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Maneuver Warfare - Lessons Learnt from Manstein, Rommel & Guderian

culture of the two armies

Indeed, I feel one can trace back a lot of this culture (psyche-driven in the end) to hanseatic league + prussian angst and disdain at state of "Germany" during their formative political eras...given what the "Holy Roman Empire" had long devolved into....and really long come to an quite appalling conclusion even before Fred the great's time.

Thus the driving need for an army 2nd to none to put an end to this nonsense accumulated and dispersed, taking major cues (as to leadership insertion right at ground level intensely when the need was felt) from the last great stretch army in the region that fulfilled this with records to show for it (non-ironically similar) under the Aquila standard....if you look at how centurions, tribunes, commanders and legates, even consuls (before becoming obsolete, another story)...being in the thick of action were found to be correlated to downstream power projection and retention and overall morale of the Army at its prime.

It is a different set of political events and mindset-shaping for other major powers of Europe....their locations and geographies compared to more easy-access, multi-named (as a result) "Germany" afforded it too.
 
Indeed, I feel one can trace back a lot of this culture (psyche-driven in the end) to hanseatic league + prussian angst and disdain at state of "Germany" during their formative political eras...given what the "Holy Roman Empire" had long devolved into....and really long come to an quite appalling conclusion even before Fred the great's time.

Thus the driving need for an army 2nd to none to put an end to this nonsense accumulated and dispersed, taking major cues (as to leadership insertion right at ground level intensely when the need was felt) from the last great stretch army in the region that fulfilled this with records to show for it (non-ironically similar) under the Aquila standard....if you look at how centurions, tribunes, commanders and legates, even consuls (before becoming obsolete, another story)...being in the thick of action were found to be correlated to downstream power projection and retention and overall morale of the Army at its prime.

It is a different set of political events and mindset-shaping for other major powers of Europe....their locations and geographies compared to more easy-access, multi-named (as a result) "Germany" afforded it too.

Perhaps you took an off-hand remark rather more seriously than expected. My point was actually quite minor: that the very German institution of a General Staff permitted their commanders to leave the detailed working to be done by that staff, and allowed them relatively more time on the front-line, with their troops. While there have always been hands-on generals who have insisted on being in the front-line, it was about institutionalising this habit. Compared to the Germans, the Prussians before the unification, the French and the British had far more casual systems, although naturally, under the pressure of war, all systems converged a bit.

PanzerKiel's point about the hoarding behaviour of the Soviets is a very interesting one. Hoarding is normally seen in economies of shortages; his remark implies an economy of shortages, shortages of intellectual resources. That was a fair remark.

Your tracing the descent of this behaviour to the Roman legionaries is another kettle of fish. I am keeping a book-mark here, to remind me to address that point.
 
Perhaps you took an off-hand remark rather more seriously than expected. My point was actually quite minor: that the very German institution of a General Staff permitted their commanders to leave the detailed working to be done by that staff, and allowed them relatively more time on the front-line, with their troops. While there have always been hands-on generals who have insisted on being in the front-line, it was about institutionalising this habit. Compared to the Germans, the Prussians before the unification, the French and the British had far more casual systems, although naturally, under the pressure of war, all systems converged a bit.

PanzerKiel's point about the hoarding behaviour of the Soviets is a very interesting one. Hoarding is normally seen in economies of shortages; his remark implies an economy of shortages, shortages of intellectual resources. That was a fair remark.

Your tracing the descent of this behaviour to the Roman legionaries is another kettle of fish. I am keeping a book-mark here, to remind me to address that point.

Yup it was to spur some though on deeper thing here hah. I realised I went bit too far when I saw Panzer later reply...but heck I'll leave it up just for something more for people to think on.
 
@PanzerKiel I was reading through Manstein's book and a thought came to me which you were touching upon - how officers are time consuming and difficult to train. Can you help me understand this better?

