YeBeWarned
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I found the real reason for not buying AC ..
The REAL Reason Why Pakistan Does not have an Aircraft Carrier
- Thread starter Hassan Guy
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The Maverick
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your navy doctrine is coastal defence only
the cost is way out of reach
you have no plans to power project even in regional way. and navy is the only way to power project .
India power projects in indian Ocean from Sri Lanka to the Gulf states to Malacca straights,considering this waters of interest and trade protection for a 3 trillion GDP economy.
pakistan is one tenth the GDP and has no need to power project this far out
the cost is way out of reach
you have no plans to power project even in regional way. and navy is the only way to power project .
India power projects in indian Ocean from Sri Lanka to the Gulf states to Malacca straights,considering this waters of interest and trade protection for a 3 trillion GDP economy.
pakistan is one tenth the GDP and has no need to power project this far out
N.Siddiqui
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Slashed by anything between 270-300 billion USD...so that makes it 9 times.
In its latest report on the global economy, the IMF forecasts that India's gross domestic product will plunge 10.3 percent this fiscal year ending on March 31, 2021, the biggest contraction since independence.
The Maverick
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it's only covid related buddy and temporary the,rebound will be equal in percentage and as rapid. you can't prevent natural economic power based on size if nation and resources.
besides,it's about your carrier needs .
your military budget which is very modest is dominated by your army and leaves very little for big capital warships like destroyers, nuke subs and carriers.
your navy will retain frigates corvette,and aip eqipped subs enough to deny India total supremacy in your waters,only .
it's,a good realistic strategy
Cool_Soldier
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Currently, we can not think of Carrier Ship but in near future PN would need at least Mini carrier to defend its territory .
Mini Carrier with capability of hosting 10-15 warship helicopter and 20 armed drones along with fire punch such as long air defence, Anti ship long range cruise and Ballistic missile capability and land attack missiles will do the job.
Right now focus should be on more advanced Ships with latest systems and fire power.
Mini Carrier with capability of hosting 10-15 warship helicopter and 20 armed drones along with fire punch such as long air defence, Anti ship long range cruise and Ballistic missile capability and land attack missiles will do the job.
Right now focus should be on more advanced Ships with latest systems and fire power.
Rashid Mahmood
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FuturePAF
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your right, it all comes back to the doctrine and the mission
If the goal is not power projection, but fighter cover to the PN’s ships and submarines as well as the MPA, then giving the navy (or assigning dedicated units from the PAF) it’s own land based fighter squadrons and aerial refuelers would be the most cost effective solution. Most of the Chinese navy’s fighters are land based, and it has worked well for them as they or mission is defense of their coastline.
A good example of a waste of an aircraft carrier was Argentina’s carrier during the falklands war. When the General Belgrano was sunk by a Royal Navy submarine, their carrier turned around and went back to port. It was their land based super etendards that carried the Exocets, which took the fight to the Royal Navy.
If we are to give the navy a useful aerial asset (in the next few years), equipping them with at least one squadron of J-31s should be. A more potent threat to their MPA and surface ships, then a small carrier, which would bog us down in defending.
Acquiring bases along our SLOCs would also reduce the need for a carrier If our mission, outside of our EEZ, is just to protect our commercial shipping.
Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen
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Simple. Pakistan don't have the money for an aircraft carrier.
Darth Vader
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1 Money
2nd Pakistan doesn't need it and will never need it as Pakistan doesn't have direct disputes with other countries besides few neighbours.
3 Unless Pakistan becomes the sole military protdctor of all Muslims countries this will never happen and than mostly bill of that will be shared by other countries.
4 even if Pakistan does get one or 2 Mid size ships or convert somehow than you will need few things
5 Multi layered protection of ships, multiple modern crafts which are suited for sea and carrier operations, Pakistan will need few smaller awacs and refueling crafts are get bigger fleet to support for longer ranges.
Unless Pakistan have close to atleast $10 billion and than some sitting somewhere it makes no sense.
