Maneuver Warfare - Lessons Learnt from Manstein, Rommel & Guderian

[PanzerKiel]

@PanzerKiel
Hi,
Can you recommend any military books?

Let me know the details

 

[_NOBODY_]

Let me know the details

Books on cold war which focuses on geopolitics and proxies.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Okay I am reading through it will get back to you when I am done. Preliminary thoughts, the terrain and lack of vectors seem very different from the Polish open terrain and multiple vectors for the Germans.

Italian troops quality much lower, equipment quality much less. They were not doing a blitz. You'd be facing a German blitz my friend, in open terrain coming from virtually any direction... what would you do... with all those Polish infantry divisions and horse bound cavalry... how would you stop the panzers....

Where would you form the defensive line - at the beginning the Poles didn't know where the German offensive would come from. It ended up coming from four vectors with two objectives.

Vectors..you may like to change this term to something else...

As far as stopping a mobile attack is concerned......the sooner the attacker penetrates through the defences ,the lesssser will be the losses and the attacker can then start to began the mobile battle...

Slowly, and by learning the hard way of course, the Soviets managed to erect such deep defences that Germans found it increasingly difficult to breakthrough....that they were managing it till 1945 is a tribute to German tactics and improvisations.....

Try to read about Soviet concept of Deep Battle of 1930s......Soviet Cold War Doctrines and Sunderji Doctrine of 80s owes alot to this concept....

Interesting, makes one wonder how the world would have been if the Germans had mastered mass production and had a German equivalent to the US Jeep and a 1 ton truck, mass produced.

Its not that Germans did not master......the main reason was their late start....till 1943 they were so sure of victory that had not put their industries on war footing for mass producing military weapons.......this they started to do from 1943 onwards.....so basically the Allies had a head start of almost three years on Germans as far as military mass production is concerned.

@PanzerKiel I think the attack on France could have succeeded even without Manstein's plan. The initial successful assault through Netherlands / Belgium proves this. Had the second army group that attacked the Ardenes been used there, the collapse would have been far more comprehensive and decisive. Then they could have gone for a right hook, cutting off the allies from the Sea, thus avoiding what happened at Dunkirk. Pressed against the Swiss border, this would have been successful anyways.

However, I do like how Manstein emphasizes on surprise, something I really approve of!

I disagree.

We may discuss Manstein plan, and its predecessor if you like////

 

[Armchair]

Books on cold war which focuses on geopolitics and proxies.

The Bear Trap. The Great Game.

 

[_NOBODY_]

The Bear Trap. The Great Game.

Thank you

 

[PanzerKiel]

Books on cold war which focuses on geopolitics and proxies.

There you go dear

 

[_NOBODY_]

There you go dear

Thank you so much. Do any of these books focus heavily on south america?

 

[PanzerKiel]

Thank you so much. Do any of these books focus heavily on south america?

Some.....

You didn't mention South America before....

OK I'll ask you again.... That's why I asked you before as well....
Which field exactly you want..... Be specific and clear , I'll find the right things

 

[Armchair]

I disagree.

We may discuss Manstein plan, and its predecessor if you like////

Here is what Manstein has to say himself:

As it turned out, the enemy was overrun wholesale in Belgium in 1940, thanks to the skilful handling of Army Group B, with the result that the Belgian and Dutch armies were forced to capitulate. But however great our trust in German leadership and the striking power of our armour, these were not successes that could be counted upon in advance. Had the other side been better led, the story might have been a very different one.

Its not that Germans did not master......the main reason was their late start....till 1943 they were so sure of victory that had not put their industries on war footing for mass producing military weapons.......this they started to do from 1943 onwards.....so basically the Allies had a head start of almost three years on Germans as far as military mass production is concerned.

In a subject called Production Operations Management there are case studies of how the allies won because their engineering was more geared to mass production than the Germans. The Germans engineered overcomplexity, while the US and Russia focused on designs easy to mass produce. We see this today even in the car industry vis-a-vis US/Japan/Germany.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Here is what Manstein has to say himself:

This thing is always there.....what if the enemy might have behaved differently....what ifs...

