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We sank the Khukri | Sinking of India’s Antisubmarine Frigate INS Khukri

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By Rear admiral R Qadri, SJ (Retd)
November 20, 1971 was a holiday and so was 21 November – two whole days “free” during the difficult days of turmoil in East Pakistan. It was Eid-al-Azha, time for sacrificial offering of animals, of family get-togethers and of feasting and sharing of joys. However, 1971 was not to be a year for such celebrations for us. The Indians had decided that 1971 was their year of the “opportunity of the century” and they were not about to miss the opportunity.

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INS Khukri, the first anti-submarine frigate sunk by a submarine after WWII

It was already apparent to any thinking person keeping track of the unfolding events that with each passing day, he day of decision was drawing nearer. The Indians had to intervene in East Pakistan during that winter or miss the “opportunity of the century” forever.

PN Submarine Ghazi had been dispatched only a few days earlier to the Bay of Bengal for operations in that distant area, should the need arise. The mission assigned was difficult and dangerous but the submarine had sailed out in a blaze of glory with the battle cries of Allah-Ho-Akbar little knowing that this was to be its last mission.

I was at that time the Electrical Officer of PN submarine Hangor and therefore before going home for two days Eid holidays had made sure, as is the practice, that everything was ready in case the submarine was required to proceed to sea at short notice. Except for attending the congregational Eid prayers, I had decided to stay at home. There was no visiting relatives or friends, only a quiet day at home, knowing that the Indians always preferred days or events of National or religious importance to launch their attacks.

Eid day passed off quietly, but on the evening of second day of Eid my front gate bell rang. Thinking it might be a visitor, I went to open the front gate, but on seeing a naval police patrolman standing there, realization at once dawned that the time of waiting and uncertainty was over and that time had finally come for the submarine Hangor to put to sea.

This was confirmed by the patrolman. I therefore quickly changed into uniform, picked up the small handbag which was already packed for such an eventuality and with a quick goodbye to wife and children sped away at breakneck speed towards the Submarine Base – praying all the way to be granted enough time to enable our submarine to put to sea before hostilities commenced in the Western theatre of war also.



On reaching the Submarine Base, I found that those submariners who lived nearer or had been contacted earlier had already reported for duty, while others like me were just arriving. The fact that not a single officer or sailor wasted a single second in reporting for duty, and every single one of them reported promptly, showed that without being told, every submariner had the same thought in mind and had kept himself ready for this eventuality.

As each member of Hangor’s crew arrived on board, he knew exactly what had to be done in terms of final preparations, and set about doing it. Family, friends and festival were all forgotten – only the mission and the task at hand mattered. It was a good team, disciplined and well trained and needed no guidance.

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The daredevil crew of PNS Hangor that hunted INS Khukri

After the sailing-orders had been received, all the submarines, with their identification numbers painted out slipped silently from their berths one by one, as their departure times came, to proceed separately to their respective patrol areas. From now on hey would be on their own, without contact with the outside world except to periodically receive, and that too only when possible, radioed instructions from Naval Headquarters. They themselves could not contact the outside world and, in order not to compromise their location, would have to maintain complete radio silence, except to pass an extremely important message.

Once the submarines were in their patrol areas, all contacts if classified as warships or submarines, were to be considered hostile. From now on life would be a constant effort to stay one jump ahead of the enemy. Every emission and every noise, be it electro-magnetic, sonic or ultra-sonic would have to be checked, measured, plotted, analysed and evaluated. On this would depend whether you were the attacker or the attacked in this deadly game.

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PNS Hangor, meaning Shark, proved itself to be true to its name in 1971 war with India

Once Hangor had cleared the Manora breakwater, on the way to its patrol area, ships company automatically fell into its usual three watch system, with one watch on duty and two watches “off”. This would now be the constant routine except when “action stations” were closed up or during other emergencies when everybody would be closed up at his allocated station, depending on the type of emergency.

I found myself in the “off” watch at this stage and therefore, after checking once again that everything was shipshape in my department, I turned in to take some rest before my own watch which would be in the middle of the night.

While lying in my bunk, I could not help reflecting back on that cold, grey and gloomy early morning of November 1969 at Brest, France, when I happened to be standing on the gates of a submarine pen in which Hangor had been docked. I still remember the deadly appearance its sleek, black hull presented with the sharp lines of its vertical rudders, the horizontal planes and stabilizers sticking out like the fins of shark, and saying to myself: “God help those who fall prey to this deadly submarine”. Well! Hangor, the shark, was now loose at last, fully armed and hunting for real prey. No more exercises. All e training was behind. It was now the real thing – kill or be killed. In submarine warfare there isn’t much room for any other choice once the battle is joined, especially when an anti-submarine force itself is one of the targets.

Hangor reached it’s patrol area without encountering any enemy units, though a lot of air activity was seen and frantic communication traffic intercepted. Until 2 December Hangor operated in various areas, as ordered by Naval Headquarters, sometimes encountering small vessels such as ferries and dhows and some merchant ships. Indian warships generally remained out of the area, except for some close inshore patrolling by their small frigates and patrol craft in shallow waters out of reach of the submarine.

Late in the afternoon of 2 December Hangor’s sensors picked up a number of radar emissions from the direction of Bombay harbour. These emissions were analysed and were correctly identified as transmissions of radars fitted on certain Indian warships. It was also correctly appreciated, taking various factors into account, that this presaged imminent sailing out of the Indian Western Fleet. A little latter a sudden jump in the strength of the radar emissions was again correctly appreciated to indicate that the Indian fleet had indeed sailed out of harbour. Hangor, thereafter, kept close watch on it, tracking it be radar emissions as well as the propeller H.E. (Hydrophone Effect) of ships.

At about 2340, when the strength of the radar emissions indicated that the Indian fleet was within our radar range, the radar mast was raised and a radar sweep was taken from periscope depth. This radar sweep clearly painted ten enemy contacts. On the radar screen a clear picture could be seen of four ships of the main body in the centre of the formation being screened by six units around it.

Hangor having estimated the enemy’s course and speed found itself ahead of the approaching enemy, and set course to intercept. Finally, with “action stations” closed up and with all torpedoes ready for launch, Hangor managed to penetrate the anti-submarine screen and ended up between the main-body and its protective screen, in an ideal position to attack both and could have played havoc with the Indian Fleet.



All the crew’s preparations and training had been for this moment. Had the rules of engagement permitted, we could have fired torpedoes at the enemy units as fast as we could line up the sight on each target. But the enemy was just about to be granted a reprieve, for all submarines had sailed out with strict orders not to engage the enemy unless fired upon first or till these orders were cancelled by Naval Headquarters. There had been no change in these orders, and therefore all that Hangor could do was to pass under the enemy ships and then break radio silence to make an enemy contact report to Naval Headquarters. It was one of the most frustrating experience that a submariner can go through. It was even more frustrating to learn later on that hostilities had commenced in the Western theatre on 3 December, within a few hours of the submarine’s encounter with the Indian fleet.

The Indian Fleet had a close call and Hangor missed a golden opportunity but, after restrictions on engaging enemy units were lifted, its crew became even more determined to ensure that no enemy units in its patrol area escaped unscathed. However, the submarine’s tribulations were not yet over and one of the cooling pumps on board broke down. Without repairs to this pump it would not be possible to continue its war patrol. But repairs to this pump involved shutting down the main air conditioning plant of the submarine and lifting and removing its compressor motor to gain access to the defective pump.

Repairs to the pump itself were not much of a problem but removal of the air conditioning plant compressor motor was a different matter entirely, posing many serious problems.

In a submarine, owing to lack of space, machinery is closely packed so that access to machines fitted close to the hull is only possible after removal of the intervening machinery in a specific sequence. Also, due to lack of space, certain heavier machines can only be lifted and moved after cutting the “soft” deck plates above the machine and then re-welding the plates back after the repairs are completed. The AC compressor motor was one such machine.

Even during peacetime in harbour with all dockyard facilities available, the task would have taken approximately a week to complete. We now had to choose either to return to harbour for repairs – which everyone on board realized would effectively put the submarine out of the war or attempts to effect repairs at sea in enemy waters with none of the dockyard facilities at hand. In case it was decided to effect repairs at sea, there was a further question of whether to carry out repairs with the submarine completely submerged or partly surfaced. Detection by enemy aircraft in the middle of repairs would necessitate crash dive by the submarine, with the possibility of the detached heavy compressor motor causing further damage to material and men. Also, the repairs had to be completed in hours rather than days or weeks.

Hangor’s crew were a determined lot. They did not want to sit out the war in the safety of Karachi harbour and had a tradition of accepting challenges. It was therefore decided to carry out the repairs at sea. Carrying out repairs at sea with the submarine completely submerged and the air conditioning plant shut down was not possible as not only the heat inside the submarine would be unbearable for the crew, but also the rise in humidity would lead to problems in the very important electronic equipment due to condensation of water vapour on sensitive circuits. It was, therefore, decided to take a risk and work with the submarine partially surfaced. A sharp lookout was to be maintained for enemy aircraft and surface units and at the first sign of the enemy, the submarine was to dive.

