Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy
October,
2003
SECTION: NUCLEAR STRATEGY; Pg. 4
LENGTH: 2581 words
HEADLINE:
A New Nuclear Age; Pakistan's Accord to Place Nuclear Weapons and Long-Range Missiles in Saudi Arabia Places European and Indian Targets Within Reach
BYLINE: By Yossef Bodansky and Gregory R. Copley
PAKISTAN HAS REACHED A secret but definitive agreement to station nuclear weapons on Saudi soil, fitted to a new generation of Chinese (PRC)-supplied long-range (4,000 to 5,000km) ballistic missiles which would be under Pakistani command, but clearly with some form of joint Saudi-Pakistani command and control.
The new systems would be able to reach European and Indian targets, increasing Saudi political influence in Europe and giving Pakistan the strategic depth it needs to have a second-strike capability against Indian nuclear capabilities. This radically changes the balance of power in South Asia.
Highly-reliable Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily sources in Islamabad and Riyadh reported on October 21, 2003, that Saudi Arabia's effective ruler, Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister 'Abdallah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz al Sa'ud, reached the agreement with Pakistan Pres. Pervez Musharraf and Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali during the visit of the Saudi delegation to Pakistan October 18-20, 2003. The agreement is the culmination of a long and sustained series of Saudi requests to Pakistan. A significant, unreported one-on-one meeting between Pres. Musharraf and Crown Prince 'Abdallah in Kuala Lumpur, at the Organization for Islamic Conference (OIC) on October 15, 2003, was also significant in the process.
It was clearly the fact that the Saudi basing would give Pakistan the capability to credibly deter an Indian nuclear or conventional attack on Pakistan which was the decisive element for the Pakistani leadership. Pakistan's domestically-based nuclear capability is insufficient to deter the threat even of an overwhelming Indian military thrust into the country. However, the basing of an IRBM capability, with nuclear weapons, in Saudi Arabia, adds a complex second-strike capability to Pakistan's deterrence and bargaining power with India.
Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali arrived in Tehran on October 21, 2003, for a three-day visit, ostensibly about trade, but the Pakistani Government wished to use the visit to explain the Saudi-Pakistani deal with Iranian officials, in order to ensure that Iran did not see the new arrangement as a threat to Iran. Iran is conscious of the fact that the 1987 Saudi CSS-2 acquisition was specifically designed to deter Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia.
It was understood that, under the Saudi-Pakistani pact, the nuclear weapons deployed to Saudi Arabia would remain as Pakistani systems, and the new series of ballistic missiles -- which would replace the existing Saudi CSS-2 missiles (2,800km+ range), provided by the PRC and based on the DF-3A -- would be paid-for by Saudi Arabia while being marked as Pakistani systems. The new systems would have a range of at least 4,000km and possibly 5,000km.
Saudi Arabia acquired its CSS-2s in 1987, principally to counter potential threats from Iran. The Saudi systems, which were obsolescent even then, were fitted with conventional warheads, although it was believed that Saudi Arabia had developed chemical and/or biological warhead capabilities for the missiles. The Royal Saudi Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Malakiya as Sa'udiya) operates a total of 50 CSS-2 IRBMs, in two squadrons; one at al-Joffer, the other at Sulayel (the principal missile base). The CSS-2 is a road-transportable, liquid-fueled IRBM, and can be launched from either permanent launch pads or from portable launch stands, although the RSAF approach appears to be to base the systems at fixed sites.
It was understood that the new systems would replace the CSS-2s at al-Joffer and Sulayel. Ideally, according to the sources, the new systems would be solid-fuel missiles, although it was possible that a derivative of the DF-4 liquid-fueled system (4,750km range) could be obtained, surplus from PRC stocks as an interim measure. The DF-4 operates from fixed bases. No specific timetable was put on the proposed new deployment of Pakistani strategic systems in Saudi Arabia, but a DF-4 acquisition option could make the plan operational within a very short timeframe.
In about February 2002, Saudi workers began a major expansion program at Sulayel. By early March 2002, there were significant numbers of new buildings and fortified storage facilities. New facilities were also built at the nearby King Khalid Military City, to support the Sulayel expansion. New launch pads were created and, significantly, new fortified storage facilities were built for missiles which would be longer than the CSS-2s currently in service. Two underground facilities were also noted.
The implication of the Saudi-Pakistani deal is that it (a) gives Saudi Arabia more credibility and leverage in dealing with European states and the US; and (b) makes Saudi Arabia now a part of the threat matrix for India.