 

[Armchair]

Deep Battle Vs Blitzkreig

While the Germans preferred shock and awe, with lightening strikes and flanking maneuver, the British and the Soviets preferred a slower and steadier combined arms operation. The Soviets called this Deep Battle strategy. If armored brigades attempt to replicate the blitzkreig idea, the concept of the Flex brigade / division is an iteration of the Deep Battle conception. It is a half-way compromise between the very numerous infantry brigades on all sides, and the toy-like, never-known-to-be-effective armored brigades, that have never proved decisive in South Asia.

This is what i wrote in another thread. @panzerkiel is my understanding of Deep Battle correct?

This thing is always there.....what if the enemy might have behaved differently....what ifs...

Fair enough.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Fair enough.

Nops, Deep Battle concept is something else.

 

[Nilgiri]

and Rommel

books as part of my continuous research

Sorry my friend, I couldn't resist :

It's a good placeholder as any anyways... so I get alerts from this thread too, to delve in that interesting mind of yours.

This is quite the subject I have gotten into myself....I will share some details if need arises here.

I was actually chatting with Joe, when you first re-appeared here on forum in that I do rate Rommel and Guderian higher than Manstein....but I understand why Manstein is often overlooked and underrated past those 2 a lot of the time....and is a worthy to highlight even more because of it.

I do know of Mansteins significant strengths and aptitudes (which you have already summarized well here)...but I have also discerned some notable weaknesses he had, esp during and just after Stalingrad (esp his own written post war analysis + memoirs of this as to his take/blame on that stuff, esp if reader stays rooted to objectivity and cross-correlates with other credible sources and accounts).

I was wondering in your estimation, have you adjudged any weaknesses in Manstein's effort and analysis too?

 

[PanzerKiel]

Sorry my friend, I couldn't resist :

It's a good placeholder as any anyways... so I get alerts from this thread too, to delve in that interesting mind of yours.

This is quite the subject I have gotten into myself....I will share some details if need arises here.

I was actually chatting with Joe, when you first re-appeared here on forum in that I do rate Rommel and Guderian higher than Manstein....but I understand why Manstein is often overlooked and underrated past those 2 a lot of the time....and is a worthy to highlight even more because of it.

I do know of Mansteins significant strengths and aptitudes (which you have already summarized well here)...but I have also discerned some notable weaknesses he had, esp during and just after Stalingrad (esp his own written post war analysis + memoirs of this as to his take/blame on that stuff, esp if reader stays rooted to objectivity and cross-correlates with other credible sources and accounts).

I was wondering in your estimation, have you adjudged any weaknesses in Manstein's effort and analysis too?

Not to brag about, but i have gotten almost into the lives of these three (Manstein, Guderian and Rommel).......apart from the several hundreds of others...

overall, these three have their different strengths and weaknesses.....point being, comparing these three would be unjust....

....like lets take Rommel first (my personal favorite tactical level commander).....his strengths being known( we can discuss them as well).....so taking his weaknesses

...he dislikes logistics, having no interest in it either (he put off Paulus who was the QMG, by telling him that its
QMG job to supply my troops in North Africa, his own concern being the operational details only)....

...he rapidly rose from a GOC to Army Groups Commander, became a Field Marshal at 50 yrs (almost 15 years early)....this rapid rise ensured that he excelled at tactical and operational levels of strategy, found a bit weak at strategic and Grand Strategy levels....

...dislikes staying at his HQ, which is the proper place of a commander, instead even leading sub tactical groups into battle himself.....with his HQ staff in air as to the location of their Commander or once important decisions are required to be taken.......

...in the habit of bypassing the established chain of command, getting his work done by hook or crook....

...and then many more...

 

[Armchair]

just after Stalingrad (esp his own written post war analysis + memoirs of this as to his take/blame on that stuff, esp if reader stays rooted to objectivity and cross-correlates with other credible sources and accounts).

Would love to learn more about this. As I understood it, he tried to convince Hitler to get the group army in Stalingard to fight back towards the German lines. Hitler didn't accept this and ultimately this was it's downfall. Manstein was busy further South.
@PanzerKiel