Once the decision was taken, work was commenced in right earnest and continued without break. The spirit of the crew had to be seen to be believed. Everybody from the commanding officer to the junior most sailor was involved in the work in one way or the other. If the requirement was to keep a look out for the enemy, the sharpest eyes and ears were constantly at it. If any thing was required by the repair team, it was promptly provided if available, if not, it was improvised. Those who could not contribute by their technical knowledge contributed with their muscle power, and those who could not even contribute in this way, maintained a constant flow of nourishment in the form of tea and water to those working cramped in tight corners, soaked in the oily bilge water. There was no distinction by branch or seniority, everyone contributed in whatever way he could.

The impossible had finally became possible and, even under the most hazardous conditions faced by Hangor, the repairs were completed in under 48 hours. Everybody heaved a sigh of relief when the submarine was able to submerge completely once again, with the repaired pump working satisfactorily and the air conditioning plant back in operation. Like a true shark, Hangor was back on the hunt once again, having effected repairs in the enemy’s own backyard.

Hangor’s crew had worked hard and made many sacrifices. While at sea none of them had any idea of what their near and dear ones faced back on shore. Everyone of them had responded to the call to duty without hesitation. Even he Eid holidays had been spent in the waiting. The cool pleasant days of November and December, when officers and men would normally be thinking of annual leave to go north, were spent in this deadly game of hide and seek. Surely it was an act of God that our sacrifices did not go unrewarded.

The reward came in the form of two distant contacts early on the morning of 9 December 1971. Analysis of the contacts had already established that they were two warships equipped with radars and sonars. But their speed and course were such that the much slower submarine could not catch up with them. They were, however, tracked and by the afternoon the analysis of their behaviour indicated that they were doing a rectangular anti-submarine search. The two contacts were thus appreciated to be two anti-submarine frigates engaged in SAU (Search and Attack Unit) operations.

It was therefore decided to wait for the ships at a selected point on their search pattern, rather than chasing them all over the place. This strategy paid off as the two contacts started closing, late in the evening. Course and speed of the submarine was adjusted to ensure being in a position to attack at a time of our own choosing.

By 1900 Hangor was waiting on the estimated rack of the targets. Everyone on board already knew what was happening and there was an air of expectancy everywhere. The targets were still behaving as anticipated and range was steadily closing with both frigates still operating their sonars. “Action Stations” was therefore sounded at 1915. The “shark” had bared it’s teeth, and it’s moment of truth had come. Next few minutes would permanently seal the fate of one of the two frigates.

Though the enemy was operating sonar, Hangor had not been detected and therefore still enjoyed the advantage of surprise. She knew too well that failure to hit the enemy at first attempt would shift the balance of advantage completely in favour of the two anti-submarine frigates. Hangor had to hit the enemy first, and hit hard at the first attempt.

Already the factor of shallow depth (60-65 meters) in the area was working in favour of the enemy as the submarine did not have much room to maneuver in the vertical plane to avoid enemy’s depth charges, should that be necessary.

Outside, it was dark, the sunset already having taken place. It was, therefore, decided to go deep and to carry out a blind (Sonar only) approach and attack. The attack team now concentrated on tracking the two targets as they gradually came within firing range. (After the war, these two targets were identified as INS Kirpan and INS Khukri. Thus, with the benefit of hindsight we can henceforth refer to all three participants in the unfolding drama by their proper names.)

After having obtained a perfect solution Hangor commenced the attack at 1957 by firing one homing torpedo, “down the throat” at the more northerly target, which was INS Kirpan. The torpedo ran true and it was tracked on sonar all the way as it acquired “lock on” to the target and passed under it (as it was supposed to do). However, the newly acquired torpedoes, whose test facilities had not yet been set up, failed to explode and kept going. Until the time that the torpedo was fired neither of the two frigates had any inkling of being under attack. However, the moment the torpedo passed under INS Kirpan, she suddenly woke up, realized she was under attack and turned away at maximum speed. Hangor had struck first, but had failed to hit hard. The new torpedo had let it down.

The advantage had now shifted completely in favour of the enemy. If the enemy had kept their cool, it is difficult to say what would have been the final outcome. Perhaps, this article would not have been written in such detail. But one thing is sure – the fate of INS Khukri would still have been what it was.

As Kirpan turned away and ran, Khukri, which was to its south, now knowing the direction from which the torpedo had come, increased speed and came straight for an attack on Hangor.

It was now Hangor’s turn to keep it’s cool – and this, the submarine did well. As Khukri came in for attack, Hangor’s attack team calmly shifted target to Khukri, obtained a quick solution and fired the second torpedo at it. This quick shot was mostly meant to spoil he attack by Khukri, however loss of nerve by Khukri’s Commanding Officer on hearing the oncoming torpedo, made him try to turn away from it. This greatly helped to “pull” the torpedo towards the frigate. As soon as the torpedo acquired “lock on” it went straight for the target, passed under it and when it was directly under the keel it exploded, breaking the keel of INS Khukri which sank in a matter of two minutes, with all hands on board. There were no survivors. There was simply no time for the myth of the “CO nonchalantly lighting a cigarette as the ship sank under him” to be enacted.

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The poor captain of INS Khukri (now a mythical figure in India) who was not even (surprisingly) wearing a life jacket on an action station state of alert.

The sinking of Khukri had now made the balance of advantage even between Hangor and Kirpan and the action had not yet finished.

Seeing its sister ship sink in such a short time must have been a nerve shattering experience for the Kirpan’s Commanding Officer, for he came charging in for an emergency attack, fired off a pattern of depth charges, hoping to scare Hangor away into breaking off its attack. But when he found that the Hangor was not intimidated and instead had fired the third torpedo at Kirpan, he broke off the attack just as quickly and ran “hell for leather” in panic trying to outrun the torpedo locked on to the frigates tail. That was the last seen (actually heard) of her.

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INS Kirpan, the lucky survivor of PNS Hangor’s misfired torpedo

Hangor, the shark, had struck first. It had struck hard in the second attempt, and in the third attempt the surviving enemy frigate had been left worrying about the “torpedo locked on to its tail”.

What followed this action was a massive anti-submarine effort by the Indian Navy, in the form of Operation Falcon to hunt down and kill just one submarine, PNS/M Hangor. The operation was launched shortly after the sinking of the Khukri, on the night of 9 December and continued for four days till the night of 13 December.

During these four days, the Indian Navy utilized all available anti-submarine ships, Alize (Specialized anti-submarine naval aircraft), shore-based surveillance aircraft and Sea King anti-submarine helicopters in HUK Groups (Hunter-Killer Groups) and combed an area extending from the point southwest of Diu Head, where Khukri was sunk, right upto a point just short of PAF’s air-strike range from Karachi.

Details of Operation Falcon are given in the book ‘War in The Indian Ocean’ written by Vice Admiral (Retd) Roy, IN.

In fact, indirectly Hangor was responsible for another loss to the Indian Navy, for according to Admiral Roy, during Operation Falcon, the Indian Navy also lost an Alize anti-submarine aircraft at sea with all three of its crew.

What Vice Admiral (Retd) Roy has not mentioned is the number of anti-submarine charges fired, on hat the HUK groups thought was Hangor. In the submarine itself 24 salvoes (each of three charges) on 10 December and 12 salvoes on 12 December were registered. The latter depth charging took place after Indian Navy’s shore stations had taken cross bearings on Hangor’s radio message to Naval Headquarters regarding the action.

Throughout these four days Hangor remained completely aware of the huge effort underway (though the details of Operation Falcon as such were known only after the war) and it is a measure of Hangor’s efficiency that in spite of leaving the action area with a highly depleted battery, and with such a massive hunt for her in progress, she managed not only to recharge her batteries but was able to successfully lay a false trail for the HUK groups to follow. How successful the false trail was, can be judged from the fact that of the more than 36 salvoes fired, only two slightly shook the submarine. Most being far away and could just be heard on sonar. In spite of this, the Indians claimed to have sunk the Hangor a number of times between 9 and 13 December.

By now, the submarine had been at sea for over 21 days and, though the body odours of the crew were getting stronger and the unshaven hair on their chins longer, their morale was sky high. They had just been through the ultimate test as submariners, both collectively as well as individually. They all knew in their own hearts how they had stood the test, and they were satisfied.

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The hunter-killer Submarine PNS Hangor now placed in Naval Museum, Karachi
 
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No you didnt kiddo.. it sank while laying mines...

Another controversy:


Now, no record of Navy sinking Pakistani submarine in 1971:

https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CEMQFjAD&url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Now-no-record-of-Navy-sinking-Pakistani-submarine-in-1971/articleshow/5919209.cms&ei=4jJ4U8X1NoKJOJzAgNAF&usg=AFQjCNHk6iLkycVOYYQUNNlTgQjJRVIjbA&bvm=bv.66917471,d.ZWU

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The Ghazi That Defied The Indian Navy

Pakistan's first submarine, the Ghazi, blazed a trail of raw courage and professional skill and national dedication that has inspired and guided the young naval arm ever since. Within a year of its arrival in Pakistan on 4 September 1964 PNS/M Ghazi established the tradition of aggressive patrolling across the strategic expanse of North Arabian Sea.When the Indo-Pakistan war broke out on 6 September 1965, the Ghazi was assigned to keep a vigil off the Bombay harbor which at that time was packed tight with Indian warships including the aircraft carrier Vikrant.
The Ghazi was told not to tinker with smaller vessels but focus on the heavier units. So effective was its blockade that no Indian warships dared run the gauntlet. It was the bottling-up of the Indian fleet by the Ghazi that enabled the Pakistan flotilla to move in and blast the Indian naval fortress of Dwarka.
A graphic account of the Pakistan Navy's performance is offered by India's Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, a former Commander of the Vikrant and Commander-in-Chief of India's Eastern Naval Command, in his 1995 book War in the Indian Ocean. He writes, "But the Bombayites failed to understand the lack of success by the Indian fleet especially with sirens wailing, Jamnagar attacked and Dwarka shelled with the Indian fleet still preparing to sail was an affront to the sailors in white who could not understand what was holding the fleet back".
As Vice Admiral N Kirshnan is supposed to have said:
"One of our frigates, Talwar, was at Okha. It is unfortunate that she could not sail forth and seek battle. Even if there was a mandate against the Navy participating in the war, no government would blame a warship going into action, if attacked. An affront to our national honor is no joke and we cannot laugh it away by saying 'All the Pakistanis did was to kill a cow'. Let us at least create a memorial to the 'unknown cow' who died with her hooves on in a battle against the Pakistan Navy".

