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Indonesia Defence Forum

Raytheon wins $634M foreign missile contract

Tucson-based Raytheon Missile Systems has been awarded a $634 million Air Force contract to produce Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles and perform related work under a foreign military sales deal to Japan, Korea, Morocco, Poland, Indonesia, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Bahrain and Qatar.

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The work will be performed in Tucson, with an expected completion date of Jan. 31, 2020, the Pentagon said in a contract notice.

Separately, the Air Force awarded Raytheon a $25.8 million contract for special AMRAAM tooling and test equipment, for foreign military sales to Norway, Japan, Korea, Morocco, Australia, the United Kingdom, Poland, Indonesia, Romania, Spain, Turkey and Qatar.

http://tucson.com/business/raytheon...cle_f4bf3586-f00b-11e7-a7d4-035d1f86bb66.html
 
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Diplomacy on the Doorstep: Australia's Equivocal Indonesian Relationship

With close to 300 million people, and a GDP that for the first time last year hit USD$1 trillion, Australia has been quick to take notice of its Indonesian neighbour. But how has Canberra handled a country whose relative proximity belies its stark dissimilarity?

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Recently in Jakarta I was asked to compare Australia’s relationship with Indonesia today with that under the New Order.

During the New Order, our problems derived mostly from Timor and from the different backgrounds of our countries. Our leaders generally tried to steady the relationship, and Keating and Suharto sought to strengthen it. But, Australians saw Indonesia as militaristic and corrupt. To Indonesians, Australia was a country cousin of the colonial powers but without their political savvy. These perceptions affected how we dealt with each other.

When Timor fell off the agenda and Indonesian democracy sprung open, the relationship arguably became more equable. It also became more complex.

Border issues, combatting terrorism, economic dealings, education and so on are constants in the relationship. However, it is increasingly shaped by four overarching factors, discernible in 2000, but now more pronounced.

First is the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States.

From the beginning of the New Order, Indonesia’s importance to Australia in regional security terms was as a stable and pivotal member of ASEAN, it contributed to a benign security environment in South East Asia. But the guarantor of Australian security was the United States.

It still is. But, as doubts have grown about the durability of the American commitment to the region, so too has the view that regional security will increasingly revolve around a multipolar power structure in the Asia-Pacific and around closer security relationships between the more significant regional nations, of which Indonesia is one.

Indonesia’s security doctrines are self evidently different from Australia’s. While Indonesia sees advantage in the United States’ presence in the region, it takes non-alignment seriously and eschews a public embrace of the United States.

Indonesian attitudes on Chinese economic activity in Indonesia can be sharp, and as happened during the Ahok affair (involving the imprisonment of the ethnic Chinese Christian governor of Jakarta for blasphemy), some groups tie in Islam with economic nationalism. Such approaches impact on dealings with China.

In a more strictly security context, Indonesia is nervous about Chinese militarism, but it is less so than the Australian security establishment, and it is hesitant to criticise Chinese behavior in the South China Sea.

This mix of attitudes suggests that Indonesia will remain cautious about the scope of its security relationship with Australia, but will be more open to substantive dialogue with Australia about regional security issues. This could lead to greater propinquity of perspectives on how best to deal with regional threats.

The second factor is the importance of political Islam. The divide between those Indonesians who want an Islamic state and those who favour a broader constitutional structure has always been central to Indonesian politics. But, since 1999, all parties have accommodated increased popular sympathy for Islamist perspectives and the Islamist factor in Indonesian politics has become more pronounced since the Ahok issue.

How Indonesia governs itself is Indonesia’s business. But it is not in Australia’s interest for Indonesia to swing more towards radical Islam if only because the latter breeds anti-western sentiment, and ideologically Australia is in the west.

Australia therefore needs to think about its attitude towards Islam, and particularly how best to use what influence we have with Islam in Indonesia.

One approach might be to deal with a wider spectrum of Islamic opinion in Indonesia than in recent years. It is usually best to engage rather than avoid those with whose ideas we disagree.

We must also recognise that neither we, nor anyone else, can disaggregate our policies towards the region from other policies, particularly on the Middle East.