Also, what books could I read to get closer to getting the skill set of an officer?

I've been reading books like Last 100 yards, and other lighter stuff but are there textbooks which officers have to study? As a university faculty, I tend to think of textbooks although there is obviously much more practical and hands on training to it. Just thinking about it roughly:

1. Management and leadership skill
2. Technical skill in things like how to prepare offensive and defensive battles
3. A lot of practical experience
 
I've been reading books like Last 100 yards, and other lighter stuff but are there textbooks which officers have to study?

Apart from mandatory course books, there is no bar on what officers study.....

@PanzerKiel how officers are time consuming and difficult to train. Can you help me understand this better?

Also, what books could I read to get closer to getting the skill set of an officer?

Vast subject, certain leadership qualities are there, some have to be inculcated, some are already there...most people may not be having them at all.....mind is also put through stress situations in order to detect chinks in mental armor......lots of such things.......and these things take alot of time...
 
Another issue that came to mind that I face as an academic - is that Bangladeshi universities tend to use foreign textbooks from the US or UK. This creates a major disconnect between students and the subject matter. It's quite surprising that our intellectuals are unable to create local textbooks that are of relevance. I've written a textbook myself, but the gap is enormous and quite shameful for us.

How does the PA military academies deal with this issue?

Apart from mandatory course books, there is no bar on what officers study.....

Without revealing any classified information, would you be able to make me a "mandatory course book list" so I can somehow train myself to as close as possible, an officer level?
 
Another issue that came to mind that I face as an academic - is that Bangladeshi universities tend to use foreign textbooks from the US or UK. This creates a major disconnect between students and the subject matter. It's quite surprising that our intellectuals are unable to create local textbooks that are of relevance. I've written a textbook myself, but the gap is enormous and quite shameful for us.

How does the PA military academies deal with this issue?

In our military academy, PA GSPs are used... Moreover Platoon commanders teach military lessons themselves, after compiling it and getting it approved.

Without revealing any classified information, would you be able to make me a "mandatory course book list" so I can somehow train myself to as close as possible, an officer level?

This way, you can be disastrous.... Being all theory and no practical
 
This way, you can be disastrous.... Being all theory and no practical

Not that I will be fighting a war after reading a book but just for my own personal satisfaction and knowledge.

between, what is a GSP?
 
Not that I will be fighting a war after reading a book but just for my own personal satisfaction and knowledge.

between, what is a GSP?

General Staff Publications
 
@Nilgiri

As a teenager, with other teenagers, I was made to recite the Chetwode pledge, every morning:

The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time.
The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next.
Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time.


As it happened, after hardening myself physically, after becoming instructor for my NCC troop and passing my certificates, my pre-SSB medicals showed that my eyesight wouldn't let me join the executive branch in the Navy. So, since I was not interested in the Army (my vision was good enough for the Army; Bhaskar Roy had worse vision than mine), I became what my friend Usman Sadozai laughingly calls a Bloody Civilian.

Then for forty years, I lived as close to that pledge as I could, and never knowingly dishonoured it. It meant heart-ache, supersession by slicker boss managers, political wilderness and humiliation in public on occasion; but those whom I managed believed in me, and I rose to commanding positions. Civilian private service is a slippery pole to climb, and nobody who has been in the services would be able to adjust readily; some do, of course, these being misfits in the military in any case. Those of us who managed did so because, for some of us, that pledge meant something and we lived by it.

It also meant teaching oneself software programming with a history degree as a foundation; learning enough law to negotiate contracts with the first grade of overseas defence contractors; representing the country on delegations to others without making disastrous commitments and getting an agreement for our mutual benefit; knowing enough about finance and marketing and man management, and operations for the taking over bankrupted organisations and turning them around and making them permanently profitable, and being turfed out four times after doing that; spending twenty hour days on occasion, communicating with international associates; working for a joint venture with British and Indian partners where the Chairman of the Indian partner was bent on stabbing us in the back; and ending up teaching for a living and managing on an income that my staff drivers used to earn.