Adds Vice Admiral Mihir Roy: "In this context, one recollects the court martial of Admiral Sir John Byng of the Royal Navy for neglect of duty when he failed to take adequate action against the French fleet at the siege of Minorca. As a postscript, Admiral Byng was executed on the quarter-deck of the 74-Gun HMS Monarch in Portsmouth on 14 March 1957 as the 'British found it necessary from time to time to shoot an Admiral to set an example to others'!"

The Ghazi's audacious performance won it 10 awards including two decorations of Sitara-i-Jurat and the President's citations said, "He (Commander Karamat Rahman Niazi) operated the submarine in the enemy territorial waters from 6th September to 23rd September 1965 with courage and determination . His personal example of valor, sound judgment and aggressiveness inspired his officers and men to maintain a high degree of operational efficiency of the submarine in the face of the enemy".

The dread of the Ghazi seems somehow to have persisted in the Indian mind in the six years between the two wars. As the danger of another Indo-Pakistan conflict loomed large on the horizon the Indians moved their aircraft carrier, the Vikrant, not only out of Bombay but even out of Cochin, and from Cochin in October 1971 all the way to their eastern seaboard, and finally, not content even with the security of their massive naval base at Vishakapatnam, they hid it away in the backwaters of the Andamans. Setting the response to the insistence of the Pakistan Military High Command to reinforce Pakistan's position in the eastern war theatre. The strategic soundness of the decision cannot be questioned insofar as Ghazi was the only ship which had the range and capability to undertake operations in the distant waters under control of the enemy. The presence of a lucrative target in the shape of the aircraft carrier Vikrant, the pride of the Indian Fleet, in that area was known. The plan had all the ingredients of daring and surprise which are essential for success in a situation tilted heavily in favour of the enemy. Indeed, had the Ghazi been able to sink or even damage the Indian aircraft carrier the shock effect alone would have been sufficient to upset Indian naval plans.

The odds undoubtedly were formidable. It was not the same Arabian Sea nor the same Bay of Bengal as in 1965. Just as stung by its defeat in the Himalayas by the Chinese in 1962 India had revamped and multiplied its land forces, stung by its humiliation in the naval encounter with the Pakistan Navy in 1965, India had tripled its naval power between 1965-71. The Ghazi had to traverse Ghazi on the Vikrant's scent was not only an irresistible temptation but also a smart strategy.

According to Naval experts Ghazi's deployment to the Bay of Bengal ought to be regarded as a measure taken to rectify a strategic posture that was getting increasingly out of step with military realities. The dispatch of the Ghazi to Bay of Bengal was in over 3000 miles of the Indian Ocean, defying the threat posed by a host of shore-installations in ports dotting the Indian coastline including Okha, Kunjali. Bobmay, Hansa, Karwar, jaruda, Cochin, Madras, Rajah and finally Vishakapatnam and Dega.

But undeterred, PNS/M Ghazi valiantly but quietly sailed forth from Karachi on 14 November 1971, under the command of Commander Zafar Mohammad Khan and with a complement of 92 officers and men. The regional situation was so tense and explosive that the submarine was directed to maintain radio silence and use its snorkel and charge its batteries only at night. The Ghazi was to make its last report when rounding Sri Lanka about 26 November 1971; it hoped to run past Madras around November 28, and after that it was entirely on its own. It appears that it bypassed even Vishakapatnam and embarked upon an extensive search for the missing Indian aircraft carrier across the vast expanse of the Bay of Bengal like a bloodhound smelling around for its prey. Unable to locate it, the Ghazi turned back and made for the major Indian base of Vishakapatnam, the headquar-ters of India's Eastern Naval Command, confident that it will take its swipe at the Vikrant or at least bottle up the Indian Navy's heavy units clustered in this major Indian naval base. To that end it started laying mines off the harbour.

The Ghazi seems to have met a tragedy on the night of December 3/4, 1971. It blew up with a force that shook the entire harbor. For quite a while the Indian's did not know what had happened but when some Indian fishermen found a life-jacket of the PNS/M Ghazi floating in the sea, the Indian Navy started claiming credit for sinking it and even awarded medals to some of its officers and men.

However, the true story has been told by Vice Admiral Mihir Roy in his just recently published book. He says: "The Ghazi had obviously been positioned off Vishakapatnam and presumably had commenced laying mines on 2/3 December 1971. At least 2-3 mines in close proximity had already been laid as a mine damaged a ship later. The mines were being laid in a linear pattern 150 meters apart and at a depth of 30 meters as confirmed later by the under-water television of the submarine rescue vessel Nistar". But presumably picking up the sonar transmissions or propeller noise of the two patrolling vessels, he adds, "the Pakistan submarine got out of the area to the safety of deeper waters". The Indian Vice Admiral concludes, "At about midnight when the patrolling vessels had returned to harbor the submarine presumably approached the partly mined area to complete her assignment of bottling up the entire Eastern Fleet in their home port of Vishakapatnam. In her anxiety to complete her task Ghazi probably made the cardinal error of inadvertently recrossing her previous track, possibly due to strong tides which occur in this post-monsoon period off this coast".

On the enemy's own testimony, the valiant Ghazi exploded in a flash of glory while trying to make doubly sure that it had done a through job of mining the narrow approaches to the strategic harbor in a bid to bottle up the entire Indian Eastern Fleet.

To the Indians so important was the demise of the Ghazi and so skeptic was Admiral Nanda that underwater televisions and divers were used to physically check the wreckage and a special IAF plane was commissioned to carry Ghazi's life-jackets etc to Delhi, and the announcement was withheld until 9 December 1971, as according to Mihir Roy, the Indian Defence Minister insisted on being the first to report the sinking of the Ghazi to the Indian Parliament.

At the same time the Indian Navy's Eastern Command flashed a message to the Western Command that after the sinking of the Ghazi they should feel free to operate in the Arabian Sea. The Indians however forgot one thing, the tradition of valor and consummate skill and national dedication bequeathed by the Ghazi had been inherited by the new fleet of Daphne submarines acquired by the Pakistan Navy. Just about the time Indian Defence Minister was voicing his joy at the demise of the Ghazi another Pakistani submarine PNS/M Hangor hit the Indian anti-submarine frigate Khukri, patrolling off the Kathiawar coast, blowing up its magazine with a torpedo and sinking it in a matter of minutes. The Pakistan Navy submarine also damaged another Indian ship Kirpan. However, one is left with the unhappy impression that there has been inadequate recognition of the splendid performance of Pakistan's first submarine PNS/M Ghazi, and sufficient appreciation of the heroic solitary voyage undertaken by the Gliazi clear across the Indian Ocean and not enough tribute has been paid to the brave officers and men who willingly laid down their lives for their country while daring into the "enemy's Lair" and who but for a mishap might have accomplished what looked like 'a mission impossible'.

If rules permit the Ghazi ought to be posthumously awarded Nishan-i-Haider. In any case, the nation salutes the valiant warriors.



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Naval Battles Revisited.

By Commander (retd) Muhammad Azam Khan

No star would I be, if it lay in my will,
But a gleaming white pearl in the cavernous sea, --
Lives that need have no acquaintance with death:
Can that be called life, which hears death's importunity?
If, making earth lovely, our end must be thus,
Let me rather be changed to a flower-falling dew drop
Iqbal (Bang-i-Dara)

It is a fact that countless acts of gallantry, indomitable courage and sacrifices of our officers, soldiers, sailors and airmen during the 1971 war could not stop the inevitable from happening. Some heroic events of the naval battle in which a relatively small and much neglected Pakistan Navy put up a resolute fight against a far bigger Indian Navy find scant mention in chronicles. This is so since history, more often than not, is documented by the triumphant. Thus there is no shortage of war accounts most of which have been rendered by Indian authors in a rather blown out fashion.

In his recently published memoir, which is a crude attempt at personal glorification, the then Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy, Admiral S.M Nanda catalogues some lofty actions of Indian Navy during the 1971 war. But only two events prove that had Pakistan made some rightful investments in its navy and certain crucially needed decisions come in time, the history of war, at least in the naval context, may have been different.