A clear example of how polices towards one region affects those towards another is Trump’s Jerusalem decision, which has had a negative impact in Jakarta.

Although Australia abstained rather than supported the United States in the United Nations vote critical of the Jerusalem decision, the issue should be a reminder that an unsympathetic voting pattern on issues of importance to the whole of the Islamic world, particularly where we do not have a direct national interest in adhering to that pattern, has an adverse resonance in our own region and hampers our capacity to influence thinking there.

Third is the impact of democracy in Indonesia. It has not eradicated issues deriving from its cultural divide with Australia. During the New Order, the relationship was brittle but had predictability. The relationship became more volatile as Indonesian public opinion increasingly influenced government policy after 1999. In one sense Indonesian democracy has made the relationship harder to manage.

That said, Australia only loses from a regression in Indonesian democracy. Democracy requires more than a fair voting system. It is about strong institutions, adherence to precepts and protection of rights. If progress in these areas suffers setbacks, as has happened in recent years in Indonesia, the scope for the rise of an Indonesian Erdogan increases.

It is for Indonesians to manage Indonesia and there is no magic wand to wave over Indonesian democracy. But we should support those Indonesians who are trying to protect the democratic structures established in the aftermath of the New Order.

Finally, the asymmetry in the relationship favouring Indonesia is more pronounced. Indonesia sits astride Australia’s northern approaches. It is central to the regional structures we seek to influence. We do not have an equivalent strategic importance to it.

On a purchasing power parity basis, most estimates suggest that in 2030 Indonesia will be between the world’s 5th and 8th biggest economy. We will rank in the mid 20s.

These asymmetries are not necessarily a minus for Australia. A strong and wealthier Indonesia will contribute to strategic balance in the region and could benefit us if we develop an effective economic relationship with it, particularly by using our assets in innovation and technology. But we will need to compete to get attention in Jakarta.

https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australia-indonesia-relationship/
 
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Indonesian Search and Rescue Teams Deploy TAC-PAK Command Centers for High Speed, Portable Communications

Communication always plays a vital role in the completion of missions throughout the diverse and challenging Indonesian geography. Imagine the necessity of swift and accurate data transmission during disaster response within a country with a footprint larger than the US, and comprised of over 1500 islands. That is the challenge presented to BASARNAS, the Indonesian Search and Rescue organization.

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Previously, Indonesian military and humanitarian personnel have found themselves trying to communicate in the midst of total terrestrial chaos and destruction using legacy radio systems and outdated command infrastructure. Given recent tsunamis, fires and mudslides BASARNAS recognized the need for more command resources in the remote, communications sterile locations - and deployed TAC-PAK and Flexiwatt satcom mobile command and power systems developed by 308 SYSTEMS Inc.

These custom-configured "mobile command in a box" TAC-PAK/Flexiwatt systems were custom-configured to meet specific mission field communication requirements, including linking field radios to cell phones and computers throughout the country. From the base operations in Jakarta, the TAC-PAK and Flexiwatt comm/power systems provision each remote team with a comprehensive voice and data response capability.

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With multiple form factors and satcom data rates up to 6mbps, this TAC-PAK/Flexiwatt flyaway kit combination provided spectacular deployment flexibility, operated anywhere with great efficiency, and is packaged in a rugged, small, and highly portable form factor easily loaded into a pickup truck or similar deploying vehicle. This effectively turned any local vehicle into a "Mobile Command Center."

This extensive Mobile Command/Flexiwatt lineup represents the latest state-of-the-art high bandwidth mobile command /communication solutions from 308 SYSTEMS Inc.

https://www.prnewswire.com/news-rel...-speed-portable-communications-300576385.html
 
Economy in brief: PAL to finish submarine production

The Jakarta Post
Bandung | Wed, January 10 2018 | 12:31 am

State-owned shipbuilder PT PAL seeks to complete the construction of a submarine for the Navy this year.

PAL president director Budiman Saleh is optimistic that the firm will be able to finish the project, which kicked of last May, on time.

“We still have five steps to go after finishing the battery [making],” he said on Tuesday.

