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A few good lessons from the Crusaders
By By Ross Douthat
Jun 08 2010
Watching the Israeli governments botched, bloody attempt to enforce its blockade of Gaza, I kept thinking about Outremer.
Thats the name French for beyond the sea given to the states that the Crusaders established in the Holy Land during the High Middle Ages: the principality of Antioch, the counties of Edessa and Tripoli, and the kingdom of Jerusalem.
Out of a mix of amnesia and self-abnegation, we tend to remember the Crusader states only as deplorable exercises in Western aggression. (Never mind that in an age defined by conquest and reconquest, they were no less legitimate than the Muslim states they warred against which had themselves been founded atop once-Christian territories.) The analogy between Israel and Outremer is usually drawn by Israels enemies: Jews and Crusaders is one of Osama bin Ladens favourite epithets, and Palestinian radicals often pine for another Saladin to drive the Israelis into the sea.
But Israels friends can learn something from Outremer as well. Like todays Jewish republic, the Crusader kingdoms were small states forged by military valour, based in West Asia but oriented Westward, with distant patrons and potential foes just next door. Like Israel, they were magnets for fanatics from East and West alike. And when they eventually fell after surviving for longer than Israel has currently existed it was for reasons that are directly relevant to the challenges facing the Israeli government today.
The first reason was geographic: the Holy Land is easier to conquer than defend, because its topograpy and regional position leave it perpetually vulnerable to invasion. The second was diplomatic: the Crusaders were perpetually falling out with their major neighbours, from Byzantium to Egypt, and the support they enjoyed from Western Europe was too limited to save them from extinction. The third was demographic: the ruling class of Outremer, primarily Frankish knights and their retainers, was a minority in a territory whose inhabitants were largely Eastern Orthodox and Muslim, and they had difficulty achieving the kind of integration that long-term stability required.
A decade ago, before the collapse of the peace process, the Israelis seemed to be faring better than Outremer on all three fronts. Their potent armed forces and nuclear deterrent more than offset the weakness of their geographic position. After decades of isolation, they had forged reasonably stable relationships with many regional powers including Turkey, Jordan and Egypt and an enduring bond with the worlds superpower, the United States. Their substantial Arab minority was better-treated and better-integrated than minority populations in almost any other West Asian state. And they appeared to be disentangling themselves from the long-term occupation of a much larger Arab population in Gaza and the West Bank.
Ten years later, though, only the military advantage endures. Diplomatically and demographically, Israel increasingly faces the same problems that bedevilled the 12th-century kings of Jerusalem.
In the wake of the Gaza and Lebanon wars, and now the blockade-running fiasco, the Jewish state is as isolated on the world stage as its been since the dark Zionism-is-racism years of the 1970s. Meanwhile, its relationship with its Arab citizens is increasingly strained, the occupation of the Palestinian West Bank seems destined to continue indefinitely, and both Arab populations are growing so swiftly that Jews could soon be a minority west of the Jordan River.
Israel can probably live with diplomatic isolation so long as the American public remains staunchly on its side. But it will have a harder time surviving the demographic transformation of its territory. If the Jewish state cant extricate itself from the West Bank, it may be forced to choose between the quasi-apartheid of a permanent occupation, and the dissolution that would likely follow from giving Palestinians a significant voice in Israels politics.
Israels critics often make this extrication sound easy. In reality, it promises to involve enormous sacrifices, of land and everyday security alike whether in the form of extraordinary concessions to a divided Palestinian leadership, or a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank that would be more wrenching than the 2005 retreat from Gaza.
Whats more, either approach would almost certainly invite stepped-up violence from the irreconcilable Palestinian factions and their Iranian and Syrian backers, who will see any retreat as a cue to escalate the struggle.
As Walter Russell Mead put it recently, Israel may have to pay virtually the full price for peace... without getting full peace. Nobody should blame Israelis for shying from this possibility.
Yet it may be the only way to guarantee their survival as a nation. Outremer was finally over-run by Muslim armies. But if Israel is destroyed, it will be destroyed from within.
