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INSIGHT: No need to lose sleep Ejaz Haider
Pakistan does not have an officially declared nuclear doctrine, but there is enough evidence to suggest that it is wedded to keeping its capability at a level where the strategies of coercion are not allowed to kick into play. This means that the concept of minimum credible deterrence is a fluid, not a static concept
Indias full-system test-firing February 26 of its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), dubbed K-15, from an underwater pontoon has caused Pakistans Chief of Naval Staff to warn that the development is a trigger for an arms race in this region. The CNS, head as he does a near-neglected service, cannot be faulted for saying that. It is a signal, both to the world and to Islamabad which has always treated the Navy with step-motherly affection.
Beyond this India has done nothing which was either not known or unexpected.
First, Indias nuclear doctrine clearly speaks of a triad of nuclear forces: land-, air-, and sea-based assets. It is a known fact that SLBMs constitute the most reliable second-strike capability. Also accepted is the concept that second-strike capability is essential for stabilising deterrence.
Second, K-15 falls under the Sagrika project which has seen, as one report puts it, many hits and misses over the last ten years. India also conducted at least four known sub-system tests of K-15 last year. The Feb 26 test, therefore, was not a bolt from the blue.
Third, so far there is no confirmation that the complete system test met all its parameters. According to the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) spokesperson, while the missile broke the water surface, the flight data is still being analysed.
Fourth, India has been working on an Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project, essentially an indigenous, 6000-ton nuclear-powered submarine for well over two decades. The first ATV, if everything remains on course, is scheduled for sea trials in 2009. This too is known.
Fifth, once the ATV is launched and operationalised, and if K-15 has proven successful, the final stage will require that the missile system be integrated with the ATV so it can be fired from that platform. The ATV, technically, is supposed to carry 12 vertical-launched nuclear-tipped SLBMs. For the system to be up and running, it would take several years, even though India hopes to achieve this in about two to three years.
But these are mere technical details. Such projects are notoriously glitch-ridden and DRDO hasnt exactly covered itself in glory in the past. The issue is not about how long it will take India to have an operational SSN (ship submersible nuclear) and turn it into an SSBN (ship submersible ballistic nuclear), but that it will get to that objective. That is a foregone conclusion.
Even technically, there is no reason to doubt that, like BrahMos, the supersonic cruise missile project on which India was helped by Russia, the two are not interlocked on K-15 or the ATV. Glitches also have a plus side: they induce scientists, engineers and technicians to innovate and innovation always results in jury-rigging and reverse engineering. In other words, glitches constitute a learning curve. So that is that.
The question is: what should be Pakistans response on the basis of the premise that India will in the next decade-and-half or so have an operational nuclear triad?
We shouldnt lose sleep. Not only because it will help stabilise deterrence in the region (nuclear forces t-shirt slogan should be, If youve got it, let it hang out!), but also because it is time that both India and Pakistan focus on developing their respective capabilities on the basis of factors other than each other.
Pakistan and India are embarked on a normalisation process. Even though it may be snail-paced, at least it offers a dialogue framework and has held since 2004. But, as I said at a conference in Jamia Millia about two years ago, normalisation will not preclude either, but especially India, from continuing to modernise its military. Hikes in defence expenditure by India, recent one included, prove that point. (According to SIPRI, India is now firmly placed in the top 15 spenders on defence.)
Pakistan does not have an officially declared nuclear doctrine, but there is enough evidence to suggest that it is wedded to keeping its capability at a level where the strategies of coercion are not allowed to kick into play. This means that the concept of minimum credible deterrence is a fluid, not a static concept.
By the logic of geography, Pakistan has to play at two levels: work out ratios in an asymmetric relationship with India and augment its capability; two, develop a trajectory for its nuclear capability on the basis of ex-India factors. This means that it does not have to link itself with Indian modernisation and capabilities.
So far the two sides have managed risk through ambiguity. Regardless of the western experts fears, they have done it fairly well. In this context, the normalisation process now plays a very important role (overly aggressive signalling has gone down, Indias limited war-fighting doctrine, while in place, is more difficult to operationalise, red lines are unlikely to be tested and the threat of terrorism has helped change policies and emphases).
The new development therefore helps put the capability upfront and by doing so reduces ambiguity.
As for the action threatening an arms race, arms race models have undergone many mutations since Richardson first came up with his. Today, the issue is not just approached in a linear fashion and there are many non-linear approaches to it.
An added factor for most states has to do with rethinking their force configuration. Strategic arsenals are important for deterring states; they are not for deterring and defeating non-state adversaries. In fact even hi-tech conventional capabilities may be rendered ineffective, as America is learning to its disadvantage, by an elusive adversary.
Pakistan thus needs to develop its capability at two levels: deter a state adversary and be able to defeat a threat that relies on the tools of asymmetric war. The first is hi-tech; the second low-tech. Threat perception and content therefore needs to be put in its proper perspective.