Now it appears that all that was unnecessary. It is possible to buy these tablets on prescription, that allow you to acquire OLQ on imbibing them regularly, and permit all to recognise you as an officer and a gentleman.

What a waste of forty years.
 
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Here are some of the books I've read (which I hope go towards my goal):
1. The last 100 yards
2. Attacks (Rommel)
3. The Art of War
4. Machiavelli's Prince
5. Infantry Training Part I - the Infantry Battalion 1944
6. Leader's Handbook (US Military)
7. Tactics of Trench Warfare

Tactics of Trench warfare - the file is too large so couldn't attach but here are some of the others.
 

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soch hai aap ki.



Try reading about Sponeck affair.



Yeh zulm na karein...

He practiced and excelled at what we call mobile defense, letting the enemy to attack, let him stretch itself, and then strike at the opportune moment.....

Mobile defence was the only way out for the Germans since they were less in strength, much less for a proper Area Defence.

@Armchair

There, this book is LOST VICTORIES...written by Manstein himself, i read it for the first time more than a decade ago.....try reading it.
Thank you for the book.
 
@PanzerKiel two questions:

1. After more study of Deep Battle, I'm thinking that the difference between Deep Battle and Maneuver Warfare is:
A) Deep Battle puts greater emphasis on infantry and artillery to make the initial breakthrough, reserving tanks for later. Maneuver warfare uses tanks alongside infantry and artillery for the intial breakthrough
B) After the breakthrough, both Deep Battle and German Maneuver Warfare aims to outflank the enemy. DB emphasis is on deeper strategic rear areas while MW emphasis is on cutting of outflanked enemy.

These seem to be the main differences, but overall, these differences seem rather minor, and basically branches of the same tree.

Your thoughts on this assessment?

It's clear from this the PA and IA are doctrinally closer to DB than German MW.

2. Guderian seems to be an enigmatic figure but I am not certain what his real contribution has been. Perhaps at hammering out tactical issues of blitzkrieg. That's about it.

Your thoughts on that?
 
@PanzerKiel two questions:

1. After more study of Deep Battle, I'm thinking that the difference between Deep Battle and Maneuver Warfare is:
A) Deep Battle puts greater emphasis on infantry and artillery to make the initial breakthrough, reserving tanks for later. Maneuver warfare uses tanks alongside infantry and artillery for the intial breakthrough
B) After the breakthrough, both Deep Battle and German Maneuver Warfare aims to outflank the enemy. DB emphasis is on deeper strategic rear areas while MW emphasis is on cutting of outflanked enemy.

These seem to be the main differences, but overall, these differences seem rather minor, and basically branches of the same tree.

Your thoughts on this assessment?

It's clear from this the PA and IA are doctrinally closer to DB than German MW.

Nopes...

Maneuver warfare just emphasizes on mobility being the essence of all operations. This can be achieved through tanks, helicopters etc...different modes. Towards what ends one uses this maneuver warfare is something else.

Deep Battle theory, as i already mentioned, focuses on engaging all LEVELS of enemy force simultaneously, which saps the responses of the enemy. Now this can be achieved through maneuver warfare, by artillery fire, by air force, by special forces, by diplomatic maneuvers, by water maneuver, espionage etc etc.
 
Nopes...

Maneuver warfare just emphasizes on mobility being the essence of all operations. This can be achieved through tanks, helicopters etc...different modes. Towards what ends one uses this maneuver warfare is something else.

Deep Battle theory, as i already mentioned, focuses on engaging all LEVELS of enemy force simultaneously, which saps the responses of the enemy. Now this can be achieved through maneuver warfare, by artillery fire, by air force, by special forces, by diplomatic maneuvers, by water maneuver, espionage etc etc.

Thank you for the reply. Can you break down what you mean by all levels? Would really appreciate it.
 
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