircraft over enemy airspace so that they can avoid, suppress or destroy these threats in near real time.

U-2S With Full Senior Glass Equipment

Here we have the same U-2S that appeared in the last image, although in this image it is configured with a full Senior Glass installation, including the Senior Spear COMINT installation on the right super-pod, along with a massive antenna farm on the aircraft's belly, as well as the Senior Ruby electronic intelligence (radar emission) collection system on the left wing super-pod. U-2s equipped with this extensive ventral antenna farm have also been rumored to be capable of networking relay functions, providing over the horizon connectivity to aircraft and ground units within the U-2s area of operations. The two bulges on the bottom of the aircraft, one below the intakes and one behind the tail wheel, are the aircraft's within line of sight data link antennas used for transferring the data collected by the aircraft's sensors down to ground stations and ground data entry points in near real time.

U-2S With ASARS-2

This U-2, once again the same aircraft as the one above, is configuration in a similar fashion as the last image with one major difference, it packs the ASARS-2 (Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System) in its elongated nose cone. ASARS-2 consists of a pair of advanced electronically scanned array sideways-looking radar antennas mounted on each side of the U-2s elongated nose. This system takes high-fidelity radar "imagery" of the battleground out to about 100 miles on either side of the aircraft's position. Seeing as the U-2 often operates just outside of an enemy's borders, being able to fly an orbit in either direction while collecting radar data is key.

The ASARS-2 can see through bad weather and smoke, something that optical cameras have trouble with, and it can also work in ground moving target indicator (GMTI) mode. This mode basically identifies vehicles, and even large troop formations, moving within ASAR's range of detection via recognizing the "doppler effect" created by the moving objects against static ground clutter. Such data can be quickly exploited by commanders via the setting up of ambushes or by directing air power to destroy the enemy ground formations with prejudice. In a sense, ASARS-2 offers a similar, albeit less powerful ground tracking capability as the USAF's 707 based E-8 J-STARS.

U-2S With SYERS

Now we have a notably different U-2S configuration, once again on the same aircraft. The nose seen in this picture is also elongated but it does not have the cooling scoop as seen on the ASARS equipped U-2. Instead, this nosecone houses the SYERS (Senior Year Electro Optical Reconnaissance System). This camera system, the U-2's primary optical sensor, can peer deep into enemy territory and possesses outstanding resolution. Upgrades to the sensor itself, leveraging breakthroughs in multi-spectral imaging, has vastly improved SYERS ability to see through smoke, light fog and transient weather. Additionally, it sees "more" than ever before as the camera is actually capable of operating in multiple bands of the optical spectrum. For instance, maybe a vehicle is concealed by camouflage netting and it is all but non existent when photographed using traditional optics. SYERS, with its additional infra-red capability, may pick up the heat signature from the vehicle's engine, effectively countering the enemy's attempt at concealing it. In addition to SYERS, in this configuration the U-2S is carrying panoramic cameras in its "Q Bay" below and behind the cockpit. These cameras can take high definition horizon to horizon images of anywhere the U-2 passes over or passes abreast of.

There has been a concerted effort by the U-2 community to be able to lug around the SYERS and the ASARS-2 at the same time. Apparently a small fleet of U-2s are equipped with this capability and feature a massive bulge around the forward fuselage, behind the cockpit where the "Q-Bay" would be.

The huge radome on top of this Dragon Lady's spine is a satellite communications system known as either Senior Span or Senior Spur, depending on how the jet is configured. Senior Span is fitted to provide the conveyance of signals intelligence collection data beyond line of sight and around the globe. Senior Spur is used for transmitting other forms of data, including image intelligence and electronic intelligence gathered by the U-2's sensors. In its latest configuration, Senior Spur may also be able to transmit data over the horizon via Ku-band satellite that is being produced remotely from another source other than the U-2's sensors. In this function the aircraft would be working as a battlefield relay surrogate for other forces.

U-2S With All Sorts Of Stuff

The U-2's amazing ability to be reconfigured at will, and the aircraft's proven reliability, is really what makes the long winged jet such a great value for the USAF, and why the RQ-4B Global Hawk, an aircraft that was supposed to replace the U-2 many years ago, has had trouble doing so until recently. As you can see in the picture above, this U-2 is configured with ASARS in its nose, and Senior Spur/Span satellite link on its spine, and a full Senior Glass installation in its wing pods and on its belly. That is a lot of intelligence gathering and transmitting capability for one aircraft! Seeing as the new shadowy configuration that allows ASARS and SYERS to be carried at the same time, along with a Senior Spur dorsal pod on its spine, depending on payload, power and cooling limitations, it may be possible for the U-2S to carry Senior Glass as well. Such a configuration would pretty much span the whole gamut of airborne strategic reconnaissance.

Beyond these primary sensors, the U-2S carries a plethora of additional sensors and communications devices that can be switched in and out at will. These include a myriad of line-of sight data links, capable of unloading the U-2S's sensor data in near real time to ground stations or ground data entry points. Then there are air sampling payloads, great for sniffing around for very deadly elements floating near or above the battlefield. There is also the U-2S's advanced threat warning and electronic warfare suite, one of the most advanced of its kind, that is used to detect and jam enemy radars and missiles that are within threatening range of the aircraft.

Additional upgrades to the U-2 fleet have resulted in an aircraft that has never been more capable or easier to operate. Enhanced power generation, a cockpit that is now semi-pressurized and all glass cockpit displays are amongst the long list of Dragon Lady improvements that have occurred over the last twenty years. Sadly, even though the fleet has never been more capable, the DoD is finally wanting to retire the U-2 in exchange for the Global Hawk.

What the Global Hawk lacks in sensor capability in some respects, it makes up for in endurance, almost 30 hours to be more exact. Considering so much of the U-2s mission now demands a loitering flight profile, the persistant nature of the $40,000,000 Global Hawk (almost $120,000,000 when including research and development costs) does have its clear advantages. Still, the U-2 fleet and its dedicated pilot cadre and maintainers are a resource that would be hard to get back once they are disbanded, so this decision does have some fairly heavy strategic consequences.

The U-2 works, and works well. The Global Hawk works, but at a higher cost per flight hour than the U-2 and lower availability rate, although these metric are beginning to improve. Additionally, the RQ-4B lacks in some areas of sensor capability when compared to its older, manned grandfather. If the DoD gets its wish, and Congress approves the dissolution of the USAF's U-2 program, it will be interesting to see how such a decision will be considered in retrospect. Something tells me that retiring the U-2 fleet in full is less than ideal idea at this point, but other "black project" forces could have had some influence on it.

There are rumors that a high-flying, enemy territory penetrating, stealthy unmanned system, that can survive directly over the battlefield while collecting data for hours on end has been in operational testing for some time. This is a capability that I have predicted should be in existence for years now and one that would go far in augmenting the Global Hawk should the U-2 fleet be castoff. With any luck this system will be the U-2's true replacement, as the original design was envisioned to complete this exact role, a deep penetrating, un-touchable sensor platform for monitoring our enemies up close and at will.

Although less capable smaller scale systems are known to exist, and a penetrating stealth surveillance aircraft was tested decades ago, this capability paired with the more conventional Global Hawk's standoff reconnaissance role, may be good enough to finally see the venerable Dragon Lady disappear form USAF flight-lines once and for all.

ER-2S

Don't get that upset just yet, the U-2 will not disappear from the skies forever if the USAF get's its way! NASA operates a pair of U-2s, known as "ER-2s," for the high altitude airborne sciences role. These craft utilize the U-2s amazing high-altitude, long endurance capability, as well as the aircraft's multitude of sensor bays and pods to accomplish a variety of data collection missions and experiments.

In the past, the ER-2 has been used for direct atmospheric sampling missions, many of which study effects of ozone depletion and global warming. Additionally, ER-2s have flown over and mapped major hurricanes and other storms using advanced radar, lidar, interferometer, and radiometer payloads, in an effort to better understand how these extreme forms of weather form and evolve over time. Like the USAF's U-2, NASA's Dragon Lady's can carry a dorsal satellite communications link system to send back its data in real time when it is operating outside of line of sight of a ground station. Also, these aircraft can fly high enough to simulate a satellite in orbit for a variety of experimental proof-of-concept applications, including those for hyper-spectral imaging and forest fire detection capabilities. Often times, these sensors will fly on the ER-2 first before being reconfigured into a satellite and launched into orbit.

