Knight Rider
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A civil-nuclear deal? - Muhammad Umar
It seems there is growing realization in the United States about the need to establish a civil nuclear cooperation deal with Pakistan. In a recent column for the Washington Post, David Ignatius clearly communicated the White House’s leak about the possibility of a deal. According to Ignatius, the US might make the proposal to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during his visit to Washington DC later this month.
This is a very important development, if true. Because a cooperation agreement will mean that Pakistan will be allowed to import nuclear fuel, components, and even reactors from the US. Its scientists will also be allowed to engage American scientists in an exchange of information.
The deal would signify American willingness to recognize us as a legitimate nuclear power, which will make it easier for us to gain membership to the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), and other international technology control regimes.
This prospective deal is in no way unique. The US has a similar civil nuclear cooperation deal with India, China, and many other countries. In fact, the Americans have had similar deals since 1954, when they first passed the Atomic Energy Act. Section 123 of the act deals solely with all civilian nuclear cooperation deals with the US. This is also why a civil nuclear cooperation deal with the US is often referred to as a 123 agreement.
Why now? What could have motivated the Americans to offer Pakistan a 123 agreement?
There are a couple of reasons for the appearing shift in America’s attitude towards Pakistan. The most critical reason is that they still need Islamabad’s support to pull out of Afghanistan. Or this might just be about President Obama’s legacy. As a lame duck, he might be thinking of writing an additional chapter in his book under US nuclear policy.
The American experiment in India failed miserably. It has been ten years since their civil nuclear cooperation deal, but no American company has been allowed to set up or operate a nuclear power plant because of the strict domestic laws that govern the issue of Supplier liability, which the Modi government has been unable to do anything about despite giving the Obama administration several assurances that it would.
Corporate America must have also had a part to play in Washington’s inclination for a civil nuclear deal with Islamabad. Having recognized that they will not be able to supply the Indian market soon, and seeing their reactors being sold by Chinese companies for use at the new Karachi nuclear power plant site, energy giants like GE, and Westinghouse must have lobbied for a 123 agreement for Pakistan with their government so they could also get a piece of the pie.
As far as Afghanistan is concerned the Americans must have done their calculations and realized that it will be impossible for them to withdraw their troops and avoid humiliation if Pakistan does not help them with the whole process.
After they leave, the Americans are counting on Pakistan to have significant involvement in Afghan affairs just as they have right now, and Washington needs to be sure that we will, otherwise it will be impossible for them to completely pull out.
In his article Ignatius says that Obama will most likely ask our prime minister to put a cap on the nuclear weapons programme in exchange for the civil nuclear cooperation deal. The thing that Nawaz Sharif must make Obama understand is that the only way we can think of having any kind of restrictions on our weapons programme is if strategic balance vis-à-vis India is guaranteed, which is not a simple thing to do.
Keep in mind: the good news is that the Americans need us, not the other way round. This fact gives us some space for negotiating on our own terms. This means that Nawaz Sharif could come to an understanding with the United States, resulting in a win-win for both sides. Again, keep in mind that it is still hypothetical.
So if Obama proposes a deal under the conditions leaked by Ignatius, our prime minister will need to stress the need to maintain strategic balance with India for the sake of regional stability and security. I would suggest that maybe the prime minister could explore the American requests in regards to our weapons programme as long as their terms do not handicap our ability to maintain a full spectrum minimum credible deterrent against India, which is the sole purpose of our programme in the first place.
This way we can provide Americans the guarantee they need, which is that we will not start producing weapons that go beyond meeting the requirements for maintaining a full spectrum minimum credible deterrent against India, and at the same time this solution means that we will not compromise on our national security needs.
It seems there is growing realization in the United States about the need to establish a civil nuclear cooperation deal with Pakistan. In a recent column for the Washington Post, David Ignatius clearly communicated the White House’s leak about the possibility of a deal. According to Ignatius, the US might make the proposal to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during his visit to Washington DC later this month.
This is a very important development, if true. Because a cooperation agreement will mean that Pakistan will be allowed to import nuclear fuel, components, and even reactors from the US. Its scientists will also be allowed to engage American scientists in an exchange of information.
The deal would signify American willingness to recognize us as a legitimate nuclear power, which will make it easier for us to gain membership to the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), and other international technology control regimes.
This prospective deal is in no way unique. The US has a similar civil nuclear cooperation deal with India, China, and many other countries. In fact, the Americans have had similar deals since 1954, when they first passed the Atomic Energy Act. Section 123 of the act deals solely with all civilian nuclear cooperation deals with the US. This is also why a civil nuclear cooperation deal with the US is often referred to as a 123 agreement.
Why now? What could have motivated the Americans to offer Pakistan a 123 agreement?
There are a couple of reasons for the appearing shift in America’s attitude towards Pakistan. The most critical reason is that they still need Islamabad’s support to pull out of Afghanistan. Or this might just be about President Obama’s legacy. As a lame duck, he might be thinking of writing an additional chapter in his book under US nuclear policy.
The American experiment in India failed miserably. It has been ten years since their civil nuclear cooperation deal, but no American company has been allowed to set up or operate a nuclear power plant because of the strict domestic laws that govern the issue of Supplier liability, which the Modi government has been unable to do anything about despite giving the Obama administration several assurances that it would.
Corporate America must have also had a part to play in Washington’s inclination for a civil nuclear deal with Islamabad. Having recognized that they will not be able to supply the Indian market soon, and seeing their reactors being sold by Chinese companies for use at the new Karachi nuclear power plant site, energy giants like GE, and Westinghouse must have lobbied for a 123 agreement for Pakistan with their government so they could also get a piece of the pie.
As far as Afghanistan is concerned the Americans must have done their calculations and realized that it will be impossible for them to withdraw their troops and avoid humiliation if Pakistan does not help them with the whole process.
After they leave, the Americans are counting on Pakistan to have significant involvement in Afghan affairs just as they have right now, and Washington needs to be sure that we will, otherwise it will be impossible for them to completely pull out.
In his article Ignatius says that Obama will most likely ask our prime minister to put a cap on the nuclear weapons programme in exchange for the civil nuclear cooperation deal. The thing that Nawaz Sharif must make Obama understand is that the only way we can think of having any kind of restrictions on our weapons programme is if strategic balance vis-à-vis India is guaranteed, which is not a simple thing to do.
Keep in mind: the good news is that the Americans need us, not the other way round. This fact gives us some space for negotiating on our own terms. This means that Nawaz Sharif could come to an understanding with the United States, resulting in a win-win for both sides. Again, keep in mind that it is still hypothetical.
So if Obama proposes a deal under the conditions leaked by Ignatius, our prime minister will need to stress the need to maintain strategic balance with India for the sake of regional stability and security. I would suggest that maybe the prime minister could explore the American requests in regards to our weapons programme as long as their terms do not handicap our ability to maintain a full spectrum minimum credible deterrent against India, which is the sole purpose of our programme in the first place.
This way we can provide Americans the guarantee they need, which is that we will not start producing weapons that go beyond meeting the requirements for maintaining a full spectrum minimum credible deterrent against India, and at the same time this solution means that we will not compromise on our national security needs.