Pakistan can achieve much more by investing that money into Pakistani economy & military as that will serve much better for Pakistans softer image
2nd Pakistan doesn't need it and will never need it as Pakistan doesn't have direct disputes with other countries besides few neighbours.
3 Unless Pakistan becomes the sole military protdctor of all Muslims countries this will never happen and than mostly bill of that will be shared by other countries.
4 even if Pakistan does get one or 2 Mid size ships or convert somehow than you will need few things
5 Multi layered protection of ships, multiple modern crafts which are suited for sea and carrier operations, Pakistan will need few smaller awacs and refueling crafts are get bigger fleet to support for longer ranges.
Unless Pakistan have close to atleast $10 billion and than some sitting somewhere it makes no sense.
Pakistan can achieve much more by investing that money into Pakistani economy & military as that will serve much better for Pakistans softer image
Yongpeng Sun-Tastaufen
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Pakistan does not operate a single destroyer. You need lots of destroyers to protect a carrier and form a carrier battle group.
PanzerKiel
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Some random thoughts....
The contribution of the navies and air forces of both sides can be decisive in specific situations. Overall, however, since both countries are land powers, the final outcome of wars between them must be decided on land.
In 1971, for example, the Indian Navy blockaded East Pakistan. Pakistan had no reinforcements to spare, nonetheless, the psychological impact of complete and final isolation was considerable. Similarly, the IAF, by overwhelming the small PAF contingent in the East achieved rapid air supremacy. For an army such as Pakistan’s, accustomed to fighting under the secure protection of its active and efficient air force, loss of its air cover proved devastating to morale and operations.
Both these services thus contributed very substantially—perhaps even decisively—to the quick decision in the East. Considering that each day’s delay increased the possibility of United Nations intervention in some form, by helping to ensure a quick war, the two services proved strategically decisive.
The Indian Navy cannot contribute materially to a short war against Pakistan. In a long war it will become a vital actor, because the bulk of war supplies and civilian trade must come by sea.
Today Pakistan has excellent road and good rail connections with Iran. Since the Middle East nations have now become its primary support base in the event of conflict with India (the U.S. connection notwithstanding), Pakistan cannot be totally isolated as was its eastern wing in 1971.
Vital high-volume low-weight supplies will come by air. The roads from the Middle East to Pakistan can take 40 -ton semitrailers enabling a continual supply flow from Europe and the Arab nations. The Karakoram Highway link with China is of less importance, as it will be quickly closed by the IAF at the outbreak of war. For a long war, however, the sea route is irreplaceable.
If, for example, military equipment carried in four Chinese freighters has first to unload at Iran’s Chahbahar port, then be containerized or shipped on heavy trailers by road to Zahedan in Iran, and then transshipped by rail or by road to Karachi and Lahore, then the process is obviously more time consuming than unloading at Karachi in the first place. In a longer war, the enormous consumption of replacement arms and war material, and the loss of trade from closure of the nation’s ports would hurt Pakistan badly.
Pakistan’s maritime strategy is the essence of simplicity:
India, on the other hand, will seek to impose its naval will on Pakistan, a strategy of sea control by:
India’s strike, power against Pakistan may have increased by a factor of five since 1971, but Pakistan’s ability to defend itself has increased by a factor of—say—twenty. While avoiding more exact comparisons to these figures than justified by the available data, a repeat of the Karachi raid may well be at least three times harder than was the case in 1971.
In 1971, Karachi was a sitting duck because Pakistan had no maritime reconnaissance capability. An ad hoc capability after the attack on Karachi was provided by Pakistan International Airways, akin to using Vayudoot or Indian Airlines to cover Bombay port and naval base. Pakistan had no land-based strike aircraft, nor any anti-ship missiles. The results are a matter of history, even if we dispute as to who inflicted the greater damage on Karachi, the IN or the IAF.
Today the major naval bases of Karachi and Gwader are well protected by anti-ship missiles. A small but adequate, reconnaissance element exists as well. Sea King holicopters, capable of anti- submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship missile strikes are available. Long-range strike elements of PAF equipped with AShMs are there. All this makes simply sailing in and blasting Gwader or Karachi impossible.
