Morpheus
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Turkey and Pakistan: a special relationship
Over recent years, Turkey and Pakistan have strengthened their diplomatic and military ties. Marisa Lino argues that understanding this 'special relationship' may help the West improve its own relations with both Pakistan and Turkey.
What defines a ‘special relationship’ between two countries? Certainly, most would agree it includes common goals and an aligned vision of foreign policy; some would add that historical ties and common adversaries are a necessary part of the equation.
In the case of Turkey and Pakistan, the recent discussion of an agreement to grant dual citizenship to Turks and Pakistanis – which may or may not ever come to fruition – is definitely a sign of a special relationship. In addition, Pakistan had announced plans to celebrate in 2020 the centenary of the Khilafat movement of the 1920s. According to Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, this movement, started on the Indian subcontinent in support of the Ottoman Empire, is a thread of common history that binds the two countries together. Notably, the Turkish ambassador to Pakistan declared recently that the Turkish consulate under construction in Karachi, Pakistan, would be Turkey’s largest consulate anywhere in the world, symbolising the importance of Turkish–Pakistani ties.
With all the challenges in Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the US, considering the immigration issues arising from the Syrian civil war and especially in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in the summer of 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has continued to look elsewhere for support, since, apparently, he has felt somewhat abandoned by the West.
In Pakistan, a fellow Islamic country, he found the sustenance he needed. Then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was the first foreign leader to contact Erdogan in the wake of the failed coup and pledge assistance. Erdogan has not forgotten what he surely considers a key lifeline at a critical juncture, and he has shown his gratitude by intensifying the bilateral relationship. Erdogan has visited Pakistan four times in an official capacity during his years as prime minister and now president; Khan, meanwhile, who has been in office a much shorter period of time, has visited Turkey once as well.
Most recently, Erdogan visited Pakistan in mid-February to participate in the sixth round of the Pakistan–Turkey High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. He took a large delegation of ministers, investors and business representatives with him. In addition to the normal high-level meetings and discussions, Erdogan addressed the parliament in Islamabad, for a record fourth time, according to Asad Qaisar, the speaker of Pakistan’s National Assembly.
Defence ties
What is perhaps of greater interest are the burgeoning defence ties between the two nations. Turkish official sources said one of the primary purposes of the February visit was to ‘further synchronise military relations.’
The military-to-military relationship is exemplified by the armed forces training exchange programme, which was inaugurated in 2000. Since the programme began, approximately 1,500 Pakistani military officers have been trained in Turkey. Turkey also helps maintain Pakistan’s fleet of F-16 aircraft.
Bilateral defence and security cooperation was boosted with significant defence deals in 2018, and these days Turkey is Pakistan’s second-biggest arms supplier after China. For example, in October 2018, the Pakistan Navy commissioned a 17,000-tonne fleet tanker, built in collaboration with Turkish defence company STM in the southern port city of Karachi. It was the largest warship ever constructed in the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works, according to Pakistani military sources. Turkey is also upgrading three Pakistani submarines.
In July 2018, Turkey won a multibillion-dollar tender to supply four corvettes to the Pakistan Navy – which then-defence minister Nurettin Canikli said was the largest contract ever granted to the Turkish defence industry. In 2016, Turkey gave 34 T-37 aircraft (with spares) to Pakistan. Turkey also agreed to purchase MFI-17 Super Mushshak trainer aircraft from Pakistan. New military training programmes are also being planned.
What does this mean for the West?
Turkey’s foreign-policy high-wire act, seeking to balance its foreign policy approach between East and West – with Europe and the US on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other – as exemplified in the broadening Syria conflict, merits a much more extensive analysis. Russia’s military and economic goals, as well as China’s efforts to tie countries together with its Belt and Road Initiative and its China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, would all need to be taken into account. Turkey’s support of Pakistan in the Kashmir conundrum brings India into the picture as well – and Turkey has also backed Pakistan in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and on financial issues.
Saudi Arabia’s relations with Turkey and Pakistan also play a major role in deconstructing the Turkey–Pakistan special relationship, how it fits into regional geopolitics and what impact it might have going forward. For Turkey, its declining relations with Saudi Arabia predate the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Its support of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, as well as differences over the approach to Libya and Qatar, had already contributed to their deterioration. Pakistan has had a symbiotic relationship with the Kingdom, going back decades, in both defence and economic spheres. How Riyadh views the developing ties between Erdogan and Khan, and what impact this will have on respective bilateral relations remains to be seen.
Ankara believes that extending strategic and military ties with Pakistan has helped to increase its influence in Asia and provided new options for its foreign-policy ambitions. It sees the European Union as too inwardly focused, dealing with Brexit and an aggressive Russia, and ignoring Turkey’s claims. Pakistan sees itself as a key player in Afghanistan and as a mediator with Iran, as well as a strategic partner helping Turkey to maintain a balance between the East and West.
Europe has been deeply concerned with the refugee flows coming through Turkey, an issue that has resurfaced recently. Its relations with Pakistan have prioritised cooperation on security and counter-terrorism and trade.
For the West, taking a closer look at the special relationship between Turkey and Pakistan might provide insights towards improving relations with each country. For the US, the focus with Turkey has been on Syria and Russia’s military influence; with Pakistan, it has been the role Pakistan plays in Afghanistan, as well as the interplay with India over Kashmir. Taking an in-depth look at what each country seeks to achieve individually and together could provide a useful analytical tool for Western and US policymakers.