Although NASA's U-2s are not necessarily vintage hand-me downs from the USAF, they have not received some of the same upgrades that their cousins in uniform have. For instance, the ER-2s do not have the much improved glass cockpit that the USAF has fielded throughout the U-2S fleet. The aircraft is still flown via "steam gauges," an archaic reality considering a better option is readily available, it just costs money. Should the USAF divest itself of the U-2 fleet in favor of the unmanned Global Hawk, of which NASA also has an early pre-production pair on hand, then the ER-2 force stands for a major upgrade and will be flush with spare parts for decades to come.

Just like the USAF's U-2s, NASA's Dragon Ladies are truly multi-role platforms that offer a comparatively fantastic return on investment for NASA. If it has to fly high and be at a certain place at a certain time, there is a good chance that the U-2 will be NASA's platform of choice to make that happen.

From A Spotter's Guide To The U-2 'Dragon Lady' And Its Many Configurations

@AUSTERLITZ @Donatello @AMDR - thought maybe you guys would like this

 

[Selous]

Just a question...I dont see any wheels on the wings...how does this thing land ? Take off I think could be accomplished with wheels that fall off, but landing ?

 

[SQ8]

Just a question...I dont see any wheels on the wings...how does this thing land ? Take off I think could be accomplished with wheels that fall off, but landing ?

It skids to a stop on smaller wheels embedded within the wingtips. Which requires a lot of skill from the pilot to keep the wings level to the very last amount of speed.

 

[black-hawk_101]

I think US might convert them into UAVs.

 

[Donatello]

Dayem, threads like these make me love PDF.

@SvenSvensonov

Any information on the RB57 aircraft that were stationed in Pakistan during the cold war.....and the story behind that?

There was another American member who gave a pretty insightful view on that.....apparently RB57 was the alternative to the U2.....could fly all the way to 70,000ft....

 

[Selous]

Dayem, threads like these make me love PDF.

@SvenSvensonov

Any information on the RB57 aircraft that were stationed in Pakistan during the cold war.....and the story behind that?

There was another American member who gave a pretty insightful view on that.....apparently RB57 was the alternative to the U2.....could fly all the way to 70,000ft....

I don't think the B57 could actually reach 70 000ft...it was closer to 65 000ft I think. Btw @SvenSvensonov how much of a difference is there between the B57 and the Canberra ? I have seen the Canberra at a airshow in SA and it looked quite similar.

 

[SvenSvensonov]

I don't think the B57 could actually reach 70 000ft...it was closer to 65 000ft I think. Btw @SvenSvensonov how much of a difference is there between the B57 and the Canberra ? I have seen the Canberra at a airshow in SA and it looked quite similar.

Same aircraft, both are called Canberra, but there are differences too since one is a bomber while the other is a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. For clarification, the RB-57 (in its "F" variant, the earlier RB-57D had an altitude of 70,000 ft) has a flight ceiling of 82,000 ft, while the B-57 has a flight ceiling of slightly over 45,000 ft.

Their main differences are the longer wingspan and difference engines of the RB-57, with its wings being 122 feet, compared to the B-57's 64 foot wingspan. The RB-57 is also 4 feet longer. Really, the difference comes down to their engine and payload capacity and rather then give you boring charts or numbers, I'll let pictures highlight the differences.

B-57

General characteristics

• Crew: 2 (pilot,navigator )
• Length: 65 ft, 6 in (20.0 m)
• Wingspan: 64 ft 0 in (19.5 m)
• Height: 14 ft 10 in (4.52 m)
• Wing area: 960 ft² (89 m²)
• Empty weight: 27,090 lb (12,285 kg)
• Loaded weight: 40,345 lb (18,300 kg)
• Max. takeoff weight: 53,720 lb (24,365 kg)
• Powerplant: 2 × Wright J65-W-5 turbojets, 7,220 lbf (32.1 kN) each
• *Zero-lift drag coefficient: 0.0119
• Drag area: 11.45 ft² (1.06 m²)
• Aspect ratio: 4.27

Performance

• Maximum speed: Mach 0.79 (598 mph, 960 km/h) at 2,500 ft (760 m)
• Cruise speed: 476 mph (414 knots, 765 km/h)
• Stall speed: 124 mph (108 knots, 200 km/h)
• Combat radius: 950 mi (825 nm, 1,530 km) with 5,250 lb (2,380 kg) of bombs
• Ferry range: 2,720 mi (2,360 nm, 4,380 km)
• Service ceiling: 45,100 ft (13,745 m)
• Rate of climb: 6,180 ft/min (31.4 m/s)
• Wing loading: 42 lb/ft² (205 kg/m²)
• Thrust/weight: 0.36
• Lift-to-drag ratio: 15.0

Data from cover.htm

R/WB-57

General characteristics

• Crew: 2
• Length: 68 ft. 10 in. (20.98 m)
• Wingspan: 122 ft 5 in (37.5 m)
• Height: 14 ft 10 in (4.52 m)
• Powerplant: 2 × Pratt & Whitney TF33-P-11 turbofans, 16,000 lbf () each

Performance

• Maximum speed: Mach 0.79 (546 mph / 475 knots)
• Combat radius: 4,000 miles / 3475 nautical miles ()
• Service ceiling: 82,000 ft ()

Data taken from Factsheets : General Dynamics RB-57F

@Donatello - I'm looking into the two RB-57s in Pakistan... it could take some time though, not a whole lot of information on their presence. I'll get back to you on this.

 

[Selous]

Same aircraft, both are called Canberra, but there are differences too since one is a bomber while the other is a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. For clarification, the RB-57 (in its "F" variant, the earlier RB-57D had an altitude of 70,000 ft) has a flight ceiling of 82,000 ft, while the B-57 has a flight ceiling of slightly over 45,000 ft.

Their main differences are the longer wingspan and difference engines of the RB-57, with its wings being 122 feet, compared to the B-57's 64 foot wingspan. The RB-57 is also 4 feet longer. Really, the difference comes down to their engine and payload capacity and rather then give you boring charts or numbers, I'll let pictures highlight the differences.

B-57
View attachment 177755

View attachment 177756

View attachment 177761

View attachment 177762

General characteristics

• Crew: 2 (pilot,navigator )
• Length: 65 ft, 6 in (20.0 m)
• Wingspan: 64 ft 0 in (19.5 m)
• Height: 14 ft 10 in (4.52 m)
• Wing area: 960 ft² (89 m²)
• Empty weight: 27,090 lb (12,285 kg)
• Loaded weight: 40,345 lb (18,300 kg)
• Max. takeoff weight: 53,720 lb (24,365 kg)
• Powerplant: 2 × Wright J65-W-5 turbojets, 7,220 lbf (32.1 kN) each
• *Zero-lift drag coefficient: 0.0119
• Drag area: 11.45 ft² (1.06 m²)
• Aspect ratio: 4.27

Performance

• Maximum speed: Mach 0.79 (598 mph, 960 km/h) at 2,500 ft (760 m)
• Cruise speed: 476 mph (414 knots, 765 km/h)
• Stall speed: 124 mph (108 knots, 200 km/h)
• Combat radius: 950 mi (825 nm, 1,530 km) with 5,250 lb (2,380 kg) of bombs
• Ferry range: 2,720 mi (2,360 nm, 4,380 km)
• Service ceiling: 45,100 ft (13,745 m)
• Rate of climb: 6,180 ft/min (31.4 m/s)
• Wing loading: 42 lb/ft² (205 kg/m²)
• Thrust/weight: 0.36
• Lift-to-drag ratio: 15.0

Data from cover.htm

R/WB-57

View attachment 177757

View attachment 177758

View attachment 177759

View attachment 177760

General characteristics

• Crew: 2
• Length: 68 ft. 10 in. (20.98 m)
• Wingspan: 122 ft 5 in (37.5 m)
• Height: 14 ft 10 in (4.52 m)
• Powerplant: 2 × Pratt & Whitney TF33-P-11 turbofans, 16,000 lbf () each

Performance

• Maximum speed: Mach 0.79 (546 mph / 475 knots)
• Combat radius: 4,000 miles / 3475 nautical miles ()
• Service ceiling: 82,000 ft ()

Data taken from Factsheets : General Dynamics RB-57F

@Donatello - I'm looking into the two RB-57s in Pakistan... it could take some time though, not a whole lot of information on their presence. I'll get back to you on this.

