A Discourse: The Japan and Taiwan Relations - Between Reality and Affinity

[Aepsilons]

Japan and Taiwan have a multifaceted relationship despite the rupture of official ties in 1972. This relationship is underpinned by a shared history, common values, economic ties, strategic alignment, and socal networks between their political and business elite. It is also buttressed by mutual warmth, admiration and appreciation at the societal level.

Many Japanese elites also have reciprocated Taiwan’s desire for a closer relationship. Such sentiments are underpinned by a host of different factors; admiration for Taiwan’s rapid economic development and democratization, Tokyo’s past militarism rarely criticized by Taipei, and a shared fleeing that Beijing is a potentially common threat. Such positive feelings toward Taiwan are also shared by Japanese public opinion that increasingly has become more critical towards China.

Yet there are limits to this relationship. Japan’s conception of national interest and its geostrategic priorities take precedence over warm sentiments towards Taiwan. The bond between Tokyo and Taipei is circumscribed by the two greatest powers in Asia; the United States and the PRC. If conflict were to break out in the Taiwan Strait, it is Washington and Tokyo that will ultimately decide whether the new US-Japan Defense Guidelines will apply to Taiwan.

Tokyo is outwardly scrupulous in its ties with Taipei to avoid antagonizing Beijing, which is suspicious of Taiwan’s inclination towards independence and sensitive to any Japanese acts it interprets as embolding Taiwan’s separation from the mainland. However, Japan’s consideration for China does not mean that it will necessarily submit to Beijing’s demands at Taipei’s expense. Tokyo balances its geopolitical needs with its relationship with Taipei. Despite Beijing’s pressure on Tokyo, Japan resolutely has refused to adopt the Three Nos advanced by President Bill Clinton in 1995 to further isolate Taiwan.

Despite Beijing’s vehement demands that Tokyo must not issue a vista to Lee Teng Hui, and warnings that such an act would fundamentally harm Sino-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government proceeded to issue a visa to Lee back in 2001 and continues to host President Lee Teng Hui as is the right.

I would like to use this thread to explore the affinity between Japan and Taiwan, their common history, a shared history, the common values of both societies, the common economic relationships, their common strategic alignments, their political and social networking that underpins their societies, and to examine the implications of such a multifaceted, multidimensional relationship in Greater East Asia.



Please join me fellow learned individuals @Atanz @Armstrong @Technogaianist @LeveragedBuyout @Peter C @AMDR @KAL-EL @madokafc @Cossack25A1 @Zero_wing @Gabriel92 @xenon54 @Shotgunner51 @Yizhi @cnleio @Edison Chen @rugering @Spectre @scorpionx @Gufi @macnurv et al.

 

[Aepsilons]

A Shared History: Colonialism and Culture




Imperial Japan seized Taiwan from the Qing Dynasty in China after the Sino Japanese War (1894-1945) and ruled Taiwan until its defeat in World War II in 1945. Fifty years of relatively benign and progressive Japanese colonial rule provided the historical , cultural, and social foundations of Japan-Taiwan relations. The colonial government not only significantly improved the infrastructure of the island and promoted economic growth and better health standards, but also successfully pursued a policy of integrating the Taiwanese population into the empire through Japanese education. This policy included enrolling Taiwanese students into Japanese tertiary institutions in Taiwan and universities in Japan.

Almost all Taiwanese of that generation including senior Taiwanese politicians (Lee Teng Hui, KMT elder Lin Yang-Kang, and Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation Koo Chen-fu) are products of this system of integration through education; many retain the language and a strong cultural affinity for Japan.

A sense of nostalgia for Japanese colonial rule among many older Taiwanese further reinforces the cultural and social bonds between Taiwan and Japan. Despite being second class imperial subjects, their revulsion against the next ‘occupier’ of Taiwan (the KMT mainlanders) makes Japan and its colonialism seem particularly attractive. In the memories of many Taiwanese, the rampant corruption of the KMT regime, the initial lack of law and order, and the massacre of Taiwanese by KMT troops following the incident of February 28, 1947 (with an estimated 10,000 to 50,000 victims) made KMT authoritarianism more repugnant than Japanese colonial rule.

Huang Chih-huei writes: “Taiwanese people’s resistance to a successor colonialism *that was imposed by the KMT regime) was the primary cause of their seemingly paradoxical pro-Japanese attitude. In their comparison, the earlier colonizers turned to be a better set; this is some sort of comparative politics of the colonized. The level of corruption in Imperial Taiwan was negligible as Taiwan was under a harmonious Japanese culture; the arrival of the KMT mainlanders brought the rampant corruption culture from the mainland into then-Japanese Taiwan.

The Japanese colonial legacy still resonates in Taiwan today. When the first lady Shu-Chen Wu took her first vocation after President Chen Shui bian’s inauguration, her destination was Japan. She explained why her relatives and traveling companions (including her mother and the president’s mother) had chosen this particular destination: “Our families’ older generation is used to eating Japanese food and they speak Japanese because they all were educated during Japanese colonial rule.” If Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan had been totally odious, Japan would not be the usual destination for many Taiwanese, including the first family. However, Chen Shui-bian, like most Taiwanese of his generation, does not speak Japanese. Chen’s generation was educated in Chinese, a policy spreaheaded by the KMT regime to resynthesize Taiwan after more than half a century of Nihonjinization.

Japan’s Deep Fondness for Taiwan: The Maternal Love


Japanese have a special appreciation for Taiwan because, unlike China and the two Koreas, Taiwan rarely criticizes Japan for its colonialism and wartime atrocities or demanded an apology from Tokyo.