A few good lessons from the Crusaders
By By Ross Douthat
Jun 08 2010
Watching the Israeli governments botched, bloody attempt to enforce its blockade of Gaza, I kept thinking about Outremer.
Thats the name French for beyond the sea given to the states that the Crusaders established in the Holy Land during the High Middle Ages: the principality of Antioch, the counties of Edessa and Tripoli, and the kingdom of Jerusalem.
Out of a mix of amnesia and self-abnegation, we tend to remember the Crusader states only as deplorable exercises in Western aggression. (Never mind that in an age defined by conquest and reconquest, they were no less legitimate than the Muslim states they warred against which had themselves been founded atop once-Christian territories.) The analogy between Israel and Outremer is usually drawn by Israels enemies: Jews and Crusaders is one of Osama bin Ladens favourite epithets, and Palestinian radicals often pine for another Saladin to drive the Israelis into the sea.
But Israels friends can learn something from Outremer as well. Like todays Jewish republic, the Crusader kingdoms were small states forged by military valour, based in West Asia but oriented Westward, with distant patrons and potential foes just next door. Like Israel, they were magnets for fanatics from East and West alike. And when they eventually fell after surviving for longer than Israel has currently existed it was for reasons that are directly relevant to the challenges facing the Israeli government today.
The first reason was geographic: the Holy Land is easier to conquer than defend, because its topograpy and regional position leave it perpetually vulnerable to invasion. The second was diplomatic: the Crusaders were perpetually falling out with their major neighbours, from Byzantium to Egypt, and the support they enjoyed from Western Europe was too limited to save them from extinction. The third was demographic: the ruling class of Outremer, primarily Frankish knights and their retainers, was a minority in a territory whose inhabitants were largely Eastern Orthodox and Muslim, and they had difficulty achieving the kind of integration that long-term stability required.
A decade ago, before the collapse of the peace process, the Israelis seemed to be faring better than Outremer on all three fronts. Their potent armed forces and nuclear deterrent more than offset the weakness of their geographic position. After decades of isolation, they had forged reasonably stable relationships with many regional powers including Turkey, Jordan and Egypt and an enduring bond with the worlds superpower, the United States. Their substantial Arab minority was better-treated and better-integrated than minority populations in almost any other West Asian state. And they appeared to be disentangling themselves from the long-term occupation of a much larger Arab population in Gaza and the West Bank.
Ten years later, though, only the military advantage endures. Diplomatically and demographically, Israel increasingly faces the same problems that bedevilled the 12th-century kings of Jerusalem.
In the wake of the Gaza and Lebanon wars, and now the blockade-running fiasco, the Jewish state is as isolated on the world stage as its been since the dark Zionism-is-racism years of the 1970s. Meanwhile, its relationship with its Arab citizens is increasingly strained, the occupation of the Palestinian West Bank seems destined to continue indefinitely, and both Arab populations are growing so swiftly that Jews could soon be a minority west of the Jordan River.
Israel can probably live with diplomatic isolation so long as the American public remains staunchly on its side. But it will have a harder time surviving the demographic transformation of its territory. If the Jewish state cant extricate itself from the West Bank, it may be forced to choose between the quasi-apartheid of a permanent occupation, and the dissolution that would likely follow from giving Palestinians a significant voice in Israels politics.
Israels critics often make this extrication sound easy. In reality, it promises to involve enormous sacrifices, of land and everyday security alike whether in the form of extraordinary concessions to a divided Palestinian leadership, or a unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank that would be more wrenching than the 2005 retreat from Gaza.
Whats more, either approach would almost certainly invite stepped-up violence from the irreconcilable Palestinian factions and their Iranian and Syrian backers, who will see any retreat as a cue to escalate the struggle.
As Walter Russell Mead put it recently, Israel may have to pay virtually the full price for peace... without getting full peace. Nobody should blame Israelis for shying from this possibility.
Yet it may be the only way to guarantee their survival as a nation. Outremer was finally over-run by Muslim armies. But if Israel is destroyed, it will be destroyed from within.
A few good lessons from the Crusaders