I might be mistaken but I thought the Brits made the Canberra....

 

[SvenSvensonov]

I might be mistaken but I thought the Brits made the Canberra....

The B-57 was a Martin USA license-produced English Electric Canberra, but the RB-57D, the original version of the RB-57 (the F model was a conversion undertaken by General Dynamics) was built solely by the US and was the product of a study at Wright Air Development Center. This was not a license produced aircraft, nor was there a British version of the RB-57, Taiwan was the only other user of the RB-57D, while the RB-57F was used solely by the USAF and NASA.

So yes, the Canberra was a British aircraft, and was license produced by a US company, Martin USA, but only in the B-57 model. The RB-57 variants are US designs and productions.

 

[Donatello]

Same aircraft, both are called Canberra, but there are differences too since one is a bomber while the other is a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. For clarification, the RB-57 (in its "F" variant, the earlier RB-57D had an altitude of 70,000 ft) has a flight ceiling of 82,000 ft, while the B-57 has a flight ceiling of slightly over 45,000 ft.

Their main differences are the longer wingspan and difference engines of the RB-57, with its wings being 122 feet, compared to the B-57's 64 foot wingspan. The RB-57 is also 4 feet longer. Really, the difference comes down to their engine and payload capacity and rather then give you boring charts or numbers, I'll let pictures highlight the differences.

B-57
View attachment 177755

View attachment 177756

View attachment 177761

View attachment 177762

General characteristics

• Crew: 2 (pilot,navigator )
• Length: 65 ft, 6 in (20.0 m)
• Wingspan: 64 ft 0 in (19.5 m)
• Height: 14 ft 10 in (4.52 m)
• Wing area: 960 ft² (89 m²)
• Empty weight: 27,090 lb (12,285 kg)
• Loaded weight: 40,345 lb (18,300 kg)
• Max. takeoff weight: 53,720 lb (24,365 kg)
• Powerplant: 2 × Wright J65-W-5 turbojets, 7,220 lbf (32.1 kN) each
• *Zero-lift drag coefficient: 0.0119
• Drag area: 11.45 ft² (1.06 m²)
• Aspect ratio: 4.27

Performance

• Maximum speed: Mach 0.79 (598 mph, 960 km/h) at 2,500 ft (760 m)
• Cruise speed: 476 mph (414 knots, 765 km/h)
• Stall speed: 124 mph (108 knots, 200 km/h)
• Combat radius: 950 mi (825 nm, 1,530 km) with 5,250 lb (2,380 kg) of bombs
• Ferry range: 2,720 mi (2,360 nm, 4,380 km)
• Service ceiling: 45,100 ft (13,745 m)
• Rate of climb: 6,180 ft/min (31.4 m/s)
• Wing loading: 42 lb/ft² (205 kg/m²)
• Thrust/weight: 0.36
• Lift-to-drag ratio: 15.0

Data from cover.htm

R/WB-57

View attachment 177757

View attachment 177758

View attachment 177759

View attachment 177760

General characteristics

• Crew: 2
• Length: 68 ft. 10 in. (20.98 m)
• Wingspan: 122 ft 5 in (37.5 m)
• Height: 14 ft 10 in (4.52 m)
• Powerplant: 2 × Pratt & Whitney TF33-P-11 turbofans, 16,000 lbf () each

Performance

• Maximum speed: Mach 0.79 (546 mph / 475 knots)
• Combat radius: 4,000 miles / 3475 nautical miles ()
• Service ceiling: 82,000 ft ()

Data taken from Factsheets : General Dynamics RB-57F

@Donatello - I'm looking into the two RB-57s in Pakistan... it could take some time though, not a whole lot of information on their presence. I'll get back to you on this.

Thanks!

Would be interesting to know their intended missions, crew and operational characteristics if possible. I think it was rumored that some flew over then the indian occupied Kashmir region and PAF given details of the Indian Army there..

 

[Darth Vader]

Just a question...I dont see any wheels on the wings...how does this thing land ? Take off I think could be accomplished with wheels that fall off, but landing ?

 

[SvenSvensonov]

Thanks!

Would be interesting to know their intended missions, crew and operational characteristics if possible. I think it was rumored that some flew over then the indian occupied Kashmir region and PAF given details of the Indian Army there..

Here's what I've found... but I'm still looking for more info:

RB-57 was a modified version of B-57 for reconnaissance. In 1959, Pakistan received B-57 bombers from United States. These planes were from 345th Tactical Bomber Wing of USAF based at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. This wing was deactivated in June 1959 and bombers given to Pakistan. After shooting down of U-2 over Soviet Union in 1960, U-2 over flights were discontinued. Various models of RB-57 were developed for high altitude reconnaissance. RB-57B had a ceiling of 65’000 feet and RB-57 F had a ceiling of 80’0000 feet. United States provided two RB-57 B models to Pakistan in early 1960s. These planes were optimized for PHOTOINT and ELINT. In 1965, two state of the art RB-57 Fs (nick named droopy due to their enormous wing span of 200 feet) were also provided to Pakistan. The droopy was exclusively an electronic intelligence gathering and photo reconnaissance platform that could cruise at altitudes up to 80,000 feet above sea level and thus stay well beyond the then air defense capability if flying at maximum heights. RB-57F was used for PHOTOINT through a special high altitude cameras as well as equipment for ELINT and SIGINT. In view of curtailment of over flights over hostile territories in the aftermath of the May 1960 shooting down of U-2 over Soviet Union, new equipment was developed. State of the art side looking camera installed on RB-57 could take detailed pictures from nearly sixty miles away allowing the planes to fly over international waters as well as inside the host country airspace.

Four RB-57s were part of then classified No 24 Intelligence Squadron of PAF based in Peshawar. Two were RB-57 Fs for high altitude reconnaissance and two were RB-57 Bs used for electronic intelligence gathering (ELINT) and signal interception. These planes were provided to Pakistan with an understanding that they will be used for surveillance against Soviet Union and possibly China. Two British Royal Air Force pilots trained in Texas were associated with some of the RB-57 missions originating from Pakistan. PAF pilots took over RB-57 missions and the names of at least two pilots are known; Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal and Squadron Leader Rashid Mir.

This author has not been able to confirm that PAF pilots were involved in over flight missions over Soviet Union. PAF pilots flew RB-57s over Pakistan’s northern areas which border Afghanistan where a narrow strip of Wakhan separates Pakistan from Soviet Union. Pakistan’s northern areas also share border with China. ELINT, SIGINT and TELINT equipment was probably used to obtain information from the bordering areas of Soviet Union and China without directly flying over the territory. U.S. technical staff installed the surveillance equipment prior to the flight and removed it after the mission Initially, Pakistani crew was not briefed about the missions and simply given the route of their flight. One navigator protested and demanded that they be briefed about the missions and after this protest Pakistani pilots were briefed about the missions. Commander of 215 Intel Analysis Squadron, a Wing Commander rank Pakistan Air Force officer coordinated with Americans. American technicians after deciphering all information from the equipments installed in the RB-57s would share some information with Pakistani liaison officers. Most likely this information was related to India.

It is very difficult to confirm whether Pakistani pilots flew over flight missions over Soviet territory as two known pilots associated with RB-57s are not alive. If Pakistan was involved in over flight missions, that would tantamount to ‘recklessness’ on part of Pakistan’s higher decision makers. Pakistan took enormous risk as this act would be considered direct provocation of then super power Soviet Union. The enormity of the risk is highlighted by the fact that after the 1960 shoot down of U-2, Soviet Union had clearly warned Pakistan of dire consequences in case of use of Pakistani territory for such operations.

In 1965 when tensions increased between Pakistan and India, United States wanted to move some of its ‘expensive toys’ out of the hot zone. Pakistan resisted these measures to use these state of the art planes against India. One RB-57 F returned to United States prior to the start of all out war in September 1965. Second RB-57 F was damaged by Indian air defense during a mission on September 15, 1965 but Squadron Leader Rashid Mir landed the damaged plane safely at Peshawar. It was repaired and later returned to United States. One RB-57 B flown by Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal was shot down by friendly fire during the war. The lone remaining RB-57 B (tail number 3934) was destroyed during an Indian Air Force air raid on December 05, 1971 at Mauripur base thus ending the RB-57 chapter of Pakistan air force. Details of RB-57 operations in Pakistan are still classified in United States. In Pakistan not many people are alive who were intimately involved with the project and an odd one or two with some detailed knowledge are not willing to talk about it. This makes any detailed and meaningful analysis very difficult.