It was no coincidence that, during the three-day Saudi visit to Pakistan, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Sa'ud said in Islamabad on October 19, 2003, that Indian-Israel military co-operation was a "worrying element" which could unleash instability and an arms race in the region. Speaking at a joint news conference with Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri, he addressed the recently-concluded defense supply agreement in Delhi among India, Israel and Russia, Prince Sa'ud said: "Indeed what we are hearing of this cooperation (Indo-Israel deal) is that it is aimed not at the good of the region, but to inflame the region, to further add to the arms race in the region." In the same context, he recalled how some Israeli think tanks demonstrated "similar sinister designs" in the Middle East concerning the "security of Israel". He observed: "It is a country of four-million or so people that believes its security extends from the Indus River to the Atlantic Ocean."
THE SAUDI mission to Islamabad -- the first at this level since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US -- demonstrated the extent of concern which the Saudi leadership felt about the India-Israel strategic relations which had also blossomed since 2001.
The Saudi Crown Prince held talks with Gen. Musharraf and Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali, and Pakistani official sources said that the visit was as a result of an invitation delivered to the Crown Prince recently by Pres. Musharraf's special envoy. However, Saudi sources said that the visit was as much a result of Saudi wishes as Pakistani. The visit also resulted in a complete harmony of expressed views on all common foreign policy issues -- including whether Pakistan should, or should not, supply peace-keepers to Iraq [the consensus was to wait for an Iraqi invitation] -- and a statement that Saudi economic aid to Pakistan would increase from $ 65-million to $ 100-million a year "as a token of its appreciation for Pakistan's impressive economic performance over the last four years".
Crown Prince 'Abdullah on October 19, 2003, visited an exhibition of defense equipment in Islamabad, and was accompanied by the Pakistani President and Prime Minister. The extensive display and demonstrations were not, according to Pakistani sources, just for show. There was a direct interest by Saudi Arabia in Pakistani-built systems.
Significantly, however, there were now routine cooperative exercises underway between RSAF and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) units in joint asset protection -- air defense -- deployments. These, too, were not "routine", and were, according to sources, aimed at developing joint capabilities to defend the proposed new strategic missile facilities in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi-Pakistani nuclear weapons planning and cooperation has been underway for some years, but it had always been felt that Pakistani officials were resisting pressure from Riyadh to provide actual weapons to Saudi Arabia. [Even now, the formula addresses Saudi needs, but keeps the weapons in Pakistani hands, at least nominally and for some purposes.] However, the trail of events makes it clear that Saudi Arabia had consistently worked toward the acquisition of a nuclear capability, provided by Pakistan.
On May 6-7, 1999, then-Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif escorted Saudi Minister of Defense & Aviation Prince Sultan bin 'Abd al-Aziz al-Saud on a visit to Pakistani nuclear research facilities and the manufacturing facilities for the Ghauri liquid-fueled strategic ballistic missile (a derivative of the DPRK NoDong-1) in Kahuta. This was the first and only visit by a foreign dignitary to the facilities, and only the third by a Pakistani head-of-government. The host was Dr Abdul Qadir Khan, at that time regarded as the "father" of the Pakistani nuclear capability.
Prince Sultan at this time was known to have engaged in what were described by sources as "very substantive" discussions with Pakistani officials for the acquisition of both nuclear weapons and Ghauri MRBMs.
The Ghauri, with a range of only some 2,600km, was later to be by-passed, partly because of the range question; partly because it was liquid-fueled and not solid-fueled; and partly because of problems with the NoDong-1s being faced by its originator, the DPRK. Pakistani sources have said, however, that the Ghauri derivatives were likely to resume and were still viable.
Prince Sultan's visit to Pakistan was followed by a visit to Saudi Arabia in mid-September 2000 by a Pakistani strategic policy and nuclear delegation led by Dr Abdul Qadir Khan, Dr Ijaz Shafi Ghilani and Dr M. Younus But. They were guests of Prince Sultan, and at a speech on about September 20, 2000, Dr Abdul Qadir Khan thanked the Saudi Government for contributing to the success of the Pakistani nuclear weapons tests on May 28, 1998. That indicated a Saudi involvement in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program much earlier than Pakistani officials have generally acknowledged. [Saudi financial support for Pakistani nuclear research was, however, assumed even during the Zia ul-Haq era of the 1980s, but without any known understanding of a direct quid pro quo for Saudi Arabia.]
On October 15, 2003, Pres. Musharraf met in Kuala Lumpur with Crown Prince 'Abdallah at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The meeting was not reported, and was a one-on-one affair. That night, Pres. Musharraf met with a number of Pakistani officials and Pakistani expatriates, including a number of scientists who had come especially to Kuala Lumpur from China. One Defense & Foreign Affairs source made notes of Pres. Musharraf's remarks, which were not reported, and which were deemed to be private.