Pakistan Navy submarine, PNS Hangor under the Command of the then Commander (later Vice-Admiral) Ahmad Tasnim, SJ sailed on Nov 22, 1971, for war deployment. On the night of 2-3rd Dec, while lying in wait off Bombay, Hangor detected a large formation of ships from Indian Navy Western fleet that included cruiser INS Mysore. Sensing impending war in the west, Indian armada was sailing out of Bombay harbour, and passed incredibly close to Hangor. Since the commanding officer of PN submarine did not have the clearance, a valuable opportunity to destroy some prize enemy units was lost just hours before the onset of war. Within Hangor, frustration at missing the prey by such a narrow margin was too great and as Admiral Nanda states in his memoirs, years later when he met Admiral Tasnim, the latter told him that while Indian fleet passed almost overhead, "he was egged by many hotheads (sic) in the control room to fire his torpedoes which he refused on the grounds that war had not broken out".

When PNS Hangor proceeded for war patrol in November 1971, outbreak of war in the west was a foregone conclusion. Even at the peril of starting the war, had permission to the Pakistan Navy been accorded and a large Indian Navy combatant like cruiser INS Mysore sunk in the opening moments of war, the entire Indian western fleet (fearing PN submarines) may have remained repressed inside the harbour. In the event Pakistan could have avoided several missile attacks that I.N subsequently carried out on Karachi. It was not until the morning of December 4 that Hangor learned about the outbreak of hostilities. The much-needed information that could have tilted the tables in favour of the Pakistan Navy thus came a little too late. Indeed, what is lost in a moment is lost for eternity.

In order to avoid compromising its position and thus losing surprise when deployed, submarines always avoid transmitting messages. This becomes critically important during wartime where a minor lapse can cost heavily. Nonetheless, Hangor made a daring departure from the established policy and sought shift in the assigned patrol area to a position where the command believed the submarine had better chances to get enemy ships. The bold deviation eventually paid off but not before Hangor was picked up the Indian Navy via communication intercept. The Pakistani submarine was positioned by the Indians west of Diu (on India's Kathiawar coast, 330miles south west of Karachi). Two Indian Navy ships, INS Khukri and INS Kirpan, were dispatched to hunt down Hangor.

In the early hours of Dec 9, PNS Hangor spotted the two Indian ships patrolling alongside each other. PN submarine positioned itself in-between and fired the first torpedo that missed INS Kirpan. The second torpedo, however, hit INS Khukri right under the ship's aft explosive magazine. The massive combined effect of torpedo and explosion in the magazine sank enemy ship so rapidly that 18 officers and 176 sailors had no time to abandon. Mission accomplished; Hangor now had the formidable task of evading enemy onslaught.

What followed during the next 72 hours or so, (though cannot be described in detail due to space constraints) is naval history rewritten by PNS Hangor's crew. It is a tale of heroism, glory and valour etched in the memories of scores of men of the Pakistan Navy. Following sinking of INS Khukri, the Indian Navy assembled every available asset at its disposal in order to chase and destroy PN submarine. PNS Hangor was ceaselessly and aggressively attacked using all kinds of platforms ranging from destroyers, frigates to reconnaissance aircraft. Nearly 156 explosive depth charges were dropped by the Indian Navy to destroy PN submarine. Luck, however, was on the side of Hangor. Thus much against odds, PN submarine managed to elude Indian Navy blitz.

The sinking of INS Khukri was a devastating blow to the Indian Navy's high spirits generated by the earlier exaggerated success stories of missile attacks on Karachi. Not only did the Indian Navy call off a planned missile attack on Karachi due on the 10th of Dec, but no further attacks were conducted for the remaining duration of the war.

The action of Hangor and the ensuing hunt shall remain an unrivalled event recorded in the annals of naval history. The story shall also serve to remind the future Indian naval generations of the hollowness of the then large Indian Navy anti-submarine force. Here, it is also worth mentioning that despite having preponderance and a huge fleet of Soviet submarines, I.N could neither effectively deploy nor achieve a single strike against the Pakistan Navy through these offensive platforms. To this day, however, unpersuasive attempts continue to be made by the Indians in justifying the blemished role of their submarine fleet in 1971.

The story of PN submarine Ghazi, though tragic, is no less death defying. It is an epic account of guts written in blood by the crew members. In 1971, PNS Ghazi was the Pakistan Navy's only submarine which had the reach to undertake operations on India's Eastern sea board in the Bay of Bengal. Dispatch of PNS Ghazi (commanded by Commander Zafar Mahmood, Shaheed) was not part of the original plan. The submarine was sent under intense pressure from the Pakistan Army's Eastern command which desired some action by PN to thin out Indian pressure on land. Oddly, this was much against the long stated belief of the Pakistan Army that "defence of East lies in the West" to which PN had previously suffered with at least one naval chief stepping down after Field Marshal Ayub refused his request for maintaining a strong navy to defend both wings.

In any case, the long and arduous journey of nearly 2,250miles along the enemy's coast, the overwhelming task to lay the newly-acquired mines (launched from submarine torpedo tubes) and the singular effort to track down Indian Carrier against the imposing strength of Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet were just not enough to deter the command and crew of PNS Ghazi in undertaking a mission which by all accounts they knew was only one-way journey.

Fearing PNS Ghazi, the Indian Navy moved its carrier force (INS Vikrant) further eastward to Andaman Island; much away from the scene of action. For Vice-Admiral N. Krishnan, Flag officer Commanding Indian Navy Eastern Command, PNS Ghazi was no less than a nightmare. In his account, the Indian flag officer acknowledges that each morning he prayed for divine help and protection from Kali Devi (PNS Ghazi). His prayers were indeed answered; Ghazi sank on the night of 3rd-4th Dec after an explosion occurred onboard while the submarine operated off Visakhapatnam. Since all 82 crew members embraced Shahadat it is unlikely that the mystery surrounding circumstances in which Ghazi met her end will ever be unveiled. Still, the Indian claims of sinking Ghazi are not only false but utterly absurd, to say the least.

It requires no extraordinary interpolation that had PNS Ghazi survived, the possibility of Indian carrier operating in the Bay of Bengal let alone deploy its fighters to augment IAF efforts (as it did following confirmation of sinking of PNS Ghazi) or the symbolic nay bogus naval landing by the Indian Navy carried out on the shores of erstwhile East Pakistan towards the closing stages of the war would have remained only a pipedream. Alas! Things were not in our favour in 1971.

Though Ghazi's heroic effort could not prevent the war finale, it shall remain an icon of unparalleled gallantry and a shinning beacon of sacrifice in the defence of its motherland. Sadly, while the Hangor crew was aptly rewarded for the daring deed, the valiant effort of PNS Ghazi remains unsung to this day. An award even 35 years later may not be too late but rather serve as a fitting epitaph for the resting souls in the Bay of Bengal.


The truth behind the Navy`s `sinking` of Ghazi


Lt General JFR Jacob, (retd), hero of the 1971 India Pakistan war, explains why the Indian Navy destroyed documents related to the sinking of the Pakistani submarine, PNS Ghazi.

Earlier this month, there were reports that all documents connected with the sinking of the Pakistani submarine PNS Ghazi during the 1971 war had been destroyed by the Indian Navy.

It is not difficult to conjecture the reasons why.


Back in November 1971, our signal intercept units had been monitoring the movements of the Ghazi on her entering the Bay of Bengal. The last intercept we got from the Ghazi was on 27 November. We had been passing on all intercepts to the Navy.

PNS Ghazi blew up due to an internal explosion while laying mines off the port of Vishakapatnam, probably at the end of November or the beginning of December 1971.


On December 3, I received a call from Vice Admiral Krishnan, Commander of the Eastern Naval Command, who said that fishermen had found some floating wreckage, and that he had gone to the site where the wreckage was found.


Among the debris was a lifebelt with 'Diablo' printed on it. Diablo was the name of the United States Navy submarine that was transferred to the Pakistan Navy and renamed Ghazi.

Krishnan said he had no doubt that the wreckage was that of the Ghazi and that the sinking of the Ghazi was an act of God. He stated that the Navy was unaware that the Ghazi had sunk. He had rewarded the fishermen who had found the wreckage. I told him that there was no threat now to the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, which had been the prime target of the Ghazi.

On the morning of December 4, Krishnan again called me, asking if I had sent a report on the Ghazi. I replied in the negative, saying that as it was a naval matter, I had presumed that he had done so. He seemed relieved and told me that I should forget our conversation of the previous day and that he was in discussions with the Navy chief, Admiral SM Nanda, in Delhi.

On December 9, the Navy announced that they had sunk the Ghazi on December 4, after the start of the war. Later, officers were decorated for their role and the offensive action of their ships in the sinking of the Ghazi.

After the war, however, teams of divers confirmed that it was an internal explosion that sank the Ghazi. The log of the Ghazi was recovered and the last entry as far as I can recall was on November 29, 1971. Sadly, that too has been destroyed.

The Navy had earlier decided to change the date of Navy Day to December 4, the day they had proclaimed that they had sunk the Ghazi.
But I had spoken to the press regarding the sinking of the Ghazi and later published my conversations with Vice Admiral Krishnan in my book 'Surrender at Dacca' in 1997. The Navy then realised that they could no longer maintain their claims to have sunk the Ghazi on December 4.

The Navy then went on to state that December 4, the new date for Navy Day, marked the start of the war. For the record, the war started on December 3 at 1800 hours, when Pakistan bombed our airfields.

As the old saying goes, truth is the first casualty in war.