Pakistan does not have an officially declared nuclear doctrine, but there is enough evidence to suggest that it is wedded to keeping its capability at a level where the strategies of coercion are not allowed to kick into play. This means that the concept of minimum credible deterrence is a fluid, not a static concept
Indias full-system test-firing February 26 of its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), dubbed K-15, from an underwater pontoon has caused Pakistans Chief of Naval Staff to warn that the development is a trigger for an arms race in this region. The CNS, head as he does a near-neglected service, cannot be faulted for saying that. It is a signal, both to the world and to Islamabad which has always treated the Navy with step-motherly affection.
Beyond this India has done nothing which was either not known or unexpected.
First, Indias nuclear doctrine clearly speaks of a triad of nuclear forces: land-, air-, and sea-based assets. It is a known fact that SLBMs constitute the most reliable second-strike capability. Also accepted is the concept that second-strike capability is essential for stabilising deterrence.
Second, K-15 falls under the Sagrika project which has seen, as one report puts it, many hits and misses over the last ten years. India also conducted at least four known sub-system tests of K-15 last year. The Feb 26 test, therefore, was not a bolt from the blue.
Third, so far there is no confirmation that the complete system test met all its parameters. According to the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) spokesperson, while the missile broke the water surface, the flight data is still being analysed.
Fourth, India has been working on an Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project, essentially an indigenous, 6000-ton nuclear-powered submarine for well over two decades. The first ATV, if everything remains on course, is scheduled for sea trials in 2009. This too is known.
Fifth, once the ATV is launched and operationalised, and if K-15 has proven successful, the final stage will require that the missile system be integrated with the ATV so it can be fired from that platform. The ATV, technically, is supposed to carry 12 vertical-launched nuclear-tipped SLBMs. For the system to be up and running, it would take several years, even though India hopes to achieve this in about two to three years.
But these are mere technical details. Such projects are notoriously glitch-ridden and DRDO hasnt exactly covered itself in glory in the past. The issue is not about how long it will take India to have an operational SSN (ship submersible nuclear) and turn it into an SSBN (ship submersible ballistic nuclear), but that it will get to that objective. That is a foregone conclusion.
Even technically, there is no reason to doubt that, like BrahMos, the supersonic cruise missile project on which India was helped by Russia, the two are not interlocked on K-15 or the ATV. Glitches also have a plus side: they induce scientists, engineers and technicians to innovate and innovation always results in jury-rigging and reverse engineering. In other words, glitches constitute a learning curve. So that is that.
The question is: what should be Pakistans response on the basis of the premise that India will in the next decade-and-half or so have an operational nuclear triad?
We shouldnt lose sleep. Not only because it will help stabilise deterrence in the region (nuclear forces t-shirt slogan should be, If youve got it, let it hang out!), but also because it is time that both India and Pakistan focus on developing their respective capabilities on the basis of factors other than each other.
Pakistan and India are embarked on a normalisation process. Even though it may be snail-paced, at least it offers a dialogue framework and has held since 2004. But, as I said at a conference in Jamia Millia about two years ago, normalisation will not preclude either, but especially India, from continuing to modernise its military. Hikes in defence expenditure by India, recent one included, prove that point. (According to SIPRI, India is now firmly placed in the top 15 spenders on defence.)
Pakistan does not have an officially declared nuclear doctrine, but there is enough evidence to suggest that it is wedded to keeping its capability at a level where the strategies of coercion are not allowed to kick into play. This means that the concept of minimum credible deterrence is a fluid, not a static concept.
By the logic of geography, Pakistan has to play at two levels: work out ratios in an asymmetric relationship with India and augment its capability; two, develop a trajectory for its nuclear capability on the basis of ex-India factors. This means that it does not have to link itself with Indian modernisation and capabilities.
So far the two sides have managed risk through ambiguity. Regardless of the western experts fears, they have done it fairly well. In this context, the normalisation process now plays a very important role (overly aggressive signalling has gone down, Indias limited war-fighting doctrine, while in place, is more difficult to operationalise, red lines are unlikely to be tested and the threat of terrorism has helped change policies and emphases).
The new development therefore helps put the capability upfront and by doing so reduces ambiguity.
As for the action threatening an arms race, arms race models have undergone many mutations since Richardson first came up with his. Today, the issue is not just approached in a linear fashion and there are many non-linear approaches to it.
An added factor for most states has to do with rethinking their force configuration. Strategic arsenals are important for deterring states; they are not for deterring and defeating non-state adversaries. In fact even hi-tech conventional capabilities may be rendered ineffective, as America is learning to its disadvantage, by an elusive adversary.
Pakistan thus needs to develop its capability at two levels: deter a state adversary and be able to defeat a threat that relies on the tools of asymmetric war. The first is hi-tech; the second low-tech. Threat perception and content therefore needs to be put in its proper perspective.