Today a repeat of 1971 may prove, more expensive to IN than to PN. If IN sends twenty warships to sink three Pakistani warships, and damage the port, but lose four or five of its expensive ships in return, the exchange ratio cannot be considered favorable.
A point to be kept in mind regarding PN's old destroyers equipped with anti ship missiles is that the sophistication lies in the missile, which is basically an inert round till fired, not in the ship.
If IN wants to fight the Pakistan Navy in its home waters, then even the otherwise insignificant Chinese missile boats become deadly. The Pakistan Navy may not be able to attack, except with submarines, but it certainly can defend.
The problem with defending against submarines is that the cost- benefit ratio favors the submarine. This has led the submarine to be a preferred weapon of the weaker naval power. As with any other weapon, no matter how good, numbers themselves are the best force multiplier, and Pakistanis submarines today present a threat more than twice its four, submarines presented in 1971.
The point is not that of quality: IN subs are much superior to Pakistan’s subs. It is instead:
— In 1971 Pakistan had just received its three Daphnes from France and many of the crew, Bengali in origin, had jumped ship before they reached Pakistan, so that the small force was effectively crippled. Today’s force is much more effective.
— Trying to stop a handful of submarines in an area as large as the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea is a losing proposition.
The contribution of the navies and air forces of both sides can be decisive in specific situations. Overall, however, since both countries are land powers, the final outcome of wars between them must be decided on land.
In 1971, for example, the Indian Navy blockaded East Pakistan. Pakistan had no reinforcements to spare, nonetheless, the psychological impact of complete and final isolation was considerable. Similarly, the IAF, by overwhelming the small PAF contingent in the East achieved rapid air supremacy. For an army such as Pakistan’s, accustomed to fighting under the secure protection of its active and efficient air force, loss of its air cover proved devastating to morale and operations.
Both these services thus contributed very substantially—perhaps even decisively—to the quick decision in the East. Considering that each day’s delay increased the possibility of United Nations intervention in some form, by helping to ensure a quick war, the two services proved strategically decisive.
The Indian Navy cannot contribute materially to a short war against Pakistan. In a long war it will become a vital actor, because the bulk of war supplies and civilian trade must come by sea.
Today Pakistan has excellent road and good rail connections with Iran. Since the Middle East nations have now become its primary support base in the event of conflict with India (the U.S. connection notwithstanding), Pakistan cannot be totally isolated as was its eastern wing in 1971.
Vital high-volume low-weight supplies will come by air. The roads from the Middle East to Pakistan can take 40 -ton semitrailers enabling a continual supply flow from Europe and the Arab nations. The Karakoram Highway link with China is of less importance, as it will be quickly closed by the IAF at the outbreak of war. For a long war, however, the sea route is irreplaceable.
If, for example, military equipment carried in four Chinese freighters has first to unload at Iran’s Chahbahar port, then be containerized or shipped on heavy trailers by road to Zahedan in Iran, and then transshipped by rail or by road to Karachi and Lahore, then the process is obviously more time consuming than unloading at Karachi in the first place. In a longer war, the enormous consumption of replacement arms and war material, and the loss of trade from closure of the nation’s ports would hurt Pakistan badly.
Pakistan’s maritime strategy is the essence of simplicity:
- Protect its coast with a combination of Arabian Sea and attacking the Indian Navy as close to its home bases as possible.
- destroyers in the second-line, ranging upto 250 kilometers or so from the coast.
- torpedo and missile boats in the third-line, operating close to the coast.
- maritime reconnaissance aircraft, anti-submarine helicopters, and strike aircraft operating in conjunction with the surface forces.
- Keep its larger Indian opponent off balance by using its small submarine force to threaten Bombay High and Indian shipping.
India, on the other hand, will seek to impose its naval will on Pakistan, a strategy of sea control by:
- Aggressively seeking to attack all Pakistani coastal bases and targets, including the landing of amphibious forces to help the Army achieve strategic results.