Also, the US had U-2s operating in Pakistan:

Badaber Base

‘In God we trust, all others we monitor’. Intercept Operator’s motto. NSA Study, Deadly Transmissions, December 1970

In 1950s, United States ringed Soviet Union with several listening posts. Ground stations listening to Soviet communications were set up at Samsun and Trabzon in Turkey, Germany, Scotland, Philippines, Crete, Taiwan and Japan. These operations were run by NSA and intelligence arm of United States Air Force then designated United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS). NSA also provided equipment to be installed in U-2 planes that recorded emissions from Soviet radar, microwave and ground communications. Soviet radar installations communicated with each other through high frequency circuits. These high frequency signals bounce between earth and ionosphere, therefore right equipment can pick these signals thousands of miles away.

In 1958, United States and Pakistani governments started negotiations to set up an American listening post in West Pakistan. In 1959, a ten year lease was signed between Pakistan and United States. United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) chose a site near the village of Badaber on the outskirts of Peshawar and the ‘Project Sandbag’ was started. The unit assigned was designated 6937 Communications Group also known as Peshawar Air Station (PAS). The first commander of the unit responsible for setting up the infrastructure was Colonel Ethyl Branham. Badaber base was an electronic surveillance facility primarily run by NSA. No aircraft were involved in this operation. It monitored Soviet air defense systems and tracked the path of the surveillance flights but aircraft were not flown from this facility. They monitored Soviet reaction to reconnaissance flights but were not directly involved with the operations of these flights. The primary mission of Badaber facility was monitoring events at the Tyurtam missile test center and its downrange tracking stations. The facility had remote transmitter and receiver sites for high frequency teletype communications with the US military communications network.

There were Pakistani liaison officers attached to the facility for coordination but they were not allowed in operational areas. When Francis Gary Powers U-2 was shot down, at an unclassified Commanders Call, the Americans stationed at the base were told that the 6937th had no knowledge of the U-2 mission. No Pakistani officer directly participated in any capacity in these operations; however a Wing Commander rank Pakistan Air Force officer coordinated with Americans. Only a handful of high ranking Pakistani military officials including C-in-C of the army and air force chief were taken into confidence. No Pakistani civilians were allowed in the facility. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was then serving as acting foreign minister on his visit to Peshawar requested to visit the Badaber base. Peshawar deputy commissioner Roedad Khan conveyed this request to American base commander Colonel Thomas C. Hyde. The reply came that Bhutto ‘would be welcome to visit the cafeteria where he would be entertained and served coffee and sandwiches’ and that he would be allowed to visit only the cafeteria and no other part of the base.

Sometimes Pakistani officials exaggerated their contribution to the alliance with United States to extract more concessions especially military hardware. In the fall of 1963, Ayub jotted down talking points in his diary in preparation for his meeting with Secretary of State George Ball. In reference to American facilities on Pakistani soil, he wrote, ‘the facility provided to the Americans to establish a major satellite and rocket launching center in Badaber which exposed Pakistan to the wrath of the Russians’. It is not clear whether Ayub wanted to exaggerate Pakistan contribution as a bargaining tool or was not fully aware of the nature of the project at Badaber. Badaber base was only an electronic listening post and had nothing to do with any satellite reconnaissance and definitely not a rocket launching center. There were no U.S. rockets or missiles based on Pakistani soil. It is not known whether Ayub shared this thought with Ball and if he did it would have left a poor impression of Ayub. However, knowing very well that his bargaining position was strong, Ayub argued that by allowing U.S. facilities to operate, Pakistan was increasing its own exposure to Soviet retaliation. During Eisenhower’s visit to Pakistan in December 1959, this was the main argument used by Ayub to get a squadron of F-104s with Sidewinder missile. In 1964, CIA’s own analysis concluded that ‘The Pakistani President knows that the strongest card he holds is the US communications facilities at Peshawar’. He almost certainly calculates that closing the facilities would bring a drastic reduction in the US military and economic assistance on which Pakistan is so heavily dependent and for which there is no alternative in sight’.

In early 1960s, United States and Pakistan started to drift apart from their alliance in view of increased American support to India in the aftermath of Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Pakistan got alarmed at these developments and started to repair its relations with Soviet Union. Ayub Khan visited Soviet Union in 1965 and gave Soviet leaders indication that when ten year lease of Badaber base ended in 1969, he would not renew it. He also suggested a quid pro quo between issues of U.S. bases in Pakistan and Soviet Union’s veto on Kashmir resolutions and suggested that ‘the matter could be negotiated and the two sides could come to a reasonable arrangement’. Washington got alarmed and angry by Ayub’s visit to China and Soviet Union and while Ayub was still in Soviet Union Washington announced that Ayub’s upcoming visit to United States in April 1965 was rescheduled due to President Johnson’s busy schedule. Pakistan approached Soviet Union for arms but Soviet leaders were lukewarm to the idea. Ayub was thinking about using increased ties with Soviets as a bargaining chip and wrote in his diary on September 26, 1966, ‘It is in our interest that our relations with the Soviets should gain depth. We can then develop greater leverage with the United States and India’.

Ayub visited Soviet Union again in September 1967 and gave firm commitment to Soviet leaders about his decision not to renew the Badaber lease next year. In 1968 Pakistan informed Washington of its decision about closure of Badaber base at the termination of the lease that pleased Soviets. American ambassador sought an urgent interview with Ayub and conveyed ‘the great disappointment of his government. On April 06, 1968 Pakistan gave notice to United States government that Pakistan will not be renewing the lease and on April 17 Soviet Prime Minister Aleksi Kosygin arrived in Pakistan for wide ranging talks. Soviets agreed to help Pakistan in various projects including atomic power plant, steel mill and radio link between Soviet Union and Pakistan. In 1969, U.S. winded up its operations from Badaber base and officially the operations ended on January 07, 1970 when base was handed over to PAF.

U-2

‘The U-2 was a flaming javelin unwittingly thrown into the dry forest of suspicions and misperceptions that surrounded American-Soviet relations in May 1960’.

U-2 was a specially designed aircraft for high altitude flights for reconnaissance. It had electronic surveillance equipment for monitoring and recording radar and radio frequencies and a specialized camera for high resolution photographs. These flights monitored radars, air defenses, rocket launches and military and industrial sites. It was a joint operation run by CIA and USAF. CIA paid for the development of the aircraft and Strategic Air Command (SAC) trained the pilots. Most missions were flown along Soviet borders and over international waters and not over Soviet air space. Missions from Wiesbaden base in Germany covered northern and western parts of the Soviet territory while flights from Turkey covered southern parts. U-2 flights also operated from Alaska, Japan and Australia.

President Dwight Eisenhower was fully aware of the potential impact on relations with Soviet Union as far as over flight missions were concerned; therefore he kept a tight control on U-2 operations. He was told by CIA that planes were undetectable by Soviet radar system which proved to be wrong. In 1956, first two U-2 planes were transported to United Kingdom (UK) but UK pulled out of the project at the last minute and planes were shipped backed to Germany. In July 1956, first four U-2 missions over Soviet air space were flown from Wiesbaden base in Germany in ten days period. Soviet radars detected the intrusion but could not identify the plane nor could intercept it. Soviets sent a strong protest note to Washington with specific dates and times of intrusions forcing Eisenhower to order termination of additional flights. Information from these early flights was so valuable that United States could not resist and second mission was conducted in November 1956 from Incirlik base in Turkey. Later, U-2 flights were flown from Alaska, California, Texas, Germany, Turkey, Japan, England, Australia, Brazil, Norway and Pakistan. Most of these flights were flown along Soviet borders and were not over flights. Deep penetration flights were personally approved by the President. In four years, only 24 such deep penetration flights were approved by the President. Most over flights originated from Turkey as it covered large area of Soviet Union including Kapustin Yar testing site, bomber fields and military and industrial targets in Caucus, Ukraine and major cities along Volga.