=============================================
 
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The poor captain of INS Khukri (now a mythical figure in India) who was not even (surprisingly) wearing a life jacket on an action station state of alert.

Mahendra Nath Mulla chose to go down with the ship than abandoning it.he got MVC for this courageous action.

As Kirpan turned away and ran,

Kirpan actually attacked PNS Hangor with Anti Submarine Mortar while Khukri tried to engage.

The Sinking of INS Khukri | Russell Phillips
 
Mahendra Nath Mulla chose to go down with the ship than abandoning it.he got MVC for this courageous action.



Kirpan actually attacked PNS Hangor with Anti Submarine Mortar while Khukri tried to engage.

The Sinking of INS Khukri | Russell Phillips

Here is another news:


A survivor of an Indian frigate sunk by a Pakistani submarine during the 1971 war alleges that the captain of an accompanying Indian frigate fled from battle and was decorated with a gallantry award for it. A petition filed by Chanchal Singh Gill, a sailor on board the INS Khukri that was torpedoed off the coast of Gujarat on the night of December 9, 1971, killing 194 crewmen, has demanded a fresh enquiry into the incident.
In his petition filed before the Chandigarh bench of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Gill charges Commander (later Rear Admiral) Rishi Raj Sood of the INS Kirpan, sailing with the Khukri, of cowardice and dereliction of duty and has asked for his gallantry award to be withdrawn. He says a massive cover-up by the authorities led to Sood being decorated with a Vir Chakra for "bravery on the battlefield" instead of being court-martialed. The former sailor has asked for an interim order for the immediate recall of all evidence held by naval headquarters into the sinking of the warship. The loss of the Khukri resulted in India's single largest wartime loss of men. No formal board of inquiry, however, was conducted into the sinking.
It is ridiculous to replay combat situations in courts of law four decades after the incident.
- Adm. Arun Prakash, former Navy Chief
http://www.******************/images/smilies/biggrin.png
Gill, now 60, joined the frigate just two months before the outbreak of war as a shipwright artificer. The Khukri and Kirpan, two anti-submarine frigates, were dispatched from Mumbai to hunt for the Pakistani submarine Hangor that had been detected in the Arabian Sea, south of Diu. The submarine instead detected the warship first and attacked it. A torpedo fired at the frigate exploded under the frigate's ammunition store, triggering a huge blast and sinking the ship in three minutes. Gill, who was thrown into the sea by the force of the blast, rescued six of the 67 survivors by pulling them onto a life-raft. The Kirpan, Gill says, disappeared, returning only the following morning. "During the 13-hour wait in the cold sea, several of my severely injured shipmates died. They could have been saved if the Kirpan had returned sooner," Gill says.



Rear Admiral Sood's Vir Chakra citation credits him with repealing the submarine attack. "When INS Khukri received multiple torpedo hits from an enemy submarine, Commander Sood rushed his ship into a counter-attack, which was conducted so fiercely and relentlessly that the enemy submarine could not carry out any further attack and had to retreat." When contacted, Rear Admiral Sood said: "I cannot talk about this incident; I would not like to start a controversy." A Royal Navy-trained anti-submarine warfare (ASW) officer, Sood was virtually ostracised in the immediate aftermath of the Khukri's sinking. Naval officials believed he was guilty of abandoning his sinking shipmates. However, several months later, the navy found he had indeed followed the rulebook in saving his ship from attack. "The Kirpan did what was prescribed in the ASW drill. She increased speed, steered away and returned after sometime to pick up survivors," says Vice-Admiral (Retd) M.K. Roy, director (naval intelligence) during the 1971 war who played a key role in evaluating the incident.
"It is ridiculous to replay combat situations in courts of law four decades after the incident," says former chief of naval staff Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash. "The NATO doctrine establishes a Torpedo Danger Zone (TDZ) around a target whose radius is the maximum range of the torpedo. Supporting ships are required to stay outside the TDZ. But how far and for how long must be decided by the man on the spot," he adds.

So while the Kirpan decided to speed away, the Khukri's commanding officer, Captain Mahendra Nath Mulla, opted to go down with his doomed ship rather than save himself. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, India's second highest gallantry award, for his act of sacrifice. It is perhaps this contrasting conduct of both captains that raised eyebrows after the incident. Gill wants squadron commander Mulla to be posthumously decorated with the Param Vir Chakra for following orders even if they meant sailing his older warships into harm's way and operating without any air cover. His petition says it is important to clear the air over the incident to restore the credibility of gallantry awards. "The story of Captain Mulla will keep on inspiring generations to come. However, if awards are conferred on manipulators who simply do not measure up to that height, then everybody loses confidence in the system of giving awards." says Gill's petition. He has also asked for a probe into the role of then Commander-in-Chief of the Western Naval Command Vice-Admiral S.N. Kohli who ordered the ships into the fatal submarine hunt.
Gill, who retired from the navy a decade after the incident, has doggedly pursued the case of the INS Khukri over the past few years. He has been joined by Commander (Retd) Benoy Bhushan, a veteran hydrographer and then captain of the survey ship INS Investigator. Bhushan, who was asked to establish the final resting position of the Khukri, has questioned the navy's version of incidents. His 1972 report to naval headquarters, declassified five years ago, mentions that Sood fudged logbooks after the incident. He says the wrong positions reported by Sood may have delayed the search for the 67 survivors. Bhushan has written several letters to the authorities, including then president APJ Abdul Kalam, demanding a thorough enquiry into the incident. He accuses both ships of violating the standard asw drill by moving at slow speed and not being at action stations.


Hero on trial : NATION - India Today

Not to forget indian claims of having destroyed Hangor.
 
Mahendra Nath Mulla chose to go down with the ship than abandoning it.he got MVC for this courageous action.



Kirpan actually attacked PNS Hangor with Anti Submarine Mortar while Khukri tried to engage.

The Sinking of INS Khukri | Russell Phillips

Here is another news:


A survivor of an Indian frigate sunk by a Pakistani submarine during the 1971 war alleges that the captain of an accompanying Indian frigate fled from battle and was decorated with a gallantry award for it. A petition filed by Chanchal Singh Gill, a sailor on board the INS Khukri that was torpedoed off the coast of Gujarat on the night of December 9, 1971, killing 194 crewmen, has demanded a fresh enquiry into the incident.
In his petition filed before the Chandigarh bench of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Gill charges Commander (later Rear Admiral) Rishi Raj Sood of the INS Kirpan, sailing with the Khukri, of cowardice and dereliction of duty and has asked for his gallantry award to be withdrawn. He says a massive cover-up by the authorities led to Sood being decorated with a Vir Chakra for "bravery on the battlefield" instead of being court-martialed. The former sailor has asked for an interim order for the immediate recall of all evidence held by naval headquarters into the sinking of the warship. The loss of the Khukri resulted in India's single largest wartime loss of men. No formal board of inquiry, however, was conducted into the sinking.
It is ridiculous to replay combat situations in courts of law four decades after the incident.
- Adm. Arun Prakash, former Navy Chief
http://www.******************/images/smilies/biggrin.png
Gill, now 60, joined the frigate just two months before the outbreak of war as a shipwright artificer. The Khukri and Kirpan, two anti-submarine frigates, were dispatched from Mumbai to hunt for the Pakistani submarine Hangor that had been detected in the Arabian Sea, south of Diu. The submarine instead detected the warship first and attacked it. A torpedo fired at the frigate exploded under the frigate's ammunition store, triggering a huge blast and sinking the ship in three minutes. Gill, who was thrown into the sea by the force of the blast, rescued six of the 67 survivors by pulling them onto a life-raft. The Kirpan, Gill says, disappeared, returning only the following morning. "During the 13-hour wait in the cold sea, several of my severely injured shipmates died. They could have been saved if the Kirpan had returned sooner," Gill says.



Rear Admiral Sood's Vir Chakra citation credits him with repealing the submarine attack. "When INS Khukri received multiple torpedo hits from an enemy submarine, Commander Sood rushed his ship into a counter-attack, which was conducted so fiercely and relentlessly that the enemy submarine could not carry out any further attack and had to retreat." When contacted, Rear Admiral Sood said: "I cannot talk about this incident; I would not like to start a controversy." A Royal Navy-trained anti-submarine warfare (ASW) officer, Sood was virtually ostracised in the immediate aftermath of the Khukri's sinking. Naval officials believed he was guilty of abandoning his sinking shipmates. However, several months later, the navy found he had indeed followed the rulebook in saving his ship from attack. "The Kirpan did what was prescribed in the ASW drill. She increased speed, steered away and returned after sometime to pick up survivors," says Vice-Admiral (Retd) M.K. Roy, director (naval intelligence) during the 1971 war who played a key role in evaluating the incident.
"It is ridiculous to replay combat situations in courts of law four decades after the incident," says former chief of naval staff Admiral (Retd) Arun Prakash. "The NATO doctrine establishes a Torpedo Danger Zone (TDZ) around a target whose radius is the maximum range of the torpedo. Supporting ships are required to stay outside the TDZ. But how far and for how long must be decided by the man on the spot," he adds.