The source, who made the notes available to Defense & Foreign Affairs, noted that the President said that he was encouraged and optimistic and that Pakistan was about to spread its wings on the world stage. He said that the world was looking for a role for Pakistan, and that it could contribute something which nobody else could. He said that Pakistan was at a crossroads and that it could decide whether it would accept this challenge for the ummah (Islamic world) and Islam.
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The Washington Times October 22, 2003
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in secret nuke pact. Islamabad trades weapons technology for oil
In-Depth Coverage
By Arnaud de Borchgrave
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have concluded a secret agreement on "nuclear cooperation" that will provide the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for cheap oil, according to a ranking Pakistani insider.
The disclosure came at the end of a 26-hour state visit to Islamabad last weekend by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, who flew across the Arabian Sea with an entourage of 200, including Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal and several Cabinet ministers.
Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the pro-American defense minister who is next in line to the throne after the crown prince, was not part of the delegation.
"It will be vehemently denied by both countries," said the Pakistani source, whose information has proven reliable for more than a decade, "but future events will confirm that Pakistan has agreed to provide [Saudi Arabia] with the wherewithal for a nuclear deterrent."
As predicted, Saudi Arabia - which has faced strong international suspicion for years that it was seeking a nuclear capability through Pakistan - strongly denied the claim.
Prince Sultan was quoted in the Saudi newspaper Okaz yesterday saying that "no military agreements were concluded between the kingdom and Pakistan during [Prince Abdullah's] visit to Islamabad."
Mohammad Sadiq, deputy chief of mission for Pakistan's embassy in Washington, also denied any nuclear deal was in the works. "That is totally incorrect," he said in a telephone interview. "We have a clear policy: We will not export our nuclear expertise."
But the CIA believes Pakistan already has shared its nuclear know-how, working with North Korea in exchange for missile technology.
A Pakistani C-130 was spotted by satellite loading North Korean missiles at Pyongyang airport last year. Pakistan, which is estimated to have between 35 and 60 nuclear weapons, said this was a straight purchase for cash and strongly denied a nuclear quid pro quo.
"Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia," the Pakistani source said, "see a world that is moving from nonproliferation to proliferation of nuclear weapons."
The Saudi rulers, who are Sunni Muslims, are believed to have concluded that nothing will deter the Shi'ite Muslims who rule Iran from continuing their quest for a nuclear weapons capability.
Pakistan, meanwhile, is concerned about a recent arms agreement between India, its nuclear archrival, and Israel, a longtime nuclear power whose inventory is estimated at between 200 and 400 weapons.
To counter what Pakistani and Saudi leaders regard as multiple regional threats, the two countries have decided to quietly move ahead with an exchange of free or cheap Saudi oil for Pakistani nuclear know-how, the Pakistani source said.
Pakistanis have worked as contract pilots for the Royal Saudi Air Force for the past 30 years. Several hundred thousand Pakistani workers are employed by the Gulf states, both as skilled and unskilled workers, and their remittances are a hard currency boon for the Pakistani treasury.
Prince Abdullah reportedly sees Saudi oil reserves, the world's largest, as becoming increasingly vulnerable over the next 10 years.
By mutual agreement, U.S. forces withdrew from Saudi Arabia earlier this year to relocate across the border in the tiny oil sheikdom of Qatar.
Saudi officials also are still chafing over a closed meeting - later well publicized - of the U.S. Defense Policy Board in 2002, where an expert explained, with a 16-slide Powerpoint presentation, why and how the United States should seize and occupy oil fields in the country's Eastern Province.
Several incidents have raised questions over the extent of Saudi-Pakistani cooperation in defense matters.
A new policy paper by Simon Henderson, an analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, noted that Prince Sultan visited Pakistan's highly restricted Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile assembly factory in 1999, a visit that prompted a formal diplomatic complaint from Washington.
And a son of Prince Abdullah attended Pakistan's test-firing last year of its Ghauri-class missile, which has a range of 950 miles and could be used to deliver a nuclear payload.
President Bush was reported to have confronted Pervez Musharraf over the Saudi nuclear issue during the Pakistani president's visit to Camp David this summer, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage raised the issue during a trip to Islamabad earlier this month, according to Mr. Henderson's paper.
"Apart from proliferation concerns, Washington likely harbors more general fears about what would happen if either of the regimes in Riyadh or Islamabad became radically Islamic," according to Mr. Henderson.
GlobalSecurity.org, a well-connected defense Internet site, found in a recent survey that Saudi Arabia has the infrastructure to exploit such nuclear exports very quickly.
"While there is no direct evidence that Saudi Arabia has chosen a nuclear option, the Saudis have in place a foundation for building a nuclear deterrent," according to the Web site.
*Arnaud de Borchgrave, editor at large of The Washington Times, is editor at large of United Press International as well.
