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HQ-19

cirr

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Chinese strategy is due to the quality and numerical advantage America has, no way within 20 years can we catch up, even if we do catch up in quality in about a decade, we still can't produce 1000 fighters in a decade.

So, our missiles will do the job, you got carriers, we got anti ship missiles, you got more fighters, we got SAM systems, you got nukes, we got nukes.

This is a good strategy of winning against America in local wars and ability to project in far away against non American countries.
 
HQ-19 Anti-Ballistic Missile Interceptor

The HQ-9B, HQ-19 [THAAD counterpart], HQ-26 [SM-3 counterpart] and HQ-29 [PAC-3 counterpart] are designed primarily for Anti Ballistic Missile capabilities. While the HQ-9A air defense variant of the HQ-9 series is very well attested, the remaining theater missile defense interceptors are poorly attested, and verge on being little more than rumors.(huh?:azn::D:dance3:

It is believed by some that the Russian S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile system was a joint development program, but others say that HQ-19 has nothing to do with S-400 [according to one source, "and I say this with certainty." China has shown interest in acquiring Russia’s newest long-range SAM, the S-400 TRIUMF, but a contract has not been signed yet and Russian officials have stated China would not receive the S-400 until at least 2017. This SAM can target aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical and medium-range ballistic missiles.

The only official document that clearly states the designation HQ-19 is a document entitled "The needs analysis propulsion system of tactical missiles and direction of development for solid propellant engine", dating from 2000 and written by the Institute 41 CCAC Group (China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation). This paper analyzes firstly the risks and types of conflict that China may face up to 2010 (The document is dated 2000, and speaks of "in 10 years"), and gives types of tactical missiles to develop a priority to deal with these external threats. In subsection 3.4, a priority is given to the need for an anti-missile system capable of intercepting high altitude heads ballistic missile whose range is 3000km, phase re-entry. And in response to this paragraph 3.4, in section 4.4 it is clearly stated "Developing solid propellant engines that meet the needs of anti-missile systems area at high altitude," a concept close to American THAAD ( Terminal High Altitude Area Defense).

Finally, in paragraph 5.4 of the document, it gives the status of the development of the HQ-19 motor - a solid propellant engine demonstration with a specific impulse of 260s, mass ratio of 0.85 and able to provide the necessary power for maneuverability 60g to track down the head of ballistic missile, a "completed the design phase, fabrication and testing", "testing validated the carbon fiber shell and propellant N-15B."

The HQ-19 missile is a project launched in the late 1990s. In 1995 the Chinese started serious studies of a kinetic kill vehicle KKV under Program 863. In 1986, to meet the global challenges of new technology revolution and competition, four Chinese scientists, WANG Daheng, WANG Ganchang, YANG Jiachi, and CHEN Fangyun, jointly proposed to accelerate China’s high-tech development. With strategic vision and resolution, the late Chinese leader Mr. DENG Xiaoping personally approved the National High-tech R&D Program, namely the 863 Program. Implemented during three successive Five-year Plans, the program has boosted China’s overall high-tech development, R&D capacity, socio-economic development, and national security. In April 2001, the Chinese State Council approved continued implementation of the program in the 10th Five-year Plan. As one of the national S&T program trilogy in the 10th Five-year Plan, 863 Program continues to play its important role.

In 1999, the first Chinese KKV made the suspension tests successfully flight, China became the second country in the world to have mastered the technology. The first test of V & V was held in 2003 with success. It was in final certification. HQ-19 has a KKV of about 35kg, the system performance would be similar to the US THAAD. Another R & D document mentions a technology demonstration at the HQ-19 engines in 2000, led by the Academy 4 CCAC group. The demonstration also validated "hull carbon fiber" and "rocket N-15B".

HQ-19 Anti-Ballistic Missile Interceptor
 
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Clear photo of HQ-19 anti-missile intercept missile.

graphic-showing-china-major-institutes-for-tests-of-central-stage-anti-missile-technology.jpg

Graphic showing the locations of the major institutes regarded in foreign media’s speculation as centers of China’s test of central stage anti-missile technology.

graphic-showing-foreign-media-speculation-of-the-future-deployment-of-long-range-early-warning-radar.jpg

Graphic showing foreign media speculation of the future deployment of long-range early warning radars in Xinjiang, Guizhou and Shandong in China’s anti-missile interception system.


In its recent post titled “HQ-19 Anti-missile Intercept Missile”, US global security.org website reveals its speculation based on published information on details of China’s HQ-19 anti-missile intercept missile. It believes that HQ-19 is similar in functions to US THAAD anti-missile intercept missile and that HQ-19 played a major role in China’s two ground-based midcourse anti-missile tests in 2010 and 2013.

However, the speculation is proved wrong by a recent blurred photo of the HQ-19 missile test appeared at a Chinese website. The missile is more similar in functions to the lengthened-range THAAD or Standard Missile 3 that the US is developing. It is capable of intercepting a target inside or outside the atmosphere.

Exposure of HQ-19 attracts people’s interest in China’s large, complicated and ambitious plan to develop its anti-missile arsenal.

Foreign media believes that China’s development of the midcourse anti-missile technology aims mainly for national security instead of nuclear strategic balance. They believe that Chinese anti-ballistic missile system consists of 6 kinds of missiles: HQ-9B, HQ-19, HQ-26 (similar to ground-based Standard Missile 3), HQ-29 (similar to PAC-3), DN-1 and DN2 (similar to US GMD). There are three layers of defense. The first is midcourse interception mainly by DN series of missiles to intercept missiles outside the atmosphere. It is the key layer of China’s missile defense system. The second is a layer to intercept missile inside, outside or at the edge of the atmosphere. It mainly relied on HQ-19 and HQ-26 for missile interception. The third layer is the terminal stage interception layer that mainly uses HQ-9B and HQ-29 for interception at the terminal stage.

China succeeded in testing midcourse anti-missile intercept technology in its DN-1 missile on January 11, 2010. Later, it successfully tested the technology again on January 27, 2013. Analysts believe that China has obtained initial mastery of the technology.

DN-1 and later DN-2 are China’s most advanced midcourse intercept missiles similar to US GMD system. However, as they lack the support of effective early warning radar, they remain at testing stage.

Foreign media believes that China has obtained the technology in order to intercept the ICBMs from large nuclear power. That is not correct. It is impossible for China to intercept such a large number of first-strike ICBMs a large nuclear power has. China’s strategic nuclear deterrence relies on its second-strike strength. The anti-missile intercept missiles can only be used to intercept a few ICBMs fired at China by mistake.

The midcourse intercept technology is mainly used to intercept the small number of ballistic missiles from a small nuclear power such as India.

Source: Huangqiu
 
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