So while the Kirpan decided to speed away, the Khukri's commanding officer, Captain Mahendra Nath Mulla, opted to go down with his doomed ship rather than save himself. He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, India's second highest gallantry award, for his act of sacrifice. It is perhaps this contrasting conduct of both captains that raised eyebrows after the incident. Gill wants squadron commander Mulla to be posthumously decorated with the Param Vir Chakra for following orders even if they meant sailing his older warships into harm's way and operating without any air cover. His petition says it is important to clear the air over the incident to restore the credibility of gallantry awards. "The story of Captain Mulla will keep on inspiring generations to come. However, if awards are conferred on manipulators who simply do not measure up to that height, then everybody loses confidence in the system of giving awards." says Gill's petition. He has also asked for a probe into the role of then Commander-in-Chief of the Western Naval Command Vice-Admiral S.N. Kohli who ordered the ships into the fatal submarine hunt.
Gill, who retired from the navy a decade after the incident, has doggedly pursued the case of the INS Khukri over the past few years. He has been joined by Commander (Retd) Benoy Bhushan, a veteran hydrographer and then captain of the survey ship INS Investigator. Bhushan, who was asked to establish the final resting position of the Khukri, has questioned the navy's version of incidents. His 1972 report to naval headquarters, declassified five years ago, mentions that Sood fudged logbooks after the incident. He says the wrong positions reported by Sood may have delayed the search for the 67 survivors. Bhushan has written several letters to the authorities, including then president APJ Abdul Kalam, demanding a thorough enquiry into the incident. He accuses both ships of violating the standard asw drill by moving at slow speed and not being at action stations.


Hero on trial : NATION - India Today
 
INS Khukri was two and half decade old(at that time) anti sub corvette of second world war vintage. It was obsolete by any standards. Where as PNS hangor spanking new french submarine(just over two year old) with all the bells and whistles. Hangor outmatched Khukri in all most all aspects.

All said and done, the sinking of Khukri was a pin prick compared to carnage brought upon by Indian navy upon Pakistani Naval assets(in both East and West) and Pakistani harbours of Karachi, Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar.

Pakistani Naval casualties in the war stood at.

7 gunboats,
1 minesweeper,
1 submarine,
2 destroyers,
3 patrol crafts,
18 cargo, supply and communication vessels,
Four merchant navy ships – Anwar Baksh, Pasni, Madhumathi and an American ammunition supply ship MV Venus Challenger.
Ten vessels were captured.
Large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in Karachi including its oil storage facilities.
Around 1900 personnel were lost and 1400 captured.

Where as Indian losses were

INS Khukri
Alize patrol craft lost to a star fighter.
197 Personnel were lost.
 
Correct Naval history, says INS Khukri survivor - The Times of India

CHANDIGARH: Did the crew of INS Kirpan, the Indian Navy frigate which was honoured with gallantry award for its role in 1971 Indo-Pak war play an ignominious role by deserting sailors who were drowning in INS Khukri?

Nearly 40 years after the sinking of INS Khukri, this is the question being raised by one of the survivors of the ill-fated frigate of Indian Navy.

A retired sailor, Chanchal Singh Gill, who served in the Indian Navy for 14 years, has moved the Chandigarh bench of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) seeking correction of Naval history related to the INS Khukri.

A comprehensive time bound inquiry by a commission, withdrawal of gallantry awards from those who allegedly showed cowardice, including officers and Commanding Officer of INS Kirpan, and fixing responsibility for the Indian Navy's ''greatest cover up after the greatest tragedy'', besides their court martial, has also been sought.

The main allegations of 58-year old Gill — who was on duty as artificer apprentice on the fateful night of December 9, 1971 when the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor hit the INS Khukri — is that the record prepared by the Historical Cell of Directorate of Naval Operations, at Naval Headquarters, New Delhi, pertaining to INS Khukri is ''far away from the truth''.

While pointing out ''glaring errors'' in the records, which came to his notice in February 2004, that 'Khukri sank just by one torpedo hit whereas INS Kirpan manoeuvered to deflect torpedo attacks', Gill claims that actually three torpedoes had hit Khukri and instead of joining action to counter the attack, INS Kirpan ''fled away''. After reading the official account, Gill immediately sent letters to parliamentary standing committee on defence seeking correction of the records but has not heard from them till now.
 
INS Khukri was two and half decade old(at that time) anti sub corvette of second world war vintage. It was obsolete by any standards. Where as PNS hangor spanking new french submarine(just over two year old) with all the bells and whistles. Hangor outmatched Khukri in all most all aspects.

All said and done, the sinking of Khukri was a pin prick compared to carnage brought upon by Indian navy upon Pakistani Naval assets(in both East and West) and Pakistani harbours of Karachi, Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar.

Pakistani Naval casualties in the war stood at.

7 gunboats,
1 minesweeper,
1 submarine,
2 destroyers,
3 patrol crafts,
18 cargo, supply and communication vessels,
Four merchant navy ships – Anwar Baksh, Pasni, Madhumathi and an American ammunition supply ship MV Venus Challenger.
Ten vessels were captured.
Large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in Karachi including its oil storage facilities.
Around 1900 personnel were lost and 1400 captured.

Where as Indian losses were

INS Khukri
Alize patrol craft lost to a star fighter.
197 Personnel were lost.
Thats some serious kill ratio I say.
 
INS Khukri was two and half decade old(at that time) anti sub corvette of second world war vintage. It was obsolete by any standards. Where as PNS hangor spanking new french submarine(just over two year old) with all the bells and whistles. Hangor outmatched Khukri in all most all aspects.
All said and done, the sinking of Khukri was a pin prick compared to carnage brought upon by Indian navy upon Pakistani Naval assets(in both East and West) and Pakistani harbours of Karachi, Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar.
Pakistani Naval casualties in the war stood at.
7 gunboats,
1 minesweeper,
1 submarine,
2 destroyers,
3 patrol crafts,
18 cargo, supply and communication vessels,
Four merchant navy ships – Anwar Baksh, Pasni, Madhumathi and an American ammunition supply ship MV Venus Challenger.
Ten vessels were captured.
Large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in Karachi including its oil storage facilities.
Around 1900 personnel were lost and 1400 captured.
Where as Indian losses were
INS Khukri
Alize patrol craft lost to a star fighter.
197 Personnel were lost.
An often overlooked point. Thanks for bringing the same into perspective to balance the fanaticism.
 
Where as Indian losses were

INS Khukri
Alize patrol craft
lost to a star fighter.
197 Personnel were lost.
Last i heard was Okha was also in India.

During the night of 4 December 1971, Indian Osa missile boats attacked the Pakistan Navy, hitting a destroyer, PNS Khyber and a minesweeper, PNS Hafeez, to the southeast of Karachi. The Indian missile boats were a very serious threat not only to the Navy but also to other Pakistani ships in the Arabian Sea and in the Karachi harbour. Pakistan retaliated by causing extensive damage through a single B-57 attack on Indian naval base Okha. The bombs scored direct hits on fuel dumps, ammunition dump and the missile boats jetty. The missile boat attacks on Pakistani naval installations ceased thereafter. Flight Lieutenant Shabbir A Khan piloted the B-57 mission while Flight Lieutenant Ansar navigated it.

Two days later a pair of F-104 Starfighters which visited the site found it still burning beyond control.
 
No you didnt kiddo.. it sank while laying mines...

Another controversy:


Now, no record of Navy sinking Pakistani submarine in 1971:

https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CEMQFjAD&url=http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Now-no-record-of-Navy-sinking-Pakistani-submarine-in-1971/articleshow/5919209.cms&ei=4jJ4U8X1NoKJOJzAgNAF&usg=AFQjCNHk6iLkycVOYYQUNNlTgQjJRVIjbA&bvm=bv.66917471,d.ZWU

..................................................



The Ghazi That Defied The Indian Navy

Pakistan's first submarine, the Ghazi, blazed a trail of raw courage and professional skill and national dedication that has inspired and guided the young naval arm ever since. Within a year of its arrival in Pakistan on 4 September 1964 PNS/M Ghazi established the tradition of aggressive patrolling across the strategic expanse of North Arabian Sea.When the Indo-Pakistan war broke out on 6 September 1965, the Ghazi was assigned to keep a vigil off the Bombay harbor which at that time was packed tight with Indian warships including the aircraft carrier Vikrant.
The Ghazi was told not to tinker with smaller vessels but focus on the heavier units. So effective was its blockade that no Indian warships dared run the gauntlet. It was the bottling-up of the Indian fleet by the Ghazi that enabled the Pakistan flotilla to move in and blast the Indian naval fortress of Dwarka.
A graphic account of the Pakistan Navy's performance is offered by India's Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, a former Commander of the Vikrant and Commander-in-Chief of India's Eastern Naval Command, in his 1995 book War in the Indian Ocean. He writes, "But the Bombayites failed to understand the lack of success by the Indian fleet especially with sirens wailing, Jamnagar attacked and Dwarka shelled with the Indian fleet still preparing to sail was an affront to the sailors in white who could not understand what was holding the fleet back".
As Vice Admiral N Kirshnan is supposed to have said:
"One of our frigates, Talwar, was at Okha. It is unfortunate that she could not sail forth and seek battle. Even if there was a mandate against the Navy participating in the war, no government would blame a warship going into action, if attacked. An affront to our national honor is no joke and we cannot laugh it away by saying 'All the Pakistanis did was to kill a cow'. Let us at least create a memorial to the 'unknown cow' who died with her hooves on in a battle against the Pakistan Navy".

