fatman17
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old article but with some interesting observations:
FEATURES, A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH
JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY
DATE: 14-Jan-1995
Brian Cloughley
INTRODUCTION:
In the past,
Pakistan's clandestine ISI has operated with almost
complete autonomy. While it retains its cloak of secrecy, the service
is now focused strictly on more reputable pursuits. Brian Cloughley
reports
The Pakistan Directorate General of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)
is a secret service. Its budget, manning, deployment, aims and
objectives are not available to the public - or even to senior
bureaucrats, politicians and military officers of the country. It is
accountable to the Chief of the Army Staff and, through him, to the
government.
Chief of the Army Staff General Waheed (and his predecessor, who died
prematurely of natural causes), achieved control over the ISI, which,
during the years of the Afghan conflict, was almost a law unto
itself.
With the support of the CIA and other Western intelligence elements,
the Directorate assisted the Mujahideen to fight against the former
USSR and the Kabul Government. There were few holds barred in the
ISI's aid to the fighters within Afghanistan, and the organization
grew and prospered. Funds were abundant, and so was equipment.
Some of the most sophisticated materiel of the time was given to the
ISI for monitoring Soviet electronic emissions. Satellite imagery,
with better resolution than provided to Kabul and Delhi by the former
USSR, came regularly into the ISI HQ. USAF aircraft landing in
darkness in Pershawar and Rawalpindi were unloaded by ISI personnel
under the knowing eyes of the CIA, which much later was to regret its
failure to record the numbers of Stinger missiles.
Yet in the 1980s the ISI was also being used, by the then President
Zia, in an internal security role.
At this time the organization was expanded. With funds provided by
several foreign intelligence services it was able to move into wider
areas, both within and outside Pakistan. Blind eyes were turned to
its more imaginative operations in the interests of defeating the
Soviets.
In the 1980s the ISI's main objectives were the confounding of the
former USSR in Afghanistan, normal counter-intelligence, gathering of
information on regional countries by covert means, neutralization of
political opponents in Pakistan and abroad, acquiring "assets" -
agents in mainly India - and operations designed to embarrass India
as much as possible, preferably publicly.
A number of successes were achieved. The major counter-intelligence
targets were former Soviet Bloc agencies and the Indian equivalent,
the `Research and Analysis Wing' (RAW), India's efficient (if on
occasions bureaucratically mismanaged) secret intelligence service.
The RAW remains a priority of the ISI, but during the Zia years the
concentration on internal affairs reduced the effectiveness of
operations against that threat. Supporters of the Pakistan People's
Party along with other opposition political groups were subjected to
harassment and worse during the period.
After Benazir Bhutto came to power in 1988, in Pakistan's first
democratic elections in decades, she appointed a retired general,
Kalloo, as head of the ISI, to replace Lt Gen Hameed Gul, a hard-line
professional. (Gen Gul went on to successfully command an armoured
corps, but continued to involve himself in affairs that were not his
prerogative. He fell foul of a later chief of army staff and then
resigned.)
When Ms Bhutto's government was dismissed by the President, her ISI
Director General was forced out as well.
His replacement was Asad Durrani, a former army intelligence chief. A
professional intelligence officer, highly respected in European
capitals, he began the cleansing of the ISI to rid it of the
doctrinaire element. In this he was forceful and successful but a new
Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, attempting to placate his more extreme
religious elements, appointed Javed Nasir in his place. This was
against the wishes of the then Chief of the Army Staff, who was
overseas at the time and vexed to learn of the appointment.
Nasir continued support for the Hekmatyar faction in Afghanistan,
manifestly a lost cause. He led prayers at the Pakistan/Afghan border
at a time when peace seemed within the grasp of men of goodwill, in
which number many would say Hekmatyar is decidedly excluded.
Consequently, Nasir had to go.
The present Director General is Lt Gen Javed Ashraf, another
professional intelligence officer. The least accessible of all
Director Generals in the last six years despite his pleasant
personality, he is a devoted family man with few interests outside
his profession. He keeps himself to himself and is intent, with the
complete support of the Chief of the Army Staff, in having the ISI
remain outside Pakistan's internal politics.
The ISI has always operated in a robust manner. Page One; Paragraph
One of instructions for defence attaches proceeding en Poste contains
the following advice: "Do not become sexually involved in your host
country; you are a prime target."