Pilots chosen for U-2 were reserve officers with exceptional ratings, top secret clearance and extra hours on single engine, single place aircraft. Pilots resigned from the air force and worked under an eighteen month contract for CIA with much higher pay and no loss of service time in USAF when they returned back after completing the contract. In the early stages, it was decided to use non-U.S. citizens for U-2 flights over Soviet territory. The argument made by Eisenhower was that if a U.S. pilot or a member of U.S. armed forces was shot down over Soviet territory, in strict legal sense it could be considered an act of war. Some non-U.S. citizens were trained; however the idea was dropped for two reasons. First, the operation could not be kept highly classified in view of a large number of foreign pilots on the roll and secondly most of the pilots could not sustain very stringent criteria of training for missions at such heights. Four Greek pilots were brought for training in 1956 but none of them completed the training (they were later known as ‘Greek Washout). In view of keeping the secret, CIA kept them in United States sending them to colleges at government expense. Later, Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots were also brought into the mission. In case of Pakistan, when U-2 planes started to operate from Pakistan, no Pakistani air force personnel were involved with the project with the exception of liaison, logistics and administrative assistance in running the operations. In 1956, when Washington approached Pakistan for U-2 flights from Pakistan, Pakistani government hesitated and complained about the slow current rate of military assistance. Since 1954, relations between two countries have been strained due to disagreements on defense assistance issue and lengthy delays due to bureaucratic wrangling in Washington. On January 10, 1957, National Security Council approved enhanced program of military assistance to Pakistan (NSC 5701). The estimated cost of this enhanced program was $410 million for military assistance and $374.7 million for defense support for the three year period of 1957-1960. U.S. committed to raise and support four infantry and one and a half armored division of Pakistan army, absorption of additional 40’000 soldiers in Pakistan army as well as equipment for air force and navy.

In January 1957, Eisenhower approved a three year increase in military aid and next month a restricted area of Peshawar base saw construction to welcome U-2. Richard Bissell was in charge of U-2 program at CIA. His assistant, James Cunningham negotiated with Pakistan army chief General Muhammad Ayub Khan. Peshawar and Lahore were two sites from where U-2 was flown over Soviet territory. A Pakistan Air Force liaison officer was assigned to U-2 program operating from Pakistan. There was no permanent stationing of U-2 planes on Pakistani soil. Detachment 10-10 based at Incirlik base near Adana in Turkey flew missions from Pakistan. Usually, for security reasons, pilot and some essential crew members were flown a night before in a C-130 plane from Turkey. U-2 flown by standby pilot would bring in the plane so that there was least amount of exposure. Main target of flights originating from Pakistan was Tyurtam missile testing site and cosmodrome in Kazakhstan as well as military installations along Trans-Siberian railways and down range radar array that was a terminal site for missile firings from Kapustin Yar. The first U-2 flight from Pakistan flew over Soviet Union and landed at a small desert airstrip near Mashhad from where it went back to Turkey. There were total of twenty four U-2 over flights over Soviet Union from 1956 to 1960. Out of twenty four, ten were launched from Pakistan. First five flights originated from Lahore and the remaining five from Peshawar. The first Soviet over flight from Pakistan took off from Lahore on August 05, 1957.

In early 1960, CIA Director Allen Dulles and Bissell were worried about a new ballistic missile launch site in northern Urals and wanted to send some U-2 flights to check this out. Eisenhower was reluctant to authorize the flights in view of upcoming summit in Paris in June 1960. He finally agreed and on April 09, 1960, a U-2 took off from Peshawar for a Soviet over flight. The plane flew over Tayurtam launching site, nuclear testing site of Semipalatinsk and air defense missile site near Saryshagan. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was in Crimea and when informed about the U-2 flight was furious and threatened that if the next intruder was not shot down, he would severely punish several generals. Soviet leadership appointed a commission after this incident to investigate why Soviet air defense systems were not able to target these aircrafts. Colonel Alexander Orlov then serving on the staff of Air Defense Forces was member of this commission. According to Orlov, many shortcomings were discovered and rectified. In Washington, Dulles and Bissell asked for another mission as photos of suspected long range missile site near Plesetsk were not good. Soviet defense had also progressed during these years. In early 1960, Soviets had inducted P-30 radar system that could detect aircraft at high altitudes, SU-9 Fish pot high altitude interceptor aircraft and S-75 and SA-2 Guideline missile system capable of reaching a target at approximately 80’000 feet.

The Francis Gary Powers fame U-2 flight that was shot down over Soviet Union on May 01, 1960 originated from Peshawar. Powers arrived by a C-130 plane along with some ground crew members in Peshawar on April 27. U-2 was flown by stand by pilot from Incirlik base in Turkey, however it had to return on April 27 and 28 due to inclement weather over Soviet Union. Planned mission was a long flight over Soviet Union covering a distance of about 3800 miles and landing at Bodo, Norway. Flight path after take off from Peshawar was to fly over Afghanistan then over Dushanbe proceeding to Tayurtam cosmodrome. From there plane was to fly over Chelyabinsk and then over the industrial hub of Sverdlovsk. Soviet main atomic research site was located near Sverdlovsk. The plane was to go over Kirov then to Plesetsk which was a base for the new SS-6 intercontinental ballistic missiles. U-2 was to fly over Archangel then White Sea and finally making a turn around Barents Sea and land at Bodo in Norway. Soviet radar system was tracking the plane the moment it entered Soviet air space. According to Khrushchev, he got a phone call from Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky at five o’clock in the morning when U-2 entered Soviet airspace from Afghanistan. A Soviet SU-9 Fish pot high altitude interceptor took off from Sverdlovsk air field and was able to reach the desirable altitude but didn’t see the target. Soviet Air Defence commander Marshal Sergei Biryuzov along with deputy chief of operations for Air Defense Command Colonel Georgi Mikhailov from their command center informed Khrushchev that ‘there is no rocket site ready until it gets to Sverdlovsk. At Sverdlovsk, we can try our luck’. This U-2 was shot down near Sverdlovsk when a SA-2 (Soviet name for this was C-75) surface to air missile burst near its tail.

Washington had a general agreement with all host governments including Pakistan that in case of an incident United States would declare that it was flying U-2 without the permission of host government. Hugh Cumming was head of State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and was chief liaison with CIA. When news of U-2 crash in Soviet Union was confirmed, a prepared cover story written several years ago was discussed at the meeting. This story stated that a NASA U-2 weather plane flying from Turkey had accidentally over flown Pakistan without permission after the pilot reported mechanical problems by radio. There was debate about mentioning of Pakistan. Cumming insisted that Pakistan’s name should be deleted from the cover story. The problem was that by removing the Pakistan name, they had to come up with a new cover flight plan. Technicians using their tools drew a new triangular flight plan for the new cover story. The reason for removing Pakistan’s name from the story was the impression in Washington that Pakistan might not be able to take the heat from the Soviet Union compared to Turkey.

President Ayub Khan was in London when London CIA station chief gave him the news of downing of U-2. Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary Mohammad Ikramullah who was accompanying Ayub issued the statement that his country had no information that the U-2 had stopped off in Peshawar. Ayub Khan told reporters that ‘The Americans are our friends. These planes come and visit our country. How do we know where they go after they leave our country?’ On May 07, 1960, Khrushchev addressed the meeting of the Supreme Soviet. Angry Khrushchev thundered, “from the lofty rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, we warn those countries that make their territory available for launching planes with anti-Soviet intentions: Do not play with fire, gentlemen! The governments of Turkey, Pakistan and Norway must be clearly aware that they are accomplices in this flight … If these governments did not know – and I allow in this case they were not informed – they should have known what the American military was doing in their territory against the Soviet Union”. Two days later, Khrushchev confronted Pakistani ambassador Salman Ali at Czechoslovakia embassy reception and warned that ‘Peshawar had been marked on a map and pinpointed by Soviet rockets’. On May 13, Soviet foreign minister formally summoned Pakistani envoy along with his counterparts from Turkey and Norway and ‘threatened military attack in revenge for their complicity in the U-2 flights’.