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/04/dmap-turkey-and-pakistan-a-special-relationship
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Over recent years, Turkey and Pakistan have strengthened their diplomatic and military ties. Marisa Lino argues that understanding this 'special relationship' may help the West improve its own relations with both Pakistan and Turkey.
What defines a ‘special relationship’ between two countries? Certainly, most would agree it includes common goals and an aligned vision of foreign policy; some would add that historical ties and common adversaries are a necessary part of the equation.
In the case of Turkey and Pakistan, the recent discussion of an agreement to grant dual citizenship to Turks and Pakistanis – which may or may not ever come to fruition – is definitely a sign of a special relationship. In addition, Pakistan had announced plans to celebrate in 2020 the centenary of the Khilafat movement of the 1920s. According to Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, this movement, started on the Indian subcontinent in support of the Ottoman Empire, is a thread of common history that binds the two countries together. Notably, the Turkish ambassador to Pakistan declared recently that the Turkish consulate under construction in Karachi, Pakistan, would be Turkey’s largest consulate anywhere in the world, symbolising the importance of Turkish–Pakistani ties.
With all the challenges in Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the US, considering the immigration issues arising from the Syrian civil war and especially in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in the summer of 2016, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has continued to look elsewhere for support, since, apparently, he has felt somewhat abandoned by the West.
In Pakistan, a fellow Islamic country, he found the sustenance he needed. Then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was the first foreign leader to contact Erdogan in the wake of the failed coup and pledge assistance. Erdogan has not forgotten what he surely considers a key lifeline at a critical juncture, and he has shown his gratitude by intensifying the bilateral relationship. Erdogan has visited Pakistan four times in an official capacity during his years as prime minister and now president; Khan, meanwhile, who has been in office a much shorter period of time, has visited Turkey once as well.
Most recently, Erdogan visited Pakistan in mid-February to participate in the sixth round of the Pakistan–Turkey High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. He took a large delegation of ministers, investors and business representatives with him. In addition to the normal high-level meetings and discussions, Erdogan addressed the parliament in Islamabad, for a record fourth time, according to Asad Qaisar, the speaker of Pakistan’s National Assembly.
Defence ties
What is perhaps of greater interest are the burgeoning defence ties between the two nations. Turkish official sources said one of the primary purposes of the February visit was to ‘further synchronise military relations.’
The military-to-military relationship is exemplified by the armed forces training exchange programme, which was inaugurated in 2000. Since the programme began, approximately 1,500 Pakistani military officers have been trained in Turkey. Turkey also helps maintain Pakistan’s fleet of F-16 aircraft.
Bilateral defence and security cooperation was boosted with significant defence deals in 2018, and these days Turkey is Pakistan’s second-biggest arms supplier after China. For example, in October 2018, the Pakistan Navy commissioned a 17,000-tonne fleet tanker, built in collaboration with Turkish defence company STM in the southern port city of Karachi. It was the largest warship ever constructed in the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works, according to Pakistani military sources. Turkey is also upgrading three Pakistani submarines.
In July 2018, Turkey won a multibillion-dollar tender to supply four corvettes to the Pakistan Navy – which then-defence minister Nurettin Canikli said was the largest contract ever granted to the Turkish defence industry. In 2016, Turkey gave 34 T-37 aircraft (with spares) to Pakistan. Turkey also agreed to purchase MFI-17 Super Mushshak trainer aircraft from Pakistan. New military training programmes are also being planned.
What does this mean for the West?
Turkey’s foreign-policy high-wire act, seeking to balance its foreign policy approach between East and West – with Europe and the US on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other – as exemplified in the broadening Syria conflict, merits a much more extensive analysis. Russia’s military and economic goals, as well as China’s efforts to tie countries together with its Belt and Road Initiative and its China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, would all need to be taken into account. Turkey’s support of Pakistan in the Kashmir conundrum brings India into the picture as well – and Turkey has also backed Pakistan in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and on financial issues.
Saudi Arabia’s relations with Turkey and Pakistan also play a major role in deconstructing the Turkey–Pakistan special relationship, how it fits into regional geopolitics and what impact it might have going forward. For Turkey, its declining relations with Saudi Arabia predate the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Its support of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, as well as differences over the approach to Libya and Qatar, had already contributed to their deterioration. Pakistan has had a symbiotic relationship with the Kingdom, going back decades, in both defence and economic spheres. How Riyadh views the developing ties between Erdogan and Khan, and what impact this will have on respective bilateral relations remains to be seen.
Ankara believes that extending strategic and military ties with Pakistan has helped to increase its influence in Asia and provided new options for its foreign-policy ambitions. It sees the European Union as too inwardly focused, dealing with Brexit and an aggressive Russia, and ignoring Turkey’s claims. Pakistan sees itself as a key player in Afghanistan and as a mediator with Iran, as well as a strategic partner helping Turkey to maintain a balance between the East and West.
Europe has been deeply concerned with the refugee flows coming through Turkey, an issue that has resurfaced recently. Its relations with Pakistan have prioritised cooperation on security and counter-terrorism and trade.
For the West, taking a closer look at the special relationship between Turkey and Pakistan might provide insights towards improving relations with each country. For the US, the focus with Turkey has been on Syria and Russia’s military influence; with Pakistan, it has been the role Pakistan plays in Afghanistan, as well as the interplay with India over Kashmir. Taking an in-depth look at what each country seeks to achieve individually and together could provide a useful analytical tool for Western and US policymakers.
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/04/dmap-turkey-and-pakistan-a-special-relationship
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thats it