In 1990, for example, there was a case of a married Indian Navy
officer, serving in Islamabad in 1990, who went to a Pakistani Navy
parade in Karachi and met a female Pakistani major. During the next
year their liaison became closer. The denouncement came when ISI
showed him the videos. He refused to co-operate and confessed to his
high commissioner. On his instant return to Delhi he was dismissed
from the service.
In this case the ISI had failed (in recruitment if not in
embarrassing India), but there have been some modest successes over
the years with other attaches and diplomats, both within Pakistan and
overseas.
The present Chief of Army Staff is intent that the ISI should not be
involved in politics inside the country. It conducts operations
against foreign services, gathering information about and actively
confounding possible external security threats, but on no account is
the ISI now concerned with Pakistan's internal politics.
Kashmir was another matter. Towards the end of the tenure of Javed
Nasir he admitted there had been three camps within Pakistan
providing training to Kashmiri guerrillas to fight the Indian Army in
`Indian-occupied' Kashmir (that part of Kashmir is under Indian
control following UN resolutions that have not been repealed or
altered). The ISI, under Nasir's direction and that of some of his
predecessors, had been involved in supporting the guerrillas, but the
assistance was ended because of pressure from the US and other
governments and distaste on the part of the then Chief of Army Staff.
The present Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff does not countenance
anything other than Pakistani `popular' support for the Kashmiris,
which is, understandably, widespread. There is no question of his
allowing the current ISI Director General to engage in covert
operations in support of Kashmiri separatists. Replacement of about
40 senior and middle-ranking ISI officers who were involved in such
operations is evidence of the ISI being brought back on the rails of
relatively conventional intelligence activities.
The ISI is an effective organization that has a good reputation in
the world intelligence community. It is co-operating with other
reputable services (especially concerning drug-smuggling), and even
with former foes such as Russia (the present Director General visited
Moscow in March last year).
For as long as control of the organization remains firmly in the
hands of the apolitical military leadership, the ISI will continue to
be a force to be reckoned with - without the previous stigma of being
used as an agency involved in pursuit of political enemies by
whatever government might use it for such ends.
FEATURES, A FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH
JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY
DATE: 14-Jan-1995
Brian Cloughley
INTRODUCTION:
In the past,
Pakistan's clandestine ISI has operated with almost
complete autonomy. While it retains its cloak of secrecy, the service
is now focused strictly on more reputable pursuits. Brian Cloughley
reports
The Pakistan Directorate General of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)
is a secret service. Its budget, manning, deployment, aims and
objectives are not available to the public - or even to senior
bureaucrats, politicians and military officers of the country. It is
accountable to the Chief of the Army Staff and, through him, to the
government.
Chief of the Army Staff General Waheed (and his predecessor, who died
prematurely of natural causes), achieved control over the ISI, which,
during the years of the Afghan conflict, was almost a law unto
itself.
With the support of the CIA and other Western intelligence elements,
the Directorate assisted the Mujahideen to fight against the former
USSR and the Kabul Government. There were few holds barred in the
ISI's aid to the fighters within Afghanistan, and the organization
grew and prospered. Funds were abundant, and so was equipment.
Some of the most sophisticated materiel of the time was given to the
ISI for monitoring Soviet electronic emissions. Satellite imagery,
with better resolution than provided to Kabul and Delhi by the former
USSR, came regularly into the ISI HQ. USAF aircraft landing in
darkness in Pershawar and Rawalpindi were unloaded by ISI personnel
under the knowing eyes of the CIA, which much later was to regret its
failure to record the numbers of Stinger missiles.
Yet in the 1980s the ISI was also being used, by the then President
Zia, in an internal security role.
At this time the organization was expanded. With funds provided by
several foreign intelligence services it was able to move into wider
areas, both within and outside Pakistan. Blind eyes were turned to
its more imaginative operations in the interests of defeating the
Soviets.
In the 1980s the ISI's main objectives were the confounding of the
former USSR in Afghanistan, normal counter-intelligence, gathering of
information on regional countries by covert means, neutralization of
political opponents in Pakistan and abroad, acquiring "assets" -
agents in mainly India - and operations designed to embarrass India
as much as possible, preferably publicly.