There are at least two reasons for Taiwan’s reluctance to criticize Japan on historical issues. First, many Taiwanese were deeply involved in Japan’s invasion of Asia. Around two hundrend and fifty thousand Taiwanese fought in the Imperial Army and an estimated thirty thousand subsequently perished in battle. (The Spirits of these Taiwanese troops are also reposed at Yasukuni Shrine alongside fallen Japanese soldiers).

Second, Taipei does not criticize Tokyo on these issues in order to maintain excellent relations with the Japanese and forestall Beijing’s pressure on Taipei. Not surprisingly, many Japnaese view Taiwan as the friendliest political entity toward Japan in Asia, if not in the world. Because the Japanese are not well loved by their neighbors in China and in the two Koreas, they appreciate Taiwan even more.

 

[Hamartia Antidote]

Well it all boils down to who does Taiwan see in their minds as a bigger threat the "Imperial" Japanese or the "traitorous" Communists.

 

[TheTruth]

Also, Japan doesn't actively antagonize Taiwan or is forced to make concessions because it has pissed off two powerful neighbors.

Speaking as Taiwanese, we appreciate the good Japan has done since they surrendered but revising history and claims to Diaoyutai are unacceptable, as has been expressed by MOFA consistently.

 

[Aepsilons]

Japanese Strategic Alignment



The US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation and the 1997 Defense Guidelines indirectly tie Tokyo’s security to Taipei through obligations to help Washington maintain regional stability and support U.S military forces in East Asia. This has become more so with the recent changes in Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution and Japan’s Posture towards Proactive Contribution to Peace and Security.

These conditions mean that Japan will be involved in any Taiwan Strait conflict should Taiwan be attacked and the security alliance be called into action to keep the region stabilized. Thus the defense guidelines reinforce the link between Japanese security and Taiwan via the US-Japanese alliance to ensure a Japanese response to instability caused by conflict or refugee flows.

When Kajiyama Seiroku was chief cabinet secretary , he claimed that the geographical scope of the New U.S-Japan defense guidelines would cover a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. However, Tokyo has kept a strategic ambiguity about the guidelines by claiming that it is a situational rather than a geographical concept.

The indirect Tokyo-Taipei security relationship will be strengthened when Washington approves proposed Taiwanese participation in the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system together with Japan and the United States. This proposal cannot be disregarded. Even if Taiwan does not become a joint developer of the TMD, it still will enjoy an informal, quasisecurity relationship with Japan if the umbrella of the TMD is extended to Taiwan. This scenario is unpalatable to Beijing, which fears a TMD extension to Taiwan would create a “defacto alliance between Taipei and Tokyo and Washington” that could destroy any chance of a China-Taiwan Reunification.

Japan’s need to ensure its economic viability further cements the close ties between Taipei and Tokyo. As a major trading and energy importing nation, freedom of navigation is critical to Japan’s economic survival. It is a highly dependent nation on trade routes that pass through waters surrounding Taiwan for access to resources as well as to export markets in Asia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa and the Americas. Hence, a cross-Strait conflict might disrupt Japan’s oil lifeline. Indeed, the stakes for Japan in the continued peace and stability in and around the Taiwan area are high. Apart from a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the domination of Taiwan and its surrounding waters by an unfriendly power would be interpreted by Tokyo as a threat to Japanese security and prosperity. The present divided jurisdiction of the Taiwan Strait between Beijing and Taipei is preferable to Tokyo than a vicinity exclusively dominated by the PRC.

Furthermore , if the PRC were to succeed in capturing Taiwan , it could use the island as a launching pad , along with Hainan Province and the Pracel Islands for its naval power to dominate Japan’s sea lanes in the South China Sa. Thus the continued existence of Taiwan as a political entity and military power distinct from the PRC holds great importance for Japan’s economic and geopolitical interests. If Japan were to increasingly fear a Chinese threat to its security, it commitantly will value its ties with Taiwan.

The ruling DPP had , on different occasions , urged Japan to adopt a Taiwan relations act similar to the one adopted by the United States. Taiwan implicitly is and has been asking Japan to underwrite its security vis-à-vis China. Despite these overtures from Taiwan and its concern about a potential Chinese threat, Japan has seemed to take a strategic ambiguous position. With recent forays into the region, however, it seems that Japan may be prepared to consider the Taiwanese forays to Japan, despite the Diaoyuitai / Senkaku Differences. A Japanese-Taiwanese Special Relations Act and perhaps a future Tokyo-Taipei TMD / Security Act would potentially negate any minor differences between the two countries and integrate a free, independent Taiwan with Japan, long term.

 

[IsaacNewton]

When you speak of "Taiwanese" people, it seems like you often mistaken 2 different group of people. The first being those who were already in taiwan prior to 1895, the original Taiwanese people from Hokkien China that Japan colonialized, and then there are the Taiwanese that arrived after 1945, whose relation with Japan was through a bitter war.

It is rather split here. Taiwanese people (the second kind, and the majority) rarely criticize Japan's WW2 attrocities not because they benefited from Japan's colonial rule, but because they want an ally to balance against Mainland.

 

[Aepsilons]

When you speak of "Taiwanese" people, it seems like you often mistaken 2 different group of people. The first being those who were already in taiwan prior to 1895, the original Taiwanese people from Hokkien China that Japan colonialized, and then there are the Taiwanese that arrived after 1945, whose relation with Japan was through a bitter war.

It is rather split here. Taiwanese people (the second kind, and the majority) rarely criticize Japan's WW2 attrocities not because they benefited from Japan's colonial rule, but because they want an ally to balance against Mainland.

Seems to me that your view is supported by polls. Good point(s).