- Seeking to clear the Arabian Sea of all Pakistani shipping, military or civilian.
India’s strike, power against Pakistan may have increased by a factor of five since 1971, but Pakistan’s ability to defend itself has increased by a factor of—say—twenty. While avoiding more exact comparisons to these figures than justified by the available data, a repeat of the Karachi raid may well be at least three times harder than was the case in 1971.
In 1971, Karachi was a sitting duck because Pakistan had no maritime reconnaissance capability. An ad hoc capability after the attack on Karachi was provided by Pakistan International Airways, akin to using Vayudoot or Indian Airlines to cover Bombay port and naval base. Pakistan had no land-based strike aircraft, nor any anti-ship missiles. The results are a matter of history, even if we dispute as to who inflicted the greater damage on Karachi, the IN or the IAF.
Today the major naval bases of Karachi and Gwader are well protected by anti-ship missiles. A small but adequate, reconnaissance element exists as well. Sea King holicopters, capable of anti- submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship missile strikes are available. Long-range strike elements of PAF equipped with AShMs are there. All this makes simply sailing in and blasting Gwader or Karachi impossible.
Today a repeat of 1971 may prove, more expensive to IN than to PN. If IN sends twenty warships to sink three Pakistani warships, and damage the port, but lose four or five of its expensive ships in return, the exchange ratio cannot be considered favorable.
A point to be kept in mind regarding PN's old destroyers equipped with anti ship missiles is that the sophistication lies in the missile, which is basically an inert round till fired, not in the ship.
If IN wants to fight the Pakistan Navy in its home waters, then even the otherwise insignificant Chinese missile boats become deadly. The Pakistan Navy may not be able to attack, except with submarines, but it certainly can defend.
The problem with defending against submarines is that the cost- benefit ratio favors the submarine. This has led the submarine to be a preferred weapon of the weaker naval power. As with any other weapon, no matter how good, numbers themselves are the best force multiplier, and Pakistanis submarines today present a threat more than twice its four, submarines presented in 1971.
The point is not that of quality: IN subs are much superior to Pakistan’s subs. It is instead:
— In 1971 Pakistan had just received its three Daphnes from France and many of the crew, Bengali in origin, had jumped ship before they reached Pakistan, so that the small force was effectively crippled. Today’s force is much more effective.
— Trying to stop a handful of submarines in an area as large as the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea is a losing proposition.
Last edited:
Aamir Hussain
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Totally agree with PanzerKiel.
Just to add to his narrative, PN will effectively use its sub force to keep the IN Carrier Group away from Pakistani shores. In effect it will be the offensive force of PN.
The surface fleet of three surface task groups (I believe PN should have four) would ensure no intercept of Pakistan bound merchantmen takes place.
LRMP and Strike aircraft will ensure that IN surface and subsurface activity stays out to beyond 200+KM line.
The two IN Carrier Groups will pose the most serious surface threat and the PN Submarine force will be tasked to hunt them down.
My earlier estimates were for a min. 12 boat sub fleet to mount an effective round the clock hunt for carrier groups. To me PN is almost there with a 11 boat sub fleet in making.
The Achilles heel for PN remains the air strike element and shipboard helo platform.
Just to add to his narrative, PN will effectively use its sub force to keep the IN Carrier Group away from Pakistani shores. In effect it will be the offensive force of PN.
The surface fleet of three surface task groups (I believe PN should have four) would ensure no intercept of Pakistan bound merchantmen takes place.
LRMP and Strike aircraft will ensure that IN surface and subsurface activity stays out to beyond 200+KM line.
The two IN Carrier Groups will pose the most serious surface threat and the PN Submarine force will be tasked to hunt them down.
My earlier estimates were for a min. 12 boat sub fleet to mount an effective round the clock hunt for carrier groups. To me PN is almost there with a 11 boat sub fleet in making.
The Achilles heel for PN remains the air strike element and shipboard helo platform.
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