In 1967, Ayub Khan in his memoirs noted that ‘in the U-2 incident we were clearly at fault, but the whole thing had been as much of a shock to us as it was to the Soviet Union’. This statement is only half true as Ayub Khan was fully aware of the nature of the project from the beginning and what he admitted in 1967 was well in line with the secret agreement between Pakistan and United States that in case of downing in hostile territory, United States will state that they have been flying U-2 without Pakistan government’s knowledge. No further over flights over Soviet Union were carried out by U-2 after the May 01, 1960 incident. In reference to the downing of U-2, Ayub Khan in his diary wrote ‘Gary Cooper’ confusing Francis Gary Powers name with then famous Hollywood actor Gary Cooper. Another interesting fact is that Francis Gary Powers mission was codenamed ‘Operation Grand Slam’. In 1965, Pakistan also gave the codename ‘Operation Grand Slam’ to its offensive in Kashmir. Both missions didn’t live up to their illustrious titles.

Here's a rundown of the US U-2 presence in Pakistan. The format is the date the air frame arrived, the location of their basing, the pilot, and the target of the flights:

August 05, 1957
Lahore
Eugene ‘Buster’ Edens
Tyurtam missile facility


August 12, 1957
Lahore
Not Known
Not Known


August 21, 1957
Lahore
Not Known
Semipalatinsk nuclear facility


August 22, 1957
Lahore
Jim Cherbonneaux
Semipalatinsk nuclear facility


August 28, 1957
Lahore
E K Jones
Tyurtam missile facility


July 09, 1959
Peshawar
Marty Knutson
Saryshagan & Semipalatinsk


December 06, 1959
Peshawar
Robbie Robinson
Tyurtam & Kapustin Yar


February 05, 1960
Peshawar
John MacArther
Bomber site at Kazan


April 09, 1960
Peshawar
Bob Ericson
Saryshagan, Semipalatinsk
& Tyurtam


May 01, 1960
Peshawar
Francis Gary Powers
Tyurtam & Chelyabinsk

@Donatello - hope this helps!

@Horus @Oscar @AUSTERLITZ - any of you guys have additional information on the US recon presence in Pakistan... or know someone who might?

 

[Selous]

Man that is amazing!

 

[SvenSvensonov]

Man that is amazing!

You want amazing, check our this one:

I'd recommend a look at this article for more perspective on the CIA's landing of U-2s on USS Ranger.

Yes, the CIA Flew U-2 Spy Planes From Aircraft Carriers — War Is Boring — Medium

 

[Donatello]

Here's what I've found... but I'm still looking for more info:

RB-57 was a modified version of B-57 for reconnaissance. In 1959, Pakistan received B-57 bombers from United States. These planes were from 345th Tactical Bomber Wing of USAF based at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. This wing was deactivated in June 1959 and bombers given to Pakistan. After shooting down of U-2 over Soviet Union in 1960, U-2 over flights were discontinued. Various models of RB-57 were developed for high altitude reconnaissance. RB-57B had a ceiling of 65’000 feet and RB-57 F had a ceiling of 80’0000 feet. United States provided two RB-57 B models to Pakistan in early 1960s. These planes were optimized for PHOTOINT and ELINT. In 1965, two state of the art RB-57 Fs (nick named droopy due to their enormous wing span of 200 feet) were also provided to Pakistan. The droopy was exclusively an electronic intelligence gathering and photo reconnaissance platform that could cruise at altitudes up to 80,000 feet above sea level and thus stay well beyond the then air defense capability if flying at maximum heights. RB-57F was used for PHOTOINT through a special high altitude cameras as well as equipment for ELINT and SIGINT. In view of curtailment of over flights over hostile territories in the aftermath of the May 1960 shooting down of U-2 over Soviet Union, new equipment was developed. State of the art side looking camera installed on RB-57 could take detailed pictures from nearly sixty miles away allowing the planes to fly over international waters as well as inside the host country airspace.

Four RB-57s were part of then classified No 24 Intelligence Squadron of PAF based in Peshawar. Two were RB-57 Fs for high altitude reconnaissance and two were RB-57 Bs used for electronic intelligence gathering (ELINT) and signal interception. These planes were provided to Pakistan with an understanding that they will be used for surveillance against Soviet Union and possibly China. Two British Royal Air Force pilots trained in Texas were associated with some of the RB-57 missions originating from Pakistan. PAF pilots took over RB-57 missions and the names of at least two pilots are known; Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal and Squadron Leader Rashid Mir.

This author has not been able to confirm that PAF pilots were involved in over flight missions over Soviet Union. PAF pilots flew RB-57s over Pakistan’s northern areas which border Afghanistan where a narrow strip of Wakhan separates Pakistan from Soviet Union. Pakistan’s northern areas also share border with China. ELINT, SIGINT and TELINT equipment was probably used to obtain information from the bordering areas of Soviet Union and China without directly flying over the territory. U.S. technical staff installed the surveillance equipment prior to the flight and removed it after the mission Initially, Pakistani crew was not briefed about the missions and simply given the route of their flight. One navigator protested and demanded that they be briefed about the missions and after this protest Pakistani pilots were briefed about the missions. Commander of 215 Intel Analysis Squadron, a Wing Commander rank Pakistan Air Force officer coordinated with Americans. American technicians after deciphering all information from the equipments installed in the RB-57s would share some information with Pakistani liaison officers. Most likely this information was related to India.

It is very difficult to confirm whether Pakistani pilots flew over flight missions over Soviet territory as two known pilots associated with RB-57s are not alive. If Pakistan was involved in over flight missions, that would tantamount to ‘recklessness’ on part of Pakistan’s higher decision makers. Pakistan took enormous risk as this act would be considered direct provocation of then super power Soviet Union. The enormity of the risk is highlighted by the fact that after the 1960 shoot down of U-2, Soviet Union had clearly warned Pakistan of dire consequences in case of use of Pakistani territory for such operations.

In 1965 when tensions increased between Pakistan and India, United States wanted to move some of its ‘expensive toys’ out of the hot zone. Pakistan resisted these measures to use these state of the art planes against India. One RB-57 F returned to United States prior to the start of all out war in September 1965. Second RB-57 F was damaged by Indian air defense during a mission on September 15, 1965 but Squadron Leader Rashid Mir landed the damaged plane safely at Peshawar. It was repaired and later returned to United States. One RB-57 B flown by Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal was shot down by friendly fire during the war. The lone remaining RB-57 B (tail number 3934) was destroyed during an Indian Air Force air raid on December 05, 1971 at Mauripur base thus ending the RB-57 chapter of Pakistan air force. Details of RB-57 operations in Pakistan are still classified in United States. In Pakistan not many people are alive who were intimately involved with the project and an odd one or two with some detailed knowledge are not willing to talk about it. This makes any detailed and meaningful analysis very difficult.

Also, the US had U-2s operating in Pakistan:

Badaber Base

‘In God we trust, all others we monitor’. Intercept Operator’s motto. NSA Study, Deadly Transmissions, December 1970

In 1950s, United States ringed Soviet Union with several listening posts. Ground stations listening to Soviet communications were set up at Samsun and Trabzon in Turkey, Germany, Scotland, Philippines, Crete, Taiwan and Japan. These operations were run by NSA and intelligence arm of United States Air Force then designated United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS). NSA also provided equipment to be installed in U-2 planes that recorded emissions from Soviet radar, microwave and ground communications. Soviet radar installations communicated with each other through high frequency circuits. These high frequency signals bounce between earth and ionosphere, therefore right equipment can pick these signals thousands of miles away.

In 1958, United States and Pakistani governments started negotiations to set up an American listening post in West Pakistan. In 1959, a ten year lease was signed between Pakistan and United States. United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) chose a site near the village of Badaber on the outskirts of Peshawar and the ‘Project Sandbag’ was started. The unit assigned was designated 6937 Communications Group also known as Peshawar Air Station (PAS). The first commander of the unit responsible for setting up the infrastructure was Colonel Ethyl Branham. Badaber base was an electronic surveillance facility primarily run by NSA. No aircraft were involved in this operation. It monitored Soviet air defense systems and tracked the path of the surveillance flights but aircraft were not flown from this facility. They monitored Soviet reaction to reconnaissance flights but were not directly involved with the operations of these flights. The primary mission of Badaber facility was monitoring events at the Tyurtam missile test center and its downrange tracking stations. The facility had remote transmitter and receiver sites for high frequency teletype communications with the US military communications network.