Adds Vice Admiral Mihir Roy: "In this context, one recollects the court martial of Admiral Sir John Byng of the Royal Navy for neglect of duty when he failed to take adequate action against the French fleet at the siege of Minorca. As a postscript, Admiral Byng was executed on the quarter-deck of the 74-Gun HMS Monarch in Portsmouth on 14 March 1957 as the 'British found it necessary from time to time to shoot an Admiral to set an example to others'!"

The Ghazi's audacious performance won it 10 awards including two decorations of Sitara-i-Jurat and the President's citations said, "He (Commander Karamat Rahman Niazi) operated the submarine in the enemy territorial waters from 6th September to 23rd September 1965 with courage and determination . His personal example of valor, sound judgment and aggressiveness inspired his officers and men to maintain a high degree of operational efficiency of the submarine in the face of the enemy".

The dread of the Ghazi seems somehow to have persisted in the Indian mind in the six years between the two wars. As the danger of another Indo-Pakistan conflict loomed large on the horizon the Indians moved their aircraft carrier, the Vikrant, not only out of Bombay but even out of Cochin, and from Cochin in October 1971 all the way to their eastern seaboard, and finally, not content even with the security of their massive naval base at Vishakapatnam, they hid it away in the backwaters of the Andamans. Setting the response to the insistence of the Pakistan Military High Command to reinforce Pakistan's position in the eastern war theatre. The strategic soundness of the decision cannot be questioned insofar as Ghazi was the only ship which had the range and capability to undertake operations in the distant waters under control of the enemy. The presence of a lucrative target in the shape of the aircraft carrier Vikrant, the pride of the Indian Fleet, in that area was known. The plan had all the ingredients of daring and surprise which are essential for success in a situation tilted heavily in favour of the enemy. Indeed, had the Ghazi been able to sink or even damage the Indian aircraft carrier the shock effect alone would have been sufficient to upset Indian naval plans.

The odds undoubtedly were formidable. It was not the same Arabian Sea nor the same Bay of Bengal as in 1965. Just as stung by its defeat in the Himalayas by the Chinese in 1962 India had revamped and multiplied its land forces, stung by its humiliation in the naval encounter with the Pakistan Navy in 1965, India had tripled its naval power between 1965-71. The Ghazi had to traverse Ghazi on the Vikrant's scent was not only an irresistible temptation but also a smart strategy.

According to Naval experts Ghazi's deployment to the Bay of Bengal ought to be regarded as a measure taken to rectify a strategic posture that was getting increasingly out of step with military realities. The dispatch of the Ghazi to Bay of Bengal was in over 3000 miles of the Indian Ocean, defying the threat posed by a host of shore-installations in ports dotting the Indian coastline including Okha, Kunjali. Bobmay, Hansa, Karwar, jaruda, Cochin, Madras, Rajah and finally Vishakapatnam and Dega.

But undeterred, PNS/M Ghazi valiantly but quietly sailed forth from Karachi on 14 November 1971, under the command of Commander Zafar Mohammad Khan and with a complement of 92 officers and men. The regional situation was so tense and explosive that the submarine was directed to maintain radio silence and use its snorkel and charge its batteries only at night. The Ghazi was to make its last report when rounding Sri Lanka about 26 November 1971; it hoped to run past Madras around November 28, and after that it was entirely on its own. It appears that it bypassed even Vishakapatnam and embarked upon an extensive search for the missing Indian aircraft carrier across the vast expanse of the Bay of Bengal like a bloodhound smelling around for its prey. Unable to locate it, the Ghazi turned back and made for the major Indian base of Vishakapatnam, the headquar-ters of India's Eastern Naval Command, confident that it will take its swipe at the Vikrant or at least bottle up the Indian Navy's heavy units clustered in this major Indian naval base. To that end it started laying mines off the harbour.

The Ghazi seems to have met a tragedy on the night of December 3/4, 1971. It blew up with a force that shook the entire harbor. For quite a while the Indian's did not know what had happened but when some Indian fishermen found a life-jacket of the PNS/M Ghazi floating in the sea, the Indian Navy started claiming credit for sinking it and even awarded medals to some of its officers and men.

However, the true story has been told by Vice Admiral Mihir Roy in his just recently published book. He says: "The Ghazi had obviously been positioned off Vishakapatnam and presumably had commenced laying mines on 2/3 December 1971. At least 2-3 mines in close proximity had already been laid as a mine damaged a ship later. The mines were being laid in a linear pattern 150 meters apart and at a depth of 30 meters as confirmed later by the under-water television of the submarine rescue vessel Nistar". But presumably picking up the sonar transmissions or propeller noise of the two patrolling vessels, he adds, "the Pakistan submarine got out of the area to the safety of deeper waters". The Indian Vice Admiral concludes, "At about midnight when the patrolling vessels had returned to harbor the submarine presumably approached the partly mined area to complete her assignment of bottling up the entire Eastern Fleet in their home port of Vishakapatnam. In her anxiety to complete her task Ghazi probably made the cardinal error of inadvertently recrossing her previous track, possibly due to strong tides which occur in this post-monsoon period off this coast".

On the enemy's own testimony, the valiant Ghazi exploded in a flash of glory while trying to make doubly sure that it had done a through job of mining the narrow approaches to the strategic harbor in a bid to bottle up the entire Indian Eastern Fleet.

To the Indians so important was the demise of the Ghazi and so skeptic was Admiral Nanda that underwater televisions and divers were used to physically check the wreckage and a special IAF plane was commissioned to carry Ghazi's life-jackets etc to Delhi, and the announcement was withheld until 9 December 1971, as according to Mihir Roy, the Indian Defence Minister insisted on being the first to report the sinking of the Ghazi to the Indian Parliament.

At the same time the Indian Navy's Eastern Command flashed a message to the Western Command that after the sinking of the Ghazi they should feel free to operate in the Arabian Sea. The Indians however forgot one thing, the tradition of valor and consummate skill and national dedication bequeathed by the Ghazi had been inherited by the new fleet of Daphne submarines acquired by the Pakistan Navy. Just about the time Indian Defence Minister was voicing his joy at the demise of the Ghazi another Pakistani submarine PNS/M Hangor hit the Indian anti-submarine frigate Khukri, patrolling off the Kathiawar coast, blowing up its magazine with a torpedo and sinking it in a matter of minutes. The Pakistan Navy submarine also damaged another Indian ship Kirpan. However, one is left with the unhappy impression that there has been inadequate recognition of the splendid performance of Pakistan's first submarine PNS/M Ghazi, and sufficient appreciation of the heroic solitary voyage undertaken by the Gliazi clear across the Indian Ocean and not enough tribute has been paid to the brave officers and men who willingly laid down their lives for their country while daring into the "enemy's Lair" and who but for a mishap might have accomplished what looked like 'a mission impossible'.

If rules permit the Ghazi ought to be posthumously awarded Nishan-i-Haider. In any case, the nation salutes the valiant warriors.



\......................................................................





Naval Battles Revisited.

By Commander (retd) Muhammad Azam Khan

No star would I be, if it lay in my will,
But a gleaming white pearl in the cavernous sea, --
Lives that need have no acquaintance with death:
Can that be called life, which hears death's importunity?
If, making earth lovely, our end must be thus,
Let me rather be changed to a flower-falling dew drop
Iqbal (Bang-i-Dara)

It is a fact that countless acts of gallantry, indomitable courage and sacrifices of our officers, soldiers, sailors and airmen during the 1971 war could not stop the inevitable from happening. Some heroic events of the naval battle in which a relatively small and much neglected Pakistan Navy put up a resolute fight against a far bigger Indian Navy find scant mention in chronicles. This is so since history, more often than not, is documented by the triumphant. Thus there is no shortage of war accounts most of which have been rendered by Indian authors in a rather blown out fashion.

In his recently published memoir, which is a crude attempt at personal glorification, the then Chief of the Naval Staff, Indian Navy, Admiral S.M Nanda catalogues some lofty actions of Indian Navy during the 1971 war. But only two events prove that had Pakistan made some rightful investments in its navy and certain crucially needed decisions come in time, the history of war, at least in the naval context, may have been different.

Pakistan Navy submarine, PNS Hangor under the Command of the then Commander (later Vice-Admiral) Ahmad Tasnim, SJ sailed on Nov 22, 1971, for war deployment. On the night of 2-3rd Dec, while lying in wait off Bombay, Hangor detected a large formation of ships from Indian Navy Western fleet that included cruiser INS Mysore. Sensing impending war in the west, Indian armada was sailing out of Bombay harbour, and passed incredibly close to Hangor. Since the commanding officer of PN submarine did not have the clearance, a valuable opportunity to destroy some prize enemy units was lost just hours before the onset of war. Within Hangor, frustration at missing the prey by such a narrow margin was too great and as Admiral Nanda states in his memoirs, years later when he met Admiral Tasnim, the latter told him that while Indian fleet passed almost overhead, "he was egged by many hotheads (sic) in the control room to fire his torpedoes which he refused on the grounds that war had not broken out".