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/01/10/economy-brief-pal-finish-submarine-production.html
 
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Weapons producer eyes Rp 2.9 trillion in revenue for 2018

Bandung, West Java | Wed, January 10, 2018 | 10:37 am

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Technicians finish the assembly of an Anoa armored personnel carrier (APC) at PT Pindad's weapons factory in Bandung in January, 2017. (JP/Arya Dipa)

State-owned weapons manufacturer PT Pindad is aiming for Rp 2.9 trillion (US$203 million) in revenue this year, said Pindad president director Abraham Mose in Bandung on Tuesday.

He said the company had booked net profit of Rp 53 billion in 2017.

This year, the company aimed to obtain 30 percent of its revenue from its industrial products.

“This does not mean that the defense industry is slowing down. Our largest contributor is still the defense industry,” said Mose.

He explained that Pindad planned to further expand its non-defense products by producing heavy machinery.

The company will produce amphibious excavators, for example, by using technology derived from its Anoa armored personnel carriers, he added.

“We have reported this to the National Public Procurement Agency [LKPP] so that our planned product is included in the e-catalog. The Jakarta administration has expressed interest. We are in the process of building the prototype,” he added.

Pindad sent 29 of its Anoa armored personnel carriers to the Central African Republic in late 2017 as part of its support for peacekeeping efforts in the area. The shipment was an addition to an earlier batch of 70 other vehicles. (bbn)

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/...eyes-rp-2-9-trillion-in-revenue-for-2018.html
 
Senegal plans to order more CN-235
Indonesia also offers train set, naval ship, cargo & tanker to Senegal

Senegal berencana memesan kembali pesawat CN-235 buatan PT Dirgantara Indonesia (Persero). Pihak Senegal dilaporkan puas menggunakan pesawat buah karya anak bangsa Indonesia ini dalam pemesanan sebelumnya dan ingin menambah armadanya.

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Penerangan, Sosial, dan Budaya (Pensosbud) KBRI Dakar Dimas Prihadi mengatakan, keinginan memesan kembali CN-235 disampaikan Presiden Senegal Macky Sall ketika bertemu dengan Dubes RI Dakar Mansyur Pangeran akhir pekan lalu. Keduanya berbicara di sela-sela pertemuan awal tahunan di Istana Kepresidenan Senegal.

Jika pesanan pesawat tersebut terealisasi, maka akan menjadi pesawat yang keempat yang dibeli Pemerintah Senegal dari Indonesia. Sebelumnya pada 2017, negara itu telah menandatangani kontrak pembelian pesawat CN-235 ketiga. Penandatanganannya disaksikan langsung oleh Menteri Pertahanan RI Ryamizard Ryacudu.

Selain pesawat, Dubes Mansyur Pangeran menyampaikan kepada Presiden Macky Sall untuk mendorong tindak lanjut rencana pembelian gerbong kereta api PT INKA (Persero) dan kapal untuk keperluan niaga dan militer dari PT PAL Indonesia (Persero) yang dijajaki Senegal sejak 2017.

"Penawaran dua produk industri strategis Indonesia lainnya adalah gerbong kereta api dan kapal-kapal kargo, kapal tanker dan kapal militer yang saat ini dalam tahap pembahasan di tingkat teknis kementerian terkait di Senegal," ujar Mansyur kepada Antara London,Selasa (9/1).

Presiden Macky Sall menyampaikan bahwa pemerintahannya senang terhadap peningkatan hubungan bilateral antara kedua negara. Ia mengaku telah beberapa kali bertemu dengan Presiden Joko Widodo pada pertemuan internasional antara lain dalam rangka G-20 dan OKI baru-baru ini.

Promosi industri strategis Indonesia di Senegal tersebut diharapkan dapat direalisasikan pada tahun 2018. Selain itu juga ditindaklanjuti dengan saling kunjung antar tingkat kepala negara untuk memperkokoh hubungan bilateral dan persahabatan kedua negara.

http://www.republika.co.id/berita/e...as-senegal-berencana-pesan-lagi-pesawat-cn235
 
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