There were Pakistani liaison officers attached to the facility for coordination but they were not allowed in operational areas. When Francis Gary Powers U-2 was shot down, at an unclassified Commanders Call, the Americans stationed at the base were told that the 6937th had no knowledge of the U-2 mission. No Pakistani officer directly participated in any capacity in these operations; however a Wing Commander rank Pakistan Air Force officer coordinated with Americans. Only a handful of high ranking Pakistani military officials including C-in-C of the army and air force chief were taken into confidence. No Pakistani civilians were allowed in the facility. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was then serving as acting foreign minister on his visit to Peshawar requested to visit the Badaber base. Peshawar deputy commissioner Roedad Khan conveyed this request to American base commander Colonel Thomas C. Hyde. The reply came that Bhutto ‘would be welcome to visit the cafeteria where he would be entertained and served coffee and sandwiches’ and that he would be allowed to visit only the cafeteria and no other part of the base.

Sometimes Pakistani officials exaggerated their contribution to the alliance with United States to extract more concessions especially military hardware. In the fall of 1963, Ayub jotted down talking points in his diary in preparation for his meeting with Secretary of State George Ball. In reference to American facilities on Pakistani soil, he wrote, ‘the facility provided to the Americans to establish a major satellite and rocket launching center in Badaber which exposed Pakistan to the wrath of the Russians’. It is not clear whether Ayub wanted to exaggerate Pakistan contribution as a bargaining tool or was not fully aware of the nature of the project at Badaber. Badaber base was only an electronic listening post and had nothing to do with any satellite reconnaissance and definitely not a rocket launching center. There were no U.S. rockets or missiles based on Pakistani soil. It is not known whether Ayub shared this thought with Ball and if he did it would have left a poor impression of Ayub. However, knowing very well that his bargaining position was strong, Ayub argued that by allowing U.S. facilities to operate, Pakistan was increasing its own exposure to Soviet retaliation. During Eisenhower’s visit to Pakistan in December 1959, this was the main argument used by Ayub to get a squadron of F-104s with Sidewinder missile. In 1964, CIA’s own analysis concluded that ‘The Pakistani President knows that the strongest card he holds is the US communications facilities at Peshawar’. He almost certainly calculates that closing the facilities would bring a drastic reduction in the US military and economic assistance on which Pakistan is so heavily dependent and for which there is no alternative in sight’.

In early 1960s, United States and Pakistan started to drift apart from their alliance in view of increased American support to India in the aftermath of Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. Pakistan got alarmed at these developments and started to repair its relations with Soviet Union. Ayub Khan visited Soviet Union in 1965 and gave Soviet leaders indication that when ten year lease of Badaber base ended in 1969, he would not renew it. He also suggested a quid pro quo between issues of U.S. bases in Pakistan and Soviet Union’s veto on Kashmir resolutions and suggested that ‘the matter could be negotiated and the two sides could come to a reasonable arrangement’. Washington got alarmed and angry by Ayub’s visit to China and Soviet Union and while Ayub was still in Soviet Union Washington announced that Ayub’s upcoming visit to United States in April 1965 was rescheduled due to President Johnson’s busy schedule. Pakistan approached Soviet Union for arms but Soviet leaders were lukewarm to the idea. Ayub was thinking about using increased ties with Soviets as a bargaining chip and wrote in his diary on September 26, 1966, ‘It is in our interest that our relations with the Soviets should gain depth. We can then develop greater leverage with the United States and India’.

Ayub visited Soviet Union again in September 1967 and gave firm commitment to Soviet leaders about his decision not to renew the Badaber lease next year. In 1968 Pakistan informed Washington of its decision about closure of Badaber base at the termination of the lease that pleased Soviets. American ambassador sought an urgent interview with Ayub and conveyed ‘the great disappointment of his government. On April 06, 1968 Pakistan gave notice to United States government that Pakistan will not be renewing the lease and on April 17 Soviet Prime Minister Aleksi Kosygin arrived in Pakistan for wide ranging talks. Soviets agreed to help Pakistan in various projects including atomic power plant, steel mill and radio link between Soviet Union and Pakistan. In 1969, U.S. winded up its operations from Badaber base and officially the operations ended on January 07, 1970 when base was handed over to PAF.

U-2

‘The U-2 was a flaming javelin unwittingly thrown into the dry forest of suspicions and misperceptions that surrounded American-Soviet relations in May 1960’.

U-2 was a specially designed aircraft for high altitude flights for reconnaissance. It had electronic surveillance equipment for monitoring and recording radar and radio frequencies and a specialized camera for high resolution photographs. These flights monitored radars, air defenses, rocket launches and military and industrial sites. It was a joint operation run by CIA and USAF. CIA paid for the development of the aircraft and Strategic Air Command (SAC) trained the pilots. Most missions were flown along Soviet borders and over international waters and not over Soviet air space. Missions from Wiesbaden base in Germany covered northern and western parts of the Soviet territory while flights from Turkey covered southern parts. U-2 flights also operated from Alaska, Japan and Australia.

President Dwight Eisenhower was fully aware of the potential impact on relations with Soviet Union as far as over flight missions were concerned; therefore he kept a tight control on U-2 operations. He was told by CIA that planes were undetectable by Soviet radar system which proved to be wrong. In 1956, first two U-2 planes were transported to United Kingdom (UK) but UK pulled out of the project at the last minute and planes were shipped backed to Germany. In July 1956, first four U-2 missions over Soviet air space were flown from Wiesbaden base in Germany in ten days period. Soviet radars detected the intrusion but could not identify the plane nor could intercept it. Soviets sent a strong protest note to Washington with specific dates and times of intrusions forcing Eisenhower to order termination of additional flights. Information from these early flights was so valuable that United States could not resist and second mission was conducted in November 1956 from Incirlik base in Turkey. Later, U-2 flights were flown from Alaska, California, Texas, Germany, Turkey, Japan, England, Australia, Brazil, Norway and Pakistan. Most of these flights were flown along Soviet borders and were not over flights. Deep penetration flights were personally approved by the President. In four years, only 24 such deep penetration flights were approved by the President. Most over flights originated from Turkey as it covered large area of Soviet Union including Kapustin Yar testing site, bomber fields and military and industrial targets in Caucus, Ukraine and major cities along Volga.

Pilots chosen for U-2 were reserve officers with exceptional ratings, top secret clearance and extra hours on single engine, single place aircraft. Pilots resigned from the air force and worked under an eighteen month contract for CIA with much higher pay and no loss of service time in USAF when they returned back after completing the contract. In the early stages, it was decided to use non-U.S. citizens for U-2 flights over Soviet territory. The argument made by Eisenhower was that if a U.S. pilot or a member of U.S. armed forces was shot down over Soviet territory, in strict legal sense it could be considered an act of war. Some non-U.S. citizens were trained; however the idea was dropped for two reasons. First, the operation could not be kept highly classified in view of a large number of foreign pilots on the roll and secondly most of the pilots could not sustain very stringent criteria of training for missions at such heights. Four Greek pilots were brought for training in 1956 but none of them completed the training (they were later known as ‘Greek Washout). In view of keeping the secret, CIA kept them in United States sending them to colleges at government expense. Later, Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots were also brought into the mission. In case of Pakistan, when U-2 planes started to operate from Pakistan, no Pakistani air force personnel were involved with the project with the exception of liaison, logistics and administrative assistance in running the operations. In 1956, when Washington approached Pakistan for U-2 flights from Pakistan, Pakistani government hesitated and complained about the slow current rate of military assistance. Since 1954, relations between two countries have been strained due to disagreements on defense assistance issue and lengthy delays due to bureaucratic wrangling in Washington. On January 10, 1957, National Security Council approved enhanced program of military assistance to Pakistan (NSC 5701). The estimated cost of this enhanced program was $410 million for military assistance and $374.7 million for defense support for the three year period of 1957-1960. U.S. committed to raise and support four infantry and one and a half armored division of Pakistan army, absorption of additional 40’000 soldiers in Pakistan army as well as equipment for air force and navy.