A number of successes were achieved. The major counter-intelligence
targets were former Soviet Bloc agencies and the Indian equivalent,
the `Research and Analysis Wing' (RAW), India's efficient (if on
occasions bureaucratically mismanaged) secret intelligence service.
The RAW remains a priority of the ISI, but during the Zia years the
concentration on internal affairs reduced the effectiveness of
operations against that threat. Supporters of the Pakistan People's
Party along with other opposition political groups were subjected to
harassment and worse during the period.
After Benazir Bhutto came to power in 1988, in Pakistan's first
democratic elections in decades, she appointed a retired general,
Kalloo, as head of the ISI, to replace Lt Gen Hameed Gul, a hard-line
professional. (Gen Gul went on to successfully command an armoured
corps, but continued to involve himself in affairs that were not his
prerogative. He fell foul of a later chief of army staff and then
resigned.)
When Ms Bhutto's government was dismissed by the President, her ISI
Director General was forced out as well.
His replacement was Asad Durrani, a former army intelligence chief. A
professional intelligence officer, highly respected in European
capitals, he began the cleansing of the ISI to rid it of the
doctrinaire element. In this he was forceful and successful but a new
Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, attempting to placate his more extreme
religious elements, appointed Javed Nasir in his place. This was
against the wishes of the then Chief of the Army Staff, who was
overseas at the time and vexed to learn of the appointment.
Nasir continued support for the Hekmatyar faction in Afghanistan,
manifestly a lost cause. He led prayers at the Pakistan/Afghan border
at a time when peace seemed within the grasp of men of goodwill, in
which number many would say Hekmatyar is decidedly excluded.
Consequently, Nasir had to go.
The present Director General is Lt Gen Javed Ashraf, another
professional intelligence officer. The least accessible of all
Director Generals in the last six years despite his pleasant
personality, he is a devoted family man with few interests outside
his profession. He keeps himself to himself and is intent, with the
complete support of the Chief of the Army Staff, in having the ISI
remain outside Pakistan's internal politics.
The ISI has always operated in a robust manner. Page One; Paragraph
One of instructions for defence attaches proceeding en Poste contains
the following advice: "Do not become sexually involved in your host
country; you are a prime target."
In 1990, for example, there was a case of a married Indian Navy
officer, serving in Islamabad in 1990, who went to a Pakistani Navy
parade in Karachi and met a female Pakistani major. During the next
year their liaison became closer. The denouncement came when ISI
showed him the videos. He refused to co-operate and confessed to his
high commissioner. On his instant return to Delhi he was dismissed
from the service.
In this case the ISI had failed (in recruitment if not in
embarrassing India), but there have been some modest successes over
the years with other attaches and diplomats, both within Pakistan and
overseas.
The present Chief of Army Staff is intent that the ISI should not be
involved in politics inside the country. It conducts operations
against foreign services, gathering information about and actively
confounding possible external security threats, but on no account is
the ISI now concerned with Pakistan's internal politics.
Kashmir was another matter. Towards the end of the tenure of Javed
Nasir he admitted there had been three camps within Pakistan
providing training to Kashmiri guerrillas to fight the Indian Army in
`Indian-occupied' Kashmir (that part of Kashmir is under Indian
control following UN resolutions that have not been repealed or
altered). The ISI, under Nasir's direction and that of some of his
predecessors, had been involved in supporting the guerrillas, but the
assistance was ended because of pressure from the US and other
governments and distaste on the part of the then Chief of Army Staff.
The present Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff does not countenance
anything other than Pakistani `popular' support for the Kashmiris,
which is, understandably, widespread. There is no question of his
allowing the current ISI Director General to engage in covert
operations in support of Kashmiri separatists. Replacement of about
40 senior and middle-ranking ISI officers who were involved in such
operations is evidence of the ISI being brought back on the rails of
relatively conventional intelligence activities.
The ISI is an effective organization that has a good reputation in
the world intelligence community. It is co-operating with other
reputable services (especially concerning drug-smuggling), and even
with former foes such as Russia (the present Director General visited
Moscow in March last year).
For as long as control of the organization remains firmly in the
hands of the apolitical military leadership, the ISI will continue to
be a force to be reckoned with - without the previous stigma of being
used as an agency involved in pursuit of political enemies by
whatever government might use it for such ends.