When PNS Hangor proceeded for war patrol in November 1971, outbreak of war in the west was a foregone conclusion. Even at the peril of starting the war, had permission to the Pakistan Navy been accorded and a large Indian Navy combatant like cruiser INS Mysore sunk in the opening moments of war, the entire Indian western fleet (fearing PN submarines) may have remained repressed inside the harbour. In the event Pakistan could have avoided several missile attacks that I.N subsequently carried out on Karachi. It was not until the morning of December 4 that Hangor learned about the outbreak of hostilities. The much-needed information that could have tilted the tables in favour of the Pakistan Navy thus came a little too late. Indeed, what is lost in a moment is lost for eternity.

In order to avoid compromising its position and thus losing surprise when deployed, submarines always avoid transmitting messages. This becomes critically important during wartime where a minor lapse can cost heavily. Nonetheless, Hangor made a daring departure from the established policy and sought shift in the assigned patrol area to a position where the command believed the submarine had better chances to get enemy ships. The bold deviation eventually paid off but not before Hangor was picked up the Indian Navy via communication intercept. The Pakistani submarine was positioned by the Indians west of Diu (on India's Kathiawar coast, 330miles south west of Karachi). Two Indian Navy ships, INS Khukri and INS Kirpan, were dispatched to hunt down Hangor.

In the early hours of Dec 9, PNS Hangor spotted the two Indian ships patrolling alongside each other. PN submarine positioned itself in-between and fired the first torpedo that missed INS Kirpan. The second torpedo, however, hit INS Khukri right under the ship's aft explosive magazine. The massive combined effect of torpedo and explosion in the magazine sank enemy ship so rapidly that 18 officers and 176 sailors had no time to abandon. Mission accomplished; Hangor now had the formidable task of evading enemy onslaught.

What followed during the next 72 hours or so, (though cannot be described in detail due to space constraints) is naval history rewritten by PNS Hangor's crew. It is a tale of heroism, glory and valour etched in the memories of scores of men of the Pakistan Navy. Following sinking of INS Khukri, the Indian Navy assembled every available asset at its disposal in order to chase and destroy PN submarine. PNS Hangor was ceaselessly and aggressively attacked using all kinds of platforms ranging from destroyers, frigates to reconnaissance aircraft. Nearly 156 explosive depth charges were dropped by the Indian Navy to destroy PN submarine. Luck, however, was on the side of Hangor. Thus much against odds, PN submarine managed to elude Indian Navy blitz.

The sinking of INS Khukri was a devastating blow to the Indian Navy's high spirits generated by the earlier exaggerated success stories of missile attacks on Karachi. Not only did the Indian Navy call off a planned missile attack on Karachi due on the 10th of Dec, but no further attacks were conducted for the remaining duration of the war.

The action of Hangor and the ensuing hunt shall remain an unrivalled event recorded in the annals of naval history. The story shall also serve to remind the future Indian naval generations of the hollowness of the then large Indian Navy anti-submarine force. Here, it is also worth mentioning that despite having preponderance and a huge fleet of Soviet submarines, I.N could neither effectively deploy nor achieve a single strike against the Pakistan Navy through these offensive platforms. To this day, however, unpersuasive attempts continue to be made by the Indians in justifying the blemished role of their submarine fleet in 1971.

The story of PN submarine Ghazi, though tragic, is no less death defying. It is an epic account of guts written in blood by the crew members. In 1971, PNS Ghazi was the Pakistan Navy's only submarine which had the reach to undertake operations on India's Eastern sea board in the Bay of Bengal. Dispatch of PNS Ghazi (commanded by Commander Zafar Mahmood, Shaheed) was not part of the original plan. The submarine was sent under intense pressure from the Pakistan Army's Eastern command which desired some action by PN to thin out Indian pressure on land. Oddly, this was much against the long stated belief of the Pakistan Army that "defence of East lies in the West" to which PN had previously suffered with at least one naval chief stepping down after Field Marshal Ayub refused his request for maintaining a strong navy to defend both wings.

In any case, the long and arduous journey of nearly 2,250miles along the enemy's coast, the overwhelming task to lay the newly-acquired mines (launched from submarine torpedo tubes) and the singular effort to track down Indian Carrier against the imposing strength of Indian Navy's Eastern Fleet were just not enough to deter the command and crew of PNS Ghazi in undertaking a mission which by all accounts they knew was only one-way journey.

Fearing PNS Ghazi, the Indian Navy moved its carrier force (INS Vikrant) further eastward to Andaman Island; much away from the scene of action. For Vice-Admiral N. Krishnan, Flag officer Commanding Indian Navy Eastern Command, PNS Ghazi was no less than a nightmare. In his account, the Indian flag officer acknowledges that each morning he prayed for divine help and protection from Kali Devi (PNS Ghazi). His prayers were indeed answered; Ghazi sank on the night of 3rd-4th Dec after an explosion occurred onboard while the submarine operated off Visakhapatnam. Since all 82 crew members embraced Shahadat it is unlikely that the mystery surrounding circumstances in which Ghazi met her end will ever be unveiled. Still, the Indian claims of sinking Ghazi are not only false but utterly absurd, to say the least.

It requires no extraordinary interpolation that had PNS Ghazi survived, the possibility of Indian carrier operating in the Bay of Bengal let alone deploy its fighters to augment IAF efforts (as it did following confirmation of sinking of PNS Ghazi) or the symbolic nay bogus naval landing by the Indian Navy carried out on the shores of erstwhile East Pakistan towards the closing stages of the war would have remained only a pipedream. Alas! Things were not in our favour in 1971.

Though Ghazi's heroic effort could not prevent the war finale, it shall remain an icon of unparalleled gallantry and a shinning beacon of sacrifice in the defence of its motherland. Sadly, while the Hangor crew was aptly rewarded for the daring deed, the valiant effort of PNS Ghazi remains unsung to this day. An award even 35 years later may not be too late but rather serve as a fitting epitaph for the resting souls in the Bay of Bengal.



The truth behind the Navy`s `sinking` of Ghazi


Lt General JFR Jacob, (retd), hero of the 1971 India Pakistan war, explains why the Indian Navy destroyed documents related to the sinking of the Pakistani submarine, PNS Ghazi.

Earlier this month, there were reports that all documents connected with the sinking of the Pakistani submarine PNS Ghazi during the 1971 war had been destroyed by the Indian Navy.

It is not difficult to conjecture the reasons why.


Back in November 1971, our signal intercept units had been monitoring the movements of the Ghazi on her entering the Bay of Bengal. The last intercept we got from the Ghazi was on 27 November. We had been passing on all intercepts to the Navy.

PNS Ghazi blew up due to an internal explosion while laying mines off the port of Vishakapatnam, probably at the end of November or the beginning of December 1971.


On December 3, I received a call from Vice Admiral Krishnan, Commander of the Eastern Naval Command, who said that fishermen had found some floating wreckage, and that he had gone to the site where the wreckage was found.


Among the debris was a lifebelt with 'Diablo' printed on it. Diablo was the name of the United States Navy submarine that was transferred to the Pakistan Navy and renamed Ghazi.

Krishnan said he had no doubt that the wreckage was that of the Ghazi and that the sinking of the Ghazi was an act of God. He stated that the Navy was unaware that the Ghazi had sunk. He had rewarded the fishermen who had found the wreckage. I told him that there was no threat now to the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, which had been the prime target of the Ghazi.

On the morning of December 4, Krishnan again called me, asking if I had sent a report on the Ghazi. I replied in the negative, saying that as it was a naval matter, I had presumed that he had done so. He seemed relieved and told me that I should forget our conversation of the previous day and that he was in discussions with the Navy chief, Admiral SM Nanda, in Delhi.

On December 9, the Navy announced that they had sunk the Ghazi on December 4, after the start of the war. Later, officers were decorated for their role and the offensive action of their ships in the sinking of the Ghazi.

After the war, however, teams of divers confirmed that it was an internal explosion that sank the Ghazi. The log of the Ghazi was recovered and the last entry as far as I can recall was on November 29, 1971. Sadly, that too has been destroyed.

The Navy had earlier decided to change the date of Navy Day to December 4, the day they had proclaimed that they had sunk the Ghazi.
But I had spoken to the press regarding the sinking of the Ghazi and later published my conversations with Vice Admiral Krishnan in my book 'Surrender at Dacca' in 1997. The Navy then realised that they could no longer maintain their claims to have sunk the Ghazi on December 4.

The Navy then went on to state that December 4, the new date for Navy Day, marked the start of the war. For the record, the war started on December 3 at 1800 hours, when Pakistan bombed our airfields.

As the old saying goes, truth is the first casualty in war.

=============================================
YEAH YEAH! we heard that before,Truth is it was blasted out of water by our Eastern naval command in Vishakapatnam.It was first noticed by some fishermen that a large object was under water and naval command was notified, the call went to delhi Mrs.Indira Gandhi our PM that time.Her immediate order was to destroy it and the rest you know Depth charges and Destroyers did the task:rofl::rofl::rofl:
So much for chest thumping of Pakistan
s
 
YEAH YEAH! we heard that before,Truth is it was blasted out of water by our Eastern naval command in Vishakapatnam.It was first noticed by some fishermen that a large object was under water and naval command was notified, the call went to delhi Mrs.Indira Gandhi our PM that time.Her immediate order was to destroy it and the rest you know Depth charges and Destroyers did the task:rofl::rofl::rofl:
So much for chest thumping of Pakistan
s
So much BS by the Bhartis, who are nothing but victims of their own propaganda.:fie:

Now, no record of Navy sinking Pakistani submarine in 1971 - The Times of India
 

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