In January 1957, Eisenhower approved a three year increase in military aid and next month a restricted area of Peshawar base saw construction to welcome U-2. Richard Bissell was in charge of U-2 program at CIA. His assistant, James Cunningham negotiated with Pakistan army chief General Muhammad Ayub Khan. Peshawar and Lahore were two sites from where U-2 was flown over Soviet territory. A Pakistan Air Force liaison officer was assigned to U-2 program operating from Pakistan. There was no permanent stationing of U-2 planes on Pakistani soil. Detachment 10-10 based at Incirlik base near Adana in Turkey flew missions from Pakistan. Usually, for security reasons, pilot and some essential crew members were flown a night before in a C-130 plane from Turkey. U-2 flown by standby pilot would bring in the plane so that there was least amount of exposure. Main target of flights originating from Pakistan was Tyurtam missile testing site and cosmodrome in Kazakhstan as well as military installations along Trans-Siberian railways and down range radar array that was a terminal site for missile firings from Kapustin Yar. The first U-2 flight from Pakistan flew over Soviet Union and landed at a small desert airstrip near Mashhad from where it went back to Turkey. There were total of twenty four U-2 over flights over Soviet Union from 1956 to 1960. Out of twenty four, ten were launched from Pakistan. First five flights originated from Lahore and the remaining five from Peshawar. The first Soviet over flight from Pakistan took off from Lahore on August 05, 1957.

In early 1960, CIA Director Allen Dulles and Bissell were worried about a new ballistic missile launch site in northern Urals and wanted to send some U-2 flights to check this out. Eisenhower was reluctant to authorize the flights in view of upcoming summit in Paris in June 1960. He finally agreed and on April 09, 1960, a U-2 took off from Peshawar for a Soviet over flight. The plane flew over Tayurtam launching site, nuclear testing site of Semipalatinsk and air defense missile site near Saryshagan. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was in Crimea and when informed about the U-2 flight was furious and threatened that if the next intruder was not shot down, he would severely punish several generals. Soviet leadership appointed a commission after this incident to investigate why Soviet air defense systems were not able to target these aircrafts. Colonel Alexander Orlov then serving on the staff of Air Defense Forces was member of this commission. According to Orlov, many shortcomings were discovered and rectified. In Washington, Dulles and Bissell asked for another mission as photos of suspected long range missile site near Plesetsk were not good. Soviet defense had also progressed during these years. In early 1960, Soviets had inducted P-30 radar system that could detect aircraft at high altitudes, SU-9 Fish pot high altitude interceptor aircraft and S-75 and SA-2 Guideline missile system capable of reaching a target at approximately 80’000 feet.

The Francis Gary Powers fame U-2 flight that was shot down over Soviet Union on May 01, 1960 originated from Peshawar. Powers arrived by a C-130 plane along with some ground crew members in Peshawar on April 27. U-2 was flown by stand by pilot from Incirlik base in Turkey, however it had to return on April 27 and 28 due to inclement weather over Soviet Union. Planned mission was a long flight over Soviet Union covering a distance of about 3800 miles and landing at Bodo, Norway. Flight path after take off from Peshawar was to fly over Afghanistan then over Dushanbe proceeding to Tayurtam cosmodrome. From there plane was to fly over Chelyabinsk and then over the industrial hub of Sverdlovsk. Soviet main atomic research site was located near Sverdlovsk. The plane was to go over Kirov then to Plesetsk which was a base for the new SS-6 intercontinental ballistic missiles. U-2 was to fly over Archangel then White Sea and finally making a turn around Barents Sea and land at Bodo in Norway. Soviet radar system was tracking the plane the moment it entered Soviet air space. According to Khrushchev, he got a phone call from Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky at five o’clock in the morning when U-2 entered Soviet airspace from Afghanistan. A Soviet SU-9 Fish pot high altitude interceptor took off from Sverdlovsk air field and was able to reach the desirable altitude but didn’t see the target. Soviet Air Defence commander Marshal Sergei Biryuzov along with deputy chief of operations for Air Defense Command Colonel Georgi Mikhailov from their command center informed Khrushchev that ‘there is no rocket site ready until it gets to Sverdlovsk. At Sverdlovsk, we can try our luck’. This U-2 was shot down near Sverdlovsk when a SA-2 (Soviet name for this was C-75) surface to air missile burst near its tail.

Washington had a general agreement with all host governments including Pakistan that in case of an incident United States would declare that it was flying U-2 without the permission of host government. Hugh Cumming was head of State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research and was chief liaison with CIA. When news of U-2 crash in Soviet Union was confirmed, a prepared cover story written several years ago was discussed at the meeting. This story stated that a NASA U-2 weather plane flying from Turkey had accidentally over flown Pakistan without permission after the pilot reported mechanical problems by radio. There was debate about mentioning of Pakistan. Cumming insisted that Pakistan’s name should be deleted from the cover story. The problem was that by removing the Pakistan name, they had to come up with a new cover flight plan. Technicians using their tools drew a new triangular flight plan for the new cover story. The reason for removing Pakistan’s name from the story was the impression in Washington that Pakistan might not be able to take the heat from the Soviet Union compared to Turkey.

President Ayub Khan was in London when London CIA station chief gave him the news of downing of U-2. Pakistan’s former Foreign Secretary Mohammad Ikramullah who was accompanying Ayub issued the statement that his country had no information that the U-2 had stopped off in Peshawar. Ayub Khan told reporters that ‘The Americans are our friends. These planes come and visit our country. How do we know where they go after they leave our country?’ On May 07, 1960, Khrushchev addressed the meeting of the Supreme Soviet. Angry Khrushchev thundered, “from the lofty rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, we warn those countries that make their territory available for launching planes with anti-Soviet intentions: Do not play with fire, gentlemen! The governments of Turkey, Pakistan and Norway must be clearly aware that they are accomplices in this flight … If these governments did not know – and I allow in this case they were not informed – they should have known what the American military was doing in their territory against the Soviet Union”. Two days later, Khrushchev confronted Pakistani ambassador Salman Ali at Czechoslovakia embassy reception and warned that ‘Peshawar had been marked on a map and pinpointed by Soviet rockets’. On May 13, Soviet foreign minister formally summoned Pakistani envoy along with his counterparts from Turkey and Norway and ‘threatened military attack in revenge for their complicity in the U-2 flights’.

In 1967, Ayub Khan in his memoirs noted that ‘in the U-2 incident we were clearly at fault, but the whole thing had been as much of a shock to us as it was to the Soviet Union’. This statement is only half true as Ayub Khan was fully aware of the nature of the project from the beginning and what he admitted in 1967 was well in line with the secret agreement between Pakistan and United States that in case of downing in hostile territory, United States will state that they have been flying U-2 without Pakistan government’s knowledge. No further over flights over Soviet Union were carried out by U-2 after the May 01, 1960 incident. In reference to the downing of U-2, Ayub Khan in his diary wrote ‘Gary Cooper’ confusing Francis Gary Powers name with then famous Hollywood actor Gary Cooper. Another interesting fact is that Francis Gary Powers mission was codenamed ‘Operation Grand Slam’. In 1965, Pakistan also gave the codename ‘Operation Grand Slam’ to its offensive in Kashmir. Both missions didn’t live up to their illustrious titles.

Here's a rundown of the US U-2 presence in Pakistan. The format is the date the air frame arrived, the location of their basing, the pilot, and the target of the flights:

August 05, 1957
Lahore
Eugene ‘Buster’ Edens
Tyurtam missile facility


August 12, 1957
Lahore
Not Known
Not Known


August 21, 1957
Lahore
Not Known
Semipalatinsk nuclear facility


August 22, 1957
Lahore
Jim Cherbonneaux
Semipalatinsk nuclear facility


August 28, 1957
Lahore
E K Jones
Tyurtam missile facility


July 09, 1959
Peshawar
Marty Knutson
Saryshagan & Semipalatinsk


December 06, 1959
Peshawar
Robbie Robinson
Tyurtam & Kapustin Yar


February 05, 1960
Peshawar
John MacArther
Bomber site at Kazan


April 09, 1960
Peshawar
Bob Ericson
Saryshagan, Semipalatinsk
& Tyurtam


May 01, 1960
Peshawar
Francis Gary Powers
Tyurtam & Chelyabinsk

@Donatello - hope this helps!

@Horus @Oscar @AUSTERLITZ - any of you guys have additional information on the US recon presence in Pakistan... or know someone who might?

Damn, that's a treasure trove.....most don't even know that RB57 versions operated from Pakistan...let alone their aim. Is this information available in a ready form like book/online journal for future complete reference?

@MastanKhan you might find this interesting read....